가짜뉴스(fake news)에서 허위조작정보(disinformation)로

김민정 언론중재위원회 2019 미디어와 인격권 Vol.5 No.2

Around 2016, “fake news” had become a buzzword. This study posited that labeling a phenomenon is significant—whether it is the subject of research or regulation—because labels influence people’s thoughts and solutions regarding the phenomenon. It is impossible to study or regulate something if each person defines it differently; thus, this study explored fake news and disinformation. According to several Korean scholars’ related research since its introduction in Korea, the definition of fake news has three main components: intent to deceive, false facts, and news reporting imitation. However, fake news is now understood beyond its original meaning. In the rise of concerns about fake news, so-called fake news bills have been proposed in Korea. This study first examined what these bills intend to regulate. The study found that there were 27 bills related to fake news and disinformation, and among them, 13 bills defined what needs to be regulated. It was observed that the 20th National Assembly’s proposed fake news bills often referred to what needs to be regulated as “fake news” and emphasized the imitation of news reporting in the term’s definition. Inaddition, many of the fake news bills included the following definitions: 1) the information was created, produced, and disseminated to enhance political or economic interests; 2) the information was made to deceive the audience; and 3) the information contains false facts. The definition of what the fake news bills intend to regulate seems to reflect the “fake news” definition presented in Korean academic discussions. This study’s author argues that it is no longer necessary nor appropriate to focus on news reporting imitation as one of the core elements of what needs to be regulated. Given the changes in the media environment, courts applying the law would question what form news reporting takes as the information disorder disturbing the online information ecosystem and causing harm has appeared in various forms. The study also examined fake news’ and disinformation’s definitions abroad. Instead of “fake news,” the study found that the European Union and the United Kingdom use the term “disinformation” to call for responses about the complex and multifaceted phenomena. The key conceptual features of disinformation are content falsity and intentional manipulation. In addition, Google has issued a comprehensive report on disinformation and defined it as “deliberate efforts to deceive and mislead using the speed, scale, and technologies of the open web.” Meanwhile, Germany and France have passed new bills with precise definitions of what they regulate: illegal content according to the existing criminal statute in Germany and false information that was spread at a massive scale during the three months before France’s election and violated its authenticity. This study concluded that using the term “disinformation” is more suitable for regulatory discussions rather than “fake news,” but it is not enough to simply refer to fake news as disinformation. The study author argues that disinformation should not be understood as asingle thing that can be defined in legislation. Instead, the term “disinformation”—consisting of various expressions that cause different harms—has to be understood as a concept that reminds us that we must cope with new digital manipulations that are so easily done in unimaginable ways and quickly spreading because of technological advancements. 본 연구는 2016년을 전・후로 해서 전 세계적으로 주목을 끌면서 규제가 필요한 대상으로 논의되고 있는 가짜뉴스/허위조작정보의 개념을 톺아보는 것을 그 목적으로 하여, 국・내외의 규제관련 논의에서의 용어사용및 개념정의의 특징을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 연구결과, 제20대 국회에서 발의된 가짜뉴스/허위조작정보 관련 법안들은 1) 규제대상을 ‘가짜뉴스’로 지칭한 경우가 많았고 2) ‘언론보도 형식의 모방’을 핵심 개념 중하나로 상정했던 것으로 나타났다. 해외 대응안에서는 ‘가짜뉴스’라는 용어로 관련 문제를 규정하는 것은 더 이상 유효하지 않다는 지적과 함께‘내용의 허위’와 ‘고의성’을 핵심개념요소로 하는 ‘허위조작정보(disinformation)’라는 용어를 사용하면서 복합적이고 다면적인 현상에 대한 대응방안을 요청하는 경향이 두드러졌다. 아울러 해외에서는 가짜뉴스/허위조작정보를 법적 규제대상으로 상정할 때는 기존 형법상의 불법정보(독일의 네트워크법집행법) 혹은 선거의 진정성을 침해하는 거짓정보를의도적으로 (대량)유포하는 경우(프랑스의 정보조작근절법)로 제한하고있었다. 본 연구는 규제관련 논의에서 가짜뉴스라는 용어를 사용하는 것은 부적절하다고 결론짓고 해당 용어의 사용을 중지할 것을 제안한다, 아울러, 본 연구는 가짜뉴스 대신 허위조작정보라는 용어를 사용하는 것이더 바람직하나, 단순히 가짜뉴스를 허위조작정보로 대체 지칭하는 것만으로는 충분하지 않고, 허위조작정보가 법적 규제대상으로 설정될 수 있는단일 실체가 아니라 각기 다른 종류의 해악을 초래하는 다양한 유형의표현물의 복합체임을 인지함과 동시에 기술의 발전으로 인해 이전에는상상하지 못했던 방식으로 너무나도 쉽고, 빠르며, 광범위한 방식으로 전개되고 있는 일련의 디지털 조작에 총체적으로 대응해야 한다는 점을 상기시키는 용어로 허위조작정보라는 용어를 이해해야 한다고 주장한다.

