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Directions of unified Korea's alliance with the United States
한희경 Korea University 2017 국내석사
This research objective is to find a direction of the unified Korea’s alliance policy with the U.S. in balance of interest by prospecting status and options and by analyzing the benefits and losses on the Korean unification and its alliance policy that could be brought to surrounding countries. In the 2009 Joint Vision for the ROK-US alliance and at the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the alliance in 2013, the both countries agreed that the alliance should lay the groundwork for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. It is very meaningful for the two countries to prepare the future of the strategic alliance between them in terms of considering the environment of the unified Korea in Northeast Asia and their interests. However, there are concerns about the continued alliance with the U.S. after the Korean unification despite the removal of a threat-North Korea, which has been the reason of the ROK-US alliance. There has been argument about alliance formations based on the balance of power, balance of threat so far. However, after the Korean unification, the strategic relations and choices between countries will be come from more consideration of balance of interest than recognition of threat. Regarding this, chapter two will see theory and literature review and prospecting internal status of the unified Korea and its impact on the international relations and analyzing benefits and losses of the great powers on the unified Korea will be followed in chapter three. Reflecting these, the chapter four will see three impossible options (neutralization, alliance with China instead of the U.S., and the unified Korea’s nuclear armament without alliance) and one possible option (continued Korea-US alliance based on interests) as the unified Korea’s alliance policy with considerations of balance of interest and various circumstances. Lastly, based on this analysis and prospect, this paper will see restructuring forces of the future Korea-US alliance as a proper policy.
Korea's nation branding strategy : challenges and opportunities
김영화 Graduate School of International Studies, Korea Un 2017 국내석사
An image of a nation is shaped by its culture, products, economic power, military power and so on, and nation branding can enhance the image of a nation in various fields. Also cultural exchange is effective for increasing product sales, promoting tourism and encouraging foreign investment. Such would eventually lead to an increase in the national income. Therefore, this study compares and contrasts the nation branding strategies of Germany, Japan and Thailand. It determines what is applicable to Korea’s nation branding strategy and what is not, and finds similar success factors applicable to Korea in order to suggest the direction of Korea's successful nation branding in the future. In order to make realistic outcomes and achievements in implementing nation branding strategy of Korea, brand management team and project management team must be structured. The industries pertaining to IT, contents, music, movie, drama, fashion, beauty and design should be systemized, customized and categorized into measurable units to be developed into products that everyone can easily access.
A Study on the Korea-China Trade Cooperation Focusing on the Korea-China FTA
GuodongLiu 고려대학교 국제대학원 2017 국내석사
In the 21st century, global trade has become a key factor in boosting a country’s economy. After several years’ negotiation, the Korea-China FTA was finally signed on December 20, 2015. This marks a further trade liberalization between Korea and China. Both trade in goods and trade in service between Korea and China grew dramatically in the past decade. Historically, Korea primarily exported intermediate goods such as electronic devices to China. China will do the assembly work. Since 1990s, Korea has gained a large trade surplus with China. The Korea-China FTA is estimated to boost South Korea-China trade to over US$300 billion a year. On the other hand, some scholars possess negative views. If Korea doesn’t take certain action to protect its agricultural industry, the agricultural industry would have to face a worse future. The trade intensity index and the revealed comparative advantage index suggest that Korea should not worry too much about China’s agricultural influence. The regional trade cooperation will provide more benefits than potential costs for Korean economy. If Korea effectively utilizes these benefits, it could also be a business hub that connects the United States and European countries to Asian economies.
