1960년대 초 국립영화제작소의 `문화`와 `영화`: 군사정권의 공보정책과 문화영화

박선영 ( Sun Young Park ) 이화사학연구소 2017 梨花史學硏究 Vol.0 No.54

This paper was focused on films that promoted “culture” among “culture films” produced during the military rule period between coup on May 16, 1961 and the beginning of Park Chung-hee administration in December, 1963. Culture films during this time were official films produced by the National Film Production Center under the first Korean film legislation enacted in Korea since its liberation from the Japanese rule. Produced around the time when Taehan News and culture films were mandatorily screened before every feature film was shown in theaters, these culture films had to be in line with public information policies of the military regime. However, public information goals and policies faithfully reproduced in films faced moments of unexpected criticism. During that time, the military regime established detailed and effective public information policies to justify the coup and the regime`s rise to power. It utilized “culture” in various ways to this end. First, the regime attracted international cultural events to Korea to promote the legitimacy of its rule as well as the cultural nature of the regime to foreign nations. Second, the military regime attempted to boost domestic demand through industrial expos. It also attempted to engrave the image of positive “development” in Korean people`s minds by displaying industrial spectacles of modernization at expos. Third, the regime planned and held cultural events such as folk culture festivals to develop “tradition.” Through festivals honoring military figures in Korean history such as Yi Sun-shin and Chungnyol-gong (Lord of Loyalty and Righteousness), the regime attempted to link the history of Korean people to the story of the military regime. These cultural events were featured in films and showed in screens of theaters. They were used to instill the military regime`s public information goals in masses. Interestingly, cultural events that were hurriedly put together around that time seemed to have been created in order for Korea to attract “foreign currency.” The title “Tourism Korea” was born a result of the interest of the United States and South Korea`s military regime to increase Korea`s economics. To acquire foreign currency, the military regime reorganized infrastructure, implemented legislations, repaired tour routes, operated tourist hotels, and levied amusement taxes. Then also developed various cultural products. Invitation to Korea (1963) was a cultural film that embodied intentions of the military regime. The synopsis of the film was focused on inviting Smith, a fictional American who had fought in the Korean War, and his wife to Korea and giving them a tour of the country. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this film contained everything the military regime readied for “foreign” tourists. The film featured cultural products of “Tourism Korea,” including local cultural festivals such as Shilla Festival and Namwon`s Chunhyang Festival, hotels such as state-run Bando Hotel and others in Hwach`on and Sogwipo, Jeju Island, a nightclub at Walker Hill Hotel which was opened in January 1963, sex tourism, and more. One thing that is worthy of note is that while the film introduces a tour course for an American couple, it summons “Koreans living abroad” by directly addressing them in the second person. In the end, this film was actually a message to Koreans living abroad, particularly those living in Japan, since the military regime needed their wealth. Therefore, films suggesting folk culture festivals began to emerge in Korea in 1962. They were developed as “traditional cultural products” to bring in foreign currency. It also paints a black picture of the future of “Tourism Korea” by commercializing women through the promotion of sensual female dancers and sex tourism which, became major parts of Korean tourism during Park Chung-hee administration.