온라인 허위정보의 규제를 위한 접근법-허위정보의 의미와 본질, 규제 방향을 중심으로-

이정념 ( Lee Jungnyum ) 한남대학교 과학기술법연구원 2019 과학기술법연구 Vol.25 No.2

온라인 플랫폼을 기반으로 하는 정보통신서비스는 사람들에게 다양한 정보에 접근하고 필요한 정보를 수집하며 특정 논제에 대한 의사표현을 가능하게 하는 무수히 많은 방법들을 제공하고 있다. 동시에 이것은 사실이 아닌 가짜의, 거짓의 또는 허위의 정보를 확산시키며 민주주의 정치질서, 사회구조 및 국가 안보에 대한 위험을 초래하고 있는데, 이른바 ‘허위정보’는 의도적으로 해를 끼칠 목적으로 가짜인 내용 또는 사실과 가짜가 혼합되어 있는 내용을 담고 온라인 공간에서 빠르게 유포되고 있다. 유럽연합은 2017년부터 페이크뉴스와 허위정보를 구별하여 허위정보에 특화된 규제체계를 갖추기 위한 논의를 본격화하였는데, 2018년 9월 26일 공식화 된 유럽연합의 < 허위정보에 관한 실행기준 (Code of Practice on Disinformation) >은 세계에서 처음으로 온라인 정보통신서비스 제공자들이 자율적으로 허위정보에 대응하기 위하여 마련한 규제책이라는 측면에서 주목할 만하다. 본 논문은 온라인 허위정보의 특성에 맞추어진 규제의 필요성을 긍정하면서, 허위정보의 의미와 본질을 탐구하고 유럽연합의 <허위정보에 관한 실행기준>의 제정과정, 주요 내용 및 시사점을 분석하며, 우리나라에서 온라인 허위정보에 효과적으로 대응하기 위한 규제 방향에 대하여 중점적으로 언급하고 있다. Info-communications services based on online platforms provide many kinds of ways for persons to access various information, gather necessary information, and express opinions on specific topics. At the same time, however, they facilitate spreading fake, false or fabricated information and pose a risk to the democratic political order, the social structure and national security. So-called ‘Disinformation’, which involves contents that are false or fabricated information blended with genuine facts to intentionally cause harm or for profit, has spread rapidly in online space. Since 2017 the European Union has earnestly discussed the establishment of the specific regulatory system on online disinformation by discerning between fake news and disinformation. The European Union’s < Code of Practice on Disinformation >, formulated on 26 September 2018, is noteworthy as the first self-regulatory measure created voluntarily to control online disinformation by providers of online info-communications services. Affirming the need for the regulation reflecting the characteristics of online disinformation, this article explores the meaning and essence of disinformation, analyses the making process, main content and implications of the European Union’s < Code of Practice on Disinformation > and suggests regulatory directions for an effective response to online disinformation in Korea.

WHAT MAKES DISINFORMATION GO THE EXTRA MILE? EXAMINING THE DARK SIDE OF VIRALITY

Christina Okoutsidou,Raoul V. K?bler 글로벌지식마케팅경영학회 2023 Global Marketing Conference Vol.2023 No.07

Disinformation can distort real-world events and influence individuals’ decisions, posing a serious threat to society. However, moderating disinformation is still a major challenge for social network operators, as they are omnipresent, and social media’s ease-of-use, anonymity, and interconnectedness enables their rapid diffusion. Additionally, there is a lack of clear guidance on prioritizing content for censorship efforts. Until now, existing literature focuses on the virality of traditional online content, such as marketing campaigns, which are generally driven by positive emotions and arousal. Nevertheless, this type of content is vastly dissimilar from the hate-filled, misleading, and malicious content on social media platforms, rendering literature findings inapplicable when it comes to disinformation diffusion. So, what makes disinformation go viral? Using a unique dataset of ~400 million live-crawled messages on Twitter surrounding the US presidential election in 2020, our study analyzes which content and context characteristics drive the virality of disinformation. We classify ~10 million disinformation spread over ~50,000 distinct disinformation stories and (1) identify different diffusion trajectories of virality with the help of time series shape clustering. Moreover, to investigate the differing diffusion patterns, we (2) use state-of-the-art natural language processing to analyze linguistic and meta-level features. With that, this work provides ex-ante guidance to policymakers and network operators to help identify the most critical content on social media to curb the spread of threatening disinformation online. Furthermore, this study advances the overall understanding of disinformation diffusion by focusing exclusively on misleading content and the differences among them. Lastly, this work can add a new perspective to existing research by extensively quantifying the effects of viral disinformation online with a large-scale social media analysis.

