오바마 정부 출범 이후 북핵문제와 우리의 대응책

윤정원 (사) 한국전략문제연구소 2009 전략연구 Vol.- No.46

오바마 행정부가 2009년 1월 출범하자 북핵 해결을 위해 포괄적 미북협상이 촉진될 것 으로 기대되었으나, 북한이 4월 5일 대포동-2호로 의심받는 장거리 로켓을 발사해 사태가 악화되었다. 유엔안보리는 4월 14일 의장성명으로 로켓 발사가 대북제재의 기존 결의안 1718호 위반이라고 밝혔다. 이에 반발해 북한은 5월 25일 2차 핵실험을 감행하였다. 유엔 안보리는 6월 12일 더욱 강력한 대북제재를 포함한 결의안 1874호를 채택하였다. 한미 양 국 등 국제사회는 북한 도발에 제재를 가하면서 핵협상 복귀를 촉구하고 있다. 반면 북한 은 핵시설 재가동, 플루토늄 전량 무기화, 우라늄농축 활동 위협을 가하고 있다. 이에 향 후 북핵 시니리오를 갈등국면 고착, 협상국면으로 전환, 위기국면으로 비화로 제시하면서 우리의 정책적 대응방향을 제시하고 있음. It was expected that the Obama Administration would promote, after its inauguration in January 2009, US-DPRK dialogues and negotiations in comprehensive package-deal manner, and that it might reach an ultimate nuclear agreement more easily than before. However, the DPRK took provocative actions, by launching long-range rocket suspected of as Taepodong-2 missile on April 5, 2009. Subsequently, the UNSC adopted its Chairman's announcement that North Korea violated the existing Resolution 1718 of the UNSC, which calls for UN members to impose economic sanctions against North Korea. Criticizing and retorting to this announcement, North Korea surprisingly dared to conduct its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Hence, the UNSC adopted its Resolution 1874 which includes very robust and tough economic sanctions on the trade with the DPRK. Experts suggest several reasons why the DPRK showed deviant behaviors despite the dove-like gesture from the Obama administration; the technological upgrade of manufacturing nuclear bombs, the official securing of the status of nuclear weapon state, the reinforcement of its bargaining leverage while pressing the US to hold bilateral talks with the DPRK, and the stabilization of political power succession from Kim Jong-Il. After the second nuclear test, the international community, including the US and ROK, focuses on economic sanctions against North Korea, while urging the DPRK to return to nuclear talks such as six-party talks for nuclear counter-proliferation. There are three situational scenarios on the future of the DPRK nuclear problems. Those are the scenario of conflict stalemate, the scenario of nuclear bargaining, and the scenario of crisis escalation. This article suggests which policy directions the ROK should choose to confront each scenario.

북한의 핵실험과 대북포용정책 : 상관관계와 지속 필요성

김근식(Kim Keun-Sik) 고려대학교 평화연구소 2007 평화연구 Vol.15 No.1

2006년 북핵실험이 대북포용정책 탓이라는 주장은, 포용정책의 원래 대상이 남북관계이고 정책 목표 역시 남북관계 개선과 평화공존에 맞춰져 있으며 본질적으로 핵실험은 북미 적대관계의 부정적 산물이라는 점을 감안할 때 직접 연관되지 않는, 서로 차원이 다른 두 가지를 억지로 연계했다는 점에서 지나친 비약이 된다. 물론 포용정책을 통한 남북관계 개선이 북미관계와 북핵문제 해결에 긍정적인 환경을 만들 수는 있지만, 포용정책이 북핵문제 해결을 자동적으로 보장하는 필요충분조건은 아니다. 포용정책 때문에 핵실험을 한 게 아니라 남북관계의 대북포용 기조와 달리 북미관계에서 대북 강경이 지배하고 북미대결이 심화되면서 핵실험이 결과된 것이다. 또한 북한의 핵실험이 포용정책의 실패라는 주장은 역으로 포용정책이 성공했다면 북한의 핵실험을 막을 수 있다는 논리가 되는 바, 이는 지금까지 일관된 포용정책 하에서도 때로는 북미 합의가 도출되기도 하고 때로는 핵실험과 같은 극단적 대결이 나타나는 등 엇갈린 결과가 도출되었다는 점에서 별 설득력이 없다. 그러나 핵실험에도 불구하고 포용정책은 지속되어야 하지만 그렇다고 해서 과거의 것을 그대로 답습하는 것이어서는 안 된다. 이 점에서 향후 대북정책은 포용의 원칙을 견지하면서도 이른바 ‘원칙 있는 포용’의 기조를 확고히 해야 한다. The assertion that the North Korean nuclear test in 2006 was due to South Korea’s policy of engagement is a leap of logic, a forced connection between two separate things. This can be seen when considering that the focus of the engagement policy is Inter-Korean relations, and that its goals are peaceful coexistence and the improvement of relations on the peninsula. The nuclear test was fundamentally a negative result of hostile relations between North Korea and the U.S. Clearly, the improvement of Inter-Korean relations through engagement can create a positive environment for the resolution of the nuclear issue, but such a policy is not a necessary and sufficient condition that automatically guarantees a solution. The nuclear test was not a product of Seoul’s policy of engagement; rather it was a result of the worsening DPRK-U.S. standoff and U.S. pressure against the North, in contrast to the tolerance that characterized Inter-Korean relations. Furthermore, the arguments that the nuclear test represents a failure of the engagement policy lacks persuasiveness when viewed in converse: if the policy had been a success, then it could have prevented the nuclear test. However, South Korea’s consistent engagement has seen completely different outcomes, at times agreement between North Korea and the U.S. and at times extreme opposition such as the nuclear test. The policy of engagement must be continued regardless of the nuclear test, but it should not merely follow the same path. Henceforth, South Korea’s policy towards the North should adhere to engagement while having so-called “principled engagement” as its basis.

