4월혁명 직후 정군(整軍)운동과 5.16 쿠데타

홍석률(Hong Seuk-ryule) 한국사연구회 2012 한국사연구 Vol.158 No.-

This article explores the relationship between the military purification movement which occurred right after the April Revolution in 1960 and the military coup in May 16, 1961. The leaders of 5.16 Coup were the officers which had led military purification movement. They argued that military purification movement was deterred by Chang Myon regime which was corrupt and incompetent. Thus, they inevitably overthrew Chang Myon regime by the coup. However, both of the recently declassified U.S. government documents and the newspaper articles published in South Korea at that time showed that the U.S. generals such as United Nation Commander Magruder strongly opposed the purging top South Korean generals who were responsible for corruption and election rigging during the Rhee Syngman regime. Actually, Chang Myon regime was sympathetic to the military purification movement and tried to change top generals. If Chang Myon government had succeeded in changing top military officers, his government has seized military apparatus far more strongly and has responded to the coup plot more effectively. However, intervention of the U.S. generals hindered Chang Myon regime from pursuing the reform of military personnel. Some officers who took part in military purification movement planed military coup for their own political purpose, not for morals of military reform. The coup leaders indorsed General Chang Do-young, Army Chief of Staff, as the nominal head of the coup because they wanted to show clearly that their coup was supported by all the troops in South Korea and the coup was anti-communism and pro-America. Then, Chang Do-young had been one of the generals who were on the list for purging in the course of military purification movement because he was outstanding pro-Rhee regime officer in 1950s. The coup leaders betrayed themselves the justification of military purification movement for the success of the coup.

