정암 이현익의 사단칠정론

이선열 ( Sun Yuhl Yi ) (사)율곡연구원 2016 율곡학연구 Vol.32 No.-

This research focuses on the theory of Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings performed by Yi Hyun-Ik. Yi belonged to Rakhak(洛學) in Yulgok school in the Joseon Dynasty in the 18th century. Yi``s view on this issue can be recapitulated as two claims: (i) Yulgok was entirely right as regards to the relations between Four Beginnings and Seven Fellings, and (ii) nevertheless, Toegye``s view on this issue, if examined closely to understand what it was originally meant, is not incompatible with Yulgok``s theory. This reveals the basic attitudes of Yi``s philosophy, which compromises the two great philosophers`` views. At the same time, Yi provides criticisms on their views. He attempted to reach comprehensive understanding of the Theory of Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, while pointing out the problems one may face taking Toegye or Yulgok``s view tendentiously. In sum, Yi``s view on Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings is the result of accommodating both Toegye``s and Yulgok``s philosophies, and, at the same time, of critically examining their views. The historical significance of Yi``s view lies in the fact that it clarifies the complex issues raised by the theory of Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings within his own line of thinking, as opposed to merely following previous discourses.

타자 대우의 두 원칙: 관용과 서(恕)

이선열 ( Sun Yuhl Yi ) (사)율곡연구원 2012 율곡학연구 Vol.24 No.-

One of the most important political and social issues nowadays is how to maintain a society with diverse cultures and values, In order to respect diversity, we ought to be open-minded about various viewpoints on values, however, the difference in opinion stemming from various moral values often leads to social conflicts, Therefore, in order to retain the diversity of society, we should acknowledge the possibility of such conflicts, and try to manage and mitigate me controversies and disputes caused by them. This article discusses two principles of ethics, tolerance and shu (恕, generosity), suggested to cope with me social conflicts stemming from diversity in values. In particular, I discuss the significance and the limitations of the two principles, and examine how they can complement each other. The notion of tolerance as developed in me Western tradition of liberalism is based on the belief that there may be fundamental difference in moral point of views each individual holds, and such difference cannot be resolved, According to the liberalism, it is difficult to find a solid basis for holding that one moral viewpoint is superior to any others, The spirit of tolerance is to pursue the coexistence of different moral values by means of acknowledging the differences as may are, as opposed to eliminating them. Although tolerance is an essential virtue is a society respecting diversity, there may be problems in puffing me principle of tolerance into practice. First of all, one might ask whether we should tolerate a system of value mat endorses me practice of injustice such as the violation of human rights. Also, a non-intervention policy under the cloak of tolerance may give rise to the widespread apathy toward others, In general, the acknowledgement of others based on tolerance, which pursues the coexistence of different systems of value, dose not provide a principle that generates mutual sympathy.

송암 기정익의 기수설(氣數說) -박상현·윤증과의 논변을 중심으로-

이선열 ( Yi¸ Sun-yuhl ) 퇴계학연구원 2020 退溪學報 Vol.148 No.-

This article examines the academic significance of the arguments of gi (氣) and su (數) discussed in the 17th century Yulgok School, focusing on the debate among Ki Jeong-Ik, Park Sang-Hyun, and Yoon Jeung. The Gi-su argument is a discussion about how to see the relationship between gi that makes up the real world and su that determines the fortune of the reality, and is a rather peculiar discourse that has not been dealt with in the study of Chosun's Confucianism. The main issue of the argument was whether to see gi and su identically or separately, and how to understand the variability and immutability of gi and su. The philosophical question implied in the argument is to ask how much a person can overcome and change the destiny that has been given since birth, based on the worldview of the li (理) and gi (氣) theory of Neo-Confucianism. In addition, this question can be said to be embodied in the agony of the Yulgok School, which explores how far human efforts beyond the limits are possible in the reality confined by gi. Ki Jung-Ik, who was at the center of the discourse, responds to the arguments of Park and Yoon, establishing his theories and deeply pondering the relationship between will and fate.

