군사적 수정주의 행태가 핵 포기에 미치는 영향 및 북한의 핵 포기에 갖는 함의 고찰

김민정 한국동북아학회 2023 한국동북아논총 Vol.28 No.3

이 연구는 군사적 수정주의 행태가 핵 포기에 미치는 영향을 분석했다. 양적분석과 사례연구를 통하여 군사적 수정주의 행태가 강한 국가들일수록 궁극적으로 핵 포기 가능성이 높음을 증명했다. 또한 군사적 수정주의 행태가 가장 두드러졌던 북한의 경우 왜 아직 핵 포기단계에 이르지 않았는지를 리비아 사례를 통하여 논하였다. 이를 위해첫째 군사적 수정주의에 대한 이론적 배경을 살펴본 후 이를 조작적으로 정의했다. 둘째 군사적 수정주의 행태를 양적으로 수치화한 수정주의 변수 및 이와 상반되는 개념의 표적변수를 소개했다. 셋째, 각 핵 확산국의 수정주의변수와 표적변수의 수치를 비교해, 수정주의적 행태가 핵 포기와 어떠한 관계가 있는지 살펴보았다. 넷째, 21세기 들어핵개발 포기를 선언한 유일한 사례인 리비아의 사례를 통하여 군사적 수정주의 행태가 핵 포기에 끼친 영향을 설명했다. 마지막으로 북한이 핵 포기단계에 진입하는데 어떠한 외적 환경이 요구되는지 논하였다. 군사적 수정주의 국가들의 핵확산 시도는 주변국으로부터 더욱 심한 반발을 초래하여 궁극적으로 핵 포기를 가져왔다. 이는 주변국들과의 갈등이 북한의 핵 포기의 주요 조건임을 암시한다. 이 연구는 핵개발의 수정주의적 의도를 간과해온 기존 핵확산동인분석연구 및 북핵 해결을 위한 논의의 폭을 넓히는데 그 의의가 있다. This study analyzed the influence of militaristic revisionist behavior on nuclear rollback. Through quantitative analysis and case studies, it demonstrated that states exhibiting strong militaristic revisionist behavior show a higher likelihood of consequently heading toward nuclear rollback. In addition, the study explored why North Korea has not yet reached the stage of nuclear rollback despite displaying pronounced militaristic revisionist behavior, using Libya as a comparative example. In line with its objective, the study first examined the theoretical background of militaristic revisionism and provides an operational definition of it. Second, it introduced the revisionist variable, along with the target variable representing its opposite concept. Third, by comparing the numerical values of the revisionist and target variables for each nuclear proliferation state, the study investigated the potential relationship between militaristic revisionist behavior and nuclear rollback. Fourth, the study explained the impact of militaristic revisionist behavior on the nuclear rollback process through an analysis of Libya as the sole case of nuclear renunciation in the 21st century. Finally, the study further discussed the external conditions required for North Korea to enter the stage of nuclear rollback. The militaristic revisionist states’ proliferation attempts, this study suggests, have elicited stronger opposition from neighboring countries, ultimately leading to nuclear rollback. This proposes that conflicts with neighboring countries may serve as a major condition for North Korea’s nuclear rollback. This study holds significance in broadening the scope of existing causal analyses of nuclear proliferation, which have often overlooked the revisionist intent, and enriching the discussions on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

Maximum flexion and lateral rollback revealed better patient satisfaction after total knee arthroplasty

( M. Tamaki ),( T. Ishibashi ),( T. Yamazaki ),( S. Konda ),( K. Kono ),( S. Okada ),( T. Tomita ) 대한슬관절학회 2024 대한슬관절학회지 Vol.36 No.-

