Sino-North Korea relations : managing the alliance security dilemma

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

As one of the most studied bilateral relations, the Sino-North Korea alliance is a focal point of the Northeast Asian region. Recently, many observers have characterized the relationship as “fragile”, “strained”, and “uneasy” after North Korea’s four nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013 and most recently in 2016. Through two different international theoretical lenses, the thesis argues that China has employed foreign policies that are realist and liberal institutionalist in nature in order to moderate North Korea’s intransigent behaviors. Walking on a tightrope in balancing the strategic benefit and liability that North Korea has created, China played a combined strategy of selectively providing economic assistance and withholding military cooperation (realist) to North Korea, as well as a strategy of downgrading China’s relations with North Korea and encouraging it to conduct economic reform that can potentially lead to its economic integration into the region (institutionalist). In order to compete with South Korea and the U.S. in a more positive-sum and benign manner, China attempted to shape North Korea to become an ideal ally: reasonably prosperous and modest in nature. However, even though its two-pronged policy received some positive results, China largely failed in its attempt to successfully manage its relationship with DPRK; therefore, it is expecting to resolve the North Korean issue over the long run.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I. INTRODUCTION
• 1.1 Background
• 1.2 Methodology
• 1.3 Significance of the Research
• II. LITERATURE REVIEW
• 2.1 Western Scholarship
• 2.2 Chinese Scholarship
• 2.3 Concluding Remarks on Literature Review
• III. CHINA’S SEARCH FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
• 3.1 Concentric Circle Theory and Korea’s Place
• 3.2 Land Power vs. Sea Power: Korea as a Buffer Zone Still?
• 3.3 An Ideal North Korea in China’s Regional Security Configuration
• 3.3.1 Politically Stable
• 3.3.2 Nuclear Weapons Free
• 3.3.3 Militarily Aligned
• 3.3.4 Economic Survival
• IV. FIRST LENSES: REALISM
• 4.1 Theoretical Anchor: Alliance Security Dilemma
• 4.2 Goods: North Korea as an Asset in Chinese Strategic Calculation
• 4.2.1 Regional Balance of Threat
• 4.2.2 The Taiwan-North Korea Link
• 4.2.3 North Korean Bandwagoning with the US
• 4.3 Bads: North Korea as a Liability in Chinese Strategic Calculation
• 4.3.1 Entrapment in a Conflict
• 4.3.2 Ballistic Missile Defense System and North Korea

• 4.4 Chinese Management of the DPRK Through Realist Lenses
• V. SECOND LENSES: LIBERAL INSITUTIONALISM
• 5.1 Theoretical Anchor: Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy
• 5.2 Chinese’s View On Multilateralism
• 5.3 North Korean View of Multilateralism
• 5.4 Chinese Institutionalist Strategies Towards North Korea
• 5.4.1 Downgrading: From Party-to-Party to State-to-State Relations
• 5.4.2 Encouraging: Integrating North Korea into the Regional Economy
• 5.5 Chinese Management of the DPRK Through Institutionalist Lenses
• VII. CONCLUSION
• VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY