임원의 보수규제에 관한 고찰 - 최근의 국제적 동향과 입법례를 중심으로 -

최문희 한국경영법률학회 2010 經營法律 Vol.20 No.3

The topic of 'Executive Compensation' generates heated discussion in the past decade. Few other issues have generated as much interest in the corporate governance as executive compensation. Major corporate scandals, such as Enron, Worldcom, and Mannesmann, were associated with flawed executive compensation structures and the related generation of perverse management incentives. Shareholder interest in executive compensation has remained acute in recent years. Several legislations and regulations have been enacted in multi-jurisdictions, such as EU, Germany, USA, and Japan. Excessive risk-taking in the financial sector has played an important role in the major financial crisis of 2007-2009. Many people believe that compensation practice at large financial institutions are one factor among that contributed to the financial crisis. The collapse last year of major financial institution run by extraordinarily well-paid executive compensation has brought intense focus to executive compensation. High short-term profits led to generous bonus payment to executives and employees without adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposes on their firms. These incentives could have encouraged excessive risk-taking. These problem has widely accepted in the aftermath of the financial crisis. These deficiencies call for legislative and official action to ensure that compensation practices in the financial sector are sound. The FSB(Financial Stability Board) Principles for Sound Compensation Practices and Implementation Standards are intended to response to the problem in compensation structure. A promoting legislative approach to reining in executive compensation, such as a mandatory shareholder vote on pay, disclosure on compensation, etc. has been took in multi- jurisdictions. Korean Financial Supervisory Commission(FSC) has also complied the FSB Principles, and korean financial self-regulatory organs have participated in these regulatory responses by making best practice standards on compensation. In contrast, further regulations are still called for in korean executive compensation regime, such as clear and comprehensive disclosure about compensation practices.

금융기관 임원의 과도한 보수규제 및 투명성 제고 방안에 관한 연구

맹수석 전남대학교 법학연구소 2014 법학논총 Vol.34 No.1

2008년 글로벌 금융위기 이후 금융기관 임원에 대한 과도한 보수지급 등의 도덕적해이가 금융위기를 초래한 원인의 하나로 지목되면서, 각국은 금융기관 임원의 보수지급에 대한 규제를 가하고 있다. 특히 미국은 2010년 Dodd-Frank Act를 제정하여 금융기관 임원에 대한 보수를 강력히 규제하고 있다. 이 연구에서는 최근 각국의 금융기관 임원에 대한 보수규제 내용을 비교·분석하고, 이를 통해 우리나라 금융기관 임원의 보수체계에 관한 시사점을 도출해 보았다. 특히 회사법은 물론, 은행법과 자본시장법, 금융회사지배구조법(안) 등 금융규제법상 임원보수에 관한 법적 문제점을 살펴보고, 과도한보수지급에 대한 규제방안을 제시하였다. 그동안 우리나라도 금융위기 이후 금융기관 임원의 보수에 관한 규제를 강화하기 위한 입법적 노력을 해왔다. 즉 2010년 개정된 은행법은 은행에 대해 「지배구조내부규범」을 제정하도록 하면서, 그 지배구조내부규범에 ‘임원에 대한 성과평가 및 보수지급 방법에 관한 사항’ 등이 포함되도록 하였다. 그리고 2011년 금융감독원은 「성과보상체계모범규준」을 작성하여 운영하였고, 2013년 개정된 자본시장법은 사업보고서 제출대상법인의 사업보고서에 5억원 이상의 보수를 받는 임원의 개인별 보수와 그 구체적인 산정기준 및 방법을 기재하도록 하였다. 그러나 은행법 및 자본시장법은 임원보수에 관한 기준을 준수하지 않은 경우에 대한규제 규정이 미흡했다. 특히 위반시 감독기관에 의한 제재가 거의 이루어지지 않았다. 따라서 금융감독법제에 임원보수에 관한 사항을 준수하지 않은 경우에 대한 규제를 엄격하게 강화할 필요가 있다. 그리고 과거 금융기관의 부실에 대해 막대한 공적자금을투입하는 등 국가적 대응의 측면과 금융기관의 공공성에 비추어볼 때, 현재 제정을 추진하고 있는 금융회사지배구조법(안)에 부수위원회 설치에 대한 예외 조항을 삭제하고,금융기관 임원의 과도한 보수를 환수할 수 있는 규정을 두어야 한다. 아울러 ‘보수지급에 대한 연차보고서’의 기재사항으로 금융기관 임원의 개별보수액 및 보수책정의 구체적인 기준·절차도 포함시켜야 할 것이다. As moral hazard such as the excessive compensation of officers of financialinstitutions since the global financial crisis occurred in 2008 was pointed as oneof the causes of the financial crisis, countries have been adding to control oncompensation of officers of financial institutions around the world. Especially,the USA legislated Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 to have a strong control on thecompensation of officers of its financial institutions. This study made analysesof the control on the compensation of officers of financial institutions of countriesin comparison and produced suggestions on the compensation system of officersof Korean financial institutions. Especially, this study looked into legal problemswith not only the Corporation Law but the financial regulation laws such as thebanking law and the capital market law and presented methods to controlexcessive compensation. Meantime, Korea too has been making a legislative effort to strengthen thecontrol on the compensation of officers of financial institutions since the financialcrisis. Namely, the Banking Law revised in 2010 stipulated that banks legislate"Governance Structure Internal Norms and include 'Achievement Evaluation andcompensation Payment Method of officers" in the governance structure internalnorms. And the Capital market Law which was revised in 2013 stipulates thatthe individual compensation of the officers which is 500 million Won or morebe included in the business report of the concerned corporations with the specificcalculation criteria and method thereof. However, the Banking Law and the Capital Market Law have no stipulationof control on when the criteria for the officers is not complied with. Therefore,there needs to stipulate a method of control in these laws by imposing finesagainst a violation of public notice duty if information of the compensation ofofficers is not provided. In addition, in the light of the public nature of financialinstitutions concerning enormous public fund investments which were made dueto failures of financial institutions, “Financial Institution Governance Structure Law(draft)”, which is being promoted, should have a stipulation for claw-backs fromexcessive compensation of officers of financial institutions. Additionally, “The Annual Report of Compensation Payments” should include the specific criteriaand procedure for the individual compensation and compensation policy forofficers of financial institutions.