김정은 체제의 당ㆍ군 관계 변화

김태구(Kim Tae-Ku) 북한학회 2013 북한학보 Vol.38 No.1

이 글에서는 김정은이 안정적인 정권교체를 이루어 내기 위하여 당군관계를 활용하였다고 가정하고 있다. 북한의 당군 관계에 대한 연구는 단순히 북한의 정치상황 뿐 아니라 지도자의 정권 운영 방향을 예측할 수 있다는 점에서 중요한 요소로 자리매김하고 있다. 이러한 북한의 당군 관계를 분석하는 방법에는 여러 가지가 있겠지만 이 논문에서는 특히 당ㆍ군 소속의 주요 인물들을 중심으로 살펴보고 있다. 김정일은 동구권의 몰락, 경제난과 사회적 동요 등의 대내외적 위기를 군에 의지하여 극복하고자 하였다. 당시 고난의 행군으로 불렸던 식량난은 체제를 위협하였고 김정일에게 가장 절실한 문제는 체제의 존속과 후계권력을 공고히 하는 것으로서 이를 위해 군대의 물리력을 절대적으로 필요로 하였다. 김정일이 대내외적 위기 상황을 극복하기 위하여 추진한 선군정치는 군의 정치적 위상과 영향력의 증대로 인해 상대적으로 당의 위축을 가져 왔다. 그러나 김정은은 군부의 세력을 감소시키면서 당의 위상을 높여주는 등 당-군 관계의 변화를 활용하며 안정적인 정권 교체를 이루고 체제를 공고화 하고 있다. 북한은 3, 4차 당대표자회를 통해 정권안정화를 위한 토대를 마련하였고 당의 조직을 정비하였다. 또한 군사적으로 과거 국방위원회의 기능과 권한이 조선로동당 중앙군사위원회로 이양되고 있는 조치들이 가시화 되고 있다. 이와 함께 김정은은 군부 세력을 교체하거나 강등과 복권 등의 인사조치를 반복하면서 군부를 장악하고 세력견제를 통해 안정적으로 체제를 유지하고자 하는 노력을 가속화하고 있다. 군부에 대한 강도 높은 문책은 군부의 기강을 확립하고 군부를 안정적으로 장악하기 위해 실시하는 것으로 보인다. 김정은은 이 같은 확고부동한 군부 통제력을 기반으로 당에 힘을 실어주면서 당에 의한 안정적인 국정운영 체제를 확립하고 있는 것 같다. 또한 김정은이 추진하고 있는 ‘강등 후 복권’ 방식도 팽창되어 있는 군부의 세력을 견제하고 자신에게 충성을 유도하는 전략을 구사하고 있는 것으로 볼 수 있다. This essay assumes that Kim Jeong Un has used the Party-Military relation in order to accomplish a stable transition of the regime. A research on the nK' s Party-Military relation is significant as it not only provides an insight on its political structure, but also on the leadership's direction of his management. There can be several methods for analysing nK Party-Military relations, however this particular essay focuses on the analysis through influential military elites within the nK' s political party and military branches. Kim Jeong Il, with the collapse of Soviet Union and its comrades, economic crisis, and instability of his society, has intended to overcome nK' s internal and external cnses through the fortification of its military. Furthermore, in the face of extreme food shortage, posing a vivid threat to his regime's very existence, Kim Jeong Il desperately needed a physical strength of the military to secure his regime's survival and that of his successor. The 'military-first policy' developed by Kim Jeong Il's greed to hold his regime, has strengthened the military's influence over political arena, and weakened the Party. However, Kim Jeong Un, unlike his father, is shrinking the influence of military and granting the Party with more power and influence. Through this manipulation of Party-Military relation, Kim Jeong Un is gradually stabilizing his newly established regime. Through the 3rd and 4th Conference of party delegates, Kim Jeong Un has reinforced the foundation of his regime and shifted the structure of his Party accordingly. Moreover, in the military sense, major functions and authorities, which once lied with National Defense Commission, have now been transferred to the Central Military Committee of the nKorea Workers' Party. Along such changes, Kim Jeong Un has newly appointed number of important military positions, and repeatedly demoted and promoted the pre-existing military generals to eliminate potential threats to guarantee a safe path for his emerging regime. This fierce discipline by Kim Jeong Un is being implemented in order to reorganize the fundamental principles of military branch, and safely claim his control at the same time. KJU's firm grip of the military, which allows the Party for expansion of its authority, can be seen as his attempt to prevent dysfunctions within the governments, and thus stably maintain the regime. Also, his strategic 'demotion and promotions' of high ranking officers in the military is an another method of control the military, and inducing his military elite to promise everlasting loyalty to the young leader.

