중학생들의 또래 괴롭힘 참여유형에 따른 도덕 판단의 차이: 결과의 수혜자와 상황의 책임소재를 바탕으로

전연희 ( Yeon Hee Jeon ),심은정 ( Eun Jung Shim ),이윤형 ( Yoon Hyoung Lee ) 한국청소년복지학회 2015 청소년복지연구 Vol.17 No.1

본 연구의 목적은 중학생을 대상으로 또래 괴롭힘 상황에서의 주변또래 참여유형에 따라 도덕적 딜레마 상황에서의 결정에 대한 판단이 차이가 있는지를 살펴보는 것이다. 이를 위하여 본 연구에서는 도덕적 딜레마 상황에서의 판단에 따른 결과의 수혜자(자신-타인)와 상황의 책임소재(있음-없음)에 근거한 도덕 판단이 주변또래 참여유형에 따라 차이가 나는지를 옳고 그름의 판단, 자신이나 타인이 그 상황에서 어떠한 행동을 취할 것인지 선택에 대한 판단, 비난 가능성에 대한 판단으로 구분하여 살펴보았다. 본 연구에서는 울산시에 소재한 중학교 학생 382명을 대상으로 또래 괴롭힘 참여유형 척도를 실시하였으며, 도덕적 딜레마 시나리오를 제시하고 그에 따라 도덕성, 자기행위, 타인행위 및 비난 가능성을 판단하도록 했다. 그 결과 도덕 판단 시 결정의 수혜자가 자신일 때, 피해자에게 책임이 있을 때 다수를 살리기 위해 한 명을 희생하는 결정이 도덕적 행위를 어긴 정도가 덜 하다고 판단하였다. 또한 도덕적 딜레마 상황에서의 결정에 대한 판단은 주변또래 참여유형에 따라 다르게 나타났는데 자기행위 판단과 타인행위 판단의 경우에 방관자 집단이 방어자집단에 비해 딜레마 상황에서 한 명을 희생하는 결정이 도덕적 행위를 어긴 정도가 덜 하다고 판단하였다. 특히 방관자의 경우에는 자기행위 판단에서 희생자에게 책임이 있는 경우에 도덕적으로 괜찮다고 판단하였다. 본 연구의 결과는 피해자의 책임에 대한 방관자의 인식 변화가 또래 괴롭힘 상황에서의 방관자의 역할 행동변화의 중요한 요인일 수 있음을 보여주었으며 또래 괴롭힘의 예방을 위해서는 피해자들의 책임여부에 관계없이 또래 괴롭힘은 옳지 못하며 또래 괴롭힘이 결국은 자신의 문제라는 것을 인식시킬 필요성이 있다는 것을 시사한다. The purpose of this study was to examine whether moral judgments in moral dilemmas differs according to participant roles in bullying situation(i.e., bully-followers, bystanders, defenders). Specifically, the study explored differences in moral judgment based on the beneficiary of the choice(self vs others) and the attribution of the responsibility. 382 middle school students in Ulsan city completed the Participant Role Questionnaire and the scale of moral judgment in moral dilemmas. The major findings were the following; First, the moral judgment in moral dilemmas differed according to the beneficiary of the choice and the attribution of the responsibility. In overall moral judgment, participants evaluated morally more acceptable in case that the beneficiary of choice was oneself and responsibility can be attributed to victims. Moreover, the moral judgments were partly differed according to participant role in bullying and in the types of judgments. While the judgement of morality and the possibility of the blame did not differ based on the participants’ roles, bystanders deemed that the degree of violation was lower compared to defenders in the case of the judgment of one’s act,. Also, in the judgment of one’s act, bystanders evaluated that it is morally tolerable in case that victims are responsible in that situation. Such results suggested that the change of bystanders’ perception regarding the responsibility of victims might be an important factor in the change of their role in bullying situation. Current findings indicate that moral judgments in their moral dilemmas vary depending on the participant role, the beneficiary of choice and the attribution of responsibility. The current study also suggested that efforts of effective prevention and intervention strategies targeted at bullying need to consider adolescents’ moral judgment tendency.