기업의 임원보수 규제에 관한 고찰

김동근 경북대학교 법학연구원 2012 법학논고 Vol.0 No.38

The regulation of executive compensation is became the hot issue in wake of the global economic depression to cause in the global corporates' collapse such as Enron and WorldCom. The global corporates' collapse was concerned with the defective executive compensation structures and the perverse management incentives. The major developed countries such as the United Stated, the United Kingdom, Germany, EU, and Japan have been enacted several legislations and regulations to resolve the problems. Group of 20 major economies(G-20) also agreed on the financial regulations consolidation in the area occurred the financial crisis and the preparation for the regulation reform model related to the Executive's excessive compensation payment in the financial departments. Therefore, I will examine the legislations and regulations of the several countries, particularly USA and Japan about executives compensation and the disclosure of executive compensation. In 2008-2010, the United Stated Congress had passed Emergency Economic Stablilization Act, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. In 2010, The Financial Services Agency in Japan had announced a new rules to disclose executive compensation individually, set by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act that executives receiving more than 100 million yen in executive compensation should have disclosed their compensation from March 31, 2010. And then I will study on the legislation and regulation system of the executive compensation about the compensation scopes and compensation decision procedure in the related law of Korea. I will compare with the related law of the US, Japan and Korea. Finally, I will be to suggest for the improvement methods of the legislation and the regulation on the executive compensation and the disclosure of executive compensation. 임원보수 규제는 엔론과 월드컴과 같은 글로벌 기업의 도산으로 야긴된 글로벌 경제위기를 극복하는데 있어서 커다란 이슈가 되었다. 글로벌 기업들의 도산은 임원보수 구조와 과도한 경영 인센티브의 결함과 관련되어져 있다. 미국, 영국, 독일, EUl, 그리고 일본과 같은 경제 선진국들은 그러한 문제점들을 해결하기 위해 새로운 입법과 규제들을 제정하여 실시하고 있다. 또한 주요경제 20개 국가들은 재정위기가 발생된 지역내에서 재정규제의 강화와 재정부분에서 지급되는 과도한 임원보수지급과 관련된 규제개혁모델을 마련하는데 동의하였다. 그러므로, 필자는 임원보수와 임원보수공개에 관하여 여러 국가들, 특히 미국과 일본의 입법과 규제를 검토할 것이다. 2008년에서 2010년 사이에, 미국 의회는 긴급 경제안정화법과 미국 경제회복 및 재투자법, 도드-프랭크 월스트리트 개혁 및 소비자보호법을 통과시켰다. 2010년에 일본 금융청은 임원보수가 1억엔 이상 되는 기업원임원은 2010년 3월 31일까지 그들 임원들의 보수를 공개하도록 증권거래법을 개정하고, 그에 따라 금융내용 등의 개시에 관한 내각부령을 발표하였다. 그리고 필자는 우리나라의 법에 의해 규정되고 있는 임원보수 범위 그리고 임원보수결정절차와 같은 임원보수에 과한 법률과 규제에 관하여 살펴볼 것이다. 이를 통해 미국, 일본 그리고 우리나라의 관련 법규와 규정을 비교검토한다. 마지막으로 필자는 임원보수와 임원보수공개에 관한 입법과 규제의 개선방안을 제시할 것이다.