한국 대중음악 금지사 일 고찰 : 박정희 정권과 전두환 정권 시기를 중심으로

정주신(Chung, Joo-Shin) 한국정치사회연구소 2020 한국과 국제사회 Vol.4 No.1

이 글에서는 대중음악 금지 및 규제와 관련 박정희 정권과 전두환 정권을 중심으로 군부정권이 집권욕과 억압성으로 대중음악 규제조치의 제도화 과정과 금지곡 기준 및 내용이 대중음악에 어떤 영향을 미쳤는가를 고찰했다. 특히 기존 연구의 경향과는 달리 군부 권위주의정권의 특성상 유불리를 따지는 그들의 행태에 따라 ‘선택’(Choice)과 ‘배제’(Exclusion)라는 용어를 사용하여 대증음악을 민간인보다는 군부의 관점에서 억압통치의 일환이자 차별화 전략으로 사용했다. 여기서 군부정권하의 대중음악 금지사 일 고찰은 군부정권이 금지곡을 제도화시켜 대중들에게 음악의 이해와 표현의 자유를와 탄압시키는 요체이기도 하지만, 한편으로는 군부의 체제유지와 상관성이 있는 집권욕과 폭압성을 꾀하는 역할로써 동시성을 보여준 융합연구의 사례이다. 첫째, 군부정권하의 금지곡은 특히 박정희정권 시절에 대부분 이뤄진 곡들로, 통치권자의 집권욕이나 폭력성에서 이뤄진 것이어서, 금지곡의 잣대가 노래를 만들고 부르는 사람들의 창작성과 정당성을 배제한 것이었다. 둘째, 군부정권하의 금지곡 해제는 1987년 6월항쟁의 추세에 맞춰 이뤄진 졌다는 점에서, 표현 강제와 폭압성을 보여준 군부정권이 국민적 항쟁에 항복하고 나서야 이뤄졌다. 결국 공안(公安)의 측면보다는 풍속(風俗)의 측면에서의 금지곡이 많았다는 것은 사회문화적으로 군부정권이 폭압성을 드러낸 대중탄압이 심했다는 증표였다. The article examined how the military regime, led by the Park Chung-hee regime and Chun Doo-hwan regime, influenced popular music by the regime s desire and oppression. In particular, the term Choice and Exclusion were used as part of the military’s repressive rule and as a strategy to differentiate itself from the military’s perspective, using the terms Choice and Exclusion depending on the nature of the military’s authoritarian regimes, contrary to the trend of existing research. The review of banning pop music under the military regime here is an example of a fusion study in which the military regime systemizes banned songs and oppresses the public with freedom of understanding and expression, but on the other hand, it has shown concurrency as a role of seeking to maintain the military s regime and tyrannize it. First, the banned songs under the military regime were mostly performed during the Park Chung-hee regime, which ruled out the creativity and legitimacy of those who made and sang songs, as they were performed by the ruling party’s desire for power or violence. Second, the lifting of the banned song under the military regime was made only after the military regime surrendered to the national uprising, in that the song was made in line with the trend of the June 1987 uprising. After all, the fact that there were many banned songs in terms of wind speed rather than in terms of public security was a sign that the military regime was severely oppressed by the public, socially and culturally.

Path Dependence In North Korean Military Negotiation Agendas

이미숙 이화여자대학교 통일학연구원 2018 Journal of peace and unification Vol.8 No.1

Analyzing the agendas of the North Korean military negotiations, we see that they were varied according to situations, but their objective for negotiations toward South Korea, “maintaining the North Korean system” did not change. In the early 1990s, proposals for “important military negotiations, ” such as nonaggression and disarmament were mainly on the table, but they used to end up as declaratory military issues showing the characteristics of pseudo-military negotiations. However, in the early 2000s, such general military negotiations as connecting railways and roads and building military confidence were proposed and carried out to make them look like realistic negotiations, though they were still locked in the box of maintaining the regime. Therefore, the change was not in the character of the negotiations, but simply the negotiation items varied in favor of the situations in order to achieve the goal of “protecting the system.” As Thelen pointed out, the change was not targeted for the core element of maintaining the North Korean regime. Instead, the change was made in the military negotiation agendas in order to secure the regime in terms of the North’s strategy toward South Korea’s negotiation, thereby keeping up its path dependence. Analyzing the agendas of the North Korean military negotiations, we see that they were varied according to situations, but their objective for negotiations toward South Korea, “maintaining the North Korean system” did not change. In the early 1990s, proposals for “important military negotiations,” such as nonaggression and disarmament were mainly on the table, but they used to end up as declaratory military issues showing the characteristics of pseudo-military negotiations. However, in the early 2000s, such general military negotiations as connecting railways and roads and building military confidence were proposed and carried out to make them look like realistic negotiations, though they were still locked in the box of maintaining the regime. Therefore, the change was not in the character of the negotiations, but simply the negotiation items varied in favor of the situations in order to achieve the goal of “protecting the system.” As Thelen pointed out, the change was not targeted for the core element of maintaining the North Korean regime. Instead, the change was made in the military negotiation agendas in order to secure the regime in terms of the North’s strategy toward South Korea’s negotiation, thereby keeping up its path dependence.

