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      • KCI등재

        허구에 의해 환기되는 감정의 합리성 문제

        오종환 서울大學校 人文學硏究所 2002 人文論叢 Vol.47 No.-

        We usually think that the appreciation of fiction causes a paradox, because the object of fictional character and that of fictional event do not exist, contrary to our ordinary emotion which usually has its object as existent. This paradox results from three claims which cannot hold together. These claims are as follows: 1. We believed that fictional entities do not really exist. 2. We respond emotionally only to the entities which we do believe to exist. 3. We respond emotionally to fictional characters and events. There are several theories of fiction which try to avoid this paradox. But Radford proposes a theory which denies the claim 2 and, thus, asserts that our emotional response to fuctional entities is irrational. In this paper I exmine the theories of fiction to see how each provides the way to avoid the paradox, I. e., illusionism, the thought theory, and make believe theory. To see how emotion is explained I examine narrow cognitivism, broad cognitivism, and non-cognitivism of emotion. The issue of cognitive theory of emotion is whether the only cognitive component of emotion is belief or not. Against the cognitive theories of emotion, non-cognitivism holds that there is no need for emotion to have cognitive component. I defend Walton's theory of quasi-emotion, because his theory of make-believe is the best candidate to explain our emtional response to fictionl. Since the non-cognitivistic reflex-like emotional is arational, it is irrelevant to the discussion of the rationality of emotion. And the narrow cognitivism provides a better explanation than the broad cognitivism for the object of emotion, the existence of which is secured in the fictional world, and the way it is secured in a fictional world fits to our intuition of fictional entities.

      • KCI등재
      • KCI등재
      • 초박막구조 단결정성장을 위한 수직형 LPE장치의 제작과 성능개선에 관한 연구

        오종환,홍창희 한국항해항만학회 1995 한국항해학회지 Vol.19 No.4

        In this study, a vertical type LPE system has been developed for III-V semiconductor compounds single crystal growth. On the basis of the experience & basic study using this system, the system modification has been carried out for a ultra thin multi-layer single crystal. The temperature fluctuation was within ${\pm}0.006^{\circ}C$ at $800^{\circ}C$, temperature uniformity for graphite boat around was within ${\pm}0.15^{\circ}C$ at $650^{\circ}C$, and cooling rate was controllable from $2.2^{\circ}C$/min to $0.05^{\circ}C$/min. As a result it is considered to satisfy the condition to grow a ultra thin layer single crystal of III-V semiconductor compounds.

      • KCI등재

        초음파 볼륨에서 웨이브렛 변환을 이용한 전립선 객체 추출

        오종환,김상현,김남철 대한전자공학회 2006 電子工學會論文誌-SC (System and control) Vol.43 No.3

        This thesis proposes an efficient method for extracting a prostate volume from 3D ultrasound image by using wavelet transform and SVM classification. In the proposed method, a modulus image for each 2D slice is generated by averaging detail images of horizontal and vertical orientations at several scales, which has the sharpest local maxima and the lowest noise power compared to those of all single scales. Prostate contour vertices are determined accurately using a SVM classifier, where feature vectors are composed of intensity and texture moments investigated along radial lines. Experimental results show that the proposed method yields absolute mean distance of on average 1.89 pixels when the contours obtained manually by an expert are used as reference data. 본 논문에서는 웨이브렛 변환과 SVM 분류기를 이용하여 3차원 초음파 볼륨으로부터 전립선 객체를 추출하는 방법을 제안한다. 제안한 방법에서는 웨이브렛 변환의 수평 수직 방향의 상세 영상들의 평균치들로부터 웨이브렛 변환 모듈러스 영상을 구함으로써 잡음전력 대비 전립선 윤곽에 대한 국부 최대치들의 첨예도가 큰 모듈러스 영상을 얻을 수 있다. 또한 전립선의 밝기 변이 특성 및 전립선 내외부의 질감 차이 등을 특징으로 한 SVM 분류기를 이용함으로써 전립선 윤곽 추출의 정확도를 크게 향상시킬 수 있다. 실험 결과, 제안한 방법을 이용하여 전립선 윤곽을 찾을 경우 전문가에 의하여 추출된 윤곽과 비교하여 절대 평균 거리가 1.89로 나타났다.

