이승만과 하와이 감리교회와의 관계

박혜수(Hae-Soo Park) 연세대학교 신과대학(연합신학대학원) 2012 신학논단 Vol.68 No.-

Syngman Rhee, upon turning 20 years old in April 1895, enrolled at Pai Chai College established by American Methodist evangelist Henry G. Appenzeller and studied English and modern science. This was Syngman Rhee’s first encounter with Methodist Church. After graduating Pai Chai College, Syngman Rhee was implicated in attempts of coup’ de ta with Park Young Hyo and was arrested in January 9, 1899, living a prison life at Hansung Prison for five years and seven months, until August 1904. In prison, severe pain and hardships made him pray and turn to Christianity. Regular visits by Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries made Syngman Rhee mature as a Christian, along with his conversion. He evangelized and taught gospel to a number of people by constructing prison library and school in prison. Furthermore, since his conversion in jail, he started writing and researching on Christianity through reading Christianity related books in full-fledged effort. In November 1903, his thesis ?his first church-related dissertation written while in prison, titled “Church Strategy,” was carried in the Methodist theology magazine, Christian Monthly. In August 1904, immediately prior to his release from prison, he presented his thesis, “The Toils of the Korean Christian Brethren” ? also carried in Christian Monthly ? thereby continuing his efforts to spread the gospel and the salvation to one’s family and country. Upon obtaining his doctorate degree from Princeton University on July 18, 1910, Syngman Rhee returned to South Korea on October 10 to act as a manager of Seoul YMCA, staying in Korea for a year and a half. During Korean Lay Electoral Conference held in Seoul on March 9, 1912, he was elected as a representative of Korean layman for the Quadrennial General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Following his participation at the Quadrennial General Conference, on 3 February 1913, Syngman Rhee made his second visit to Hawaii. Immediately after Rhee arrived in Hawaii, from 27 February to 2 March, he supervised a training organization for Bible study and Methodist doctrine for Korean Methodist religious servers and leaders who participated in the Conference from Honolulu’s First Methodist Church. This created an opportunity for Rhee to carve out his reputation as a model religious worker for the Methodist Church in Hawaii. On 25 August 1913, Syngman Rhee took office as the principal of the Korean Boarding School for Boys, a school operated by the American Methodist Episcopal Mission. Upon Syngman Rhee’s assumption of the principal’s post, the school changed its name to the Korean Central School and, through the innovative operation of the school, in six months the enrollment skyrocketed from 36 to 120 students. Clashes with the Methodist Episcopal Mission’s education policies, however, resulted in the school’s leaving the Methodist Episcopal Mission, and Rhee went on to independently establish a Korean Christian Institute. In essence, while the Americans strove to Americanize the Koreans by completely assimilating them into Hawaiian society, Rhee on the other hand wanted to train and prepare the Koreans in the event that they would have to contribute to Korea’s exercise to recover its national sovereignty. As conflict between Rhee and the Methodist Episcopal Mission surfaced, Rhee left the Methodist Church and established independent Korean Christian Church. Although he left the Methodist Church in Hawaii to achieve his goal of establishing a church owned and asserted by Koreans, Rhee never left Methodist Church. Whether he acted on his own or under the auspices of the Methodist Church, he was forever a Methodist. Syngman Rhee, upon turning 20 years old in April 1895, enrolled at Pai Chai College established by American Methodist evangelist Henry G. Appenzeller and studied English and modern science. This was Syngman Rhee’s first encounter with Methodist Church. After graduating Pai Chai College, Syngman Rhee was implicated in attempts of coup’ de ta with Park Young Hyo and was arrested in January 9, 1899, living a prison life at Hansung Prison for five years and seven months, until August 1904. In prison, severe pain and hardships made him pray and turn to Christianity. Regular visits by Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries made Syngman Rhee mature as a Christian, along with his conversion. He evangelized and taught gospel to a number of people by constructing prison library and school in prison. Furthermore, since his conversion in jail, he started writing and researching on Christianity through reading Christianity related books in full-fledged effort. In November 1903, his thesis ?his first church-related dissertation written while in prison, titled “Church Strategy,” was carried in the Methodist theology magazine, Christian Monthly. In August 1904, immediately prior to his release from prison, he presented his thesis, “The Toils of the Korean Christian Brethren” ? also carried in Christian Monthly ? thereby continuing his efforts to spread the gospel and the salvation to one’s family and country. Upon obtaining his doctorate degree from Princeton University on July 18, 1910, Syngman Rhee returned to South Korea on October 10 to act as a manager of Seoul YMCA, staying in Korea for a year and a half. During Korean Lay Electoral Conference held in Seoul on March 9, 1912, he was elected as a representative of Korean layman for the Quadrennial General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Following his participation at the Quadrennial General Conference, on 3 February 1913, Syngman Rhee made his second visit to Hawaii. Immediately after Rhee arrived in Hawaii, from 27 February to 2 March, he supervised a training organization for Bible study and Methodist doctrine for Korean Methodist religious servers and leaders who participated in the Conference from Honolulu’s First Methodist Church. This created an opportunity for Rhee to carve out his reputation as a model religious worker for the Methodist Church in Hawaii. On 25 August 1913, Syngman Rhee took office as the principal of the Korean Boarding School for Boys, a school operated by the American Methodist Episcopal Mission. Upon Syngman Rhee’s assumption of the principal’s post, the school changed its name to the Korean Central School and, through the innovative operation of the school, in six months the enrollment skyrocketed from 36 to 120 students. Clashes with the Methodist Episcopal Mission’s education policies, however, resulted in the school’s leaving the Methodist Episcopal Mission, and Rhee went on to independently establish a Korean Christian Institute. In essence, while the Americans strove to Americanize the Koreans by completely assimilating them into Hawaiian society, Rhee on the other hand wanted to train and prepare the Koreans in the event that they would have to contribute to Korea’s exercise to recover its national sovereignty. As conflict between Rhee and the Methodist Episcopal Mission surfaced, Rhee left the Methodist Church and established independent Korean Christian Church. Although he left the Methodist Church in Hawaii to achieve his goal of establishing a church owned and asserted by Koreans, Rhee never left Methodist Church. Whether he acted on his own or under the auspices of the Methodist Church, he was forever a Methodist.