Sino-North Korea relations : managing the alliance security dilemma
천웨이위 Korea University 2016 국내석사
As one of the most studied bilateral relations, the Sino-North Korea alliance is a focal point of the Northeast Asian region. Recently, many observers have characterized the relationship as “fragile”, “strained”, and “uneasy” after North Korea’s four nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013 and most recently in 2016. Through two different international theoretical lenses, the thesis argues that China has employed foreign policies that are realist and liberal institutionalist in nature in order to moderate North Korea’s intransigent behaviors. Walking on a tightrope in balancing the strategic benefit and liability that North Korea has created, China played a combined strategy of selectively providing economic assistance and withholding military cooperation (realist) to North Korea, as well as a strategy of downgrading China’s relations with North Korea and encouraging it to conduct economic reform that can potentially lead to its economic integration into the region (institutionalist). In order to compete with South Korea and the U.S. in a more positive-sum and benign manner, China attempted to shape North Korea to become an ideal ally: reasonably prosperous and modest in nature. However, even though its two-pronged policy received some positive results, China largely failed in its attempt to successfully manage its relationship with DPRK; therefore, it is expecting to resolve the North Korean issue over the long run.
Kang, Narae Korea University 2017 국내석사
Rules of origin (RoO) are necessary and important in free trade agreements (FTAs), given the fact that their function is to prevent trade deflection. However, with the proliferation of FTAs over the last two decades, diverse RoO among the different FTAs have resulted in increases in the cost of complying with the complex requirement of RoO. In other words, RoO can play a role as trade barriers. Thus, it is critical to find out how demanding RoO are, in order not to limit exporters’ opportunities for more markets. On this ground, this paper analyzed the restrictiveness of RoO, which can be hidden protection, with the example of the bilateral FTA between Korea and Australia, using a method proposed by Estevadeordal (2000). It revealed that the restrictiveness index of the Korea-Australia FTA is 4.26, lower than those of the Korea-China FTA (4.43), the Korea-EFTA FTA (4.53), the Korea-ASEAN FTA (4.59), and the Korea-Chile FTA (4.82). This low restrictiveness index of the Korea-Australia FTA can be explained mainly by the complementary industrial and trade structure and significant amount of trade volume between the two countries. Then, examining restrictiveness of RoO for nineteen sectors, it is found that the agricultural and animal sector is the most restrictive among all the sectors, whereas the chemical and electrical equipment sectors are less restrictive. In addition, the analysis has shown that the restrictiveness of RoO in major five sectors in the Korea-Australia FTA lies between those of the China-Australia FTA and the Japan-Australia FTA. Given the results of this research, even though RoO in the Korea-Australia FTA are less restrictive than those of Korea’s other FTAs, Korea should adopt a more strategic approach to trade policy, considering the restrictiveness of RoO and Korea’s position in the Australian market vis-à-vis China and Japan. Furthermore, the Korean government needs to review these factors for renegotiation of the Korea-Australia FTA in the future.
Korea-US Alliance and Emergence of China as a Regional Power : 韓美同盟과 地域强大國으로서의 中國의 登場
Singh, Lakhvinder 成均館大學校 大學院 2004 국내박사
The alliance between the US and Korea has come a long way since it was first officially signed some 50 years ago. Faced with multiple challenges from varying directions, it now stands at a crossroads. It must prove its utility in today’s changed circumstances if it is to continue. The end of the Cold War has drastically reduced superpower competition in the region. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the remaining regional powers, particularly China and Japan, appear apt to increasingly affect the balance of power of the region. The simplicity of the Cold War system, where lines of demarcations between enemies and friends were clearly drawn, has been replaced by a complex system where no country is exactly sure of who their ‘true friends’ are. In this changed situation, different nations are trying to protect and promote their national interests in different ways. Three nuclear powers, namely, the U.S., Russia and China, and one economic super-power, Japan, are all contending for influence in the region. There are also considerable worries regarding China's continued pursuit of military modernization, North Korea's drive to become an indigenous nuclear power, and possibly Japan's resort to autonomous militarization. Today the principle axis of rivalry has changed from that of the United States-Soviet Union to the United States-China. To present a formidable deterrent to any emerging challenge to its position of influence in the region, the U.S. maintains alliances with the ROK and Japan. However, China is not happy with the prevailing order in the region and is seeking a new, regional order. To this end, it is carefully nurturing its "strategic partnership" with Russia and consults regularly with its long-time ally, North Korea. It is also seeking out new friends like South Korea by developing sound economic relationships with that country. In this changing regional environment, the competition between the U.S. and China is sharpening, and bilateral relationships are forming the centerpieces of any strategy to maintain a regional and global balance of power. In this context a debate is raging throughout