김정일 정권의 주요 군부인물 변화 -특징과 의미-

윤황 한국통일전략학회 2009 통일전략 Vol.9 No.3

The main goal of this research is to analyze the features and the implications of the changes against the Kim Jong-il regime's key figures in North Korean militarists from the start of the Kim's regime since Kim Il-sung`s death in 1994 to the present day. North Korea is controlled by Kim Jong-il in communism`s first hereditary power successor, who assumed the leadership in 1994 when Kim Il-sung died of heart failure at 82. Kim Jong-il abolished the Juseok(the head of state) and reinforced the National Defense Commission Chairman(and National Defense Commission) with a revision of the North Korean constitution in 1998 after Kim Il-sung's death. Under this fundamental awareness its analysis results were substantially as follows. Firstly, the Kim Jong-il regime's key figures between September 5, 1998 and September 2, 2003 are Jo Myong-rok(first vice chairman), Kim Il-cheol(vice chairman), Lee Yong-mu(vice chairman), Kim Yong-chun(member), Paek Hak-rim(member) of the National Defense Commission(NDC). Second, the Kim Jong-il regime's key figures between September 3, 2003 and April 8, 2009 are Jo Myong-rok(first vice chairman), Lee Yong-mu(vice chairman), Kim Yong-chun(member), Chon Pyong-ho(member) of the National Defense Commission. In the eyes of the Kim Jong-il regime's Juseokdan(the VIP seating area and VIP stage), the key figure of the militarists are Jo Myong-rok(director of the Korean People's Army), Kim Yong-chun(minister of the Peoples’ Armed Force), Kim Il-cheol(the first deputy director of MPAF/Minister of the Peoples' Armed Force), Lee Yong-mu(chief of the general political bureau of the People's Army), Kim Gyuk-Shik(the chairman of the general staff of MPAF). Third, the Kim Jong-il regime's key figures between April 9, 2009 and as of December 2009 are Lee Ul-sol(marshal, director of the guard command), Jo Myong-rok(chief of the general political bureau, first vice chairman of the National Defense Commission/NDC), Lee Yong-mu(vice chairman of NDC), Kim Yong-chun(vice chairman of NDC), Oh Keuk-ryul(vice chairman of NDC, the director general of operations bureau of KWP/Korean Workers Party), Kim Il-cheol(member of NDC), Li Ha-il(vice marshal), Ju Sang-seong(general, member of NDC), Kim