재무제표의 비교가능성과 상대적 성과평가

김응길 ( Eung Gil Kim ),김진배 ( Jin Bae Kim ),이건 ( Gun Lee ),한승수 ( Soong Soo Han ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계학연구 Vol.40 No.1

본 연구는 2006년부터 2012년 동안 유가증권시장에 상장된 비금융업을 영위하는 기업을 대상으로, 재무제표의 질적 특성 중 하나인 비교가능성(comparability)과 경영자보상 간의 관계를 상대적 성과평가(RPE)의 측면에서 파악하고자 하였다. 분석을 위해 비교가능성은 De Franco et al.(2011)의 방법론에 의해 산출하였다. 검증결과는 다음과 같다. 개별 기업과의 비교가능성이 높은 기업을 대상기업(peer firm)으로 선정한 후 대상기업의 성과가 개별 기업의 경영자 보상에 영향을 미치는지 실증한 결과, 대상기업 성과를 모형에 직접 포함한 약형(weak form) 접근법에서는 대상기업의 성과와 경영자 보상 간에 유의한 음(-)의 관계가 검증되었다. 그리고 대상기업 성과와 개별 기업 성과의 회귀분석을 통해 추정한 체계적 성과(systematic performance)와 비체계적 성과(unsystematic performance)를 모형에 포함한 강형(strong form) 분석에서는 비체계적 성과만 유의한 양(+)의 값을 나타내고 체계적 성과는 유의한 관계가 검증되지 않았다. 이러한 결과는 약형과 강형 검증에서 모두 상대적 성과평가를 지지하는 것을 의미한다. 즉, 개별 기업과 재무제표의 비교가능성이 높은 대상기업의 성과는 산업 전반에 걸쳐 발생할 수 있는 공통된 충격(common shock)을 효과적으로 통제하여 개별 기업 경영자의 노력이 적절하게 보상과 연결될 수 있는 역할을 한다는 것을 의미한다. 추가적으로 경제적 특징에 따라 비교가능성의 역할에 차이가 존재하는지 파악하고자 대상기업과 총자산 규모(SIZE)및 시장 대비 장부가액 비율(MtB)이 유사한 그룹과 그렇지 않은 그룹으로 나누어 약형(weak form) 분석하였다. 분석 결과, 상대적 성과평가에 영향을 미치는 요소를 통제하고 난 이후에도 비교가능성을 활용하여 선정된 대상기업의 성과는 일관되게 경영자 보상과 유의한 음(-)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타났다. This study examines the association between financial statement comparability and managerial compensation in a perspective of relative performance evaluation (hereafter RPE). Prior literature argues that managerial compensation using the RPE is beneficial to both agents (e.g., managers) and principals (e.g., shareholders) because it insulates agents from common shocks and provides shareholders with a useful measure to identify agents`` efforts (Holmstrom 1982). Despite of theoretical arguments above, the empirical research on the RPE provides the mixed evidence on whether firms use the relative performance evaluation when they determine the managerial compensation. Because researchers can not explicitly identify peer firms, many studies have investigated the economic characteristics, such as industry, firm siz and, growth opportunity, which can capture the common shocks in agents`` performance (Joh 1999; Garvey and Milbourn 2003; Albuquerque 2009; Gopanlan et al. 2010). Although, in the US, recent amended disclosure rules require firms to disclose their peer-firms which are used in performance evaluation, it is still difficult to identify whether Korean firms use the RPE in their managerial compensation because there are no rules for peer-firms disclosure in Korea. Thus we attempt to examine whether Korean firms use financial statement comparability to control common shocks in their managers`` performance evaluation. We focus on the financial statement comparability (hereafter comparability) which is termed as a similar mapping from economic events to financial statements among firms (De Franco et al. 2011). Given that the comparability is affected by each firms`` accounting policy, if a firm has higher comparability with certain firms, it indicates that accounting policy or practice between those firms are similar. Accordingly, it is possible that accounting information generated through similar accounting process has common factors between those firms. In addition, there is more useful information available to identify common factors between firms when those firms are highly comparable (De Franco et al. 2011). Based on arguments above, we expect firms to use the RPE based on the comparability because corporate environment with higher comparability makes firms control common shocks easier. Our sample comprises the data of all Korean listed companies ? both KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed companies, from 2006 to 2012, which yields the pooled samples of 2,190 firm-year observations. We select three peer-firms by using the comparability measure of De Franco et al.(2011), and regard the averaged performance of these firms as peer-firms`` performance. We, then, examine whether managerial compensation is affected by both a firm``s own performance and peer-firms`` performance. Our findings of empirical analyses suggest that Korean firms use the RPE in their managerial compensation based on accounting comparability. Furthermore, this evidence is supported in both weak and strong forms of the RPE test, and it is robust when we extend three peer-firms to five peer-firms. This result indicates that the performance of highly comparable firms is used to determine the managerial compensation of firms because peer firms`` performance appropriately controls or excludes common factors between firms, and thus it is more likely to reflect managers`` own efforts. In addition, we examine whether our results vary with economic characteristics which are known to affect the RPE such as firm size and market to book ratio (MtB). We find that the result of the RPE based on comparability is invariant to those economic characteristics. Our research contributes to the literature on the financial statement comparability by extending to the managerial compensation. Prior literature shows that accounting comparability is beneficial to outside information users (e.g., financial analysts, and auditors), but we provide the evidence that inside information users, such as the board of directors, and the compensation committee, also realize the usefulness of comparability, and use it in their managerial compensation scheme. We also contribute to the research on the relative performance evaluation. Despite of the benefit of the RPE, prior literature does not provide consistent result on whether firms use the RPE in the managerial compensation due to difficulty in the peer selection. However, we provide strong evidence that Korean firms, on average, evaluate managers by comparing their performance with peer firms``, peer firms selected based on financial statement comparability. Our results also show that the RPE tests based on comparability are more pronounced than those based on other economic characteristics proposed by prior research.