`이승만`이라는 표상 ―이승만 이미지를 통해 본 1950년대 지배 권력의 상징 정치―

후지이다케시 ( Fujii Takeshi ) 역사문제연구소 2008 역사문제연구 Vol.12 No.1

In order to understand the true nature of the Syngman Rhee regime, which assumed the form of a modernized political power, it is necessary to examine not only Syngman Rhee as an individual but also the regime`s inside mechanism which operated as a system based upon the image and existence of an individual named Syngman Rhee. Examined in this article, which employed the above-mentioned perspective, is for example what kind of changes the emblem of Syngman Rhee had gone through, since 1948 and through 1960. And also analyzed in this article, is the nature of the political power that ruled the time, which was displayed through a series of symbol-based politics. The task of presenting and emphasizing Syngman Rhee`s existence and character had continued since the foundation of the South Korean government. Yang Woo-Jung, who was a converted Socialist and also the head of the Yeonhap newspaper company played an important role in that task, by authoring a book called the 『president Rhee`s Political Idea for Founding of the Nation』. Prime minister Lee Bum-Suk wrote the foreword for this book, so we can presume that this book, written by Yang Woo-Jung, indeed reflected the position and opinion held by the ruling power of the time. The `Syngman Rhee~ way and position presented here was in fact one of Social democracy, and at this stage Rhee`s way and position even exhibited a certain level of `Third world` quality, which intended to resist and struggle with not only Communism but also Capitalism. Yet, after the so-called `Jokchung-gyae` faction which included Lee Bum-Suk was removed from power, with the cease-fire agreement in 1953, the image of Syngman Rhee changed significantly. Biographies of Syngman Rhee started to be published since 1954, and these biographies all emphasized Syngman Rhee`s pro-U.S. nature, while downsizing his Nationalist nature. Also, in order to present Syngman Rhee to the public in literally very visible terms, the government`s efforts continued. We can see that from the fact that the government issued orders to create portraits of Syngman Rhee everywhere in the country. And in 1955, in commemoration of Syngman Rhee`s 80th birthday, a large celebration ceremony was arranged, and the project of erecting Syngman Rhee`s statue was promoted there as well. In the latter half period of the 1950s, Syngman Rhee became almost a mythicized figure. As we can see from descriptions referring to him such as `the Korean Christ sent from God`, Syngman Rhee`s life were being described in religious, Catholic, God-related terms. This kind of mythifying of a person reached its peak right before the presidential election in 1960. Such phenomena was originated out of the Liberal Party`s desperate attempt to have Lee Ki-Poong, who did not have any kind of presentable philosophy whatsoever, elected as vice president to assist Syngman Rhee. As a result, later Syngman Rhee` s statue became a target of rallies during the April 19th revolution. In other words, Syngman Rhee`s image changed again, and became an object to be attacked as well.

1959년 이승만의 대일인식과 정책: 제4차 한일회담과 재일교포 북송문제를 중심으로

강여린(Kang, Yeo Rin) 한국동양정치사상사학회 2022 한국동양정치사상사연구 Vol.21 No.1

본 연구는 제4차 한일회담에서 북송문제라는 북한 변수가 등장하면서 이승만의 대일인식이 어떠한 방향으로 한일회담 정책에 구체적으로 반영되었는지를 분석한다. 본 연구를 통하여 제4차 한일회담 시기 이승만의 대일인식과 이에 따른 한국의 한일회담 정책을 다음의 세 가지로 정리할 수 있다. 첫째, 제4차 한일회담 시기의 이승만의 대일 인식은 과거 일제 식민지 시기의 대일인식과는 구별된다. 제4차 한일회담의 가장 큰 걸림돌은 재일교포 북송문제였다. 남북통일을 추구하였던 이승만에게 이 북송문제는 일본이 남한 이외에 북한도 인정한다는 의미로 다가왔다. 둘째, 제4차 한일회담 시기의 이승만의 대일인식은 그의 반공사상과 함께 당시 회담 정책에 반영되었다. 즉, 오로지 과거 식민지 시기의 이승만의 대일인식으로 인하여 제4차 한일회담의 진행이 어려워졌던 것이 아니다. 셋째, 제4차 한일회담 시기의 이승만의 대일인식은 미국과 갈등을 초래하였다. 또한, 본 연구는 본 연구의 분석 시기인 제4차 한일회담 이외의 한일회담 사례에 대하여 이승만의 대일인식과 관련한 후속연구의 필요성을 제시한다. This study analyzes in what direction Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan to Japan was reflected explicitly in the Korea-Japan talks policy with the emergence of the Repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea at the 4th Korea-Japan talks. In previous studies, it is not easy to examine Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan during the Korea-Japan talks chronologically. Therefore, based on the previous study results, this paper mainly utilizes the primary data of Korea, the United States, and Japan to analyze how Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan was reflected in the Korea-Japan policy at the 4th Korea-Japan talks. This study summarizes Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan during the 4th Korea-Japan talks and Korea’s Korea-Japan talks policy into the following three. First, Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan during the 4th Korea-Japan talks is distinct from the perception of Japan during the past colony of Japanese Imperialism period. The biggest obstacle to the 4th Korea-Japan talks was the issue of Repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea. For Syngman Rhee, who pursued reunification between the two Korea, the Repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea came to mean that Japan recognized North Korea and South Korea. In this respect, it can be seen that Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan is not just the perception of the colony of Japanese Imperialism in the past. Second, Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan during the 4th Korea-Japan talks was reflected in the policy along with his anti-communist idea. In other words, the 4th Korea-Japan talks did not become difficult solely due to Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan during the colonial period. Instead, Syngman Rhee tried to proceed with the fourth round of talks again, which had become acute due to Japan’s announcement of its plan to Repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea. In other words, due to the Repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea, Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan and his anti-communist image were reflected in the Korea-Japan talks together. Third, Syngman Rhee’s perception of Japan during the 4th Korea-Japan talks was inconsistent with the stance of the United States. Since the basis for the U.S. to recognize the Korea-Japan talks was in the national interest, the U.S. thought that Syngman Rhee had virtually no active intention to conclude the talks if he adhered to his policy in Korea-Japan relations.