Introduction Patient satisfaction is an important outcome of total knee arthroplasty (TKA). However, we cannot predict how and why patients are satisfied or dissatisfied with TKA. The hypothesis of this study was that patient-reported outcomes (PROs) correlate with in vivo kinematics after TKA. Materials and methods One hundred knees were analyzed after TKA. The in vivo kinematics of deep knee bending motion were estimated from single-plane fluoroscopy using a two-to-three-dimensional registration technique. Active knee flexion, femoral rotation and rollback were evaluated. The PROs were obtained after surgery using the 2011 Knee Society Scoring System (KSS), and their relationship with in vivo kinematics was determined. Results The average minimum and maximum flexion were -2.4 ± 7.3° and 113.2 ± 13.6°, respectively. The average femoral rotation was 7.4 ± 3.4°, and the average medial and lateral rollback were 2.4 ± 4.8 mm and 7.2 ± 5.6 mm, respectively. The multiple regression analysis revealed that the maximum flexion angle significantly contributed to symptoms and satisfaction. In addition, lateral rollback was also a significant factor affecting patient satisfaction. Lateral rollback and lateral Anterior-Posterior (AP) position at maximum flexion were correlated with the maximum flexion angle, whereas femoral rotation did not correlate with flexion angles. Conclusions Maximum flexion and lateral rollback are important for better patient satisfaction after TKA. To obtain the maximum flexion angle, it was necessary to perform the normal kinematic pattern with a large amount of lateral rollback.

한국전쟁의 기본개념으로서 제한전(limited war)의 성립과 분화

도진순(Doh Jin-Soon) 한국사연구회 2004 한국사연구 Vol.125 No.-

This study analyses the process for the U. S. to establish a limited war as basic concept of the Korean War and the debate on three kinds of the limited war, connected with the strategic assessment of the Korean Peninsula. The highest decision-maker of the U. S. about the Korean War was President Truman. Even before the war, he took notice of the political, diplomatic, and ideological significance of Korea in terms of the cold war. His main concern was both to intervene firmly in Korea and to limit the war in order to prevent it from extending into another World War. His initial objective in Korea was to repel the North Korean Army, restore the R.O.K. and contain communism along the 38th parallel. However, as the war situation got better, it moved to rollback North Korea and unification of the Korean Peninsula. At the level of bureaucracy, one who dealt with the Korean policy was the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. He considered Korea significant in geographical terms of the Far East, relating it with Japan, and on the other hand in terms of the collective security of the world, relating it with American credibility, Western Europe, and U. N. Acheson's position about the Korean War at first was containment, but later moved to rollback. The PPS and George F. Kennan were the most consistent about the Korean policy. They insisted that even though the Soviet Union was behind the war, the Korean War was a kind of civil conflict. They were for U. S. military intervention in Korea for containment, but against the excessive intervention for rollback to North Korea. However, their positions gave way to the rollbackers in the State Department and the Asia-firsters like General MacArthur, as the war situation got better. Those who changed their position about the Korean War dramatically were the Asia-firster MacArthur. He suggested strongly that Korea did not have little strategic importance, and that the U. S. forces in Korea be withdrawn as soon as possible. Even after the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist troops and right before the Korean War, he emphasized the importance of Taiwan, and devalued the significance of Korea. However, after the U. S. decision to intervene in Korea, he targeted at the conquest and unification of Korea beyond containment through annihilating the North Korean Army. As I examined above, a key concept of the Korean War was that of a limited war. It had already been reviewed in NSC 68 right before the war. At the beginning of the war, a-week discussion led to the establishment of a limited war as the first concept indicating that U. S. Army repel the enemy, restore R. O. K. and contain communism along the 38th parallel. As the war situation got better, about two-month debate led to another limited war of the whole Korean Peninsula. According to NSC 81/1, the theater was firmly defined within the border of Korea, while cautious about the intervention of the Soviet Union or China. As the war came to the stalemate at the end of 1950 and the early of 1951, the third limited war emerged by MacArthur. The third concept was that the war could be expanded beyond the Korean Peninsula to the mainland of China without limitation in the Korean Peninsula. Summing up, the basic concept to define the Korean War was that of a limited war, which is divided into three categories. The first limited war was to contain communism along the 38th parallel, and the victory in it gave birth to the second concept of a limited war in which the war expanded to the whole peninsula. The failure of the second concept made MacArthur suggest the third concept of a limited war, in which the war could be expanded to Chines mainland. However, Truman and JCS rejected it as “the wrong war", and they moved back to the first limited war of containment.

Rollback과 Roll-forward 기법을 사용한 TMR 고장의 시간여분 복구 정책

윤재영(Yoon Jae Young),김학배(Kim Hag Bae) 한국정보처리학회 1999 정보처리학회논문지 Vol.6 No.1

In the paper we propose two recovery methods by adopting a rollback and/or roll-forward technique(s) to recover TMR failures in a TMR (structured) system that is the simplest spatial redundancy. This technique is apparently effective to recovering TMR failures primarily caused by transient fault. The proposed policies carry out few reconfigurations at the cost of (minimal) time-overhead needed for those time-redundant schemes. The optimal checkpoint-interval vectors are derived for both methods through the likelihoods of all (possible) states of the system is well as the total execution-time. Consequently, the effectiveness of our proposed policies is validated through certain numerical examples and simulations.