종업원 참여제도가 미국 산업재해보험제도의 재해보상 기각률에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구

박용승 ( Yong Seung Park ) 아시아.유럽미래학회 2010 유라시아연구 Vol.7 No.1

This paper estimates the impacts of employee participation plans in decision making and/or firms financial returns on claim denials in the workers’ compensation system. Claim denials are used to measure employees’ propensity to file false claims, i.e. claims-reporting moral hazard behavior as claimants in the system. Workers’ compensation systems, like other insurance systems, generate two major types of moral hazard on the claimant’s side. The first type is ‘risk-bearing’ moral hazard, whereby compensation for injury induces workers to take more job-related risks than they would have in the absence of such compensation. The higher ex postcompensation therefore induces greater risk-taking by employees. The second type is ‘claims-reporting’ moral hazard, whereby expected benefits induce falseclaim filings. For example, employees may file claims for off-the-job injuries to receive benefits through the workers’compensation system. This type of moral hazard has no effect on actual injuries, but only on claims for compensation. Such moral hazardof claims-reporting behavior has been approximated by incidence of claim’s being denied in the U.S. workers compensation system. This paper, in particular, analyzes the question whether claims-reporting moral hazard of employees can be affected by human resource management plans and programs. In particular, we focus on plans and programs that provide employees with participation in decision-making (e.g., autonomous work teams, total quality management, quality circles, quality of work life, etc.), and in firm financial returns (e.g., employee stock ownership, group bonuses, profit sharing, etc.). Employee participation in decision-making and in financial returns accords employees the ability to affect certain aspects of the operation of the firm in which they work, and links a portion of their earnings or wealth to the wellbeing of the firm. Sample data for this study hasbeen constructed by matching a sample of 334 firms from the Minnesota Human Resource Management Practices Survey data and 3,659 workers’ compensation claims filed in Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry’s data base for those injuries occurred in 1992. Additional data were collected from the Minnesota Department of Economic Security on employment size of sample firms, and from US tax form 5,500 on the extent of employee financial participation in profit sharing and ESOPs. Empirical analysis of binomial Logit analysis has been conducted against this sample data in order to analyze the potential effects of employee participation plans on employee’s claims-reporting moral hazard which measured by insurer’s denial for liability in workers’ compensation system. Claimant characteristics such as age, occupation, gender, and injury type (e.g., sprains and strains, contusions, cuts, etc.) are included as control variables forthey may affect the probability of detection of false claims, related to either differential observability of employee actions, or to the likelihood of certain injuries to occur in certain industries or occupations. In this study, it is argued that claims-reporting moral hazard by employees is a double-edged phenomenon, consisting of individual employee’s making false claims, and of their coworkers not detecting and reporting them. Empirical results of this study show that; 1) employee participation plans in decision making without any financial involvement may increase group based self-opportunism by filing more fraudulent claims, 2) employee participation plans only in financial returns has increased the incidence of denials by insurers, and 3) employee participation plans both in decision-making and financial returns have been negatively correlated with the incidence of denial