习近平-金正恩时期的中朝关系

리단 부경대학교 인문사회과학연구소 2018 인문사회과학연구 Vol.19 No.1

In February 2013, North Korea’s launched its third nuclear test, after which the relationship between China and DPRK has fallen into an unprecedented indifference and alienation. In terms of the nuclear test and other adventures of the DPRK, China stated its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. China has participated in and fulfilled the UN’s resolution on sanctions against the DPRK. In addition, the dislike of DPRK in the general public of China is rising. Some scholars even have proposed the cancellation of the alliance treaty between China and DPRK. However, under the circumstances of the sanction the international social community, the communication between China and DPRK continues quietly. The visits between the state officials and in techniques did not stop. The development of economy and trade is stable. And Progress has been made in the channel construction between China and DPRK. Therefore, this paper holds that during the period in which Xi Jinping and Kim Jeong-eun are in power, the relationship between China and DPRK showed the characteristics of alienation and contact. And the policy towards DPRK of China is limited support and limited opposition. For China, the contact with DPRK is necessary to control the crisis. On the one hand, China seeks for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, China hopes this contact can prevent Kim Jeong-eun from creating tension and other taking behaviors. For the sake of the respective core interest, the contact and alienation between China and DPRK will continue within a short period of time. 2013年2月,朝鲜的第三次核试验使中国和朝鲜关系陷入空前的冷淡和疏远。对朝鲜进行核试验等冒险行为,中国通过外交部声明阐明了中国支持朝鲜半岛无核化的立场。在此背景下,本文从朝鲜第三次核试验之后中朝两国关系的发展现状着手,分析两国发展的特点进而探求两国关系的实质。因为中朝同盟本身所具有的不对称性,本文着重从中国的角度梳理了中朝新一代领导人执政之后的双边关系,本文研究结果如下:中国坚持朝鲜半岛无核化的原则更加明确,反对朝鲜的冒险行为的举措更加坚决,中国就朝核、导等威胁地区安全的行为保持了与国际社会的沟通,更加切实地履行联合国安理会的各项决议。中朝关系出现了疏远的动向,中国对朝鲜问题坚持了底线原则,对威胁地区安全、给中国核心利益带来负面影响的因素坚决反对和抵制;朝鲜作为中国的同盟国,在外部威胁和内部急需稳定的需求下,在核武路线似乎日趋接近顶峰,中朝两国的核心战略利益相左致使两国的政治外交关系出现了疏远迹象。但是,中国坚持朝鲜半岛和平稳定的立场没有变化,坚持半岛问题和平解决的立场没有发生变化。即中国反对朝鲜的冒险行为,坚持朝核问题的和平解决立场,呼吁有关各方采取冷静克制的态度,避免半岛局势的恶化。中朝关系在国际社会制裁局面下出现了冷淡和不谐之音。中国反对朝鲜进行核试验及其危及地区局势的冒险行为,参与了国际社会对朝鲜的制裁,履行联合国安理会的对朝制裁决议。但是,国际社会的制裁和中朝两国的交流并没有成正比,双方通过政府层面和部长级和特使级的交流保持了沟通,两国通过科技交流保持了稳定态势。这种接触对于中国而言,在一定的程度上防止朝鲜滑向不可预知的方向,有助于中国对朝鲜半岛危及的管理;对于朝鲜而言,坚持和中国的接触与沟通无疑是其保持体制生存所需,这种需求既是政治层面的需求,也是经济层面的需求。中朝两国的疏远和接触因两国核心利益所需在短时间内将会持续

The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK Negotiation Strategies

( Scott Snyder ) 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2007 Pacific Focus Vol.22 No.1