이승만의 상해 체류 활동

오영섭 한국민족운동사학회 2017 한국민족운동사연구 Vol.0 No.91

1919년 9월 대한민국임시정부 대통령에 오른 이승만은 임정 소재지인 상해에 부임하지 않았다. 그 대신 그는 미국에서 구미위원부를 중심으로 외교독립운동에 전념하며 전보와 서신을 통해 임정을 원격 통치해나갔다. 중요 정무가 지체되고 적체되는 폐단이 발생하자 임시의정원은 대통령의 상해 부임을 촉구하는 결의안을 통과시켰다. 이에 따라 이승만은 상해행을 결행하였다. 이승만은 1920년 12월 5일부터 1921년 5월 28까지 약 6개월간 상해에 머물렀다. 그런데 이승만의 상해 체류에 대한 기왕의 평가는 부정적 평가 일색이다. 그가 대정략과 대자금을 준비하지 않고 상해에 부임하여 임정의 난맥상을 해소하지 못했으며, 임정 내외에서 반임정ㆍ반이승만 운동이 벌어지는 상황에서 반대세력을 포용하지 못하였고, 적대세력이 테러위협을 가하자 워싱턴회의 참가를 핑계로 밤중에 몰래 상해를 떠나 하와이로 돌아감으로써 임정의 분란과 분열을 촉진시켰다는 것이다. 그러나 이승만의 상해 체류 활동에 대한 기왕의 부정적 평가는 재고의 여지가 있다. 첫째, 임정의 침체와 분열 원인을 분석함에 있어 임정의 태생적 약점인 재정곤란ㆍ노선차이ㆍ지방파쟁ㆍ조직의 비효율성 등의 문제를 제쳐두고 오로지 이승만 개인의 지도력 부재 문제만을 추궁하였다. 둘째, 이승만이 상해에서 임정 유지를 위해 또 독립운동의 침체를 극복하기 위해 그 나름의 노력을 기울였음에도 불구하고 이를 주목하지 않거나 비판적으로만 파악하려 하였다. 이런 문제들로 말미암아 이승만의 상해 체류 활동에 대해서는 새롭게 분석해볼 필요가 있다. 이승만의 상해 부임 직전 임정은 재정과 운영 면에서 심각한 어려움에 처해 있었다. 당시 임정 요인들은 이승만이 대정략과 대자금을 가지고 상해에 부임하여 임정의 갈등과 분란을 해결해주기를 기대하였다. 그러나 상해에서 이승만은 임정의 현황을 관찰한 결과 여러 세력들의 노선차이로 인해 대사가 이뤄질 가능성이 적다고 판단하고 임정 문제에 대해 소극적인 자세로 일관하였다. 그는 반임정ㆍ반이승만 세력의 임정 개조 및 창조 운동에 대해 완강히 반대하며 임정의 현상유지정책만을 힘써 행하였다. 이승만이 상해에서 추진한 임정의 현상유지정책은 여러 방향으로 펼쳐졌다. 이는 임정의 제도와 골격을 그대로 유지한 상태에서 독립운동을 벌이자는 것이었고, 기호파 인사들이 주축을 이룬 정부옹호파의 후원을 등에 업고 추진된 것이었다. 첫째, 이승만은 임정의 통치제도 개조 논쟁에서 대통령제의 유지를 주장하였다. 그는 이동휘 국무총리의 사퇴 요구를 민의가 아니라며 반대했고, 국무위원제도를 공산당식 위원제라며 극력 반대하였다. 둘째, 이승만은 독립전쟁론이나 의열투쟁론 등 급진적 독립노선을 되풀이하여 질타하였다. 이는 외교독립노선의 정당성을 강조하고 그에 대한 지지를 얻으려는 것이었다. 셋째, 이승만은 임정 운영의 효율성을 높이려 하였다. 그는 임정의 기구와 인원을 축소하여 인건비와 경상비를 절감함으로써 임정을 유지하려 하였다. 넷째, 이승만은 친위단체를 조직하여 임정 옹호 활동을 벌이도록 하였다. 그는 반임정ㆍ반이승만 운동이 거세지자 지지자들에게 협성회란 단체를 조직하여 임정 및 대통령을 보호하게 하였다. 이승만이 대통령 중심제로 짜여진 임정을 유지하려 애썼던 것은 몇 가지 이유 때문일 것이다. 우선, 미국식... Syngman Rhee stayed in Shanghai about 6 month from 5th December 1920 to 28th May 1921. However, the evaluation of his activities in Shanghai was very negative. It was because he assigned to Shanghai without great-political strategy and great-funds, and he could not tolerate the counterforce in the inside and outside of Korean Provisional Government(KPG), and he promoted the dissolution and confusion in the KPG as he return to Hawaii on the pretext of attend in Washington Conference. However, there is room to reconsider the negative evaluation of Syngman Rhee’s activities in Shanghai. First, we should consider simultaneously the viviparous weak point of KPG of financial difficulties, difference in ideological orientation, regional strife and inefficiency of organization and his own’s absence of leadership in related with the cause of depression and division of KPG. Second, we also consider that Syngman Rhee tried to overcome the recession of independence movement and maintain of KPG in Shanghai in his own way. The KPG was in serious financial and management trouble just before Syngman Rhee’s assignment. The leading figures of the KPG expected that Syngman Rhee assigned to Shanghai with great-political strategy and great-funds and resolved the conflict and confusion of KPG. However, Rhee concluded that the KPG could not be easily united because of the ideological orientation of various parties, so he maintained a passive attitude in current issues of KPG. He carried out a policy of maintenance of the status quo opposing the remodeling and creative movement of the government of anti-KPG and anti-Syngman Rhee parties. The policy of maintenance of the status quo developed by Syngman Rhee in Shanghai ran in several directions. This meant to develop the independent movement in the condition of maintaining the institution and framework of KPG. It was also promoted by the support of advocative parties of government constituted the mainstay of Giho Party. First, Syngman Rhee asserted to maintain the presidential system in the dispute over the ruling system of KPG. He opposed the request for resignation of president because it is not the will of the people, and also refused the system of Cabinet as it is the Communist committee system. Second, he criticized the radical methods for independence such as theory of independent campaign and theory of patriotic struggle. This was to emphasize the ideological orientation for diplomatic independence movement and sought to receive support. Third, Rhee tried to improve efficiency of management of KPG. He sought to reduce the personal and operation expenses through the decrease in numbers and organization in KPG. Fourth, he organized the Guards and made them advocate the KPG. As the movement for anti-KPG and anti-Syngman Rhee was grew more powerful, he organized the Hyupsunghui with his supporters and made them advocate the KPG and president. There were several reasons that Syngman Rhee strived to maintain the KPG. Frist, he became the president of KPG for the first time, which adapt the American-styled republicanism, through the Governor of Council of Hanseong Provisional Government. Second, only if he maintained the position of president, it could be possible to push forward the diplomatic independence movement in the international conference with great powers of Europe and America. Moreover, as Rhee maintained the position of president, he thought that he could easily raised the independent funds for Korean-American, and through this he had hegemony over the independence movement