송시열과 박상현의 미발 논변

이선열(Yi, Sun-Yuhl) 서울대학교 철학사상연구소 2010 철학사상 Vol.36 No.-

미발(未發)과 기질(氣質)의 관계는 중화론(中和論)과 이기론(理氣論)이라는 주자학의 두 논의범주가 중첩되면서 발생하는 논리적 문제로, 이는 율곡학파 특유의 논점과 결합하여 더욱 증폭되는 양상을 띠게 된다. 주희는 중화신설을 정립하며 미발을 현상 너머의 초월적 본체가 아닌 ‘마음’의 한 국면으로 규정하였는데, 여기에 심(心)을 기(氣)로 보는 율곡학파의 인식이 투영되자 심의 한 부분인 미발 또한 결국 기의 조건에 좌우되는 것이 아닌가라는 문제가 제기되었던 것이다. 이에 송시열과 박상현은 미발을 기질 개념과 결부하여 이해하는 것이 타당한지를 놓고 이론적으로 대립한다. 박상현에게 미발이란 ‘대상사물과 감응하기 이전’이라는 마음의 한 시점을 뜻하는 것으로, 여기에는 시간적 관념이 우선하며 특정한 도덕적 함의가 들어있지 않다. 그에게 미발은 곧바로 중(中)의 상태로 환원되지 않는 것이다. 이에 박상현은 마음을 이루는 기의 청탁(淸濁) 여하에 따라 미발시에도 중(中)과 부중(不中) 또는 선과 악이 모두 존재할 수 있다는 입장에 선다. 이러한 그의 논리는 성인과 보통사람은 각각 기질이 다르기 때문에 미발에 있어서도 서로 동일하지 않다는 성범부동론(聖凡不同論)의 견해로 이어진다. 반면 송시열은 미발이란 곧 마음이 중의 상태에 있음을 일컫는 것이요, 미발 개념을 규정함에 있어 기질의 편차는 고려 대상이 되지 않는다고 본다. 그에 따르면 미발은 단지 사물과 접하지 않은 시점에 그치는 것이 아니라 도덕적 이상태로서의 의미를 그 자체로 함축한다. 그는 기품 여하와 무관하게 천리와 소통하는 마음자리로서 미발의 이념적 위상을 확보하고자 하며, 이에 기질의 영향이 실제화되는 시점을 이발(已發) 이후로 한정하여 미발과 기질의 상관성을 아예 차단시킨다. 송시열에게 미발이란 본성 또는 천리와 동등한 보편성을 가지며, 따라서 성인과 범인을 막론하고 누구에게나 동질적으로 체험될 수 있는 심적 상태로 간주된다. 이러한 두 사람의 견해차는 훗날 호학과 낙학의 입장 대립과 큰 틀에서 부합한다고 할 수 있다. Debate on Mibal(未發) between Song Si-Yeol and Park Sang-Hyun: Focusing on the problem of understanding mibal in relation to kijil(氣質). Song Si-Yeol and one of his disciples Park Sang-Hyun disagree with each other as to whether it is legitimate to understand mibal (未發) in relation to kijil(氣質, temperament). The disagreement between them stems from the fact that their versions of mibal differ from each other. According to Park, mibal is a certain time prior to the mind"s making contact with an object. From this view, mibal is basically a temporal notion and does not contain any ethical implications in particular. For Park, mibal is not equated with the notion of centrality(中). He argues that centrality and incorrectness (不中), or good and evil, may coexist, even in the state of mibal. This leads to the view that a sage and a layman cannot be the same in terms of mibal, for they differ in temperament. On the other hand, Song contends that mibal is the mind in the state of centrality. According to him, the difference in temperament should not be taken into account when expounding the concept of mibal. He holds that mibal is not a mere temporal point prior to the contact to an object, but an ideal entity that contains moral significance by itself. Song aims to provide a metaphysical basis of mibal that interprets it as the realm of a mind that is connected to the Heavenly Principle(天理). For this reason, he claims that the difference in temperament can only be displayed in the state of yibal(已發), precluding the interconnection between mibal and temperament. According to Song, mibal, like sung(性) and li(理), is universally applied. Thus, it can be experienced by every member of mankind, sages and laymen alike. In general, the difference of opinion on this matter between Song and Park corresponds to the later disagreement between the Ho-hak line(湖學) and the Rak-hak line(洛學).