the region over whether China's economic rise is a factor of stability or instability in the region. Regardless of China’s best efforts to project its economic growth as an opportunity for all Asian countries to grow along with it and prosper, many countries in the region are not sure of the possible consequences of China’s rise as an economic and military power. Many of its neighbors sense that China's growing strength will cause traumatic shifts in the balance of power in the region. A stronger China will undercut the pre-eminence of Japan, challenge America's role as regional overseer, rewrite Southeast Asia's economic and political course, and influence the peace process on the Korean peninsula in such a way that will undermine the interest of the other regional powers. The growing economic and military power of China has led it to view the region from different perspectives. It now contests with the US on many issues concerning peace and stability in the region. It is asking for a new regional order based on five principles of peaceful co-existence and wants to see the end of American dominance in the region. The U.S. and China also have differing visions over the Korean peninsula. The U.S. argues that future security is best served by a continued U.S.-Korea security relationship even after reunification or reconciliation. On the contrary, China disagrees that maintaining a U.S. security alliance is the best way of achieving peace and stability in the region. China argues that it is premature to envision post-reunification alignments in the region at this stage. Both countries also disagree on many issues concerning the region such as arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. China does not want to enter into comprehensive arms talks with America, as it continues to expand its own nuclear and missile arsenals. However, it is dead-set against U.S. efforts to pursue theater missile defense (especially if it involves Taiwan) and national missile defense programs. Rather, it wants the US to cut short its missile defense plans immediately. It also does not view US arms sale in the region favorably and wants this aspect included as part of any agenda of arms controls discussions in the region. The North Korean nuclear program is another important issue dominating the region. It is the core issue of contention between the US and North Korea. North Korea is not willing to give up its nuclear program until and unless fully compensated both politically and economically. While negotiations and six-party talks are currently going on, North Korea progresses constantly on its nuclear program. It is believed today that North Korea is much closer to nuclear weapons than it was just five years ago. A recent report of the CIA suggested North Korea might possess up to eight nuclear weapons. South Korea has changed its hard-line stance on North Korea and has adopted a much softer approach towards its northern neighbor. It is in favor of solving the nuclear crisis through peaceful means and is against war with North Korea on the issue. This new approach of the South Korean government is creating a lot of friction between US-South Korea relations. America has gone from a softer to a more uncompromising position, and it wants North Korea to abandon its nuclear program unconditionally before any talks can be held on other issues facing the region. Moreover, the US is refusing to negotiate the problem with North Korea bilaterally and is insisting on a multilateral approach. However, it has increased the leverage of China in the six-party talks over North Korea’s peace process. China is the only country in the region which has close relations with North Korea, and it is in a better position to restrain North Korea than it was just ten years ago. Today, 70 to 82 percent of North Korea’s energy needs and 40- 50 percent of its supply needs are met by China. How China plays out its role in the peace process and in North Korean’s nuclear and missile questions and what kind of influence it manages to have over North Korea and South Korea in solving the crisis will play a major role in determining China ‘s new position in the emerging new regional order of North East Asia. North Korea‘s closer relationship with China has provided it with much-needed psychological and material support. The security guarantee that Beijing has assured is an incalculable asset for the embattled and isolated regime. To its credit, China has attempted to nudge Pyongyang toward reforms. However, the extent to which it has succeeded in opening North Korea’s closed economic system remains unclear. Lately, South Korea has shown considerable appreciation for closer North Korea-China relations, and it expects China to be a positive force in continuing to improve inter-Korean relations. At the same time, however, it should have no illusions about Chinese motives. China has no desire to see a unified Korea that would eliminate an ally and a buffer state on its border. Neither does China (like any other country in the region) want to see North Korea implode or self-destruct. The ROK government should well understand that what Beijing wants are good relations with South Korea to promote trade and investment and the transfer of technology and other forms of know-how. Yet recent Chinese attempts to play hard-ball with the ROK over various trade disputes were a pointed reminder of the limits of Beijing's good will. On the Korean peninsula the growing Korea-China business relations are challenging the traditional US-Korea alliance. China surpassed the United States as the primary destination for Korean investment in 2002. According to the Korea Investment Trade Association, Korea’s trade relations with China (Hong Kong included) reached US$74 billion as of 2003. Korea has relied on its alliance with the United States as a