1950년대 중후반기 이승만 대통령의 언론 이미지 변화 - 정부기관지 『서울신문』의 보도를 중심으로 -

김진흠 역사문제연구소 2022 역사문제연구 Vol.26 No.1

언론이 전달하고 만들어내는 정치인의 이미지는 대중들에게 많은 영향을 미친다. 재임 당시 이승만 대통령의 언론 이미지는 ‘우상화’와 ‘독재자’로 대표된다. 그런데 1950년대 중후반 언론에서 전하는 혹은 만들어내는 이승만 대통령의 이미지는 다양하게 나타났다. 단조로운 우상화에 의한 추앙과 독재자라는 공격만 받았던 것은 아니었다. 정부기관지인 서울신문에서는 근엄하고 존경받는 대상에서 친근하고 인자하며 검소한 이미지, 그리고 건강하면서 열정적인 할아버지의 이미지 등 이승만의 다양한 이미지를 만들어냈다. 1954년의 사사오입개헌 이후 이승만을 독재자로 규정하는 발언이 적극적으로 나타나고 독재라는 단어가 이승만 정권과 연결되었다. 이런 요인들이 이후의 이미지 변화 시도로 이어졌다. 이승만은 경무대를 개방하여 독재국가가 아닌 ‘민주주의 나라’의 대통령이 되어 국민들과 나란히 섞여 지내는 모습을 연출했고, 소통할 줄 아는 인자한 ‘우리 할아버지’가 되어 국민들에게 친근하게 다가가려는 시도와 노력을 보여주려 했다. 아이들을 사랑하고 검소하며 소박한 이미지의 추구도 같은 맥락에서 이해 가능하다. 야당으로부터 독재자로 공격받는 대통령의 모습과는 정반대의 모습들이다. 또한 정권 유지를 위해서 이승만이 건강 면에서 건재하다는 이미지를 지속적으로 국민들에게 주입했다. 이와 같은 이미지 변화모색이 우상화와 독재자로의 공격 속에서 동시에 추진되었다. 국민들의 이승만에 대한 감정은 우상화와 독재자라는 키워드만으로 이해하기 힘들다. 국민들은 양극의 감정으로만 이승만을 바라본 것은 아니었다. 언론에 의해 만들어진 이승만의 이미지들을 고려한다면 이승만에 대한 대중들의 다양하고 복잡한 감정과 반응의 일면을 이해할 수 있을 것이다. 또한 당시 국민들에게 이승만이 어떠한 존재였는지를 짐작할 수 있을 것이라 생각한다. The image of politicians delivered and created by the media has a great influence on the public. During his tenure, President Syngman Rhee's media image is represented by "idolization" and "dictator." However, the images of President Syngman Rhee delivered or created by the media in the mid-to-late 1950s appeared in various ways. It was not just reverence by monotonous idolization and attack as a dictator. The Seoul Newspaper, a government agency, created a variety of images of Syngman Rhee, including a friendly, benevolent, frugal image, and a healthy and passionate grandfather's image. After the constitutional amendment in 1954, remarks that defined Syngman Rhee as a dictator actively appeared, and the word dictatorship was linked to the Syngman Rhee regime. These factors led to subsequent attempts to change the image. Syngman Rhee opened the presidential residence to become the president of a "democratic country," not a dictatorship, to live side by side with the people, and there were attempts and efforts to become a kind "grandfather" who can communicate and approach the people friendly. The pursuit of loving children, frugal, and simple images can be understood in the same context. These are the opposite of the president being attacked as a dictator by the opposition party. In addition, in order to maintain the regime, Syngman Rhee continued to inject the image of being healthy into the people. This attempt for image change was promoted simultaneously amid idolization and attack by dictators. It is difficult to understand the people's feelings for Syngman Rhee only with the keywords idolization and dictatorship. Considering Syngman Rhee's images created by the media, we will be able to understand one aspect of the public's diverse and complex emotions and reactions to Syngman Rhee. Also, we can guess what Syngman Rhee was to the people at the time.