Jong-gak(general, member of NDC), Lee Young-ho(general, chairman of central staff of MPAF), Kim Chol-man(general). In conclusion, this research analyzed the Kim's regime brought the key figure of the militarists, mostly to consolidating the military`s loyalty to leader Kim Jong-il, into the country`s National Defense Committee, the North Korea`s Rodong(Workers`) Party, and the Cabinet. This is entirely derived from the military dictatorship for safety of a hereditary father-son(‘Kim Il-sung’ - ‘Kim Jong-il’ - ‘Kim Jong-un') power succession. For this, Kim Jong-il rules the country as chairman of the National Defense Commission, and Kim's regime signaled his focus on military-oriented politics. In short, the Kim's regime promotes the military-first politics, called ‘songun politics’, as its national management system. But the military dictatorship of Kim`s absolute power and the top-down system of the military-first politics are occupying continuously to the economic crisis. 본 논문의 연구목적은 제1기-제3기 현재까지 김정일(金正日) 정권의 주요 군부인물들에 대한 변화를 추적하여 그 특징과 의미를 규명해 보고자 하는 데에 두고 있다. 이의 연구목적에 따라 본 연구의 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 제1기 김정일 정권의 주요 군부인물들은 국방위원회의 조명록, 김일철, 리용무, 김영춘, 백학림이었고, ‘차수’ 계급이 제1기 김정일 정권의 군부핵심계급층이었다. 그리고 1998년 9월 제1기 김정일 정권의 출범 직후인 ‘정권수립 50주년기념 열병식’과 2000년 '당창건 55돌 경축 열병식'의 주석단 서열에서는 군부인물들이 그 서열 30위권에 각각 10명과 11명이나 포진하였다. 이로써 군부의 인물들이 제1기 김정일 정권의 출범과 동시에 주요 권력세력으로 급부상하였다고 분석하였다. 둘째, 제1기 김정일 정권에 이어 제2기 정권의 국방위원회에 제1부위원장 조명록, 부위원장 리용무, 위원 김영춘․전병호가 그대로 임명되었다는 것은 이들이 제1기와 제2기의 김정일 정권에서 주요 핵심 군부인물들이라고 분석되었다. 그리고 제2기 김정일 정권의 출범 직후 최초의 2003년 ‘정권수립 55돌 열병식’ 주석단 서열에서 조명록, 김영춘, 김일철, 리용무, 김격식이 10위권의 군부인물들로 들어갔다는 것은 이들이 제2기 정권의 핵심 군부인물이라고 분석하였다. 셋째, 제3기 김정일 정권의 국방위원회와 주석단 서열로 본 군부인물들에 토대해 보면, 제3기 정권의 핵심적인 주요 군부인물들은 리을설, 조명록, 김영춘, 리용무, 김일철, 리하일, 오극렬, 주상성, 김정각, 리영호, 김철만 등이 가장 대표적이다. 그 중에 제1기와 제2기에 이어 제1부위원장에 조명록, 부위원장에 리용무, 위원에 김영춘, 전병호가 그대로 임명되었다는 점에서 이들 4인방이 제1기-제3기 김정일 정권의 주요 최고 핵심 군부인물들로서 사실상 김정일의 최측근들이다.넷째, 제1기-제3기 김정일 정권에서 떠오른 군부의 주요 인물은 김기선, 김명국, 김상익, 김성규, 김원홍, 김윤심, 김정각, 김형룡, 박기서, 박재경, 신일남, 여춘석, 오극렬, 우동측, 유용철, 리명수, 리영호, 정명도, 주상성, 지영춘, 한동근, 현철해라고 분석되었다. 이들 중에 특히, 제3기 김정일 정권에서 가장 떠오르고 주목해야 할 군부인물들은 김명국, 김원홍, 김정각, 박재경, 오극렬, 우동측, 리명수, 리영호이다. 이와 관련하여 김정일의 최측근 군부인물은 김영춘, 리영호, 김정각, 김명국 김원홍, 현철해, 리명수, 한동근이고 이들 중에 김영춘․리영호․김정각․현철해․리명수가 제3기 김정일 정권의 ‘5인방 군부핵심인물’이라고 분석되었다.

