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이영호 한국전략문제연구소 1997 전략연구 Vol.4 No.3
The fall of communism and collapse of the cold war regime in the international arena, it seems, cannot keep North Korea from concentrating all her efforts building the legitimacy of Kim Jung-il' s political succession by maintaining and strengthening the monolithic ideological thought of Kim Il-sung. Despite of the strained national economy having created more difficulties for regime's preservation, North Korea has been domestically indulged herself into building the cult of personality for Kim Jung-il since the death of Kim Il-sung last year: needs for the demonstration of his abilities as a "general" and "Highest Commander-In-Chief of the North Korean Peoples Armed Forces(NKPA) seems to have made the Border Guards be under the direct control of defense ministry. NKP A now is consisted of more than one million personnel in active service: armed with more than 3,800 tanks, 10,000 artillery pieces, 850 combat aircrafts and 460 various naval combatants: which has been continuously reinforced by the deployment of newly built tanks, amphibious combat vehicles, APCs, hovercrafts, long range artillery pieces at the front, the introduction of newly tested ballastic missiles and forward redeployment of combat aircrafts; all of which will eventually enhance the NKPA's capabilities for surprise attack. Since an assessment of balance between two rivals' military capabilities is perhaps more important in judging the probability of a war than any other factor because national capabilities (including military capabilities) are relatively more static or constant than national intension (including political intension) when you presume war is functional outcome of both variables, national capabilities and intension, this paper will mainly focus on quantified comparison of forces' capabilities to provide general outline on the degree and level of North Korean military threat to South. And if the dictum, "war is an extension or a tool of politics", is an acceptable hypothesis, some what reversed hypothesis "military capabilities will set the boundary of political intension" is perhaps acceptable one since national capabilities will often decisively work in setting the political goals and means. If so, then, the correct analysis and assessment of military balance between two Koreas can provide significant symptoms for the boundaries of North Korea's political intension in near future. It is goes without saying that even the fundamental problems inherited in he quantified analysis of military capabilities using such method as ADE(Armor Division Equivalent) Scoring, which this paper applies, is remained unsolvable.: however. this is the only available method that, in a current warfare, quality factor of weapons system and intangible factors of military capabilities such as C3I, which appear to be very important at the contemporary war such as Gulf War, can be counted. In case of ground forces' capabilities, NKPA is armed partly with some obsolete weapons system of PRC and Soviet Union and in large part with self produced weapons system of relatively high quality. The total ADE scores of NKPA's ground forces is about 1.4~1.8 times of those of ground forces of Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKA). More significant is that the force structure of NKPA's ground forces is formed to exercise its combat fighting capability more effectively than ROKA's ground forces: Of its total ADE scores, 65.7% are composed with major attack weapons system which is consisted of fire powers and maneuver capabilities at the ratio of two to one. In comparisons with this, of total ADE scores of the ROKA's ground forces, 60% are composed with major attack weapons system and 40% with foot soldiers, 5% higher than that of NKPA's. In addition, NKPA already reorganized its Spear Head Units for infiltration and break-through operations into formidable numbers of brigades. after having had field maneuver tests of brigade's size units that is optimally operational under condition of the Korean terrains and its main forces with large scale mechanized units which can. perhaps. be used at the maneuver operations at the step of both exploit and pursuit after the break-through. Accounting all of these. it can be said that NKP A may be capable of exercising its own ''britz- krieg". perhaps North Korean's prototype of OMG against South Korea. In case of naval capabilities. the ratio of ship fire power index between North and South is about 100 to 90 which can be said almost even. The capabilities of component operations. however. differ each other. The ship fire power index of NKPN in missile boat and submarine out-numbers ROKN as much as 4 times. while in case of destroyer and patrol craft, ROKN out-numbers the NKPN from 2.5 to 5 times. NKPN is so structured withlarge numbers