태평양전쟁기 이승만-중경임시정부의 관계와 연대 강화

정병준(Jung Byung-Joon) 한국사연구회 2007 한국사연구 Vol.137 No.-

Syngman Rhee was spelled from his KOPOGO presidency in 1925 by the Korean Congress. In 1941, he was elected as the chief of the Korean Commission(KORIC), which was the sub-organ of Diplomatic Department, KOPOGO and in charge of the diplomatic mission in United States. After then, he had a very close relations with the key members of KOPOGO, especially with Kim Koo. The recovery and strengthened partnership with KOPOGO was one of his major political assets for his political success after returning to Korea. He returned to Seoul as an Commissioner of KORIC, but he pretended to represent the whole KOPOGO for some time because KOPOGO was then in China. He became the Commissioner of KORIC by the decision of United Korean Committee(UKC) that was an united body of whole Korean people lived in U.S. mainland and Hawaii for the cause of Korean independence. His diplomatic mission was to get the allied power's diplomatic approval of KOPOGO and military aid according to the Lend Lease Act. He had done his best but did not get the diplomatic approval. Then he turned his diplomatic efforts to anti-Soviet and anti-communist agitation. Also he blamed the U.S. Department of State and Chinese government for their assistance to the Russian plot to take whole Korean peninsula. It was so called Yalta conspiracy argument by Syngman Rhee during the San Francisco Conference for United Nations. It was against the will and hope of KOPOGO which eagerly wanted the approval of Allied Powers. Kim Koo and key leaders of KOPOGO thought Syngman Rhee had some influence within U.S. military and intelligence fields, because his followers and U.S. agencies like C.O.I and O.S.S. field units appeared at Chungking several times in 1942 and used military communications channels for Chungking-Washington D.C. communication. So KOPOGO overestimated Syngman Rhee's military and diplomatic ability and believed his lobbying activity to win the U.S. government and congress support. The critical dispute was arisen between Syngman Rhee and UKC for the control over the Koreans in U.S. In 1944, KOPOGO instructed the UKC and Koreans in U.S. to reorganize the KORIC according to the will of majority. But KOPOGO rejected the decision by the majority because Syngman Rhee did not participated. Then the Korean society in U.S. was utterly disrupted, but KOPOGO decided to support Synman Rhee side. KOPOGO choose Syngman Rhee instead of UKC and Korean society in U.S. Syngman Rhee's wartime diplomatic activities brought KOPOGO unwanted results, i.e., the decline of support from Korean society in U.S., and negative recognition to KOPOGO by the allied powers. It was an misfortune to KOPOGO. But Syngman Rhee got his backers and followers in U.S. military and intelligence fields because of his anti-Soviet and anti-communist agitation as well as the title of key members of KOPOGO. It was happened during the early 1940s and gave us a clue for the myth of Syngman Rhee's sudden political success after Korean liberation.

이승만의 『청일전기』 번역.간행과 자주독립론

오영섭(Oh Young Seob) 한국사학사학회 2010 韓國史學史學報 Vol.0 No.22

Syngman Rhee spent his adolescence in the transition period from the Chinese centered confucian society to the U.S. centered Christianity society. During this period, the Sino-Japanese War played crucial role in breaking Korean’s ceno-centric point of view of the world. Moreover, influenced by the Sino-Japanese War, Syngman Rhee decided to learn about modern studies after giving up his study in confucianism. Syngman Rhee considers the Sino-Japanese War that altered his life path as an important incident that determined the fate of modern Korea. Syngman Rhee’s translation work of The Sino-Japanese War History was part of the movement by intellectuals who were trying to follow up with the modern civilization during The Greater Korean Empire. Moreover, in the period of The Greater Korean Empire, Enlightenment Movement texts and Christian texts imported from the Ch’ing Dynasty were distributed to the public, which contributed to the transition of Korean people’s thoughts. The books were published as the original version or translated in Korean Chinese and were widely distributed to the public. Publication of modern texts as well as translation activity continued to persist even in the negative condition when national sovereignty of Korea was being taken over by the Japanese imperialism. Therefore, translation work of the Sino-Japanese War history was part of acceptance movement of modern civilization by Koreans during the transition period of civilization. The Sino-Japanese War History contains variety of contents. It contains numerous articles including editorials of enlightenment campaign, royal edict, telegraphic news, all types of treaty and protocol, news articles, epistolary composition, etc. The time period the book covers is from prior to the Sino-Japanese War when there was disputes over withdrawal of troops between the Ch’ing and Japan to January, 1898 when a letter was sent to Emperor Kojong from the emperor of Ch’ing. Therefore, it would be more accurate to consider the Sino-Japanese War history as a text that deals with the history of international relations of East Asia before and after the Sino-Japanese War rather than as a text that records merely the history of the Sino-Japanese War The Sino-Japanese War History is not a work of Syngman Rhee alone but it was a work contributed by reform minded political prisoners who were imprisoned in Hansung prison. For approximately three months, Syngman Rhee contributed his time in translation work. However, due to his illness, translation work of religious texts, and other office work, he could not devote all of his time and energy into the translation work of The Sino-Japanese War History. Therefore, he had to receive aid from the politicians who were imprisoned, and at the time, Soonman Jung as well as several fellow imprisoner helped Syngman Rhee's translation work. Therefore, The Sino-Japanese War History could be considered as group work by politicians who were seeking independence and advancement of Korea, and civilization and improvement of the people. The Sino-Japanese War History had limited influence on Koreans in Korea as well as abroad. Nonetheless. it is the first book that contains Syngman Rhee’s desire to achieve civilization and independence of Korea. Syngman Rhee grieved over the fact that Korea was destroyed and lost independence due to the Sino-Japanese War. He claimed that we should be warned against Japanese who reorganized the battle line for hundreds of years after the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592 and took away the independence of Korea using the opportunity offered by the Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, he insisted that Koreans should be well aware of the reason. process, and results of the occurrence of the Sino-Japanese War in order to build the basis for sustaining the independence of Korea.