생명윤리에서의 넓은 반성적 평형과 판단력

최경석 한국법철학회 2008 법철학연구 Vol.11 No.1

Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) was first presented by John Rawls and developed by Norman Daniels. It was thought of primarily as a method for evaluating theories of justice (Rawls) or ethical theories (Daniels). Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress then considered WRE as an explicit methodology for biomedical ethics, that is, moral reasoning for the justification of moral judgments. Thus, I characterize the method of WRE as practical moral reasoning. The process of reaching a conclusion using the methods of WRE is characterized as a back-and-forth process of revision aimed at coherent comprehensive personal or group belief systems without incorrect beliefs. The question arises, however, as to whether the methods of WRE can give us determinate answers about what to do. But there must be different ways of revising beliefs depending on the exercise of judgment as a faculty of thinking. There is no algorithmic decision procedure. Some may expect a mechanical decision procedure by which to reach answers to the above questions, but this is misconceived. Our decision in unprecedented or unpredictable situations and circumstances cannot help calling for judgment. Judgment is not unique to the methods of WRE. Other methods, such as principlism and casuistry, also rely on judgment. When principlists attempt to apply moral principles to a particular case, they must decide which of their moral principles covers the case, just as a judge would have to decide which law or regulation is relevant to a given case. Because principles are abstract and general, they must be interpreted in the light of the details of the particular case. Thus, we arrive at conclusions from the interaction between universal knowledge(major premise) and particular knowledge(minor premise) in a practical syllogism. Casuists also call for the use of judgment. They usually suggest the use of analogical thinking employing paradigm cases. Similarities must be sought between a given case and paradigm cases. However, the recognition of similarity is not a mechanical procedure it requires judgment to determine which features of two cases being compared are relevant. The need for judgment implies that there are no determinate answers for resolving a conflict between two arguers following same method of reasoning. But the exercise of judgment is not a matter of mere taste or arbitrary preference. It requires its justification. There may be some principles and values to guide and regulate the exercise of judgment required in the methods of WRE. First, coherence, comprehensiveness, and the number of incorrect beliefs are not only criteria for comparing competing belief systems, but will also be values for a revision process. Second, we will pursue the maximization of coherence and comprehensiveness while minimizing revision, by revising peripheral beliefs rather than core beliefs in our belief system. Third, the efficiency of a revision process may be one of the important considerations tied to the choice of provisionally fixed beliefs. Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) was first presented by John Rawls and developed by Norman Daniels. It was thought of primarily as a method for evaluating theories of justice (Rawls) or ethical theories (Daniels). Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress then considered WRE as an explicit methodology for biomedical ethics, that is, moral reasoning for the justification of moral judgments. Thus, I characterize the method of WRE as practical moral reasoning. The process of reaching a conclusion using the methods of WRE is characterized as a back-and-forth process of revision aimed at coherent comprehensive personal or group belief systems without incorrect beliefs. The question arises, however, as to whether the methods of WRE can give us determinate answers about what to do. But there must be different ways of revising beliefs depending on the exercise of judgment as a faculty of thinking. There is no algorithmic decision procedure. Some may expect a mechanical decision procedure by which to reach answers to the above questions, but this is misconceived. Our decision in unprecedented or unpredictable situations and circumstances cannot help calling for judgment. Judgment is not unique to the methods of WRE. Other methods, such as principlism and casuistry, also rely on judgment. When principlists attempt to apply moral principles to a particular case, they must decide which of their moral principles covers the case, just as a judge would have to decide which law or regulation is relevant to a given case. Because principles are abstract and general, they must be interpreted in the light of the details of the particular case. Thus, we arrive at conclusions from the interaction between universal knowledge(major premise) and particular knowledge(minor premise) in a practical syllogism. Casuists also call for the use of judgment. They usually suggest the use of analogical thinking employing paradigm cases. Similarities must be sought between a given case and paradigm cases. However, the recognition of similarity is not a mechanical procedure it requires judgment to determine which features of two cases being compared are relevant. The need for judgment implies that there are no determinate answers for resolving a conflict between two arguers following same method of reasoning. But the exercise of judgment is not a matter of mere taste or arbitrary preference. It requires its justification. There may be some principles and values to guide and regulate the exercise of judgment required in the methods of WRE. First, coherence, comprehensiveness, and the number of incorrect beliefs are not only criteria for comparing competing belief systems, but will also be values for a revision process. Second, we will pursue the maximization of coherence and comprehensiveness while minimizing revision, by revising peripheral beliefs rather than core beliefs in our belief system. Third, the efficiency of a revision process may be one of the important considerations tied to the choice of provisionally fixed beliefs.