hedge against military threats from the North. At the same time it has cultivated different partners -- including some the United States identifies as present or potential security threats -- to hedge against economic dangers. Of course, using the U.S. alliance as a military shield and other economic relationships as a mercantile sword has not been easy, and it has required some delicate diplomacy from Korea to harmonize the seemingly contradictory aspects of its strategy. Specifically, Korea has had to reassure Washington that it is acting as an active military partner, while at the same time reassuring other capitals that it is not. While the rapid and steady development of Sino-Korea trade cannot be considered outside of the global economic environment, it can be safely argued that internal factors between the two nations have played a more important role. Even though the geographical proximity and similar cultural backgrounds have played crucial roles for Sino-Korea economic cooperation and development by cutting the costs of transportation and trade, these are basically secondary factors. More important are both nations’ new strategic thinking and the perceived relative importance of each other in meeting their respective national interests. Increasing economic ties with China has put South Korea at a crossroads. It is being called upon to make some crucial strategic choices. The most important question before South Korea is what kind of overall relationship it should have with China. It has to decide to what extent it can cultivate this new partnership with China without affecting the balance of power in the region and its half-century old alliance with the US. China is also trying to walk a fine line in balancing its bilateral relations with Seoul and Pyongyang. It fully understands that in order to keep its influence on the peninsula it must maintain good relations with both countries. In this context it has been trying to play the role of facilitator in north-south relations. China is also acting as a moderating influence over North Korea's behavior. It must be admitted that China's rising share in Korea's economic relations and the cultural similarities the two nations share will inevitably influence Korea‘s military alliance with the United States to some extent. Korean security specialists with a focus on China recognize that the rise of China is "the most serious security dilemma that the ROK will face in the mid- to long-term." When confronted with the contradictions inherent in balancing Korea's rapidly developing economic interests on the one hand with the requirements of the U.S.-ROK security alliance on the other, some Korean analysts argue that the Cold War is over and it is no longer necessary to view political, security, and economic relationships in zero-sum terms. Korean analysts examine the level of economic interdependence between the U.S. and China and conclude that the nature of the U.S. relationship with China is different from that with the former Soviet Union, arguing that the possibility of a "partnership-like relationship" between the U.S. and China should not be excluded in the future. Given the stakes involved, many Korean analysts appear to be in denial regarding a potential Sino-U.S. confrontation, and the ROK government "has taken no concrete steps in planning on these issues." Many South Koreans favor strategies that avoid escalation of U.S.-China disputes and emphasize cooperative relationships between Washington and Beijing. Given the intermittently confrontational track of the U.S.-PRC relationship, the issue of how to deal with China is gradually becoming a likely source of future differences in the U.S.-ROK relationship. It is important for diplomatic consultations and coordination on policies toward the PRC to be enhanced as a vehicle for minimizing alliance differences and building support within the alliance relationship. Despite Korea's growing trade with China, Seoul knows that the foundation for a prosperous trade relationship with China is its security relationship with the United States and under current circumstances will have to choose the security relationship when pressed to do so. The ROK's continued liberalization and a strong U.S. economic presence - as market for Korean goods, as investor in the Korean market, and as guarantor of regional economic and security stability - will increasingly become an essential underpinning to ensure that Korea's orientation and feelings of shared values remain strongly with the U.S., despite Korea's cultural affinity for China. One reason that the US-Korea alliance has survived for the last 50 years is that it serves the interests of both Korea and the US well. On the Korean side, it serves in countering the North Korean threat, containing North Korea's nuclear program, helping in the peace process and preventing the emergence of a regional superpower. It also helps the Koreans in attaining sufficient national self-defense capabilities, in preventing regional crises, in achieving weapons system compatibility with allies, in protection of sea lanes and overseas assets, and in maintaining a competitive defense industry. On the US side, the alliance helps in countering the North Korean threat, maintaining influence within the Asian Pacific region, preventing the emergence of a regional superpower and maintaining economic ties and creating and developing markets in the Asian Pacific region. It also serves the US in spreading democracy and free market economics, preventing regional crises and the emergence of possible enemy states, attaining an allied weapon sales market, protection of sea lanes and overseas assets, and defense budget savings through contributions of allied nations. The presence of American forces would also be a deterring factor to neighboring countries that might try to