한국 중립화론의 역사와 이승만의 중립화론 - 구한말과 일제 강점기 -

정태욱 인하대학교 법학연구소 2023 法學硏究 Vol.26 No.2

Due to Korea's geopolitical position, the idea of Korea's neutrality has a long history. Syngman Rhee also considered the neutralization of Korea and claimed it as a strategy for Korean independence movement. However, there are not many studies on Syngman Rhee's idea of Korean neutrality. This paper tried to examine the meaning and development process of Syngman Rhee's perspective of neutralization in the context of his independence movement. Early in the crises of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, several proposals of neutrality for Korean were raised. In particular, during the Russo-Japanese War, Emperor Gojong of the Korean Empire was very active for realizing neutrality. Syngman Rhee's interest in neutrality also originated from that situation. Syngman Rhee was very negative about Emperor Gojong's attempts to neutralize the country. However, while studying in the United States, Syngman Rhee obtained a Ph.D. degree on wartime neutrality. Here, Syngman Rhee says that the neutrality law was a blessing for human peace and freedom of commerce. Later, in 1919, Syngman Rhee officially proposed the neutralization of the Korean Peninsula in a petition for mandate to the League of Nations as a measure of Korean independence. This invited much criticism from the camp of the Korean independence movement at the time. However, although the part of the mandate was later deleted, the fundamental idea of neutralization was not changed. Syngman Rhee regarded neutralization of Korea, a buffer state, and freedom of commerce as the basis for the independence strategy of the Korean people at the Washington Conference 1921 and at the General Assembly of the League of Nations 1933 after the Japanese Manchurian Aggression. 한반도의 지정학적 위치와 함께 한국의 중립화론은 오랜 역사를 가지고 있다. 이승만도 한국의 중립화를 주된 독립운동 방략으로 삼았다. 그러나 이에 대한 연구는 많지 않다. 이 글은 한국 중립화론의 계보 속에서 이승만의 중립화론의 의의를 찾아보았다. 이승만 이전에 제출된 한국 중립화론을 간단히 살펴보고, 이어서 이승만 중립화론의 전개과정을 서술하였다. 이승만의 중립화론이 초기 <독립정신> 저술 시기, 박사 논문 작성 시기, <태평양잡지> 운영 시기, 위임통치 청원 시기, 워싱턴 회의 및 국제연맹 외교 시기에걸쳐서 어떻게 진행되었고 어떤 변화가 있었는지 추적하였다. 그리고 이승만 중립화론의변화의 이유에 대하여 논하였다. 이승만의 중립화론은 러일전쟁 시기 고종의 중립화 시도에 대한 비판에서 시작한다. 이승만은 고종의 중립화 시도가 권력을 부지하기 위한 수단에 불과하였으며, 더욱이 러시아에 의존하였다는 점에서 해로운 것이었다고 평가한다. 이후 이승만은 박사 논문에서 전시중립과 중립통상에 대한 연구를 하고, 미국 식민지 필리핀의 독립 방안으로서 점진적 자치와 영세중립의 방안을 접하게 된다. 그리하여 마침내 1919년 위임통치 청원에서 한국 독립의 방략으로 통상의 자유와 영세중립을 연결한완충국가의 상을 제시하였다. 이승만의 위임통치 청원은 독립운동 진영에서 많은 비판을받았다. 이후 이승만은 위임통치는 더이상 거론하지 않았으나, 영세중립 독립방략은 계속 견지하였다. 1920년대 워싱턴 회의, 1930년 국제연맹 외교에서 이승만은 한결같이 통상의 자유와 영세중립을 결합한 완충국가 안을 주창하였다. 중립 완충국 그리고 통상에개방된 한국의 독립은 바로 동아시아와 태평양 지역의 평화의 열쇠임을 주장하였다. 요컨대 이승만은 구한말 그리고 일제 강점기 한국 중립화론의 대표자였으며 그 선구자인유길준의 중립론에 이어 한국 중립화론의 계보를 이은 계승자였다고 생각한다.