The experience of U.S.-DPRK negotiations during the first North Korean nuclear crisis has framed American and North Korean strategies and tactics as they have approached the second crisis. The six party talks negotiating format itself has been favored by the Bush administration based on its own perception of lessons learned from the Clinton administration`s experience. For its part, the DPRK leadership has relied on a range of familiar tactics in the initial rounds of talks, including calculated efforts to utilize brinkmanship and crisis escalation to catalyze a direct response to the Bush administration. In the case of both Washington and Pyongyang, the use of these tactics reveal that until North Korea`s nuclear test on October 9th, 2006, neither side had truly committed itself to resolving the nuclear issue through a give-and-take negotiation process. Instead, both sides have attempted to shape the environment to their own ends as a vehicle for reaping benefits through the mechanism of negotiations. The North Korean nuclear test achieved Pyongyang`s tactical goal of drawing the United States into direct talks, but against a strategic context that initially appeared to be relatively unfavorable to North Korea`s longer-term strategic aims. This paper will examine possible lessons learned from the first North Korean nuclear crisis, will review the progress of the six party process, and will analyze the tactics and strategies of the U.S. and DPRK, respectively, as well as the other parties to the talks.

China's Strategies for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Guo Xinning 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소 2006 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.11 No.2

The international society has been very much concerned about the latest situation on the Korean Peninsula after the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear test on 9 October 2006 and has shown ever-increasing anxiety over the prospecter a peaceful solution to the crisis. What will be the outcome of the crisis? Is there hope for the Peninsula to come out ofthe crisis peacefully? What are the best options for the solution of the issue? There are different views among internationa1 observers on the questions. ln the author's personal point of view, a comprehenslve and dipomatic solution must be pursued should the international society wish to avoid a catastrophic situation in the future.

China`s Strategies for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

( Xin Ning Guo ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2006 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.11 No.2

북핵문제에 대한 북·미간 갈등과 6자회담

김창희(Chang Hee Kim) 한국동북아학회 2007 한국동북아논총 Vol.12 No.1

북한의 세 차례 핵실험과 중국의 대북한 정책 변화 분석

이영학(LEE Young Hak) 한국국제정치학회 2013 國際政治論叢 Vol.53 No.4

시진핑시기 중국의 대한반도 정책과 박근혜 대통령 방중의 의의

김흥규 (사) 한국전략문제연구소 2013 전략연구 Vol.59 No.-

The purpose of this piece of paper is to understand the evolution of China’s North Korea policy under the era of Xi Jinping, and evaluate President Park’s China visit and South Korea-China relationship. There have been fierce domestic debates on how to understand changing China’s North Korea policies before President Park’s China visit. The debates had tremendous importance to the strategy of Park’s visit to China as well as a direction of South Korea’s China policies. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China’s foreign policies is under transformation based upon the new identity of “great power” from the former one of “developing country.” Such transformation certainly influences China’s Korea policies. South Korea’s strategy in President Park’s China visit was constructed based upon the “assumption of China’s transformation in foreign policy” and an active engagement approach to China. This visit also symbolized South Korea’s changing priority in bilateral relations from Japan to China after the U.S. China’s Korea policy is still evolving. Its policy will be influenced and adjusted by several key variables such as Sino-US relations, South Korea-China relations, and North Korea nuclear development in the future. Therefore, in spite of President Park’s successful visit to China, it is too early to evaluate South Korea-China relationship optimistically. Uncertainty is still abundant in the relationship. 이 글은 시진핑 시기 중국의 대한반도 정책의 진화에 대한 이해를 기반으로 박근혜 대통령의 방중에 대한 평가를 시도하고, 한중관계를 조망해 보는 것을 목적으로 한다. 박 대통령의 방중 전 국내에서 시진핑 시기의 대외정책과 대북정책을 어떻게 이해해야 할지를 놓고 논쟁이 가열되었다. 이는 중국에 대한 정책적 함의가 큰 논쟁이었다. 시진핑 시기 대외정책은 기존의 발전도상국이란 정체성에서 ‘강대국’이란 정체성에 입각하여 전환중이다. 이는 중국의 대한반도 정책에도 영향을 미치고 있다. 분명한 것은 이번 박근혜 대통령의 방중이 “중국 변화론”에 근거하여 추진되었고, 향후 보다 적극적으로 중국을 포용하겠다는 의지를 바탕으로 하고 있다. 그리고 이번 방중은 이명박 대통령 시기 미국, 일본, 중국 순이었던 한국 강대국 외교의 순위변화를 가시적으로 알린 상징적인 방문이었다. 중국의 대 한반도 정책은 여전히 진화중이다. 이는 향후에 미중관계, 한중관계, 북한의 핵개발 요인 등에 의해 영향을 받으면서 조정될 전망이다. 박 대통령의 성공적인 방중에도 불구하고 한중관계를 반드시 낙관적으로 바라보기에는 불확실한 어려운 요인들이 증가하고 있다.