exploit the unstable situation for their own interests. In the absence of Korea‘s alliance with the U.S., keeping healthy relations with Japan would also pose a challenging problem. It could make the Koreans more nervous in dealing with Japan outside of the American alliance system. The Japanese would also be suspicious of a Korea detached from their American alliance partner, as a unified Korea in the absence of American forces could fall into Chinese orbit easily. This in turn could lead to tensions between Japan?Korea and Japan-China. Japan, which is expected to play the most prominent role in the rebuilding of a unified Korea, might not be coming forward with major economic assistance in a scenario whereby Korea were to tilt substantially towards China. The U.S. military presence in Korea would thus be a crucial factor in Japan’s post-unification assistance to Korea. The U.S. has no history of invading Korea for territorial gains and thus can be more trusted by the Korean people than any other country in the eastern region. This leaves America relatively free of Korean suspicion as a potential foe. And its role as balancer in the region would be least opposed not only by the Koreans themselves but also by the countries surrounding the Korean peninsula. Keeping in view the interests the US-Korea alliance serves for both countries, it will be big mistake for Korea to sacrifice the benefits of its special security relationship with America for that of a closer relationship with China. China is and will remain a strategic uncertainty for Korea, given its enormous population, proximity and history of seeking dominant influence over the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the nature of China's communist political system should also limit the trust and appreciation Korea's populace has for Chinese politics and ambition. In many regards China is no match for the U.S. It will have many economic, political, and social hurdles to cross before it can even legitimately challenge American leadership in the region. It has very few allies outside of close relations with a handful of outcast autocratic states such as Myanmar, North Korea and Pakistan, who carry little weight in the international arena. Its position is further weakened by its obsession with issues of “sovereignty,” which makes it difficult for Beijing to participate actively in diplomatic intercourse and multinational institutions that are based on give-and-take among nations. In several cases, such as the South China Sea Islands and Taiwan, it has shown a preference for the use of force or the threat thereof over diplomacy. The Chinese tendency of hurling verbal abuse at foreign governments with which it disagrees further limits the effectiveness of its diplomacy. Its handling of the US Navy EP-3 incident earlier in 2001 exemplified its tendency to overact and in the process, to strengthen anti-PRC sentiment overseas. From 1978 through to the mid-1990s, China had the fastest-growing economy in the world, and it has appeared poised to dominate Asia, and beyond, in the near future. But after focusing on facts rather than theory and looking at the conditions behind the spectacular numbers, many scholars have begun to doubt China‘s mid- to long-term economic future. As one scholar recently observed, "peer beneath the surface, and there is a weak China, one that is in long-term decline and even on the verge of collapse. The symptoms of decay are to be seen everywhere." By failing to complete its reformation, China has maintained an illusion of progress, but in reality has caused more problems than opportunities for would-be entrepreneurs and foreign investors. Because reform has not been fast enough or sufficiently comprehensive, China is unable to benefit from its modernization or keep up technologically with much of the world. The government's reluctance to get rid of state-owned enterprises has not only rendered China uncompetitive just as it has begun its membership in the World Trade Organization, but this reluctance is causing the banks--which were forced to lend money to SOEs--to fail alongside them. Widespread unemployment, corruption within the Communist party, millions of resentful peasants, and a general lack of leadership further threaten stability. The Communist party "knows how to suppress but it no longer has the power to lead”. Despite having the largest army in the world, China is also militarily weak. Its forces have no resources even remotely comparable with its American counterparts. In any armed clash between the U.S. and China, the latter would have remote chances of gaining any sort of military victory. Some have argued that while China is obviously no comparison to the U.S. in this regard, it does have the potential to grow and challenge American regional might in the future. This view is partially wrong, however. Though China does have a great potential of growth and may enjoy increasing economic prosperity, it has no chances of coming close to what the Americans have and are enjoying today. There are many reasons for this. Foremost, China lacks the rule of law and solid property rights that are the foundations of all developed states, be they western or Asian. Empirical evidence shows us that it is extremely difficult and time-consuming to develop the institutions that serve as the backbone of economically developed polities. Moreover, the gradual decaying of the Communist party, which has not been accompanied by the development of alternative political organizations, points to a coming period of instability rather than continued growth. China can thus in no way compare to or replace the U.S. as a dominant economic or military force in the region. Thus Korea does not have much choice but to keep its alliance with the US for its very survival as rich and prosperous nation in the region.