5·16군사정변 당시 북한의 인식 및 중국과의 의사소통 과정 연구 -중국 외교부 기밀 해제 문서를 중심으로

학군환 동국대학교 북한학연구소 2011 북한학연구 Vol.7 No.2

On May 16, 1961, Park Chung-hee led a military coup in South Korea which was so sudden and unexpected that it was difficult for anyone at the time to grasp the situation. China and North Korea proceeded swiftly to exchange information and ideas on the nature of the “sudden change in situation” in South Korea as well as its causes and background. Although China and North Korea viewed the event as “a thoroughly prepared reactionary fascist coup”, their analyses on the specific causes and background of the military coup differed. Using recently declassified documents of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, this article covers the Chinese and North Korean analytical processes and the exchange of information and ideas regarding the nature and reasons for the military coup. Although North Korea initially saw the military coup as a plot by the United States based on Park Chung-hee’s “Revolution Pledge,” they later believed a revolution by progressive forces in South Korea was highly possible based on intelligence that revealed that Park Chung-hee’s was a former member of South Korea’s Labor Party as well as United States opposition to the coup d’état. As a result, they prepared an announcement to support it. However as the situation progressed, North Korea came to the conclusion that the coup could not have succeeded without prior backing from the United States which meant, in the North Korean view,that the US preemptively installed a new ruling force before the progressive forces within South Korea could overturn Chang Myŏn’s corrupt government. In other words, they saw the coup as a plot by the United States. Throughout this process, China respected the position of the North Korean authorities from beginning to end while keeping their own opinions to themselves and patiently observing the situation. Popular sentiment was sharply in support of North Korea. From China’s point of view, the 5·16military coup was ultimately led by anti-communist military forces within South Korea with the United States deciding to support it after the fact. The difference in opinion between China and North Korea can be readily seen. This article divides and examines the internal reasons why North Korea repeatedly shifted its understanding and judgment at the time of the military coup as follows: 1) miscalculations due to lack of information, 2)psychological influence on the decision-making process due to overestimation of the progressive forces in South Korea since the 4·19Revolution, and 3) the decisive role of ideological principles when making final judgments. In addition, China was internally able to be more objective because it was able to distance itself geopolitically from the situation in South Korea more than the North. In addition, China had more diverse routes and time to obtain and analyze information. While this may be the case, it can be argued that the reason why China, in terms of its foreign policy position, was able to express solidarity with North Korea’s position was because of the blood alliance they formed during the Korean War and the primacy of ideology within a Cold War world. 1961년 5월 16일 한국에서 발생한 박정희 군사정변은 사태의 돌발성으로 인하여 당시로서는 그 누구도 사건의 진상을 파악하기가 힘들었다. 남한에서 발생한 “군사정변”의 성격과 발생한 원인 및 배경을 두고 중국과 북한에서는 신속한정보·의사 교환을 진행하였다. 중국이나 북한은 모두 “주도면밀한 준비과정을거친 반동적인 파쇼 군사정변”이라는 견해에는 일치했으나 보다 구체적인 정변발생 원인과 배경에 대한 분석에 있어서는 견해를 달리했다. 본고에서는 중국 외교부에서 최근 해제한 기밀문서를 중심으로 중국과 북한이 정변 성격과 이유에대한 분석과정과 정보·의사 교환과정을 정리하여 보았다. 북한의 경우, 최초에는 「혁명 공약」의 내용을 근거로 정변을 미국의 음모라고 보았으나, 뒤이어 박정희의 남노당 내력 등 신상 정보와 미국의 정변 반대 입장을 근거로 진보세력에의한 혁명일 가능성이 크다고 보고 지지성명 발표를 준비한다. 그러나 사태가 진전됨에 따라 작전 지휘권이 있는 미국의 동의 없이 정변은 불가능하였다고 보며최종적으로 남한 내 진보 세력이 부패한 장면 정권을 무너뜨리기 전에 미국이 선조치를 통하여 새로운 지배세력을 교체하였다며 미국의 책동으로 그 성격을 규명하기에 이른다. 이 과정에 중국은 시종일관 북한 당국의 입장을 존중했으며,자국의 견해를 보류한 채 인내력 있게 사태를 지켜보았고 여론으로 북한을 대폭지지해 나선다. 중국의 경우, 최종적으로 5·16군사정변은 한국 내 반공 군사세력이 주도하였으며, 정변 발생 후 미국의 지지가 있었을 거라고 판단하고 있었다. 이는 미국의 책동이라는 북한 당국의 견해와는 어느 정도 차이를 보이고 있다. 본고에서는 북한이 사건 당시에 인식과 판단에 있어 번복을 거듭하였던 내적원인을 정보의 부족으로 인한 판단 오류와 4·19혁명 이래 남한의 진보세력에대한 기대가 판단과정에 끼친 심리적 영향, 이데올로기 원칙성이 최종 판단에 미친 결정적인 역할 등으로 나누어 살펴보았다. 또한 중국의 경우에는, 그 이해관계에 있어서 북한보다 남한의 사태에 거리감을 유지할 수 있었던 점, 보다 다양한 루트를 통해 시간적 여유를 가지고 정보를 입수 분석할 수 있었던 점에서 보다 객관적인 판단을 할 수 있었던 내적 원인을 밝혀 보았다. 그러면서도 중국이대외 선전에 있어서 북한과 일치한 입장을 표명할 수 있었던 원인은 한국전쟁을통한 북한과의 혈맹 관계와 냉전 체제 내에서의 이데올로기 원칙성을 우선적으로 내세웠던 데에서 찾아보고자 하였다.