도덕민감성, 도덕동기, 도덕판단, 자아강도와 도덕행동의 관계

문병상 한국교육개발원 2011 한국교육 Vol.38 No.1

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between Rest’s four components of morality (moral sensitivity, moral motivation, moral judgment, and ego strength) and moral behavior, by setting up a theoretical model for casual relationships between them with reference to empirical data. The subjects of this study were 270 sixth grade students in Taegu, who were surveyed for moral sensitivity, moral motivation, moral judgment, and ego strength, and also took a moral behavior test. The statistical method employed for data analysis was path analysis by AMOS 6.0 program. The findings of this study were as follows: First, the goodness of fit of the research model was evaluated as very appropriate. Second, moral motivation had a direct effect on moral sensitivity, whereas moral motivation had no meaningful effect on moral judgment. Moreover, moral sensitivity was found to have a statistically meaningful influence upon moral judgment, moral judgment upon ego strength, and ego strength upon moral behavior. Third, moral motivation did indirectly affect moral judgment through moral sensitivity and moral judgment did indirectly affect moral behavior through ego strength. Fourth, moral motivation accounts for 12.9% of the variance in moral sensitivity, moral motivation and moral sensitivity account for 11.2% of the variance in moral judgment, moral judgment accounts for 5.2% of the variance in ego strength, and ego strength accounts for 6.2% of the variance in moral behavior. The result of this study implies that multifaceted approaches to moral education should be pursued given the examined interaction between cognitive and emotional components of morality. 본 연구의 목적은 도덕교육에서 중요시되는 Rest의 4구성 요소와 도덕행동의 관계를 종합적으로 규명해보고자 하였다. 즉 도덕행동에 영향을 미치는 Rest의 4구성 요소인 도덕민감성, 도덕동기, 도덕판단, 그리고 자아강도 변인들의 인과 관계 모형을 이론적으로 설정하고, 가장 적합한 인과 관계 모형을 경험적 자료에 근거하여 탐색하였다. 대구시내 초등학교 6학년 학생 270명을 대상으로 도덕민감성, 도덕동기, 도덕판단, 자아강도, 그리고 도덕행동 검사를 실시하여 자료를 수집하였다. 경로분석 결과, 도덕민감성, 도덕동기, 도덕판단, 자아강도, 그리고 도덕행동 변인의 인과적 관계를 설명하는 연구 모형이 경험적 자료에 적합한 모형으로 평가되었다. 도덕동기가 도덕민감성에 가장 큰 영향을 미치나, 도덕동기는 도덕판단에는 유의미한 영향을 미치지 못하였다. 도덕민감성은 도덕판단에, 도덕판단은 자아강도에, 자아강도는 도덕행동에 모두 통계학적으로 유의미한 정적 영향을 미치고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 도덕동기는 도덕민감성을 12.9%, 도덕동기와 도덕민감성은 도덕판단을 11.2%, 도덕판단은 자아강도를 5.2%, 그리고 자아강도는 도덕적 행동을 6.2% 설명해주고 있다. 본 연구의 결과는 도덕교육에서 도덕성의 인지적 요인과 정의적 요인이 상호작용하여 도덕행동에 영향을 미칠 수 있도록 다각적인 교육방법을 모색해 나가야 한다는 것을 시사하고 있다.

인간의 선악을 보여주는 영상은 자신과 타인에 대한 도덕적 판단에 어떤 향을 미치는가?