In 1992, Korea established diplomatic relation with China. The UNCLOS passed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. Since then, there has been a new fishery order and a series of new institutions such as Exclusive Economic Zone started. Under the new ocean law system, more and more disputes occurred between China and Korea to protect themselves’ maritime rights and interests as well as differentiate each boundary of Exclusive Economic Zone in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As a result, two countries signed China-Korea Fishery Agreement, which divided the temporary sea area to maintain a normal fishery order between China and Korea. Due to the decline of Fisheries Resources along the Coast of China, illegal fishing activities of Chinese fishermen happen more frequently and the situation tends to be more and more violent. Since Korea-China Fishery Agreement came into force in 2001, conflicts occurred persistently among Chinese fishermen, Korea marine Police and Korea fishermen. In September 2008, when Marine Police was checking the Chinese fishing boats, there was a conflict with seamen and the police was stabbed by the knife. On March 3, 2011, the Korea marine Police shot at a Chinese seamen for the first time. On September 29, 2016, when Chinese fishermen made the illegal fishing in the exclusive economic zone of Korea, the Korea marine Police intercepted them and threw three sonic bombs for warning. The fishing boat caught fire and it led to three seamen death. In these fisheries conflicts, Chinese fishermen had gotten expelled, detained, fined and shot up by the Korea marine Police. Why do Chinese fishing boats keep on operating illegally in Korean waters regardless of the danger? What's the problem with Chinese fisheries management? In this paper, Analysis will be performed to understand the Fisheries Disputes between Korea and China, as well as find the difference by contrasting their fishery license management system. It will also clarify the importance of cooperation between the two countries with proposal for reasonable solutions.
최활식 韓國外國語大學校 大學院 2012 국내박사
Korea's degree of dependence upon foreign trade is up to 98%, which ranks the most among the G20 countries. High degree of dependency does not necessarily mean a drawback, but it increases vulnerability to external economic shocks. In order to rectify this high degree of dependency, the best solution is to switch the GDP policy to a GNP growth policy. In this new policy, Korea needs to find a strategic economic partner and seek an economic co-operation. The world economy in the WTO system is based on limitless competition. As a result, economic integration has been promoted among regions, continents, and moreover among religious affiliations. This form of economic blocs raise the barrier against the non-members, which pushes Korea to find a detour. In order to counter this crises, Korea has accelerated on seeking an alternatives such as promoting Foreign Direct Investment(FDI), spurring the development of new technology, and securing new markets. After a careful examination, Indonesia has been selected as our main target for cooperation, who is the leader of ASEAN and the center for Islam culture and economics in Asia. Malaysia has a great growth potential as a center and hub for transportation and distribution, and Korea can benefit from the abundant resources and low labor costs of Malaysia. Results of SWOT analysis show that the goal of Malaysia, which carries the banner of "Vision 2020," is to reach GDP per capita of fifteen thousand dollars through various processes; Green Industry, Enlarging the knowledge-based infrastructure, Development of Technology, and Development of Finances. The Vision 2020 plan of Malaysia provides Korea with a great advantage and competitiveness over other countries. This is because Korea has a deep knowledge and experience on building knowledge-based infrastructure and a higher value-added business. Korea also have a high level of education and human resources as well as high-technology level in manufacturing area. Korea's metalwares, machinery, equipments, electronics, car industries have a great degree of competitiveness. If Korea can transfer the experiences and technologies to Malaysia, it will be beneficial for the Malaysian government in prosecuting industry diversification from labor-intensive industry and natural resource based industry; and as a result, the outcome of economic cooperation will be a great success for both countries. We can take an advantage of the excellent transportation and distribution infrastructure of Malaysian ports. Since our economy highly depends on exports and