군부 권위주의로 회귀하는 미얀마 - 민간-군부관계로 본 쿠데타의 역동성 -

張准榮(Jang, Jun Young) 역사교육연구회 2022 역사교육 Vol.161 No.-

The purpose of this article is to analyze the background of the Myanmar’s military(Tatmadaw) coup on February 1, 2021, based on the military’s internal and external environment, and to explore dynamics of competition and conflict between the military and the people. In detail, it is intended to focus on the fundamental reasons why the old institution such as the military seizes political power and the people’s resistance to the coup under the situation which has undergone a short process of democratization, In doing so, it focus on verifying the factors that inevitably led to the coup in perspective of the the civilian-military relationship replacing with the structure and the agency. If we understand the civilian-military relationship that had been solidified internally, we could trace the reason of the military coup, interpretation of a subsequent situations that have taken place after the coup, and prospect of the political development. The military has enjoyed “reserved domains” in the areas of administration and legislature based on the Constitution, but the level of military control by the civilian government was relatively higher than that of the administration. Being conflicts and cracks among the nationals, such as Sangha, ethnic Burman and the ethnic minorities, the older and the MZ generations, and the existence of dalang which is a supporting group to the military, it was not able to make collective resistance against the military. Furthermore, it is sure that the military, which lost its self-control, staged acoup to defend collective interests under the weak situation of vertical and horizontal control by the civilian government. In conclusion, achieving democratization at the institutional level seems to be a long way off, unless the military voluntarily returns to the barracks. Although the military returns to the barracks or democratic bloc restores democratization, if the principle of civilian supremacy over the military will not be realized, then the future of democracy will not be bright. Therefore, strategy for civilian supremacy over the military should be promoted as a mid and long term task, and civil society should choose and promote national reconciliation and integration as its top priority before solidifying democracy’s confidence through strengthening its internal capabilities.