사회적 법익을 침해하는 허위조작정보 대응을 위한 시론적 논의 - 코로나19 관련 허위조작정보를 중심으로 -

정영주(YoungJu Jung),홍종윤(Jong-Yoon Hong),박유진(Yujin Park) 한국언론법학회 2021 언론과 법 Vol.20 No.1

허위조작정보에 대한 규제는 현행 법률로도 상당 부분 가능하다. 그러나, 대부분 개인적 법익 침해를 기본 요건으로 하고 있어 불특정 다수와 국가 및 사회적 법익 침해하는 허위조작정보에 대한 규제는 공백 상황이다. 코로나19와 같은 대규모 감염병은 그 특성상 공동체의 안위와 직결되는 사회적 재난으로서, 정치적·경제적 목적의 허위조작정보와 달리 국민의 건강과 신체, 공동체에 직접적 위해를 가져올 수 있다는 점에서 사회적 법익 침해의 대표적 사례가 될 수 있다. 이 연구는 국내 코로나19 관련 허위조작정보의 유형 및 현황을 분석하여 피해자가 특정되지 않으면서 사회적 혼란과 불안 등을 야기하는 허위조작정보에 대한 규제 대응 방안을 모색한다. 코로나19 관련 허위조작정보의 대다수는 출처 불명의 루머 형태로 온라인 커뮤니티·포털, 소셜미디어 서비스를 통해 유통되고 있으며, 전염 경로나 전파력, 예방, 백신 등 공동체 안위에 직결되는 의학 정보 관련 내용이 많고, 또한 피해 대상이 특정되지 않는 경우가 대부분이다. 따라서, 감염병이라는 특수하고 제한된 사회재난 상황에서 국민의 신체와 건강, 공동체의 안위에 명백하고 실질적인 위험을 초래하거나 초래할 가능성이 있는 허위조작정보를 가능한 세분화하고, 이에 대한 입법적·행정적 대응 방안을 모색하는 것이 필요하다. 허위조작정보 규제에 대한 불필요한 정치적 논란을 해소하면서 허위조작정보 생산자에 대한 처벌 중심의 프레임이 아니라 허위조작정보의 유통과 확산을 최소화하여 시민의 건강과 공동체의 안위를 저해하는 허위조작정보에 대한 실효성 있는 대응 방안을 모색해야 할 것이다. Regulations on disinformation are possible to a large extent under current legislation. However, with the exception of the Public Offices Election Act, all other laws require infringement of personal legal interests, so it is impossible to regulate disinformation that infringes social legal interests. For example, in the context of social disasters such as the COVID-19, disinformation associated with the infection are representative of social legal infringement in that they can directly harm the health of the population and the community. In this study, by analyzing the current state of disinformation related to COVID-19, we will seek regulatory measures for disinformation that infringes social legal interests and causes social confusion, although the victim is not identified. Most of the disinformation related to COVID-19 is distributed through online community, portals and social media in the form of rumors of unknown source. There are many medical information-related contents that directly harm the community safety, such as infection routes, infectivity, preventive methods, and vaccines, and in most cases, the target of damage is not specified. Therefore, in a special and limited social disaster situation, disinformation that can pose obvious and substantial risks to the well-being of the people"s bodies and communities needs to be categorized as specifically as possible. Based on that, we must seek legislative and administrative measures. Specifically, it is necessary to set a frame that minimizes the distribution of disinformation, rather than a frame that focuses on punishment of producers of disinformation. It will be the first step in seeking effective countermeasures for disinformation that impedes the health of citizens and the well-being of communities. In the future, it will be necessary to conduct an survey on the exposure status of disinformation related to COVID-19. Based on this, subsequent research should be conducted to understand the scope and extent of the substantial harmful effects to search for concrete legal and administrative measures.