송시열과 한원진의 미발론 비교 검토

이선열(Yi Sun-yuhl) 한국학중앙연구원 2009 한국학 Vol.32 No.2

남당 한원진의 김창협 지각론 비판

이선열 ( Sun Yuhl Yi ) 한국철학사연구회 2013 한국 철학논집 Vol.0 No.36

본 논문의 목적은 18세기 湖學의 종장이었던 남당 한원진의 김창협 지각론에 대한 비판을 구체적으로 분석해 보는 것이다. 당시 호락논쟁에서 지각과 관련된 논쟁을 주도했던 인물은 김창협이었고, 따라서 당시의 지각 담론은 대체로 그에 대한 찬반 논의로 전개되는 양상이었다. 洛學과 대립한 한원진에게 농암설을 성공적으로 반박하는 것은 湖學의 학파적 입장을 정립함에 있어 주요한 사안이었다. 쟁점은 주로 지각의 연원에 관한 문제, 혹은 智와 知覺의 관계에 관한 문제였다. 김창협은 智와 知覺이 본질상 별개의 범주에 속하며 양자 간에 體用의 관계가 성립하지 않는다고 본다. 그는 智와 知覺의 관계를 실현되어야 할 ‘道’와 그것을 실현해야 할 ‘器’의 관계, 또는 객체(所)와 주체(能)의 관계로만 보는 입장을 정식화 한다. 나아가 김창협은 心의 지각활동이 본성과 직결된 것이 아니며 그로부터 비롯되는 것도 아니라고 주장하여 心의 독자성을 강조한다. 한원진은 그러한 김창협의 구도가 性과 心을 분리하며 궁극적으로 본성이 아니라 마음을 본체로 삼는 오류에 빠질 수 있음을 경계한다. 그는 心의 지각 활동이 본성이라는 절대적 근거가 없이 이루어진다면, 결국 지각은 자의적으로 대상과 관계맺는 맹목적인 인지활동에 지나지 않게 된다고 본다. 만약 본성에 근거하지 않더라도 지각이 도덕적 성격을 띠게 된다고 가정 할 경우, 이는 본성이 아니라 마음 자체에 도덕의 근거가 내재한다는 얘기가 되므로 결국 본체를 性과 心둘로 나누는 셈이 되고 만다. 한원진에 따르면 인간의 지각이란 도덕본성에 근거하여 이루어지는 활동이어야 한다. 그렇게 볼 때 김창협이 도덕실현의 주체로서 지각의 역할을 강조하는 입장이라면, 한원진의 경우 도덕실현을 가능케 하는 본원으로서 智의 위상을 중시하는 입장에 선다. This paper aims to analyse Han Wonjin`s criticism centered on Kim Changhyup`s theory of Jigak(知覺). In the early 18th century, Kim Changhyup whose position considered as the leader of Rakhak(洛學) circle was the central figure in the debate on the controversial subject of Jigak. Han Wonjin as an opinion leader of Hohak(湖學)`s legacy was required to argue with his counterpart in order to establish his circle`s standpoint. The main issue they discussed was the relationship between Ji(智) and Jigak. Kim contends that Ji and Jigak belong to different categories, and that the substance-function(體用) relation cannot be applied to them. According to him, the relation between Ji and Jigak is that of Do(道) and Gi(器). Similarly, the relation between Sim(心) and Sung(性) is that of subject and object. He also maintains that Jigak is not the phenomenalized mode of Ji, but the innate capability that employs Sung as the source of morality and turns it into feelings. In contrast, Han argues that Ji, as a ontological foundation of Jigak, is what enables Jigak to be a moral activity. In criticizing Kim Changhyup, Han maintains that if one denies the relation between Ji and Jigak, then one would have to characterize Jigak as a blind function with no moral sense. If one admits Jigak can have moral contents on its own without the connection with Ji, then one would have to allow two moral foundation, which leads one`s idea into heretical beliefs. Han holds that Jigak can a moral function only when it is grounded upon Ji. In conclusion, Han emphasizes Ji as the base of Jigak that enables Jigak to realize morality while Kim emphasizes the role of Jigak as the principal agent of moral activity.

잠야(潛冶) 박지계(朴知誡)의 인심도심설(人心道心說)