김신우,이원섭,이형철 한국감성과학회 2019 감성과학 Vol.22 No.2

Previous resarch demonstrated that moral judgment is not an outcome of rational reasoning, but an independent variable determined by diverse factors. The effects of disgust on moral harshness, audience effect on moralistic punishment are some examples that support this view. The variability of moral judgment raises a question on what effects video stimuli might have on moral judgments. Although a few studies (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010) have shown that watching a prosocial video clip promote moral behavior, no research have simultaneously tested the effects of both positive and negative video clips on moral (not bahavior but) judgments. Hence, this research tested the effects of viewing videos about good and evil on moral judgments regarding the self and others. To this end, participants were asked to view a video clip depicting content of either positive or negative human behavior and required to make moral judgments on conduct described in a scenario assuming that the person committing the act was either themselves or another person. The results showed significant effects of both video contents (positive, negative) and the actor (self, others) on moral judgments, but they were qualified by the interaction between the two. In particular, participants who watched evil deed of others made harsher judgments on others’ moral transgression. Theses results demonstrate that video contents influence moral judgments, and the effect depends on the actor of the immoral behavior. In general discussion, we interpreted the results based on moral disgust, framing effect, and fundamental attribution error. 기존 연구들은 도덕 판단이 다양한 요인에 의해 영향받는다는 것을 보여주었다. 혐오감이 도덕 엄격함을 유도하며, 도덕적 처벌에 대한 청중효과는 이를 보여주는 예들이다. 도덕적 판단이 유동적이라는 것은 강한 정서적, 인지적 효과를 가진 영상자극이 도덕적 판단에 어떤 영향을 미치는지에 대한 질문을 던지게 한다. 긍정영상이 도덕적 행동을 촉진한다는 것을 보여준 연구들은 일부 존재하지만(Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010), 부정영상이 도덕적 판단에 미치는 영향을 확인한 연구는 존재하지 않는다. 본 연구는 인간의 선함과 악함을 보여주는 영상이 자신과 타인에 대한 도덕적 판단에 미치는 영향을 검증하였다. 이를 위해 참가자들에게 인간의 긍정 혹은 부정적인 면을 보여주는 영상을 시청하게 한 다음, 자신 혹은 타인의 도덕적 위반행위의 옳고 그름에 대한 판단하게 하였다. 그 결과 영상의 내용(긍정, 부정)과 행위주체(자신, 타인) 모두 도덕적 판단에 유의미한 영향을 미쳤으나, 두 요인간의 상호작용이 발견되었다. 특히 인간의 악함을 보여주는 영상을 시청한 경우 참가자들은 타인의 도덕적 위반행위를 더욱 가혹하게 판단하였다. 이 결과는 영상의 내용이 도덕적 판단에 영향을 미치며, 그 영향이 행위주체에 따라 달라지는 것을 보여준다. 도덕적 혐오, 프레이밍 효과 , 기본적 귀인오류에 근거하여 이 결과를 해석하였다.

학교체육에서 나타나는 도덕적 판단 메커니즘: 사회적 직관주의 모델을 중심으로

장용규,이정택 한국초등체육학회 2019 한국초등체육학회지 Vol.24 No.4

본 연구는 학교체육에서 나타나는 도덕적 판단 메커니즘을 사회적 직관주의 모델에 근거하여 살펴보고자 하였다. 이를 위해 도덕적 판단에 대한 새로운 관점과 사회적 직관주의 모델을 알아보고, 학교체육에서 나타나는 도덕적 판단과 도덕적 판단 메커니즘의 특징과 의미를 해석하였다. 마지막으로 올바른 도덕적 판단의 기초가 되는 직관의 발달을 위해 학교체육이 어떠한 역할을 할 수 있을지에 대해 논의하였다. 그 결과, 인간의 도덕적 판단에는 정서가 작용하고 있었으며 정서와 관련된 직관의 발달은 학습자의 도덕적 행위에 직접적으로 영향을 미치고 있었다. 특히 학교체육에서 나타나는 도덕적 판단이 자기중심적이라는 점, 숙고의 과정 없이 빠르게 이루어진다는 점, 타인과의 상호작용을 통해 나타나는 인신적 도덕 판단이라는 점에서 정서와 깊은 관련을 맺고 있다고 볼 수 있었다. 따라서 학교체육에서 나타나는 도덕적 판단은 ‘상황-직관-판단-사후추론’의 과정을 통해 도덕적 판단을 내린다는 사회적 직관주의 모델에 근거하여 이해할 수 있을 것이다. 앞으로의 학교체육은 학습자의 정서와 직관의 발달에 필요한 ‘직관들의 선택적인 상실’, ‘관습 복합체에 몰두’, ‘또래집단 사회화’의 과정을 강조해야 하며, 본 연구는 도덕적 정서와 직관의 교육의 관점에서 학습자의 인성을 함양할 수 있는 체육교육을 계획하여 전개해 나가야 함을 시사하고 있다. The purpose of this study is to examine the moral judgment mechanism in school physical education focused on social intuitionist model. For this purpose, the new perspectives on moral judgment based on neuroscience research and social intuitionism model were examined, and the moral judgment and moral judgment mechanism of school physical education were analyzed. Lastly, the role of school physical education for the development of intuition which is the basis of correct moral judgment was discussed. The results were as follows; First, emotions had an influence on human moral judgment. Second, the development of intuition related to emotion directly affected the moral behavior of learners. Third, the moral judgment was deeply related to emotions: it was self-centered and not universal, it was done quickly without process of consideration and it was personal moral judgment through interaction with others. Therefore, the moral judgment in school physical education can be understood based on the social intuitionist model in which the moral judgment is gone through the process of 'situation - intuition - judgment - post reasoning'. The future school physical education should emphasize the process of 'the selective loss of intuitions', 'immersion in custom complexes' and 'peer socialization' necessary for the development of learner 's emotion and intuition. As the consequences, this study suggests that physical education should be planned in order to cultivate human character in terms of moral emotion and intuition education.