일반논문 : 5,16군사정변 당시 북한의 인식 및 중국과의 의사소통 과정 연구 -중국 외교부 기밀 해제 문서를 중심으로

학군환 ( Qun Huan Hao ) 동국대학교 북한학연구소(구 동국대학교 안보연구소) 2011 북한학연구 Vol.7 No.2

1961년 5월 16일 한국에서 발생한 박정희 군사정변은 사태의 돌발성으로 인하여 당시로서는 그 누구도 사건의 진상을 파악하기가 힘들었다. 남한에서 발생한 "군사정변"의 성격과 발생한 원인 및 배경을 두고 중국과 북한에서는 신속한 정보·의사 교환을 진행하였다. 중국이나 북한은 모두 "주도면밀한 준비과정을 거친 반동적인 파쇼 군사정변"이라는 견해에는 일치했으나 보다 구체적인 정변발생 원인과 배경에 대한 분석에 있어서는 견해를 달리했다. 본고에서는 중국 외교부에서 최근 해제한 기밀문서를 중심으로 중국과 북한이 정변 성격과 이유에 대한 분석과정과 정보·의사 교환과정을 정리하여 보았다. 북한의 경우, 최초에는 「혁명 공약」의 내용을 근거로 정변을 미국의 음모라고 보았으나, 뒤이어 박정희의 남노당 내력 등 신상 정보와 미국의 정변 반대 입장을 근거로 진보세력에 의한 혁명일 가능성이 크다고 보고 지지성명 발표를 준비한다. 그러나 사태가 진전됨에 따라 작전 지휘권이 있는 미국의 동의 없이 정변은 불가능하였다고 보며 최종적으로 남한 내 진보 세력이 부패한 장면 정권을 무너뜨리기 전에 미국이 선 조치를 통하여 새로운 지배세력을 교체하였다며 미국의 책동으로 그 성격을 규명하기에 이른다. 이 과정에 중국은 시종일관 북한 당국의 입장을 존중했으며, 자국의 견해를 보류한 채 인내력 있게 사태를 지켜보았고 여론으로 북한을 대폭 지지해 나선다. 중국의 경우, 최종적으로 5·16군사정변은 한국 내 반공 군사세력이 주도하였으며, 정변 발생 후 미국의 지지가 있었을 거라고 판단하고 있었다. 이는 미국의 책동이라는 북한 당국의 견해와는 어느 정도 차이를 보이고 있다. 본고에서는 북한이 사건 당시에 인식과 판단에 있어 번복을 거듭하였던 내적 원인을 정보의 부족으로 인한 판단 오류와 4·19혁명 이래 남한의 진보세력에 대한 기대가 판단과정에 끼친 심리적 영향, 이데올로기 원칙성이 최종 판단에 미친 결정적인 역할 등으로 나누어 살펴보았다. 또한 중국의 경우에는, 그 이해관계에 있어서 북한보다 남한의 사태에 거리감을 유지할 수 있었던 점, 보다 다양한 루트를 통해 시간적 여유를 가지고 정보를 입수 분석할 수 있었던 점에서 보다 객관적인 판단을 할 수 있었던 내적 원인을 밝혀 보았다. 그러면서도 중국이 대외 선전에 있어서 북한과 일치한 입장을 표명할 수 있었던 원인은 한국전쟁을 통한 북한과의 혈맹 관계와 냉전 체제 내에서의 이데올로기 원칙성을 우선적으로 내세웠던 데에서 찾아보고자 하였다. On May 16, 1961, Park Chung-hee led a military coup in South Korea which was so sudden and unexpected that it was difficult for anyone at the time to grasp the situation. China and North Korea proceeded swiftly to exchange information and ideas on the nature of the "sudden change in situation" in South Korea as well as its causes and background. Although China and North Korea viewed the event as "a thoroughly prepared reactionary fascist coup", their analyses on the specific causes and background of the military coup differed. Using recently declassified documents of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, this article covers the Chinese and North Korean analytical processes and the exchange of information and ideas regarding the nature and reasons for the military coup. Although North Korea initially saw the military coup as a plot by the United States based on Park Chung-hee`s "Revolution Pledge," they later believed a revolution by progressive forces in South Korea was highly possible based on intelligence that revealed that Park Chung-hee`s was a former member of South Korea`s Labor Party as well as United States opposition to the coup d`etat. As a result, they prepared an announcement to support it. However as the situation progressed, North Korea came to the conclusion that the coup could not have succeeded without prior backing from the United States which meant, in the North Korean view, that the US preemptively installed a new ruling force before the progressive forces within South Korea could overturn Chang Myon`s corrupt government. In other words, they saw the coup as a plot by the United States. Throughout this process, China respected the position of the North Korean authorities from beginning to end while keeping their own opinions to themselves and patiently observing the situation. Popular sentiment was sharply in support of North Korea. From China`s point of view, the 5·16military coup was ultimately led by anti-communist military forces within South Korea with the United States deciding to support it after the fact. The difference in opinion between China and North Korea can be readily seen. This article divides and examines the internal reasons why North Korea repeatedly shifted its understanding and judgment at the time of the military coup as follows: 1) miscalculations due to lack of information, 2) psychological influence on the decision-making process due to overestimation of the progressive forces in South Korea since the 4·19 Revolution, and 3) the decisive role of ideological principles when making final judgments. In addition, China was internally able to be more objective because it was able to distance itself geopolitically from the situation in South Korea more than the North. In addition, China had more diverse routes and time to obtain and analyze information. While this may be the case, it can be argued that the reason why China, in terms of its foreign policy position, was able to express solidarity with North Korea`s position was because of the blood alliance they formed during the Korean War and the primacy of ideology within a Cold War world.

Military Organizational Cohesion and the 2006 Military Coup in Thailand

김인수,곽형신 육군사관학교 화랑대연구소 2010 한국군사학논집 Vol.66 No.1

The goal of this study is to demonstrate that strong intra-military cohesion has significantly enhanced the political strength of the military by binding military officers to military leadership. The elimination of military strongmen after the short-lived democratic period (1973-1976) apparently eroded the Thai military’s organizational coherence. Therefore, this study demonstrates two points: (1) the extent to which the Thai military effectively governs and controls society depends not only on the level of the society’s socioeconomic development but also on the political strength of the military; and (2) the political strength of the military to intervene in domestic politics varies according to the military’s organizational coherence in Thailand.