of liability. Finally, employee participation plans both in decision- making and financial returns have been negatively correlated with the incidence of denial of liability though not statistically significant. This result suggests that these two different types of employee participation rights can complement to each other resulting in more desirable outcome. For example, group based self-opportunism in case of participation in decision-making rights can be reduced by rendering employees have incentives of saving firm’s overall cost through participation in firm’s financial returns. Also, the problem such as free-ridership in practice of employee participation plans only in financial-returns can be reduced by peer monitoring pressures provided through employee involvement programs in decision making such as self-autonomous teams.

금융회사 리스크 관리와 채권 기반 임원보상제도

고영미(Young-Mi Ko) 한국기업법학회 2014 企業法硏究 Vol.28 No.4

본 논문은 최근 미국 및 유럽에서 부상하고 있는 기업 채권(예를 들면, 후순위채나 채무 증서 등)을 이용한 보상 방식에 대한 논의를 중심으로 임원보상에 관련한 이러한 새로운 동향을 소개하고, 우리나라의 금융회사와 규제기관을 위한 몇 가지 시사점을 제공하기 위하여 작성되었다. 특히 글로벌 금융 위기 이후 부상하고 있는 조건부자본증권이 이와 같은 채권을 이용한 보상의 구체적 방식으로써 이용될 수 방안을 개발하기 위하여, 구체적인 설계 방안, 국제적인 활용 예, 그리고, 금융회사 임원에 보상을 규정하는 한국의 현행 제도에 편입시키기 위한 방안 등을 연구하였다. 논문의 내용을 요약하자면, 금융회사의 지배구조의 특수성에 대한 이해를 바탕으로, 기존 임원보상 체계의 문제점을 지적하고, 바람직한 임원보상 정책의 수립 필요성과 이를 위한 적정한 보상 책정 기준들을 제시할 것이다. 특히, 기업 채권을 이용한 임원보상 공식 등 임원보상 책정을 위한 새로운 기준은, 임원 보상 체계를 다양한 이해관계자의 이익과 연계되도록 설계됨으로써, 경영진으로 하여금 업무성과에 있어서의 단기주의와 업무수행에 있어서의 과도한 위험 추구에 대한 유인을 극복할 수 있도록 해 줄 것이다. 논문은, 임원 보상을 위한 기업채권의 이용에 대한 논의를 소개하고, 더 나아가, 구체적인 실행 방안 중 하나로써의 조기 전환 발동장치를 가진 조건부자본증권의 활용을 제안한다. 결국, 이 논문의 가장 중요한 핵심은 시스템상 중요한 금융기관(Systemically Important Financial Institutions, the “SIFIs”)의 경영진으로 하여금 리스크 인수를 줄이도록 하는 강력한 인센티브를 제공하는 조건부 자본의 기능에 대한 조명에 있을 것이다. 본 논문은 개별적인 법 조항들로부터 제기될 수 있는 법적 쟁점에 대한 구체적 분석보다는 금융기관의 지배구조 개선 및 효율적인 리스크 관리를 목적으로 한 법 경제학적법 정책학적 담론을 주된 내용으로 한다. From the early stage of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, existing executive compensation program has been criticized since it could be one of main factors that magnified the crisis with its flawed compensation formula and high level of compensation. The considerable amount of executive compensation was focused on equity-based compensation, which leads executive to take inappropriate risks, concentrate on short-term performance, neglect sustainability, and pose traditional moral hazard. As proved by some empirical researches, executives who hold more debts compared to equity holdings would take decreased risks. The debt-based compensation will provide the executives with incentive to take the creditor-centered approach, resulting in less risk taking, less income inequality, overcoming short-termism, producing sustainability, and constraining moral hazard. Since the Financial Crisis, reform proposals of corporate governance have stressed on the importance of optimal framework for executive compensation package. Equity-based executive compensations such as deferred-equity compensation and restricted-equity compensation hav been developed, which could satisfy the demands for performance-based compensations, however, could not address the problem of excessive risk takings by executives. This article introduces a development tendency of executive compensation focusing on the debt-based executive compensation, which is getting increasingly more interests in Europe and US, in order to provide several implications for financial regulatory agencies and financial institutions in Korea. If financial institution includes contingent convertible bond in executive compensation package, its management will not take excessive risks since the part of managers" interests are aligned with creditors" interests. In particular, the contingent convertible bond has a great potential to improve corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions when it is designed with earlier trigger feature.