The Role of Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Decision-making

( Moon Kyung-ho ) 한국윤리학회 2016 倫理硏究 Vol.110 No.1

In relation to moral judgment, it is the `reasoning` and `intuition` of human representative decision mechanism in cognitive science. The first type is intuitive and automatical way of thinking, and second is ratiocinative and reflecting one. Kohlberg asserted that the most powerful impetus comes from moral reasoning to lead moral judgment and behavior. Haidt explained that intuition plays an leading role and reasoning charges only role of post-justification, in the almost majority of moral situation, via social intuitionism model. Greene elucidates that deontological judgement is deduced intuitively by emotional response automatic and immediately, and judgment due to result does so by reasoning, conscious and reflecting cognitive reaction, through dual process theory. Kahneman maintains that humans make incomplete and irrational judgment, because they have incomplete ability of information processing inherently. To make good judgment, there are so many data to be processed, and we need to make decisions rapidly. Therefore, we use, so-called `shortcut of judgment` of heuristic, that is, intuition. They acknowledges biased intuition as subject to overcome and upholds the effect of intuition used widely in decision-making at the same time. On the other hand, Gigerenzer claims that it does not necessarily define intuition as source of irrational bias and needs to think it as useful environmental adaptation tool box. In current moral education, the reasoning education is being utilized as core factor to enhance the ability of moral judgment. However, according to the opinions of intuitionist along with Haidt, it suggests strongly that it is not so useful the method of moral education based on reasoning in making moral judgment. This might be clearly significant challenge to moral education. It is because that it supports Haidt`s argument that plays an important role for intuition resulting from emotion in moral decision making by many empirical studies recently. In this study, it argues that it guards against the view of underestimating role of moral reasoning, and reasoning could be utilized significantly in decision-making. Reasoning used in situation requiring more complex deliberation differs from intuition system used in context to make rapid decision more effectively, in its roles.

