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이창환,김동우,김성환,변종훈,어호용,김용흔 대한내과학회 1986 대한내과학회지 Vol.31 No.3
We have experienced a case of massive splenomegaly which showed hypersplenism in a 53- year-old lady. The cause was obscure after preoperative diagnostic work-ups. Exploratory laparotomy with splenectomy wedge biopsy of liver, and lymph node biopsy was performed for the diagnostic and therapeutic purpose. There were no evidences suggesting for malignant lymphoma, myelofibrosis with myeloid metaplasia, storage diseases, or tuberculosis. We have observed her post-operative course for over two years. No evidence of disease progression have been found. We have cautiously concluded that her illness was so-called primary hypersplenism.
Modeling Coordinated Contracts for a Supply Chain Consisting of Normal and Markdown Sale Markets
이창환 한국경영과학회 2005 Management Science and Financial Engineering Vol.11 No.1
The results of a study of the coordination effect in stocking and promotional markdown policies for a supply chain consisting of a retailer and a discount outlet (DCO) are reported here. We assume that the product is sold in two consecutive periods: the Normal Sales Period (NSP) and the subsequent Promotional Markdown Sales Period (PSP). We first study an integrated supply chain in which managers in the two periods design a common system so as to jointly decide the stocking quantities, markdown time schedule, and mark-down price to maximize mutual profit. Next, we consider a decentralized supply chain. An uncoordinated contract is designed in which decisions are decentralized to optimize the individual party’s objective function. Here, three sources of system inefficiencies cause the decentralized system to earn a lower expected system profit than that in the integrated supply chain. The three sources are as follows: in the decentralized system the retailer tends to (1) stock less, and (2) keep a longer sales period, and the DCO tends to (3) stock fewer leftovers inventories and charge a higher markdown price. Finally, a numerical ex-periment is provided to compare the coordinated model with the uncoordinated model to explore factors that make coordination an effective approach.
가격보호 정책, 반품 정책과 물량할인 정책을 사용한 3단계 공급사슬의 협력방안
이창환 한국경영과학회 2005 韓國經營科學會誌 Vol.30 No.3
The coordination of a three-level supply chain consisting of a supplier, a retailer, and a discount outlet (DCO) is studied here. We assume that the product is sold in two consecutive periods:a Normal Sales Period (NSP) and a subsequent Clearance Salvage Period (CSP). A benchmark case is studied initially in which the supply chain is coordinated by a single agent. Thus, the supplier, the retailer, and the discount outlet design a common system that allows centralized decision making about stocking quantities, markdown time schedules, and policies on disposing of leftovers to deliver the greatest possible expected supply chain profit. Next, we consider a decentralized supply chain. Here, decisions are made without coordination. The objective is to maximize an individual party's expected profits. The focus of the study is on the following questions: what factors make the coordination an effective approach for the supply chain? How do we coordinate the supply chain so as to maximize the supply chain joint expected profit? These and other related study issues are explored in this paper.
Designing a Supply Chain Coordinating Returns Policies for a Risk Sensitive Manufacturer
이창환,임재익 한국경영과학회 2005 Management Science and Financial Engineering Vol.11 No.2
In this article we consider a supply chain consisting of a risk-sensitive manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. The manufacturer maximizes her individual expected profit by designing a supply chain coordinating returns contract (SCRC) that consists of (i) a channel coordinating returns policy that maximizes the supply chain joint expected profit, and (ii) a profit sharing arrangement that gives the retailer an expected profit only slightly higher than that in the no returns case so that it is just enough to induce the retailer to accept the SCRC. Thus, the manufacturer captures as high a per-centage as possible of the jointly maximum supply chain profit. However, this contract can some-times lead to the manufacturer’s resulting realized profit being lower than that in the no returns case when demand is lower than expected. In this context, even though profit is sufficiently attractive on average, will the risk-sensitive manufacturer ever consider applying a SCRC? Our research raises this question and focuses on designing a SCRC that can significantly increase the probability of the manufacturer’s resulting realized profit being at least higher than that in the no returns case.