진리를 추구하는 삶을 위한 탈진실 시대의 리터러시 : 활동적 장년층의 허위정보 인식을 중심으로

김효숙 한국기독교교육정보학회 2023 기독교교육정보 Vol.- No.78

The church, as a community seeking the truth, needs to actively address the challenge of disinformation. The purpose of this study is to investigate the perception of disinformation of the active senior (age group 55-70, N=900) emerging as engaged participants in an ultra-aging society based on their religious identity and political tendencies, and to provide an opportunity for reflection and education to restore the church's public role. Regarding groups based on religious identity, there were more similarities than differences in the perception of the concept of disinformation between 'Christians' and 'non-Christians'. ‘Pastors' showed a high awareness of recommendation algorithms but expressed some skepticism about the usefulness of them. It was evident that subjective beliefs had a greater impact than objective facts in discerning disinformation and accepting fact-checked news. In the case of groups based on political tendencies, it was found that groups with strong political tendencies (progressive group and conservative group) perceived the concept of disinformation somewhat strictly. In terms of identifying disinformation, the 'progressive group' was the most accurate, and in accepting fact-checked news, the 'conservative group' tended to judge based on subjective beliefs rather than objective facts. The presence of a third-person effect on the impact of disinformation was evident across all groups, indicating the need for proactive measures to address disinformation. As a result, it is relevant to propose educational opportunities to promote reflective information literacy.

Regulating Disinformation through Criminal Sanctions: What Drives South Korea’s and Brazil’s Attempts to Penalize Disinformation?

명석영,정호윤 호남대학교 인문사회과학연구소 2022 인문사회과학연구 Vol.65 No.1

As fears of fake news were highlighted during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, attempts to regulate fake news or disinformation have continued internationally. This study addresses the research questions of why some countries are moving toward tight regulations, and what factors lead to similarly stricter regulations on disinformation with criminal sanctions in different countries. A comparative study is conducted to identify which factors produce similar results in socio-politically different South Korea and Brazil, based on macro-causal analysis through the most different systems design. Research outcomes reveal that both countries share a similarly low level of digital media literacy, commonly possess supporting legal infrastructure for anti-disinformation legislation, defamation laws in particular, and a comparable degree of concern over disinformation among their citizens. This study argues that both countries commonly possess a legal and social foundation on which punitive regulations on disinformation can be realized and those three factors have been mutually “combined” to lead to punitive regulations.

유튜브 채널에서 코로나19 중국관련 허위정보 확산에 관한 연구: 확산 주체와 정보유형 분석을 중심으로

홍주현(Ju-Hyun Hong),설진아(Jin-ah Seol),이종임(Jong-Im Lee) 한국콘텐츠학회 2021 한국콘텐츠학회논문지 Vol.21 No.2

유튜브 채널에서 중국 관련 코로나19 정보의 확산과정을 네트워크 분석을 통해 알아봤다. 중국 관련 코로나19 정보를 사실 정보와 허위정보로 구분했고, 사실 정보는 긍정적, 부정적으로 분류했다. 네트워크 분석결과 부정적 정보와 허위정보가 많았고, 긍정적 정보는 가장 적었다. 허위정보 중에서 우한연구소 유출설 관련 동영상이 많았고, 유전자 조작설 관련 동영상의 조회 수와 매개 중심성 평균이 가장 컸다. 언론사 채널은 허위정보에 대한 팩트 체크보다 있는 그대로 전달하는데 그쳤다. 중국 관련 코로나19 동영상 중 부정적 정보와 허위정보가 많았다는 것은 중국 관련 비판적이거나 자극적인 내용이 유튜버의 관심을 끌었다는 것을 보여준다. 결론적으로 유튜브 채널의 허위정보는 이용자들이 유사한 주제의 동영상을 시청하게 하는 확산 효과를 가져왔다. This study explores diffusion of information on Covid-19 relating to China on You Tube. For this, information on Covid-19 relating to China was divided into factual information and disinformation, with factual information being categorized into positive and negative information. According to network analysis, there are lots of negative information and disinformation. On the contrary positive information is rare. There are lots of videos about rumor on the leak of Wuhan institute among disinformation. Rumor on the manipulation of genes has the highest average value of view count and betweenness centrality. Main stream youtube channel has only role of messenger which delivers messages as it is instead of fact-checking on disinformation. The fact which there are much more negative information or disinformation among videos about Covid-19 relating with China shows that Youtube users skewed toward negative information and disinformation than positive ones. In summary, disinformation on youtube brings spreadable effect by making user watch similar contents.