스미스의 도덕 판단과 공정한 관망자

변영진 ( Byun Young-jin ) 한국윤리교육학회 2017 윤리교육연구 Vol.0 No.43

이 글은 스미스의 `도덕 판단`에 관해 `공정한 관망자`를 중심으로 고찰할 것이다. 스미스에 따르면 인간의 행위는 감정에 기인한 결과이다. 그러므로 행위의 옳고 그름은 행위 동기인 감정을 기준으로 판정할 수 있다. 스미스는 도덕감, 즉 시인감과 부인감이 행위를 불러일으키는 감정에 각각 공감함 그리고 비공감함을 통해 형성된다고 생각한다. 우리가 타인의 행위 동기인 감정에 공감한다면 시인의 감정을, 그 감정에 공감하지 않는다면 부인의 감정을 갖게 된다. 도덕감은 도덕 판단의 바탕이 된다. 하지만 그 자체로 행위의 옳고 그름에 대한 도덕 판단이 될 수는 없다. 도덕 판단을 위해서는 공감 또는 비공감의 기준, 즉 공감하거나 비공감하는 주체가 공정한 관망자이어야만 한다. `행위자` 관점에서의 공감(또는 비공감)은 정당한 도덕 판단을 형성할 수 없다. 공정한 관망자는 공감(또는 비공감)에 앞서 도덕 판단을 위해 요구되는 개념이다. 그 개념은 제3자의 입장에서 행위자의 행위를 공정하게 판단할 수 있는 주체를 의미한다. 그러나 공정한 관망자는 사회적으로 합의된 공적 규범에 따르지 않는다. 스미스는 공적인 규범을 도덕성의 기준으로 삼는 관망자를 `외부의 인간`이라 칭하는데, 그것을 통해서는 정당한 도덕 판단에 도달할 수 없다. 구체적 상황에서의 행위에 대한 객관적 판단은 오로지 `내부의 인간`, 즉 공정한 관망자에 의해 가능하다. 나아가 스미스는 `타인의 행위`뿐만 아니라 `자신의 행위`에 대해서도, 그 도덕성을 판단하는 기준은 공정한 관망자에 있다고 생각한다. 공정한 관망자는 우리의 마음속 양심에 해당하지만 그 어떤 형이상학적 개념이 아니다. 그것은 우리 모두가 경험과 습관을 통해 성취할 수 있는 도덕성의 잣대이다. In this article I interpret Smith`s `moral judgment` with `impartial spectator` as its center. According to Smith human action is the result of emotions. Therefore the right or the wrong of actions can be judged based on the emotions which are the motive of actions. Smith thinks that the moral sentiment, namely the feeling of approval or disapproval is formed through sympathy or antipathy(non-sympathy) with the emotions that cause actions. If we sympathize with other`s emotions that motivate the actions, we will have feelings of the approval. And if we do not sympathize with them, we will have that of the disapproval. Though moral sentiment forms the basis of moral judgment, it can not be a moral judgment of the action itself. In order for it to be a correct moral judgment, the criteria of sympathy(or non-sympathy), that is, the subject who is sympathetic(or not sympathetic) must be a impartial spectator. Moral judgments can not be formed through sympathy(or non-sympathy) from the perspective of agent. The impartial spectator is the concept required for moral judgment before sympathy(or non-sympathy). The concept means the subject who can fairly judge the action of the agent from the third position. But the impartial spectator does not conform to the socially agreed public norms. Smith calls to the human being who judges morality by public norms a `man without`, and thinks it can not make a fair moral judgment. The objective moral judgment of an action in a specific situation is only possible by the `man within`, i.e. the impartial spectator. Smith considers the criterion for judging the morality of our own action as well as other`s action to be the impartial spectator. The impartial spectator corresponds to the conscience, but it is not a metaphysical concept. It is a measure of morality that we all can achieve through experience and habits.

The Role of Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Decision-making

문경호 한국윤리학회 2016 倫理硏究 Vol.110 No.1

In relation to moral judgment, it is the 'reasoning' and 'intuition' of human representative decision mechanism in cognitive science. The first type is intuitive and automatical way of thinking, and second is ratiocinative and reflecting one. Kohlberg asserted that the most powerful impetus comes from moral reasoning to lead moral judgment and behavior. Haidt explained that intuition plays an leading role and reasoning charges only role of post-justification, in the almost majority of moral situation, via social intuitionism model. Greene elucidates that deontological judgement is deduced intuitively by emotional response automatic and immediately, and judgment due to result does so by reasoning, conscious and reflecting cognitive reaction, through dual process theory. Kahneman maintains that humans make incomplete and irrational judgment, because they have incomplete ability of information processing inherently. To make good judgment, there are so many data to be processed, and we need to make decisions rapidly. Therefore, we use, so-called 'shortcut of judgment' of heuristic, that is, intuition. They acknowledges biased intuition as subject to overcome and upholds the effect of intuition used widely in decision-making at the same time. On the other hand, Gigerenzer claims that it does not necessarily define intuition as source of irrational bias and needs to think it as useful environmental adaptation tool box. In current moral education, the reasoning education is being utilized as core factor to enhance the ability of moral judgment. However, according to the opinions of intuitionist along with Haidt, it suggests strongly that it is not so useful the method of moral education based on reasoning in making moral judgment. This might be clearly significant challenge to moral education. It is because that it supports Haidt's argument that plays an important role for intuition resulting from emotion in moral decision making by many empirical studies recently. In this study, it argues that it guards against the view of underestimating role of moral reasoning, and reasoning could be utilized significantly in decision-making. Reasoning used in situation requiring more complex deliberation differs from intuition system used in context to make rapid decision more effectively, in its roles.