핵폐기 사례연구: 남아프리카공화국 사례의 함의와 한계

한인택 ( In Taek Han ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2011 한국과 국제정치 Vol.27 No.1

남아프리카공화국은 핵무기를 개발하고 스스로 폐기한 유일한 국가이다. 따라서 북한이 ``왜,`` ``어떻게`` 핵을 폐기할 것인지를 예측하고, 폐기를 유도하기 위해서 남아프리카공화국의 사례를 살펴보지 않을 수 없다. 그러나 남아프리카공화국이 유일한 사례이므로 비교분석을 통해 불필요한 인과변수와 부정확한 모델을 추려내는 것이 힘들다. 그 결과 다양한, 심지어 상호모순적인 설명이 존재하는데, 기존 설명은 크게 핵폐기 결정이 안보위협이 감소한 결과라는 설명과 안보위협의 감소와는 상관없다는 설명으로 양분된다. 안보위협 감소와 관계없다는 설명을 다시 세분하면 핵폐기를 드 클레르크 대통령이 추진했다는 설명, 군이 요구했다는 설명, 미국 정부가 압력을 넣었다는 설명, 아프리카민족회의가 요구했다는 설명 등이 있다. 남아프리카공화국의 사례가 주는 함의는 첫째, 안보위협의 감소가 반드시 북한의 핵폐기를 유도하지 않을 수 있다. 따라서 소극적 안전보장의 제공만으로 핵폐기를 유도하는 것이 용이하지 않을 수 있다. 둘째, 체제의 변화 없이 리더십 변화만으로도 핵폐기가 가능할 수 있다. 하지만 북한에 어떤 지도자가 등장하느냐는 외부에서 결정할 수 있는 사안이 아니다. 셋째, 개혁과 개방을 지향하는 지도자가 등장하여 국제규범을 준수하고자 하는 경우, 이에 대해 꼭 신뢰할 수 있는 보상이 있어야 한다. 넷째, 북한이 자신의 이미지를 ``정상국가``와 ``국제사회의 일원``으로 새로 정립할 때 핵폐기가 따를 가능성이 크다. 마지막으로, 북한의 핵폐기를 위해서는 경제적 보상과 안보적 보장이 필요할 수 있다는 점에서 우크라이나의 경험에서도 시사점을 찾을 수 있다. South Africa is the first and only known country that has built and then dismantled its nuclear arsenal. As we discuss how and why North Korea might give up its nuclear weapons, South Africa`s decision is worth a close examination. Multiple explanations exist for South Africa`s decision, some of which are mutually contradictory. This is inevitable for a single case, however. In this essay, existing explanations for South Africa`s decision are grouped into two broad types. The first type argues that the decision came as a result of a reduction in external threat, while the second type explains the decision through factors unrelated to security. To be more specific, second-type explanations point to President de Klerk`s leadership, demand from the military, pressure from the U.S. government, and pressure from the ANC as the causes for the decision. The South Africa case has the following potential implications for North Korea. First, improved security may not necessarily lead North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. This means, among others, that negative security guarantee may be of limited use. Second, nuclear rollback may not require a regime change; it may just need a change in leadership. Unfortunately for us, we have little, if not zero, influence over the North Korean leadership let alone its change. Third, the international community must make credible commitments to reward a North Korean leader who decides to reform and liberalize North Korea and also to abide by international norm. Fourth, North Korea is likely to dismantle its nuclear arsenal when it redefines its identity as a ``normal state`` and a ``member of the international community.`` Lastly, since North Korea`s nuclear rollback is likely to involve economic compensation and security guarantee, the Ukraine case may be also relevant.