제2공화국 민주당 정권의 성립과 붕괴: 한미관계, 국가-시민사회관계, 그리고 민군관계를 중심으로

정일준 한국공공사회학회 2020 공공사회연구 Vol.10 No.3

This article tries to reestimate the rise and demise of the 2nd Republic by relocating democratic regime in the cross currents of ROK-U.S.A. Relation, State-Civil Society Relation and Civil-Military Relation. The 1st democratic regime led by premier Chang was established only 7 years after the armistice of the Korean war. ROK government was heavily depend America on its national security, political stability, and economic survival. Without American military and economic aid, ROK national security and economy cannot be sustained. Furthermore, the sudden collapse of Syngman Rhee regime caused hugh vacuum for governing ROK-U.S.A. relations and domestic politics. Under the enormous pressure of the U. S. A., power vacuum of the South Korean state and the challenge from civil society, John Chang regime, had to promote democracy and pursue economic reform. This article starts with reviewing the 2nd republic and Chang regime focusing on international and historical legacies inherited from previous regime. Second, American viewpoints and reactions toward the establishment of Chang regime was examined. Americans were negative in the military reform such as reducing the size of the South Korean military and the military purification movement within ROK army. However, they were very positive and active on the South Korean economic reform to reduce American economic aid. Third, Chang regime’s state project, ‘Economy First’ policy was reestimated. Fourth, the demise of Chang regime was re-examined by focusing on the dual pressure caused by international and domestic sphere. By reestimating the rise and demise of the 1st democratic regime of South Korea from relational viewpoint, we can have more relevant understanding of South Korean democracy now & here. 이 논문은 제2공화국 민주당정권의 성립과 붕괴를 한미관계, 국가-시민사회관계 그리고 민군관계의 상호교차 속에서 재평가하고자 하는 시도이다. 한국현대사 최초의 민주정권이었던 장면 총리의 민주당 정권은 한국전쟁이 휴전으로 종료된 지 7년 만에 수립되었다. 한국정부는 국가안보, 정치안정 그리고 경제사활을 미국에 크게 의존했다. 미국의 군사원조와 경제원조가 없으면 한국 안보와 경제는 유지될 수 없었다. 더욱이 한미관계와 국내정치를 거의 혼자서 좌지우지하던 절대 권력자 이승만 대통령의 갑작스런 퇴장은 한국외교와 한국정치에 커다란 공백을 초래했다. 장면정권은 미국의 엄청난 압력과 국가권력기구의 이완, 그리고 시민사회의 도전 아래서 민주주의를 증진하는 동시에 경제개혁을 추진해나가야 했다. 이 논문은 먼저 민주당정권이 물려받은 국제정치적, 역사적 유산들에 초점을 맞추고자 한다. 둘째, 장면정권 수립을 미국은 어떻게 인식하며 대응했는지 살펴보고자 한다. 미국은 한국군 병력감축이나 정군운동(整軍運動) 같은 군개혁에는 부정적 입장을 취했다. 반면 미국의 원조부담을 덜기 위한 한국경제개혁에는 적극적으로 움직였다. 셋째, 민주당정권의 국가프로젝트인 ‘경제제일주의’ 정책을 재평가하고자 했다. 넷째, 민주당정권에 가해진 국내외의 압력이 어우러져 장면정권을 약화시키는 구체적인 과정을 재해석하고자 했다. 최초의 민주정권인 제2공화국 민주당 정권 성립과 붕괴과정을 한미관계, 국가-시민사회관계 그리고 민군관계의 상호교차에서 재평가함으로써, 우리는 지금 여기서 한국 민주주의를 보다 적절하게 인식할 수 있을 것이다

고려 최씨 정권기 私兵의 운영과 家奴

이정민 역사학회 2022 역사학보 Vol.- No.256

This study explores the management of private army(私兵) during the Choe military regime in Goryeo period and changes in the characteristics of its members. This study also intends to reveal the limitations of the regime’s running of private army. There are precedent studies that have analyzed the Choe regime’s management of private army, but they have not dealt with its members’ propensity. Therefore, the reason for the fundamental change in the attitudeofsoldiershasnotbeenproperly considered. The Choe military regime’s private army was largely composed of Dobang(都房) and House army(家兵). All members of Dobang were connected to the central bureaucracy, but the House army was not. Dobang had a bond with the Choe military regime in exchange for public offices, and could turn its back on the Choe military regime depending on the political situation. In preparation for such a situation, Choe military regime bestowed an office on domestic slaves(家奴), the conductor of the House army. However, these domestic slaves, newly involved with the bureaucracy, broke away from the Choe military regime and caused the fall of the regime. The limitation of the private army management was that Choe’s military regime used the centralized royal bureaucracy for its own benefit, but could not possess it. 본 연구는 고려 최씨 정권기 사병의 운영과 그 구성원의 성격 변화를 추적하여 최씨 정권의 사병 운영 한계점을 밝혔다. 기존 연구에서도 사병의 운영을 분석하는 작업이 이루어지기는 했지만, 구성원의 성격과 함께 분석되는 작업이 별로 행해지지 않아 그들의 행동 변화가 근본적으로 왜 일어났는지에 대한 고찰이 제대로 이루어지지 못했다. 최씨 정권의 사병은 크게 도방과 가병이 있었다. 도방의 구성원은 모두 중앙의 관료제와 관련되었으나, 가병은 그렇지 못했다. 도방은 관직을 반대급부로 하여 최씨 정권과 결합관계를 맺었는데, 정치적 상황에 따라 최씨 정권을 이탈할 수 있었다. 이를 대비하여 최씨 정권은 가병의 지휘자인 가노에게 관직을 주었는데, 새롭게 관료제와 연결된 가노가 최씨 정권을 이탈하면서 최씨 정권은 무너지게 되었다. 사병 운영 한계는 최씨 정권이 국왕 중심적 성격의 관료제를 자신에게 유리하도록 활용했지만 소유할 수 없는 점에 있었다.