미얀마 민간정부에서 쿠데타 가능성과 그 조건: 군 내부의 역동성을 중심으로

장준영 ( Jun Young Jang ) 한국외국어대학교 글로벌정치연구소 2016 글로벌정치연구 Vol.9 No.1

이 글의 목적은 미얀마 민간정부 하 군부가 쿠데타를 통해 정치에 개입할 가능성과 조건을 탐구하는 것이다. 미얀마는 1962년부터 2011년 유사민간정권이 출범하기 전까지 군부가 집권했는데, 각기 다른 두 번의 군부정권 동안 유사한 정치행태가 목격되었다. 최고 권력자는 정치권력을 독점하기 위해 잠재적 경쟁자를 제거하고, 공식 직위에 물러난 이후에도 막후권력을 통해 자신의 존재감을 과시했다. 2016년 민간정부가 출범하면서 군부의 정치참여는 축소되었으나 은퇴한 군 지도자가장악한 막후권력은 여전히 유효하다. 그러나 현재 막후권력은 과거와 달리 운명공동체로서 군부를 통제하는 것이 아니라 개인적 목적에 따라 작동되고 있다. 그러므로 민간정부에서 쿠데타가 발생할 가능성은 낮고, 쿠데타가 성공하더라도 군부정권의 생명은 길지 않을것이다. 그럼에도 여전히 군부가 정치에 개입할 수 있는 사회적 조건은 유효하다 This paper explores the possibilities and the preconditions of the military coup under the new civilian government in Myanmar. The military had ruled from 1962 to 2011 when the quasi civilian government was launched with centering on the retired military members, however the political behaviors in the different two military regimes are shown to be similar to each other. The military ruler purged his potential competitors to consolidate his political power, and even after the retirement from the official position, the power behind in curtain of the retired military supremo has still been operating. But the character of the power behind in curtain in the incumbent is different from the past in such a way that it is only operating for the personal purposes not to reinforce the military``s unity. The retired supremo would like to be guaranteed his safe final days, and exit strategy. Therefore, the possibilities of the military coup might be low and even if the coup is successful, the life of military regime is not too long. Nevertheless, the social conditions for the military coup are still valid.

고려후기 改班-文‧武班을 중심으로

이정훈 한국중세사학회 2016 한국중세사연구 Vol.0 No.45

This study focuses on the phenomenon of gaeban(changing officials, 改班) after the military coup, in which the civilian officials changed their class into the military, and the military officials into the civilian class, and reflects on its aspects, causes and operation. During the maintenance of the yangban(兩班) system, a phenomenon emerged among the military and civilian officials to convert their classes after the military coup. The reason for gaeban for the civilian officials was to keep their lives and status, and for the kings to protect their favorite civilian officials, as the military officials took power from the coup. However, gaeban was contrary to the consciousness of the people of Goryeo who revered the civilian officials. Therefore, if someone decided on gaeban, he was given a high office to reduce the sense of repulse to converting to the military class. Meanwhile, the military officials did not convert to the civilian class during the military regime. During the Yuan intervention period, gaeban was more active than during the military regime for the following reasons. First, gaeban was taken as a means to reinforce the numbers of military officials by converting the civilian officials to the military ones, after many military officials died from the war against the Mongol. Second, as the kings initiated politics by their close personal attendants, gaeban was exploited for its nature that enabled faster promotion than custom in order to prefer and nurture their personal attendants. Third, as the adoption of Neo-Confucianism established the mood for learning for intellectual righteousness, gaeban was attempted from the military class to the civilian class. As a result, mutual gaeban became active between both classes. However, whereas gaeban from the civilian to the military class required no condition whatsoever, gaeban from the military to the civilian class was possible only by passing state examination or some form of recognition of intellectual capacity. Also, while geaban from the civilian to the military class led to a higher office than before, gaeban from the military to the civilian class resulted in no difference in office rank before and after the change. Therefore, even during the Yuan intervention period, gaeban from the civilian to the military class was more frequent than geaban from the military to the civilian class. In the later period of Goryeo, holding a second office in the civilian and military classes was as active as gaeban. They were applied to different subjects:the high officials, who were able to promote their opinions on state affairs, were allowed to hold a second office in the civilian or military class, and the low officials, who could not offer their views on state affairs, were not allowed to do so. If a high civilian official seeks to be in charge of a military duty, or a high military official attempts to be in charge of a civilian duty, they were encouraged to gaeban. The reason for not allowing the officials below the seventh poom-rank to hold a second office in the civilian or military class was to keep in line with the purpose of the yangban system to focus on one’s own duties and class. In other words, gaeban was implemented for the purpose of applying the division of yangban and separation of the responsibilities minimally on the class in charge of administrative affairs.