      • KCI등재후보

        시각적 재현의 객관성에 대한 소고

        오종환 한국미학회 2001 美學 Vol.30 No.-

        There has been a long and bitter debate between naturalism and conventionalism of iconic signs in characterizing the nature of pictorial representation. The traditional theory of imitation presupposed that there was a resemblance between a picture and what it depicts, and the issue has been what the nature of the assumed resemblance is. The answer to this question was the literal identity between picture and the depicted, but it is rebutted that a two-dimensional picture cannot be identical with the three-dimensional object in the world. The next answer is that the way a picture looks to us is identical with the way the depicted does. But Gombrich convincingly shows us that a picture cannot convey the whole information of the light of the depicted in the world because of the limit of its medium. And Descartes already raised a question about the alleged retinal image, which forced us to postulate the existence of homunculus in our heads. The inevitable result of these discussions is that a picture is a sign which must be interpreted by the perceiver. The conventionalist holds that, since picture is an iconic sign, it must have the conventional nature of signs in general. As we see in the case of linguistic signs that signs are arbitrary, so must the iconic sign be arbitrary, and therefore, conventional. The meaning of sign is determined by interpretation and, accordingly, sign has no intrinsic meaning in itself. Therefore, the meaning of a picture is dependent on the system of representation and there is no objectivity in pictorial representation. But this conclusion runs against our intuition that we, human beings, see the world in the same way and see pictures in that way, too. And there is a significant difference between iconic signs and linguistic signs. Iconic signs cannot be interpreted in terms of mereology, but rather the meaning of the whole determines those of its parts. Also, even though signs have conventional components, some of them have natural meanings. The footstep of a bird denotes that particular kind of bird and we cannot change its meaning. These are natural signs and sometimes we use these signs for our purposes. Pictures are just such a case. Though the ways we draw pictures are conventional, the meanings contained in them are not conventional. Such a natural meaning is what the picture conveys. The reason that we consider pictures as natural signs is the assumption that they stimulate the way in which we recognize objects in the world. Gibson argues that we directly perceive the world in ambient optic arrays, which contain all the informations of the world we need for our survival. In the optic arrays there are invariant structures which allow us to grasp the stable characteristics of this ever-changing world. Since this is natural way we see the world, the meaning of the information from the world is natural. Therefore, even though pictorial representation is a conventional way to denote its objects, picture has the character of a natural sign and its meaning is not arbitrary. This paper does not provide a knock-down argument that conventionalism is wrong, but it holds that, if we can explain the phenomena of pictorial representation in harmony with our intuition of its objectivity, then we do not need to accept the conventionalist's account of pictorial representation.

      • KCI등재

        미적 도구주의의 관점에서 본 예술비평의 인식적 성격

        오종환 서울大學校 人文學硏究所 1995 人文論叢 Vol.33 No.-

        Why do we think that art in general and works of art are valuable? Because it provides or causes our experiences which are pleasing or delightful. If this is the case, then the value of works of art is instrumental. For they are means to a certain end, which is causing a certain kind of experience. Usually we call such experience aesthetic experience. Then, why is aesthetic experience valuable? There are two ways of explaining the value of aesthetic experience. The one is aesthetic autonomy which asserts that aesthetic experience has intrinsic value and the other is aesthetic instrumentalism which holds that aesthetic experience has instrumental, i.e. extrinsic value. These two positions are usually considered to be incompatible with each other. in this article I scrutinize the plausibility of that assumption and try to find a way of defending the position of aesthetic instrumentalism. The traditional theory of aesthetic attitude holds that the value of aesthetic experience is intrinsic because of the presupposition of disinterestedness. When we have no ulterior purpose(s) except the purpose of just having the experience of an object, it is said that the value of such a disinterested experience must be intrinsic, because it cannot be a means to other end. But could we say that the value of such an experience is really intrinsic, even when we cannot find any pleasure or delight in it? This is the doubt where aesthetic instrumentalism can get off the ground. If we do not say that something which is sometimes negative has value in its own, then we must explain its value in terms of its subsequent effects. The value of aesthetic experience, then, should be accounted for its unique consequences. Whatever they are, now the value of aesthetic experience is instrumental. I follow this way of reasoning according to Beardsley's account of instrumentalism, but this account seems incompatible with his assertion of an aesthetic object as phenomenal object. Even though Beardsley does not accept the theory of aesthetic attitude, he holds that aesthetic experience is detached from the rest of experience and that aesthetic object is relationless to the actual object with which it is connected. But, in art criticism it is inevitable to call for many factors besides the aesthetic viewpoint, for example, cognitive and moral. In this article I argue that we cannot ignore the cognitive factor of a work of art to appreciate and evaluate it properly. The instrumentalist can hold that the aesthetic viewpoint is necessary to evaluate a work of art, because it is presupposed to understand its content at first in order to tell its subsequent effect(s). The assumption of this assertion is that there is no difference between interested and disinterested attitude, i.e. that the disinterested attitude for aesthetic appreciation is a myth. Following Dickie, we can argue that the alleged difference between disinterested and interested attitudes is in fact just that between attention and inattention. When there is only one kind of attention with different motives, there is no reason to exclude cognitive factor in the appreciation of a work of art. For the appreciation must have every feature that the rest of our experience contains to become an experience. And we know that the cognitive feature is most prominent in case of literature. Does the appreciation of art in general, however, have this feature? One possibility is Goodman's theory that art is a system of symbols. But when we have non-objective paintings or instrumental musical works, Goodman's explanation of exemplification seems implausible, because it does presuppose the context which can tell a work of art from its perceptually indiscernible counterpart. Danto's explanation of the status of a work of art is much more plausible than Goodman's in such cases. Dante holds that the distinction requires knowledge of the causal and the cultural context of a work of art, and that a work of art is emerged from its ordinary counterpart through interpretation. The knowledge of the artworld which enables someone to grasp the significance of the way of representation is, then, necessarily contained in every criticism of a work of art. From this we can conclude that there must be cognitive nature of art criticism. We can also find this feature prominent in many contemporary theories, for example Margolis' theory of art. Some people might criticise this position, because the cognitive feature is commented and noticed only in the classificatory sense, but not in the evaluative sense. But, for an instrumentalist there is no distinction between classification and evaluation of a work of art, because the distinction itself presupposes the aesthetic autonomy.

      • KCI등재

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