of small combatants as to exercise ''hit and run" operations around coastal area; and in the fields of short distance surprise landing, infiltration support. sea lane harassment, mine laying and coastal defense NKPN can probably perform the operations more effectively than ROKN; except for the submarine attack. as the high-sea operation capabilities are very limited. KKPN' s main fleet perhaps cannot but avoid direct confrontation against South Korean Fleet at high sea. As for ROKN have more capabilities of high sea operations than NKPN, it is expected for ROKN to conduct relatively independent naval operation with more effectiveness than KKPN in the areas of anti-submarine warfare. some what large scale landing support. and cutting the line of communications on the sea. As for the case of air forces capabilities. even if fire power index of Air force of North Korean Peoples Armed Forces(NKPAF) appears to be about 10% to 20% higher than that of Air Force of ROK Armed Forces (ROKAF). disparity of capabilities between two Korea's air forces may be neglect able when technologically advanced electronic equipments and higher skill of pilots of ROKAF were considered. And in case of the force structure, NKPAF is consisted by 44% of its total fire power index with obsolete type of aircrafts, MIG-17/19 in contrast to ROKAF of which total fire power index only 31% is consisted by the relatively obsolete type of aircraft F-5C/D. This well indicates ROKAF is more modernized than its rival. Considering the disadvantages posed by the inferior qualities of weapons system and pilots' skills of NKPAF as well as the advantages of absolute superiority in the quantities of aircrafts, NKPAF may believe that in case of war, to maximize the effects of initial surprise attack is the only way to preserve the parity, if not superiority, of air power. And to achieve this goal. NKPAF can, most likely, utilize those obsolete aircrafts as the suicidal commando forces infiltrating deep into South to strike strategic targets such as communication posts, air fields or aircrafts at lots and perform "dog-fighting" with large scales of wings to disrupt the effectiveness of electronics. Then, as for the ROKAF, early warning capabilities and counter measures to the initial surprise attack as well as break-down of "dog-fighting" will be the key for achievement of air superiority at the initial stage of war. Of other North Korean military capabilities, not-neglectable are both the chemical warfare and the infiltration capabilities. Since NKPA has formidable amounts(1.000 tons to 3,000tons) of all kinds chemical agent in stock. but also large numbers of delivery means such as IL-28 bombers, 150mm/170mm artillery pieces, FROG-5/7 and SCUD missiles, it is highly possible that NKPA in case of war will launch a chemical warfare in order to make a break-through at front or to achieve a strategic goal by direct attack on Seoul. capital city with high density of population. In contrast to North Korean capabilities of chemical warfare, South Korea's protective capabilities remains at the very rudimentary level. The individual protective equipment at combat field under CBR warfare is proved with very limited sustainability of combat fighting and group protection and regional counteraction system for the high densely populated area is turned out to be in need of urgent improvement. NKPA is accounted of its capabilities to infiltrate all at once about 3 brigades by aireal and naval means and 6 to 7 brigades through ground routes. These units, after having infiltrated just into ROKA's front or/and deep into South, can work decisively, it is believed, for securing the high speedy maneuver of the main attack forces, NKPA's ground forces by opening up the routes for their maneuver and by checking free advance of ROKA's combat reserves through the assault or occupation of strategic position of operation. ROKA's counter-infiltration operations which in general is due to rely on much to the reserve forces's operations, seems mainly to focus on counter measures against the operation of the infiltrated troops within South Korean regions instead on early detection and strike on the way of initial infiltration movement. Of various fields of military capabilities, advantageous area for South Korea includes such intangible factors as logistics, C3I. training and exercises, morale which are often regarded as the multiplier for the capabilities. It can be said that NKPA is outstripped to ROKA in the fields of logistics, communications. and combat intelligence, even to it in the fields of discipline and commanding ability, but still inanimate relatively to ROKA in the fields of morale and training and exercises. It can be presumed that in field of the intangible capabilities as the multiplier, ROKA will be weighted 20% to 30% more than its rival. The net assessment, relied on static