아프리카 쿠데타 부활의 배경 및 전망

김동석(KIM Dong-suk) 한국외교협회 2024 계간 외교 Vol.- No.149

2020년대 들어 아프리카 지역에서 군부 쿠데타가 부활하고 있다. 2020년부터 2023년까지 말리, 부르키나파소, 차드, 수단, 니제르, 가봉 등에서 총 15건의 군부 쿠데타가 발생하면서 말리에서 수단으로 이어지는 ‘쿠데타 벨트’가 형성되었다. 국제사회는 역내 민주주의 위기를 우려하면서 쿠데타 발생국에 제재를 단행하였다. 이러한 국제사회의 반응에도 불구하고 쿠데타에 대한 국내 여론은 호의적이다. ▲ 민간 정부의 실정에 대한 국민들의 실망감 및 불만, ▲ 군부의 불만 증대 혹은 기득권 수호 시도, ▲ 쿠데타에 대한 지역 기구 제재의 지속성부재, ▲ 사헬 지역에서의 반프랑스 정서 팽배가 쿠데타에 촉매제로 작용하였다. 말리, 부르키나파소, 차드, 기니 등의 민정 이양 과정에서 군부와 민간 지도자들 간 갈등이 벌어질 소지가 있다. 쿠데타로 인한 혼란과 안보 공백은 지하디스트 폭력 사태의 악화를 초래할 것으로 보인다. 말리, 니제르, 가봉 등과 비슷한 정치⋅경제적 환경에 놓인 국가들이 쿠데타의 위험에 노출되어 있지만 쿠데타가 아프리카 전역을 뒤덮지는 않을 전망이다. 일련의 쿠데타로 사헬 지역에서 프랑스의 영향력이 줄어들 것으로 예상된다. 반대로 프랑스군 철수에 따른 공백메우기를 시도하는 러시아의 사헬 지역에서의 위상은 높아질 전망이다. Since the 2020s, military coup has resurged in Africa. From 2020 to 2023, fifteen coups erupted in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Sudan, Niger, Gabon, among others, which formed ‘coup belt’ranging from Mali to Sudan. The international community imposed sanctions on coup states, worrying about the danger of democracy in the region. However, public opinion in these countries is quite positive about the coups. Disillusion and discontent with bad performance of the elected government, military’s growing discontent and attempt to preserve their interests, the absence of consistency in regional organizations’sanctions, and rising anti-French sentiment in the Sahel catalyzed the resurgence of coups in Africa. In Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Guinea, in the process of handing over power to civilians, it is likely that military and civilian leaders will collide with each other. Security vacuum and chaos resulting from coups will exacerbate jihadist violence in the Sahel region. Countries whose political and economic environments are similar to Mali, Niger, and Gabon are exposed to the danger of military coup. But coup will be unlikely to sweep the entire African continent. It is predicted that a series of coups will diminish the influence of France, while Russia that is filling the void caused by the French troop withdrawal will gain more influence in the Sahel region.