이승만의 대한민국임시정부 통치구상

오영섭 한국민족운동사학회 2009 한국민족운동사연구 Vol.0 No.61

1919년 9월 이승만은 대한민국임시정부의 임시대통령에 선출되어 한국독립운동의 최고지도자가 되었다. 그러나 그는 상해로 가지 않고 미국에 계속 머물며 구미 열강과 국제회의를 상대로 하는 외교독립운동을 벌였다. 그는 임정 요인들의 거듭된 요청과 비난에도 불구하고 미국에 계속 머물렀다. 따라서 그는 미국에서 상해의 임정을 통치하기 위한 방안을 구상하게 되었다. 이승만은 한국의 최후 독립은 무력을 통해서만 가능하다고 보았다. 다만 무략만으로는 독립이 불가능하므로 무력과 외교를 병행해야 한다고 하였다. 다시 말해 외교와 무력의 양대 방면에서 착실히 준비를 하여 독립을 기다리는 것이 중요하다고 보았다. 그에게 무력은 독립전쟁을 수행할 한국인의 무장투쟁을 위해서 필요하며, 외교는 독립전쟁에 필요한 국제사회의 승인이나 원조를 받기 위해 필요하였다. 따라서 이승만의 외교독립론은 단순히 외교지상주의적 독립론이 아니라 외교와 무력을 병행하여 고려하는 현실주의적 독립론이었다. 이승만은 미국과 중국 간의 거리 차이를 감안하여 역할분담론을 제기했다. 이것은 상해일은 국무총리와 각원이 상의ㆍ처리하고 미주일은 자신이 전담하여 처리하되, 중대사만 서로 상의하자는 것이다. 이렇게 이승만은 미국에서 전보와 서한을 통해 원동의 임정을 원격 통치하였다. 그러나 이것은 대통령 재임기간 내내 이승만을 괴롭히는 주요 원인이 되었다. 다시 말해 이승만은 반대파로부터 대통령이 임지에 오지 않고 타국에서 임정의 난맥상을 방치한다는 비난을 받았던 것이다. 이승만은 임정의 효율적 통치를 위해 임정내 우호세력을 활용하는 방책을 구사했다. 그는 경술국치 전부터 자신과 인연을 맺은 기호파를 주목하고 이들을 단일세력으로 모으고자 통신원 제도를 도입했다. 그는 일부 인사들을 통신원에 임명하여 임정 현황을 수시로 보고하게 하였다. 또 그들에게 자주 서한을 보내 친이승만 성향의 인사들을 포섭하게 하였다. 아울러 상해 부임 후에는 친위단체 협성회를 조직하여 자신과 기호파 내각의 임정유지정책을 지지하게 하였다. 이로써 이승만은 비교적 소수파인 기호파 세력을 통해 임정을 원격 통치할 수 있었다. 이승만은 상해 임정이 有形無跡한 정부가 되기를 원했다. 그는 임정이 형체는 있으나 자취가 없는 정부기관으로서 원동과 미주, 국내와 국외를 연결시켜 주는 구심점이 돼야 한다고 보았다. 이때 임정이 외형적으로 정부형태를 갖추려 하기보다는 조직ㆍ인원을 최소화하여 내실을 기해야 하며, 국내외 민족운동을 지휘ㆍ통제하려고 애쓰기보다는 연결ㆍ조정하는 역할을 맡으면서 독립을 대비해야 한다고 하였다. 이것은 국내의 시위투쟁과 항일활동, 만주와 노령의 군사활동, 미주의 외교활동을 각각 그 장점대로 추진해 나가면서 최후의 독립전쟁에 대비할 힘을 비축해야 한다는 것이었다. 이승만은 외국차관을 통해 임정의 항구적 운영자금을 마련함으로써 자신의 對임정 장악력을 강화하려 하였다. 그가 상해 부임 후에 기호파 내각의 각원들과 상의하다가 결정하지 못한 차관도입 기획안에는 이 점이 잘 나타나 있다. 즉, 이승만은 미국에서 200만불의 차관을 들여오되, 차관교섭을 자신이 전담하고, 또 차관한 자금을 자신의 통제 하에 두려 하였다. 또 이런 차관장악 문제와 별도로 임시의정원을 일시 정지시키고, 정무위원회를 설치하여... In September 1919, Syngman Rhee rose as a top leader of Korean Independence Movement by being elected the temporary President of Korean Provisional Government which had been established in French Concession of Shanghai in China. Later, he didn’t move to Shanghai and while he was staying in the United States, he strived for diplomatic independence movement which had been promoted before the launch of Provisional government against the western powers and the international conference. Therefore, he had to continue to abide in U.S. rather than leave for Shanghai even though key figures of the provisional government repeated requests and criticism on him. Consequently, he came to formulate a plan in his own way to rule provisional government of Far East in U.S. As the head of the Korean provisional government, Syngman Rhee considered that the final independence of Korea would be possible only through military power. He only insisted that military power must go side by side with diplomacy because independence can’t be achieved only with forces. In other words, he came to conclusion that waiting for the chance of independence would be a shortcut to independence as preparing closely in each way of both military power and diplomacy. Accordingly, he thought military forces are in need of the armed struggle for Korean to carry out the war of independence and diplomacy is needed for approval and assistance of the international community which is necessary for war of independence. In this sense, it draws an attention that Syngman Rhee’s Diplomatic independence theory was not merely diplomatic-primary independence movement theory but realistic independence theory which was considered a combination of diplomacy and force. Syngman Rhee suggested ‘who does what theory’ to overcome the distance between U.S. and China. The ‘who does what theory’ meant that prime minister and other members took counsel and proceeded affairs in Shanghai, he took whole charge of the diplomatic operations in U.S. and both conducted only serious matters in discussion. By doing like this, Syngman Rhee ruled remote the provisional government of Far East by corresponding telegraphs and letters in U.S. However, the ‘who does what theory’ which he had designed in consideration of his real situation became a main reason that it was interfering Syngman Rhee throughout his tenure. In other words, Syngman Rhee was taking criticism from the opponent that the president didn’t proceed to his post and leave difficulties of the provisional government unsettled as staying in other country. Owing to this, the problem of the absence in Shanghai could not help being dealt with a primary concern in an impeachment resolution of Syngman Rhee. Syngman Rhee made the best use of well-wishers in the provisional government to rule effectively the provisional government. The well-wishers were Giho Party who he made relations from Independence Club to Japanese annexation. He introduced a correspondent system to gather them into a single political force. He appointed some members of provisional government as correspondents and made them report all the matters of the provisional government in detail. Besides he often sent letters to the correspondents to make the provisional government members who were favored to him gather as a political force. Moreover, he had organized Cooperation Achievement Association, Hyeopseonghoe, after proceeding to his post in Shanghai and made them actively support for the policy of provisional government maintenance of Giho Party and him. From this, Syngman Rhee made it possible to govern remote the provisional government by Giho Party who were relatively small in the provisional government. Syngman Rhee wanted Shanghai Provisional Government to be like that there is the appearance without evidence. Specifically, he considered that the provisional government was to play a pivotal role in connecting between Far East and the United State...