analysis of the military balance between South and North Korea shows that ROKA's capabilities is about 73% to 75% of NKPA's and will reach to 85% to 87% of it when we weight ROKA 20% to 30% more with the multiplier of intangible factors. Even if war is an extension of politics and the causes of war vary in accordance with the political purposes, it also can be said that no rational politics of a nation can make a reckless war without close and enough accounts in advance on the winning. So, even though static analysis provides presumption of no expectation for winning to both South and North, still, additionally necessary is the dynamic analysis which enables the close examination on the level and contents of the threat and the war probabilities through a realistic analysis of war game models or war simulations under realistic combat condition and war situation presumed from both rivals' strategies, tactics, military postures, terrain and even climate conditions. Dynamic analysis of the South and North Korean military capabilities is believed to be conducted by the experts within the military services and the outcomes of it is presumed to be used for complement for OP 5027, the defense plan for ROK and eventually applied for force improvement plans. Since it needs more spaces for details of outcomes of any war game. this paper provides. instead of detailed dynamic analysis. only the fundamental frame-work of scenarios for North Korea's offense and its expected outcomes. The NKPA is known to deploy about % of its total ground forces southward Pyongyang-Wonsan line. This posture can be considered as flexible one for both offensive and defensive operation with the ratio of front to reserve forces at 2:1 rather than it is usually understood as one of offensive only. ADE scores of the front units of both side ground forces maintain almost parity in general. although slightly different in accordance with each approach: therefore. in the case of a usual attrition warfare. it might be difficult for anyone side. either South or North. to make any strategically significant break-through of the Front within a short time. There is not, however. little possibility for NKPA to make an unexpected break through of the Front. if not by an unexpected force concentration. by a successful surpTIse attack invaliding early warning system of ROKA (and its allied forces, U.S. Armed Forces), making a significant break-through with the help of the chemical offensive operations and/or large scale infiltration operations followed by the maneuver operations of large scale mechanized units consisting the maneuver group for the exploitation and pursuit before the intersections of the ROKA's reserve forces either directly to occupy the capital city, Seoul or to closely encircle it. Yet. it seems that this doesn't impair much the deterrent provided by the south Korean military capabilities when the available counter measures are considered. Although not with- standing to account other deterrent factors such as allied force capabilities, especially U.S. force's C31 and war-time reinforcements, it can be insisted that two Koreas maintain so highly dense military forces as to enable the mutual deterrence even if current military capabilities is in favor of the North at the Hone) to 0.75 ratio over the South. If both two Koreas continue to improve their military capabilities during next half decade in a manner similar to those they did past decade. south Korea may be hardly able to gain the parity of military capabilities with north before the beginning of the 21'st Century. This slow improve- ment of the disparity of military capabilities between two Koreas seems rather not to impair much the military stability on the Korean peninsular. than to increment the high density of forces confronting each other. Since the confrontation between two high strengths maintains to create a strained condition against each other, it is presumable that the pendulum of the relations between south and North Korea will keep swinging between the high military tension and the political rapprochement and the dangerousness of a war out-break will remain as in the past if not incremental. out of the mutual misunderstandings,miscalculations on the opponent's capabilities or unexpected incidents.
이영호,박래경,김석동,홍은희,황영현,정길웅 한국콩연구회 1989 韓國콩硏究會誌 Vol.6 No.1
人類가 栽培하는 作物中에서 콩 만큼 용도가 다양한 작물이 없고 또한 단위 면적당 가장 蛋白質 生産을 많이 하는 作物이라고 볼 때, 앞으로 安定的인 蛋白質 供拾을 爲해서는 콩이라는 作物을 다시 認識하면서 良質·高蛋白 콩 新品種 育成에 더 많은 努力이 경주되어야 할 때라고 보아 그 間 이 부분에 대한 연구내용을 중심으로 정리한 바, 다음과 같은 결론을 얻었다. 1. 遺傳資源의 지속적인 수집·분류·특성조사 및 보관을 해야 되고, 특허 高蛋白 新品種 育成에 야생콩의 이용에 관심을 두어야 한다. 2. 雜種集團에서 多收性에 촛점 맞추면서 단위면 적당 단백질 生産을 높이는 方向으로 하되, 高蛋白系統을 2次 選拔對象으로 삼는다. 3. 組合에 따라서는 蛋白質 含量도 높고 收良도 높은 경우가 있을 뿐 아니라, 蛋白質 含量의 遺傳力도 比較的 높고 遺傳獲得量도 크다. 4. 11S 蛋白質內에 含硫黃아미노산인 Methionine의 함량이 높아 Germplasm 中에서 11S 蛋白質이 높은 品種을 交配 母本으로 이용하고, 系統選拔時 11S/7S의 비율이 높은 것을 選拔할 수 있도록 한다.