성공한 쿠데타, 위로부터의 혁명, 그리고 5ㆍ16

김석근(Kim, Seog Gun) 한국동양정치사상사학회 2012 한국동양정치사상사연구 Vol.11 No.1

이 글에서는 5ㆍ16이란 정치적 사건의 자리매김과 관련해서 ‘성공한 쿠데타’와 ‘위로부터의 혁명’이라는 서로 다른 두 개의 관점에 대해서 검토해보자 했다. 이 문제는 사태를 바라보는 시각에 따라 결정될 수 밖에 없겠지만, 여기서는 5ㆍ16 이후 그들이 내세웠던 ‘조국근대화’ 이념이 어떤 정치적 성격과 함의를 지니고 있었는지, 그리고 또 지닐 수 없었는지에 대해서 살펴보고자 했다. 아울러 그 같은 사안에 대해서 박정희 자신이 어떻게 생각하고 있었는지, 그리고 어떤 말로써 자신의 행위를 ‘변호’(내지 ‘정당화’)하고 있었는가 하는 점에 대해서도 유념해서 보고자 했다. 일단은 형식적인 측면에서 보자면 5ㆍ16은 역시 ‘군사 쿠데타’라고 해야 할 듯하다. 하지만 결과적으로 그 것은 성공한 쿠테타였다고 해야 할 것이다. 하지만 평가는 다각적으로 이루어졌다. 훗날 박정희의 강력한 정치적 라이벌이자 비판자가 되는 장준하(張俊河, 1918-75)가 5ㆍ16정변에 대해서 ‘5ㆍ16군사혁명’ 내지 ‘5ㆍ16혁명’으로 자리매김했었다는 사실도 흥미롭다. 한편 일부 정치학자들은, 하야시 타케히코(林建彦)나 김일영 등은 엘렌 케이 트림버거(Ellen Kay Trimberger)의 ‘위로부터의 혁명’ 개념을 적극적으로 원용하면서 5ㆍ16을 위로부터의 혁명이라 규정하기도 했다. 그런 주장은 ‘쿠데타’였지만 근대화 과정을 이끔으로써 내용 적으로는 ‘혁명’이 될 수 없다는 식의 함의를 던지고 있다. 5ㆍ16 주체, 특히 박정희의 경우 세계 각 지역의 혁명과 쿠데타 사례에 대해서 자세히 조사했으며, 중남미 지역의 단순한 쿠데타 사례에 대해서는 경계하기도 했다. 특히 중국의 손일선(손문)혁명, 일본의 메이지유신, 터키의 케말 파샤 혁명, 이집트의 나세르 혁명과 같은 사례에 주목했다. 그들을 가리켜 민족의 재기와 발전을 위한 거룩한 거사라 했다. 성공한 쿠테타와 위로부터의 혁명 사이에 존재하는 간격을 메우기 위해서, 그는 ‘조국근대화’라는 이념을 적극적으로 내세우고, 그것을 이루기 위해서 나름대로 노력했다고 할 수 있겠다. ‘동원된 근대화’ ‘개발동원 체제’ ‘개발독재’ 식의 비판 역시 경제개발과 근대화, 산업화가 어느 정도 이루어졌다는 것을 시사해주는 것으로 여겨진다. This paper focuses on the two different perspectives of ‘Successful Coup d’Etat’ and ‘Revolution From Above’, in relation with the evaluation of 5ㆍ16 as a radical political event. Ultimately, the evaluation must and can be changed according to the evaluator’s value system, but this paper is going to review the idea of ‘Fatherland Modernization’ and its implication, and especially the leader, Park Chung Hee(朴正熙, 1917-79)’s thoughts on ‘Fatherland Modernization’ and justification of their coup behaviors. As far as it is concerned with formal aspect, it seems that 5ㆍ16 had to be a military coup. And eventually it was a Successful Coup d’Etat. But various evaluations have been made. It is very interesting that Jang Joon Ha(張俊河, 1918-75), who is later not only a political rival but also a synical critic, announced 5ㆍ16 as ‘5ㆍ16 military revolution’ or ‘5ㆍ16 revolution’. Some political scientists, such as Hayashi Takehiko(林建彦) and Kim Il Young, using Ellen Kay Trimberger’s concept of ‘Revolution From Above’, positively evaluated 5ㆍ16 as a Revolution From Above. The groups of 5ㆍ16, specially Park Jeong Hee, investigated the cases of revoltions and coup d’etats all oer the World, and had some vigiland at the simple cases of coup d’etats of Central and Southern America. They carefully watched at China’s Revolution, Japan’s Meiji Restoration, Kemal Pasha’s revolution of Turkey, and Nasser’s Revolution of Egypt. They called them a sacred uprising for the rise and development of the Nation, They posotively announced the idea of ‘Fatherland Modernization’ and tried to achieve it. Critics on Park’s regime, such as ‘mobilized modernization’, "the mobilization system for modernization’, ‘dictatorship for development’, paradoxically indicate some degree of economic development and industrialization at that time.