임원보수공시제도에 관한 소고 - 우리나라 임원보수공시제도의 현황·문제점 및 개선방안을 중심으로 -

박정국 서울시립대학교 서울시립대학교 법학연구소 2015 서울법학 Vol.23 No.1

임원보수에 대한 주주와 투자자의 통제 및 감시기능을 강화하고 회사경영의 투명성을 제고하는 차원에서 우리나라는 2013년 5월 28일 「자본시장과 금융투자업에 관한 법률」을 개정하여 동년 11월 29일 시행하였다. 즉 종래 주주총회에서 정한 임원보수의 총액만을 공시하도록 하던 규정을 개정하여 5억 원 이상의 보수를 받는 임원의 개인별 보수와 그 구체적인 산정기준 및 방법 등을 공시하도록 개정하였다. 하지만 동법은 보수공시 대상을 등기임원으로 한정하고 있어 미등기임원인 총수 일가 등이 고액의 연봉을 받는다 해도 통제 및 감시의 대상이 될 수 없으므로 보수공시 대상을 미등기임원으로 확대할 필요가 있다. 또한 정부는 보수공시의 구체적인 산정기준과 방법을 회사의 자율에 맡기고 있고 회사는 임원처우규정(이사회 결의)에 따르는 것으로 기재․제출하여 공시의 실효성이 전혀 없으므로 정부는 보다 구체적인 산정기준과 방법을 마련할 필요가 있다. 아울러 국내 일부 상장회사만이 보수위원회를 설치․운영하여 주주총회에 상정할 개별 임원보수액을 책정하고 있기 때문에 보수 책정 절차의 합리성을 담보할 수 없으므로 사외이사를 중심으로 한 보수위원회의 설치․운영을 강제할 필요가 있다. 개별 임원보수공시제도가 시행된 지 불과 1년 조금 지난 시점이긴 하지만 향후 운영상의 실효성을 확보하기 위해서는 임원의 도덕적 해이를 차단하고 경영의 투명성을 확보하고자 했던 제도의 입법취지를 충분히 고려해서 판단해야 할 것으로 본다. The 「Law on Capital Markets and Financial Investment Services」 was amended May 28, 2013 and was done November 29 the same year, in order to strengthen controls and monitoring of shareholders and investors for the compensation of officers of executive and to enhance the transparency of company management. In other words, the law was revised regulations to disclose only the total amount of compensation of executives set out in the Shareholders' Meeting and to disclose individual compensation of executive to receive compensation of 500 million or more and the specific calculation criteria and methods. But because there are limited disclosures target of compensation to the registered officers by the law, even if the officers have not been registered receive an annual salary of large, it can not be the subject of control and monitoring, therefore the disclosures target of compensation needs to be expanded to the officers have not been registered. Also, the government has to leave the concrete calculation standards and methods of compensation's disclosures to the company's voluntary and the company described as conforming to the officers's treatment regulation(council resolution) of not at all the effectiveness of the disclosure, therefore the government may have to provide the more concrete calculation standards and methods. In addition, since only some of the listed companies in the country are to install and operate the compensation committee for estimating the compensation of individual officers, it can not guarantee the rationality of the calculation procedure of compensation, therefore companies need to force the installation and operation of the compensation committee with a focus on outside directors. More than a year has passed since the compensation disclosure institution of individual executive has been implemented. The government will have to be determined taking into account the legislative intent of the institutions blocking the moral hazard of executives and wanted to ensure transparency of management in order to ensure operational effectiveness in the future.