이선열 ( Sun Yuhl Yi ) 한국철학사연구회 2012 한국 철학논집 Vol.0 No.33

본 논문은 조선 중기의 학자인 잠야 박지계의 인심도심에 관한 학설을 검토하고 그 철학적 의미를 분석한다. 박지계의 인심도심설은 주희의 그것과 뚜렷이 구분되는 차이점을 지니고 있었으며, 더욱이 주희 인심도심설이 지닌 미묘한 딜레마를 직접적으로 겨냥하고 있었다. 주희의 인심도심설에서는 두 가지 명제, 즉 “인심과 도심은 한 마음의 두 양태”라는 명제와 “양자는 모두 이발시의 마음”이라는 명제가 핵심을 이루고 있다. 주희에게 있어 이 두 명제는 모두 “지각”이라는 계기와 연관되며 서로 긴밀하게 연계된다. 그러나 주희는 인심과 도심 두 개념의 존재론적 일원성과 가치론적 이원성 사이에서 고심하며 다소 모호한 결론을 내리고 있다, 이에 대해 박지계는 인심도심이 모두 미발 이발에 걸쳐 있으며, 양자는 하나가 아니라 두 개의 마음이라고 주장함으로써 주희와 다른 길을 간다, 박지계의 인심도심설은 철저한 이분법에 근거하여 “마음은 하나”라는 주희의 전제를 포기함으로써 구축되어진다, 그에 따르면 도심과 인심은 연원에서부터 발생까지 서로 다른 별개의 메커니즘을 갖추고 있고, 전자는 후자를 주재하고 후자는 전자의 명령을 받드는 군신관계와 같다, 또한 인심은 최선의 경우라 할지라도 도심의 휘하에 놓이는 것일 뿐 도심과 같은 차원에 속할 수 없다. 박지계는 인심이 최선의 상태에 도달하기 위해서는 도심에 의해 교정되고 길들여져야 한다고 주장한다. 그의 사유는 주희의 이론과 구분되는 독자적인 성격을 지니고 있으며, 그동안 충분히 알려지지 않았던 17세기 조선 성리학계의 다양한 일면을 보여준다. Pak Jigye is a Confucian scholar of Chosun dynasty in the 17th century. This article examines his theory of Insim-Dosim, and analyzes it from philosophical perspective. Although Pak considered himself as a devout follower of Zhuxi, his theory of Insim-Dosim was quite different from Zhuxi`s. There are two fundamental propositions underlying Zhuxi`s theory of Insim-dosim: (i) Insim and Dosim are not two minds; rather, they are two aspects of one single mind, and (ii) both Insim and Dosim are in the state of post-issued mind(Yibal). For Zhuxi, these two propositions are inextricably related to the concept of Jigak. However, he struggles between the ontological unity of Insim and Dosim and their axiological duality, and finally reaches an ambiguous conclusion on the issue. Pak Jigye takes a different path, insisting that both Insim and Dosim belong to every aspect of mind including Mibal and Yibal, and that they are two separate minds. His theory is based on solid dichotomy of Insim and Dosim, and it denies Zhuxi`s premise on the unity of mind. According to him, Dosim and Insim are drastically different in terms of their forms, origins and the ways of occurrence. Their relation is analogous to the relation between sovereign and subject in the sense that the former supervises the latter while the latter follows the orders of the former. Therefore, Insim always comes under the control of Dosim even at its best, and cannot be reached at the level of Dosim. Pak maintains that Insim must be guided and domesticated by Dosim in order to reach its highest state. His theory is unique and differs from Zhuxi`s. And it reveals diverse aspects of Neo-confucian thoughts in the 17th century Chosun, which have less discussed in the literature of Korean Neo-confucianism.

김창협과 김간의 지각 논변

이선열 ( Sun Yuhl Yi ) 동양철학연구회 2010 동양철학연구 Vol.62 No.-

In the 17th century, the scholars in Yulgok School discussed the issues regarding the relationship between Ji(智) and Jigak(知覺). These discussions primarily stemmed from examining whether Hu Bing-Wen`s interpretation of Ji was correct. Hu Bing-Wen, while characterizing Ji as the mystic brightness(神 明) of mind, claims that Jigak is closely related to a mind`s capability for self-control. However, he does not make a sharp distinction between Ji and Jigak, and uses the two notions interchangeably. For this reason, Kim Chang-Hyup argues that Hu was mistaken in that he confused Ji with Jigak, and thus failed to distinguish between Sim(心) and Sung(性). Furthermore, he contends that Ji and Jigak belong to different categories, and that the substance-function(體用) relation cannot be applied to them. According to him, the relation between Ji and Jigak is that of Do(道) and Ki(器). Similarly, the relation between Simand Sungis that of subject and object. He also maintains that Jigakis not the phenomenalized mode of Ji, but the innate capability that employs Sungas the source of morality and turns it into feelings. In contrast, Kim Kan argues that Ji, as a ontological foundation of Jigak, is what enables Jigak to control a mind. In criticizing Kim Chang-Hyup, Kim Kan maintains that if one denies the relation between Ji and Jigak, then one would have to characterize Jigakas a groundless function. Although Kim Kan agrees that Jigak plays a crucial role in mind`s self-control, he holds that Jigakcan play such role only when it is grounded upon moral content, which in turn is based on Ji.