Korean Media’s Mistranslation of News Articles from Foreign Media and Its Possible Consequences on Korean Politics and Society

장선미 한국영어어문교육학회 2021 영어어문교육 Vol.27 No.1

Many people are prone to believe disinformation/fake news because of its provocativeness. Because most fake information is distributed via news articles on political issues in South Korea, it is hazardous to public and democracy by deception and manipulation. This study considers various types of disinformation that have been categorized by scholars with some examples found on current South Korean major media but also identifies a new type: mistranslation. This study examines specific types of South Korean mainstream media disinformation; it demonstrates mistranslation is an additional type; and it reveals mistranslated overseas news articles that have generated media disinformation. General types of disinformation or fake news that suit South Korea’s social context are discussed with examples including mistranslation. After further discussion, with South Korea’s social context as the backdrop for highlighting forms of mistranslation and other types of disinformation, the conclusion is followed by a critique of the conditions of English education needed to overcome mistranslation. This study shows the state of disinformation/fake news and its effects in South Korea through a different view of disinformation via trans-linguistic aspects, acknowledging that it is a normal social phenomenon open societies are supposed to face regardless of its possible negative influence in public.

사이버 명예훼손죄에 관한 법제 개선방안 -허위조작정보(이른바 페이크뉴스) 및 온라인 타인사칭을 중심으로-

고명수 법제처 2020 법제 Vol.691 No.-

This study deals with the measures to improve the current defamation legal system. Disinformation and online impersonation cannot be punished, although they are defamatory behaviors in cyberspace. The tension between punishment and freedom of expression, as well as specific defamatory aspects of cyberspace must be taken into account to justify the punishment for defamation. The current defamation rules only protect the reputation of the 'person'. Defamation against corporation or other organization is recognized by Dogmatic. However, this should be explicitly stipulated in defamation rules. Posting links or clicking the 'Like'button for defamatory expression on Facebook could be punished as an accomplice. Since the illegality of the defamatory expression in SNS remains until it is completely deleted, and if it is shared, the illegality of principal offender is strengthened. It is not clear to distinguish between statement of fact and expression of opinion, and between objective truth and falsity. Therefore, when determining the strength and scope of the sanctions for fake news, it is important to clearly define the subject of regulation, taking into account the principle of legality and freedom of expression.: The subject of regulation should be 'disinformation' that has been intentionally manipulated for a specific purpose. A specific purpose such as public interest, public order or national security assurance is proposed for punishing disinformation, but this is against the principle of legality. In view of this, it would be desirable to have individual punishment rules in individual laws (「Framework Act on the management of disasters and safety」, 「Act on the Prevention and Management of Infectious Diseases」, 「Counterterrorism Act for Citizen Protection and Public Safety」), such as the 「Public Election Act」, rather than having general punishment rules for disinformation. And in order to enact rules to block or delete disinformation, freedom of expression should be scrutinized more carefully than punishment rules, since the information is still within the scope of freedom of expression. It is suggested that the possible time frame for blocking or deleting disinformation be limited to when specific risks arise or are at a sufficiently anticipated stage: during wartime, civil war, incidents, terrorism, hostility; after declaring a state of alert in a disaster crisis; a few days before election day. Only then could freedom of expression be guaranteed as far as possible, democracy protected and this preemptive measure justified. Online impersonation is an act of intentionally impersonating another person using his or her personal information without permission in cyberspace. There is no punishment for defamation if the facts in defamatory expression were not dealt with directly with the impersonated person, so the need for a separate punishment rule is pointed out. Since impersonation in itself is not enough to be punished, the punishment must be justified by limiting the subject of punishment and the type of behavior. The purpose of impersonation should be directed towards a crime, particularly defamation, fraud and persistent harassment. Regarding defamation, legislation may be considered that punishes defamation based on continuous activity in SNS, not based on giving specific facts related to the victim. Then, whether or not other users in SNS misrecognize the actor as an impersonated person should be judged according to objective criteria, and whether or not there is a defamatory expression should be judged comprehensively.

유튜브의 개인화 알고리즘이 ‘허위정보 경험에 대한 인식’에 미치는 영향

황주성 정보통신정책학회 2022 정보통신정책연구 Vol.29 No.2

Since mid-2010s, creation and distribution of disinformation through social media has been increasing. Social media such as Facebook, Tweeter and YouTube are regarded as major channels of disinformation in that they bias individual media consumption through echo chamber effects and filter bubble effects. However, while discussions on the bias effects of social media are abundant, there are few empirical studies that objectively reveal the relationship between social media and disinformation. This paper empirically investigated if YouTube’s echo chamber effects and filter bubble effects actually affect perceptions of disinformation experiences, using the raw data of the 2018 Korea Press Foundation’s survey. As a result of the analysis, echo chamber effects through subscription to YouTube platform showed positive (+) relation to the perceptions of disinformation experiences. On the other hand, filter bubble effects through algorithmic recommendation did not show a statistically significant effect. These results are academically and politically meaningful in that YouTube’s algorithmic effect is the result of echo chamber effects by users rather than filter bubble effects of algorithm-based recommendation platform.