Executive Compensation, Ownership Structureand Firm Performance in Chinese Financial Corporations

Yongli Luo,Dave O.Jackson 사람과세계경영학회 2012 Global Business and Finance Review Vol.17 No.1

Executive compensation in the U.S. banking industry has been criticized as a root cause of the recent financial crisis. This study examines the relationship between executive compensation, ownership structure, and firm performance for Chinese financial corporations during 2001- 2009. The results reveal that executive compensation in Chinese banks follows a relation-based rather than a market-based contract. There is little evidence in support of the pay-for- performance setting for Chinese executive compensation. Ownership concentration has significantly negative impacts while firm size has significantly positive impacts on CEO compensation. Further, the involvement of state ownership tends to limit executive compensation, while the compensation committee is friendly and enhances management compensation. The results suggest that the government or regulation may ensure efficient corporate governance in business activity as a helping hand when corporate governance is weak.

자본주의의 변천과 주식회사 이사의 보수

최준선 한국상사법학회 2010 商事法硏究 Vol.29 No.3

Executive compensation has been much discussed in academic circle in Korea and the fights over executives' pay is now undergoing. However,nobody has raised the fundamental questions, the reason why to limit executive compensation, how could the executive compensation of the modern corporation be controlled and who would decide the reasonable compensation? This article overlooked the relations between changes in capitalism and the executive compensation. The capitalism has changed from “owner capitalism” to “managerial capitalism”, and then to “shareholder capitalism” and to “stakeholder capitalism”, and at last to “customer capitalism” in recent years. This article not only draws a contrast between the wide-ranging battles of the 1930s and today's more narrow debates on the executive compensation, but also discusses the current situation in Korea. Most important measures to curb pay are providing in relevant Act new requirements for pay disclosure. In the United States 5 highest compensations including CEO and CFO are subject to disclosure. Still other measures, referred to as “say on pay,” would require that shareholders be permitted to offer at least an advisory opinion on the propriety of compensation packages offered to company management. While these opinions would not be binding, compensation committees could ignore them at their peril. This writer concludes that executive compensation is not an urgent issue to manage in Korea, because executives in Korea usually compensated not so much in compare to executive compensations in other countries. Differences in compensation between executives and employees in Korea also are not so sharp (executive average compensation is 7.5 times higher than that of employee) as that of other countries (475 times higher in United States).

독일 지역재정조정제(Finanzausgleich)의 실제

김영태 한국지방정치학회 2017 한국지방정치학회보 Vol.7 No.1

In the narrow sense, the national financial balancing in Germany is the horizontal financial compensation. But the finance system in Germany consists of three stages: pre-tax reconciliation(the redistribution of financial resources between the federal government and the Länder), horizontal financial compensation between the Länder, and general federal allowances. This article analyses the distribution of financial resources in 2015 to understand the compensation for the varying financial strength of the Länder in Germany. 일반적으로 독일의 재정조정제는 개별 주(Länder) 사이의 재정격차를 완화하기 위해 재정력이 강한 주에서 재정력이 약한 주로 세수를 재분배하는 소위 2차적 재정조정제(sekundärer Finanzausgleich, Ergänzender Finanzausgleich)로 이해된다. 그러나 공동세(Gemeinschaftsteuer)를 연방정부와 주정부 사이에 배분하는 1차적 재정조정(primärer Finanzausgleich, Originärer Finanzausgleich) 역시 주 정부 간 재정력 격차 완화에 커다란 의미를 갖는다. 이러한 점을 고려하여 이 글에서는 1차적 재정조정제와 2차적 재정조정제로 포괄하여 독일의 지역재정조정제의 제도적 규정을 살펴보고, 이를 토대로 2015년을 사례로 독일의 재정조정 현황과 재정조정제도의 효과를 분석해보았다.