남북 통일과정에서의 ‘군대의 정치적 중립성’에 대한 고찰

강민식 통일과북한법학회 2023 북한법연구 Vol.29 No.-

It is difficult to predict the process of inter-Korean unification. However, we cannot abandon standards as principles of popular sovereignty, liberal democracy, respect for basic human rights, rule of law, and pacifism in our Constitution. In order to maintain these standards, it is necessary to think about controlling the armed forces of the two Koreas. Regarding the control of the armed forces of the two Koreas, it is necessary to review the legal system for military integration, but the scope is very wide. In this study, I look at the ‘political neutrality’ of the military, which is a prerequisite for unification and military integration. Because the military follows orders and obedience, it can move arbitrarily by specific people or political forces in some cases. Therefore, in the unification process, it is necessary to standardize the military's political neutrality in the unification agreement and the unification constitution, and to define the act of undermining political neutrality as unconstitutional and illegal. On the other hand, the military's political neutrality, which must be considered in the unification process, is largely divided into two categories. The first is neutrality from political intervention in the election process, and the second is neutrality from military intervention (coup). This concept must be carefully reviewed and implemented in order to ensure that the basic principles and principles of our Constitution are observed in the process of unification. In particular, when examining North Korea's electoral system and military system, the Korean People's Army, led by the chairman of the State Council, is highly likely to undermine the constitutional value of a unified nation. Therefore, measures to prevent this in advance must be stipulated in the Unification Agreement and the Unification Constitution by referring to the South Korean Constitution and subordinate laws. 남북 통일과정을 예측하기는 어렵다. 그러나 우리 헌법상의 국민주권주의, 자유민주주의, 기본적 인권의 존중, 법치주의, 평화주의라는 기본원리와 원칙은 포기할 수 없다. 이 기준을 유지하기 위해서는 남북한의 군대를 통제하기 위한 고민이 필요하다. 남북한 군대의 통제는 군사통합을 위한 법제도를 함께 검토하는 것이 필요하지만 그 범위는 매우 넓다. 본 연구에서는 통일과 군사통합의 전제조건인 군대의 ‘정치적 중립성’을우선 살펴본다. 군대는 명령과 복종에 따르기 때문에, 경우에 따라서는 특정한 사람또는 정치세력에 의하여 자의적으로 움직일 수 있다. 그러므로 통일과정에서는 통일합의서와 통일헌법 상에 군대의 정치적 중립을 규범화하여 정치적 중립성을 훼손하는행위를 반헌법적이자 불법적인 것으로 규정할 필요가 있다. 한편, 통일과정에서 고려해야 하는 군대의 정치적 중립성의 개념은 크게 두 가지로구분된다. 첫 번째는 선거과정에 대한 정치적 개입으로부터의 중립성, 두 번째는 군사적 개입(쿠데타)로부터의 중립성이다. 이 개념은 통일과정에서 우리 헌법의 기본원리와 원칙이 지켜지기 위해서 반드시 관철시켜야 한다. 특히, 북한의 선거제도와 군사제도를 살펴보았을 때, 북한의 군대는 특정한 일인(一人) 또는 정치세력을 중심으로 자의적으로 행동하여 통일국가의 헌법적 가치를 훼손할 가능성이 높다. 그러므로 이를 미리 방지하기 위한 정치적 중립성의 개념을 남한헌법과 하위 법령을 참조하여 통일합의서와 통일헌법에 규정하여야 한다.