대한민국 초대 정부의 기독교적 성격

강인철 한국기독교역사학회 2009 한국기독교와 역사 Vol.30 No.-

이 글은 ‘종교정치’가 대단히 활발했던 이승만 정부 전반기의 종교적 성격과 국가-교회 관계를 분석하고 있다. 보다 구체적으로, 필자는 이 글에서 (1) 이승만 정부 핵심 구성원들의 종교적 구성과 개신교적 색채, (2) 이승만 정부 정책의 친개신교적 성격이라는 두 가지 쟁점에 집중했다. 먼저, 이승만 정부가 정치지형의 역동적인 재편을 통해 ‘개신교 정권’의 성격을 강화해가는 과정이 이승만이 구사한 종교적 동맹 혹은 배제 전략을 통해 분석되었다. 필자는 (1) 거국내각과 여당의 형성(1948.8∼1950.6), (2) 전시체제를 위한 야당과의 일시적 제휴 및 배제(1950.7∼1951.5), (3) 야당과의 대립, 장면과의 갈등 심화와 배제(1951.6∼1952.4), (4) 족청계와의 제휴와 배제, 이승만 일인지배체제의 확립(1952.5∼1953.12)라는 네 개의 시기로 구분하여, ‘정치지형 재편의 종교적 측면’을 추적했다. 이 시기에 이승만 정부를 중심으로 대종교-개신교-천주교의 관계, 개신교 내 흥사단계와 동지회계의 관계가 빠르게 변화되어갔다. 요컨대, 이승만 정부 전반기에 걸쳐 정권 핵심부로부터 대종교, 천주교, 불교계 인사들 그리고 흥사단계 개신교 인사들이 차례로 축출됨으로써, ‘개신교(특히 동지회계) 중심의 권력구조’가 뚜렷하게 모습을 드러냈던 것이다. 결국 이승만의 독자적 권력기반 구축이라는 관점에서 볼 때, 이승만 정부의 ‘개신교적’ 성격은 정부 출범 직후보다는 집권 전반기의 끝 무렵인 1953∼1954년경에 더욱 선명하게 나타났다고 말할 수 있다. 다음으로, 이승만 정부가 내세운 다양한 정책들의 친개신교적 성격이 분석되었다. 무엇보다, 이승만 정부 전반기의 지배이데올로기였던 ‘일민주의’가 기독교적 성격을 갖고 있었다. 또 이승만은 대통령이 되기 이전과 이후에 기독교를 나라의 기초로 삼아야 한다는 확신을 거듭 표명해왔다. 이승만 대통령은 미군정기에 도입된 형목제도, 성탄절 공휴일제도, 국영방송을 통한 선교 활동을 유지함으로써 개신교에 큰 혜택을 제공했다. 국회의원 취임선서, 국회개원식, 대통령 취임식, 국가적인 장례식 등의 주요한 국가의례들이 기독교식으로 제정되거나 거행되었다. 이밖에도, 개신교 교회의 요청에 의해 국기에 대한 경례 방식을 주목례로 바꾼 점, 군종제도를 도입한 점, 교회가 한국 최초의 민영방송국을 설립하고 이후 운영자금을 조달할 수 있도록 도와주었던 점, 이른바 ‘주일성수’를 가능하게 해준 점, 첩을 둔 자가 공무원이 될 수 없도록 한 조치, 미신타파운동이나 사이비종교 추방운동 등도 이승만 정부가 교회에 제공한 특권들에 포함된다. 교회 인사에게 훈장이나 감사장 등을 수여하는 것과 같은 상징적인 도움, 그리고 재정지원이나 면세 혜택 혹은 적산불하와 같은 물질적인 도움도 물론 포함되어야 할 것이다. 마지막으로, 반민특위 피의자 중 개신교계 인사들이 다른 종교에 비해 월등하게 많았다는 점에서, 이승만에 의한 반민족행위특별조사위원회 무력화 조치는 교회가 공신력에 치명적 상처를 입을 수 있는 상황을 모면하도록 도와주었다. 급격한 정치지형 변동을 거치면서 정치영역 내에서 ‘개신교의 독주체제’가 형성되었다. 다시 말해, 정치지형 변동의 종교적 결과는 “기독교 중심 사회로의 급속한 전환”으로 나타났다. 정치지형 변동과 맞물린 종교지형의 변동은 평면적으로도, 또한 입체적으로도 진행되었다. 종교지형의 ‘ ... This article deals with the church-state relationships in the period of 1948∼1954, the first half of Syngman Rhee’s presidency. Religious politics was highly activated in this period. More concretely, in this paper I concentrated on two issues: (1) religious composition of key members in the Rhee government and ruling party, (2) pro-Protestantism of the Rhee government policies. During the period of 1948∼1954, president Rhee skillfully used the strategies of religious alliance and opposition. His first cabinet was composed of members from various religions, but non-Protestant politicians belonging to Daejonggyo(대종교), Catholicism, Buddhism were gradually excluded from the cabinet and ruling party. Among the Protestant politicians, those who participated in the Young Korean Academy(Heungsadan) were also the target to be excluded. The Young Korean Academy was founded and led by Ahn Chang-Ho, who has long been the Syngman Rhee’s chief antagonist among the Korean Protestant activist groups. Instead, those who participated in Dongjihwe(동지회) founded and led by Syngman Rhee had became the key members in Rhee’s government and ruling party. By the year of 1953 or 1954, religious characteristics of Rhee’s government as a Protestant regime were even more apparent than the beginning of the his government. Pro-Protestantism of Rhee’s government was also displayed and strengthened by the various government policies which unfairly favored the Protestant Churches. Surely, these policies were the benefits in return for the strong support for president Rhee and his government in the part of Korean Protestant Churches. Above all, dominant ideology initiated by Syngman Rhee during the first half of his presidency, Ilminjui(일민주의), was colored by Christian ethics. Moreover Syngman Rhee himself has often said the need and hope to found new nation on the Christian ground. Besides, pro-Protestant policies of Rhee’s government includes the introduction of prison and military chaplainship, of Christmas as a national holiday, changing the way of salute to the national flag, evangelization through the national broadcasting system, etc. President Rhee’s unwillingness to punish the pro-Japanese collaborators would have been a great relief for the Protestant Churches, for there were much more pro-Japanese suspects in the Protestant Churches than in any other religions.