Nuclear Proliferation and Rollback: The Complex Case of Iran

( Farhad Rezaei ) 한국국방연구원 2017 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.29 No.4

This study seeks to provide answers to the following questions; what were the real motivations behind Iran’s nuclear program?; to what degree did key players of Iran’s nuclear program at a given time period fit the rational proliferator profile?; and eventually, how did key elites agree on a unified set of parameters of rollback in the nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions? The study has three objectives. The first objective is to ascertain whether Iran fits the profile of a rational proliferator. The second objective is to determine whether its response to sanctions followed the rational modality expectations embedded in proliferation theories. The third objective is to identify the background of the initial decision to pursue the nuclear program with a special emphasis on key motivations and factors that helped to drive it from a very modest beginning to a virtual breakout position.

Data Consistency-Control Scheme Using a Rollback-Recovery Mechanism for Storage Class Memory

이현구(Hyun Ku Lee),김정훈(Junghoon Kim),강동현(Dong Hyun Kang),엄영익(Young Ik Eom) Korean Institute of Information Scientists and Eng 2015 정보과학회논문지 Vol.42 No.1

An Argument against the Rollback Argument

Hyun Jeong Kang(강현정) 한국철학회 2020 哲學 Vol.- No.144

결정론자는 행위자의 선택이 인과적으로 결정되어 있다고 믿는 반면 자유주의자는 그렇지 않다고 믿는다. 이 글은 자유주의에 대한 한 가지 비판을 다룬다. 세스 샤보(S. Shabo)는 「자유의지와 미스터리: 『마인드』주장을 넘어서」에서 반 인와겐(P. van Inwagen)의 역행 논증을 정교화하면서 자유주의에 대한 반론을 펼친다. 샤보는 어떻게 행위자가 인과적으로 비결정적인 두 가지 가능한 미래상황을 하나의 실제적 미래상황이 되도록 이끄는 결정력(the power to settle)을 가질 수 있는지에 대해 자유주의자가 설명해야 한다고 주장한다. 필자는 이 결정력에 대한 샤보의 비판을 반박하며 어떤 차원에서 행위자가 그것을 소유할 수 있는지에 대한 해명을 시도한다. 필자는 2장과 3장에서 역행 논증과 더불어 결정력에 대한 샤보의 논증을 제시한다. 4장에서는 자유주의자에게 결정력을 설명하도록 요구하는 샤보의 주장이 왜 부당한지를 해명한다. 5장에서는 행위자의 선택이 어떤 점에서 행위자 자신에게 달려 있는 사안일 수 있는지에 대한 해명을 시도한다. 6장에서 필자는 역행 논증의 핵심을 재정립하고 그러한 재정립 후에도 여전히 그것이 자유주의를 무력화하기에는 역부족임을 논증한다. Libertarians believe that an agent’s action of choosing between two possible options is causally undetermined whereas determinists believe that it is determined. In this paper, I discuss one criticism against libertarians. In “Free Will and Mystery,” Seth Shabo presents arguments against libertarianism elaborating Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument. Shabo claims that libertarians must explain how a person can have the power to settle which of two causally undetermined, possible futures becomes the actual future. In this paper, I argue against Shabo’s criticism regarding the power to settle and provide my own account for how libertarians can explain that someone’s choice is up to him. In Section 2 and 3, I describe the Rollback Argument and Shabo’s explanation for the power to settle. In Section 4, I state why Shabo’s demand for the explanation of the power to settle is an unfair demand to make of libertarians. In Section 5, I attempt to explicate how a person’s choice could be up to her. In Section 6, I suggest a better way to formulate the Rollback Argument’s point. In this same section, I briefly show that even if the Rollback Argument is better founded, it still isn’t sufficient to undermine the entirety of the libertarian position.

SSL/TLS 기반의 IoT에서 cipher suite rollback 공격 탐지를 위한 선택된 알고리즘 검증 방법

정진희(Jin-Hee Chung),조대호(Tae-Ho Cho) 한국컴퓨터정보학회 2015 한국컴퓨터정보학회 학술발표논문집 Vol.23 No.2

Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?

김영호 서울대학교 국제학연구소 2004 Journal of International and Area Studies Vol.11 No.1

This article examines the role of prestige as an important intersubjective element of power in international relations which has been largely ignored by neorealist approaches to the field. The article provides the etymological origins of the concept of prestige and distinguishes between its negative and positive sources such as brutality and self-restraint. Two case studies of American intervention and rollback in the Korean War are presented. This article argues that so long as neorealism fails to show that intersubjective understandings and expectations that give brute material capabilities meaning are caused by deep material structure, its analysis must be supplemented by intersubjective elements of power such as prestige.