trade, retaining an outpost in the region can improve our trade effectiveness. This not only means that we are advancing to the Malaysian market, but also means that we can use Malaysia as a bridgehead for advancing into the southern Asian markets and also into the Islamic countries in the region. If we can build a positive connection with the Malaysian counterparts, who have a great influence in the area like ASEAN, and also in the Asian Islam affiliations, it will help us to advance further into the area. But in order to utilize these opportunities, Korea needs to overcome the fact that Malaysia is one of the big centers for Islamic culture. Malaysia does guarantee freedom of religion, but Islam rules over the society and economic systems of Malaysia. 12% of the total financial assets are Islamic, and the government is planing to promote the rate up to 20%. And the finance and communication industries, which are the two main driving forces of Malaysia economic growth, have a monopoly structure. This means that the companies who are planning to make business in this country ought to understand and also promote cultural exchange with the local people and companies. They would also have to learn the mechanisms of Islamic finances, and also enhance the relationship between the Islamic groups who control the grounds of these specific industries. In addition, supporting the future industry of Malaysia is another desirable solution. One of the starting point could be concentrating on the energy issue, for example nuclear power or new regeneration energy areas. We can provide the technological support and also training opportunities in these areas. This concludes that the cardinal direction for promoting economic cooperation with Malaysia is to comprehensively support the three main economic development strategy of Malaysian government : promoting Green Industry, knowledge-based infrastructure and Technology. Our strong points, such as great knowledge and experience in IT and high-technology industries, and also a friendly attitude towards their culture and people will help us to promote economic cooperations between the two countries. Moreover, the support of our government in advancing to these markets will further enhance the possibility of our success in building a mutual confidence. The Korean government should devise a program that can promote our country images. This can be achieved by providing educational support, such as building education facilities or making educational contents. It can also promote the image through providing student exchange programs as well as scholar interchanges. Only a sufficient and precise understanding of the Malaysian market as well as the people can minimize the adverse effects and lower the possibilities of misunderstandings. We also have to consider that we could have to modify various laws and regulations in order to meet the needs of the both sides and come into a successful negotiations. And we must remember that cooperation can only be reached by sincere efforts and thorough research and examinations.
Rethinking Korea's ODA Policies within the Developmental State Thesis
Since 2010, South Korea (hereafter Korea) has been a full-fledged member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) with which it has made the successful transition from an aid recipient to an aid-donor country. Measured by its volume, Korea is counted as a substantial contributor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) among OECD DAC members and has promised to make continuous efforts to improve its ODA policies so as to adhere to the OECD DAC standards. Nevertheless, although Korea’s ODA in terms of quantity has been on a constant increase and Korea has made continuous efforts to improve its aid effectiveness, it has been criticized for its low quality and policy decisions have often not translated into actual implementation. Korea’s ODA agenda not only suggests a strong economic interest in giving aid, but also contains elements that strongly reflect Korea’s own experience as a developmental state. Based upon a historical analysis of Korea’s ODA decision-making process and through the lens of the developmental state thesis, particularly with regards to the state-society relations, this research explores why Korea has continuously struggled to implement a more effective and coherent ODA policy framework vis-à-vis its ambitious claims. This research shows that Korea’s developmentalist mindset, which originated during its heyday as a developmental state, is still closely embedded in Korea’s ODA policy decision-making process which determines much of Korea’s behaviour as a donor of foreign aid.