고려시대 무신정권과 공공성: 전통사회 공공성 개념 추출의 시론적 연구

이희주 서울대학교 한국정치연구소 2013 韓國 政治 硏究 Vol.22 No.1

본 논문은 ‘고려시대 무신정권과 공공성’에 관한 논의를 통하여, 한국적 가치와 전통 속에서 ‘공공성’의 형태를 찾고자 하였다. 그 결과 고려사회에서 공공의 영역은 통치영 역에서 형성되었고, 그 형태는 유교이념과 유교정치체제의 테두리 내에서 규정되고 있음을 분석하였다. 본 논문은 세 가지 측면에서 고려시대 무신정권과 공공성에 대한 분 석을 시도하였다. 첫째, 무신난이 발생하게 된 정치적 상황 가운데서, 군주를 둘러싼 공 공성의 붕괴가 무신난의 주요한 요인의 하나로 작용하였다는 점, 둘째, 무신정권의 권 력장악과 국정운영이 유교이념과 유교정치체제를 이탈하여 공공성의 붕괴로 나타났다 는 점, 그럼에도 불구하고 셋째, 무신집권자의 통치의식이나 통치의 명분이 유교이념 차원에서 관념적인 형태로나마 유지되었다는 점 등이다. 이러한 특성에 기인하여, 무신 정권은 통치의 영역을 독점하여 공공성을 해치는 역기능적인 역할을 하면서도, 이후 ‘지 배세력의 확대’와 ‘성리학적 개혁’을 할 수 있는 ‘정치적 환경조성’에 부분적으로 기여하 였다는 점에서는 순기능적인 역할을 하였다. 특히 ‘지배세력의 확대’는 공공의 영역을 점유할 수 있는 층의 확대를 의미하며, 이것은 고려사회 전반적인 권력의 균형론적인 차원에서 무신정권이 기여한 면이다. This study seeks to establish a sense of political transparency grounded in Korean values and tradition through a discussion of the "military regime and political transparency of the Goryeo Dynasty." In Goryeo society, political transparency was formed from within the values of the ruling class. Moreover, such a comparison shows that the form was stimulated within the ideological boundaries and the political system of Confucianism. This study attempts to analyze political transparency of the Goryeo Dynasty and the military regime by three aspects: first, the political transparency associated with the king failed, mainly because of the detat by army officers; second, after seizing power, the governing philosophy of the military regime broke away from of the ideology and political system of Confucianism, which led to disruptions in the political transparency; and third, in spite of these two previous facts, the ruling outlook and justification of the military leaders retained an abstract form shaped by Confucianism. The military regime played a negative role by monopolizing the scope of the ruling and harming the political transparency at the same time. However, there is a positive aspect of the military regime. It expanded the ruling powers and, subsequently, it helped to foster the Neo-Confucianism Reformation. In particular, the expansion of the ruling powers indicates that more people could participate within the boundary of the political transparency. As concerns the overall balance of power of Goryeo society, historians now consider that the military regime contributed some good effects.