MCT를 이용한 공인중개사의 도덕적 판단력에 관한 연구

정승화(Seung-Hwa Jung),신은정(Eun-Jung Shin) 건국대학교 부동산도시연구원 2018 부동산 도시연구 Vol.10 No.2

공인중개사의 윤리적 판단은 전문자격사와 전문직업인, 사회구성원으로서 중요한 요소임에도 불구하고 이를 평 가하는 척도는 매우 부족한 실정이며 제고방안에 대한 연구도 미흡한 실정이다. 따라서 본 연구는 이러한 필요성에 입각하여 공인중개사의 도덕적 판단력과 영향요인들에 대하여 고찰하고 이를 기초로 공인중개사의 윤리의식 제고방 안에 효과적인 방향을 제시하는데 도움이 되는 자료를 제공하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이를 위하여 도덕성 측정 도구 중의 하나인 도덕 판단력 검사(Moral Competence Test)를 활용하여 2017년 8월 서울특별시의 개업공인중개사를 대 상으로 설문조사하여 분석하였다. 도덕적 판단력을 종속변수로 다중회귀분석한 결과, 연령이 높을수록 도덕적 판단 력이 낮아지는 것으로 분석되었고, 실제소득보다 낮은 수준으로 신고하여 간이과세자가 되는 간이과세자일수록 도 덕적 판단력이 낮아지는 것으로 분석되었다. 본 연구는 공인중개사의 윤리의식에 대하여 도덕적 판단력이라는 형태 로 계량화하였다는 점에서 그 간의 연구와 차별성이 있다. The moral judgments of real estate agents are important factors for professionals and social members carrying out real estate transactions. However, until now, neither the evaluation of the moral consciousness nor the research for its improvement have been sufficient. Therefore, this study examines the moral judgment and factors influencing that of real estate agent. The purpose of this paper is to provide an effective direction for raising moral awareness of real estate agents. This study was conducted by surveying real estate agents in Seoul in August 2017 using the Moral Competence Test(MCT), one of the measuring tools of morality. After multiple regression analysis of moral judgment into dependent variables, a negative correlation was found between moral judgment and the age of certified realtors. In addition, lower moral judgment was found in the low income group of respondents, and the moral judgment of simplified taxpayers was lower than that of the general taxpayer groups. However, this study has limitations as it fails to reflect many other factors that affect moral judgment.

대학생의 도덕 양심, 도덕 판단과 정치 성향의 관계

강인구(In-Gu Kang) 한국문화융합학회 2020 문화와 융합 Vol.42 No.2

도덕 판단은 도덕 양심에 의해 이루어진다. 즉, 도덕 양심은 도덕 판단에서 본질적인 역할을 하는 내적 도덕 가치들이다. 또한 개인의 정치 성향도 사회, 문화적인 도덕 가치를 반영한다. 본 연구는 도덕 양심, 도덕 판단, 그리고 정치성향의 관계를 분석하였다. 대학생 428명을 대상으로 하였으며, 남학생 154명, 여학생 274명이 참여하였다. 연구 결과, 도덕 양심과 도덕 판단은 유의미한 정적 상관을 보였으며, 하위 요소간 상관에서 유의미한 상관을 보였다. 정치 성향에 따라 전반적으로 진보 성향 집단이 보수 성향 집단보다 도덕 양심과 도덕 판단 평균치에서 모두 유의미하게 높은 것으로 나타났으며, 성별차이에서도 여학생이 남학생보다 도덕 양심에서 평균치에서 유의미하게 높은 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 연구 결과는 도덕 양심이 도덕 판단의 인과적 기제로서 작용한다는 것을 의미하며, 도덕 교육과 시민 교육에서 도덕 양심의 중요성을 재인식하고 교육적 방안을 탐색하는 데 더 많은 관심을 가져야 할 것이다. Moral judgment is often driven by moral conscience. Namely, moral conscience is an inner moral value which plays a substantial role in moral judgment. Additionally, individuals demonstrate social and cultural moral values through their political views. The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between moral conscience, moral judgment, and political views. A total of 428 university students (154 men and 274 women) participated in this study. The findings indicated that there was a significant positive correlation between moral conscience and moral judgment. Moral conscience was influenced by political views (liberal and conservative). Liberal groups showed significantly higher mean scores in moral conscience and moral judgment than conservative groups. A difference in gender was evident as women had significantly higher scores than men in moral conscience. This suggests that moral judgments are indeed produced by moral conscience. These findings help illuminate the nature and intractability of moral conscience and moral judgment through political views. In addition, moral conscience should be recognized as an important mechanism of moral judgment in moral and civil education.