첨단기술을 활용한 시설물 점검 및 진단 기술 검·인증을 위한 성능평가 방법론
이영호,배성재,정욱,조재용,홍성호,남우석,김영민,김정렬 한국재난정보학회 2020 한국재난정보학회 논문집 Vol.16 No.1
연구목적: 본 연구는 시설물 점검 및 진단분야에 도입될 첨단 기술 및 장비의 동향을 조사하고 미국, 일본, 한국의 표준화 체계를 분석하여 국내 실정에 맞는 시설물 점검 및 진단장비 성능평가 방법의 기본 방향을 제시하고 성능평가 기준이 우선 적으로 개발되어야 할 대상을 선정하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 연구방법: 시설물 점검 및 진단에 활용되는 첨단 장비 현황을 분석하기 위하여 시설물통합정보관리시스템(FMS)의 최근 5년간 보고서와 시설물 유지관리 업체와 안전진단전문기관에 소개된 첨단 기술을 조사하였다. 또 한, NTIS에 등록되어 있는 과제, 논문, 연구보고서, 특허 등을 검색하였다. 이후 미국, 일본, 한국의 표준화 체계를 조사하여 국내 실정에 맞는 형태의 시설물 점검 및 진단장비 성능평가 방법의 기본 방향을 제시하고 전문가 인터뷰와 설문조사를 수행하여 성능평가 기준이 우선적으 로 개발되어야 할 대상을 선정하였다. 연구결과: 자유로운 기술 개발이 이루어지고 지나친 제약이 되는 것을 방지하기 위하여 성능평가 프로 세스는 조사항목별로 장비나 기술의 종류에 상관없이 해당 장비나 기술이 목표하는 점검에 대하여 요구되는 목표 성능지표를 개발하여 해 당 성능지표를 만족할 경우 성능을 인증해 주는 방식으로 진행될 필요가 있다. 또한, 전문가 인터뷰와 설문조사 결과 내구성 평가의 콘크리 트 균열 조사항목과 안전성 평가의 콘크리트/강재 변위/변형/피로 조사항목에 활용되는 첨단장비나 기술들을 대상으로 성능평가 기준을 우 선적으로 개발해야 할 필요성을 확인하였다. 결론: 내구성 평가의 콘크리트 균열 조사항목이나 안전성 평가의 콘크리트/강재 변위/변형/피 로 조사항목을 대상으로 성능평가 가이드라인을 우선적으로 개발할 필요성이 있으며, 자유로운 기술 개발을 도모하고 기존에 개발된 첨단 장비에 새롭게 개발될 첨단장비의 성능을 공통된 기준으로 평가하기 위해서는 표준화된 시편이나 테스트 베드를 구축하여 기술 종류에 관 계없이 제시된 요구 성능을 충족하면 성능을 인정하는 방식으로 검증하는 체계를 구축해야 한다. Purpose: This paper proposes a performance evaluation method for state-of-the-art facility inspection/ diagnostic equipment through a trend survey of equipment and standardization systems of US, Japan, and Korea. This paper also suggests the priority of developing a performance evaluation method through expert interviews and surveys. Method: In this study, report for the last 5 years of FMS, state-of-the-art equipment of facility maintenance companies/safety diagnosis specialist agencies and papers/research reports/patents of NTIS were analyzed to identify recent trends of facility inspection/diagnostic equipment usages. standardization system of US, Japan, and Korea were analyzed to figure out a suitable form of a performance evaluation method for the domestic situation. And expert interview and survey were conducted to identify the priority of developing a performance evaluation method. Result: The performance evaluation method must be developed by the shape that only evaluates performance, regardless of types of equipment, on inspection item level for creative technology development. The priority of developing the performance evaluation method was identified as crack detection of concrete for durability evaluation and displacement/deformation/fatigue detection of concrete and steel for stability evaluation. Conclusion: The performance evaluation method will be developed firstly for the crack detection of concrete for durability evaluation and displacement/deformation/fatigue detection of concrete/steel for stability evaluation. In order to promote creative technology development, the performance evaluation method should be developed in a form that provides standardized specimens or testbeds and can be applied regardless of types of technologies.