이집트 엘시시(El-Sisi) 정권 안보의 취약성

김은비 명지대학교(서울캠퍼스) 중동문제연구소 2018 중동문제연구 Vol.17 No.4

Therefore, a military regime puts efforts in 1) centralizing its authority, 2) preventing another coup by comforting its military, and 3) obtaining legitimacy. However, in order to centralize the authority, a military regime represses dissenters and restricts individual freedom; to comfort its military, it allows the military to intervene in politics and/or have economic privileges; and to obtain legitimacy, it tries to show better political / economic performance by differentiating itself from the former regime. Since El-Sisi came to power through a military coup, he has implemented such policies to survive in his office as well. However, unlike the other two factors, Egypt’s economic condition is not in the proper condition, which threatens the regime’s security. If the Egyptian economy improves, as there is no alternative political group or leader, Egypt looks likely to remain in a military regime. Nevertheless, the problems of human rights abuse need to be addressed and solved for the regime’s security in the long run.

5.16 군사정부의 사회개혁정책: 농어촌고리채정리사업과 재건국민운동을 중심으로

전재호 ( Jae Ho Jeon ) 전북대학교 사회과학연구소 2010 지역과 세계 Vol.34 No.2

이 글은 농어촌고리채정리사업과 재건국민운동을 중심으로 군정(軍政)의 사회개혁정책을 고찰했다. 군정은 5.16 군사쿠데타 직후 농민들의 지지를 얻고자 중농정책을 내걸었고, 그 중 하나로 농어촌고리채정리사업을 실시했다. 이 사업은 농어민의 부채 해결을 통해 농어촌 경제의 안정과 성장을 목표로 했다, 그러나 군정은 농어촌 사회에서 고리채가 지닌 효율성과 필요성을 이해하지 못한 채 일방적으로 채권자에게 희생을 강요했고, 고리채 신고 이후 이를 대체할 농업자금을 제공하지 못함으로써 사업은 계획대로 진행되지 못했다. 또한 군정은 `군사혁명`의 정당성을 홍보하고 자신들이 정한 사회 생활규범을 보급시키기 위해 군사쿠데타 직후부터 재건국민운동을 실시했다. 초기에는 군정 주도하에 행정단위의 중앙부터 말단까지 단기간 내에 일사분란하게 전국 조직을 건설하고 이를 통해 반공이 념의 확산에 노력을 기울였다. 그런데 시간이 지나면서 재건국민운동은 교육사업, 향토개발사업, 생활지도사업 등 일상생활과 관련된 사업으로 확대되었고 운영 주체 역시 민간으로 이양되었다, 그러나 군정의 지원이 축소된 이후 재건국민운동은 급속히 약화되었다. 결국 군정 기간 실시된 농어촌 고리채정리사업과 재건국민운동은 일방적인 위로부터의 정책이 지니는 한계를 드러냈다. 그러나 전국 조직을 건설, 운영하면서 국민을 동원, 통제한 경험은 민정이양 이후 박정희 체제의 국정운영에 유용한 경험을 제공했다. Ths study examines the social reforms policies of the military administration by focusing on the anti-usury project for rural areas and the nation rebuilding movement. To gain the support of the farmers the 5.16 military administration just after the military coup offered a physiocrat policy, one of it was the enforcement anti-usury project for farming/fishing in the rural areas. The purpose of this undertaking was to solve the problems of liabilities of farmers/fishermen by reducing the dependence of farmers on the unregulated financial institutions and thereby to attract farmers into formal financial institutions to bring stability and growth in rural economy. However, the implemented policy could not proceed in the way it was planned due to the prevailing social situations in rural society which was bounded by blood ties, regional kinship, and `empathy and moral sense` and the failure of supplying the much needed funds in rural areas. Meanwhile, to promote the legitimacy of the `military takeover` and in order to popularize the social norms established by the military junta for them the military administration carried out the national rebuilding movement immediately after the military coup. In the initial period, under the initiative of military leaders a very centralized military administration was established in a very short time and every effort was made to spread anti-communist ideology. However, as time went by, the national rebuilding movement expanded its arms in education sector, regional development projects, guiding principle of day to day life, etc. and its operation spread to non-governmental organizations as well. In this way the national rebuilding movement even after downsizing of the support from the military government functioned for the private organizations, but the role of the movement rapidly weakened. Eventually, the policies on anti-usury project for rural areas and nation rebuilding movement followed unilaterally from the top during military regime exposed its limitations. However, the experience of establishment of the national organization and using it to mobilize and regulate the citizens had a huge impact on the Park Chung flee regime to run state affairs after the transfer of power to civil government.