RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색
다국어 입력

http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

예시)
  • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
  • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
닫기
    인기검색어 순위 펼치기

    RISS 인기검색어

      검색결과 좁혀 보기

      선택해제
      • 좁혀본 항목 보기순서

        • 원문유무
        • 음성지원유무
        • 원문제공처
          펼치기
        • 등재정보
          펼치기
        • 학술지명
          펼치기
        • 주제분류
          펼치기
        • 발행연도
          펼치기
        • 작성언어
          펼치기
        • 저자
          펼치기

      오늘 본 자료

      • 오늘 본 자료가 없습니다.
      더보기
      • 무료
      • 기관 내 무료
      • 유료
      • KCI등재후보

        전후 일본의 방위 구상: 일본 우익 세력의 자위대 구상과 그 실천 과정

        서민교 서울대학교 일본연구소 2014 일본비평 Vol.- No.10

        This paper analyzes the process of rearmament in postwar Japan from 1948 to 1950s during which the Self-Defense Force was established, and tries to understand how Japan’s rearmament was designed and what characterized its practical procedures. As the rearmament process became fully in progress in the 1950s, the recruitment of the military officials of the Imperial Army, the idea which was originally rejected, became inevitable. In this sense, it is essential to pay attention to the activities of the cooperative organizations such as Hattori Group (formerly organized by Imperial Army officials) as well as military advisor to prime minister Yoshida. On the other hand, even though both army and navy were “officially” dismissed after the war ended, the minespweeper units of the Imperial Navy remained undissolved. Unlike the case of the army, the networks of the navy personnel which centered around Japan Coast Guard was administered in a unified manner, and it is noteworthy that some of the former military personnel who assumed office had close personal connection with Yoshida. That is why this paper sheds light on the role of “Commssion Y.”Japan promised a large-scale rearmament to the US after the two signed MSA agreement in March 1954, which obliged the US to provide support for its allies and the US allies to strengthen their military capabilities. The SDF, often called “military without name” or “non-militaristic military,” which was the product of this agreement, began to function as a physical apparatus to take over Japan’s defense. Recently, there have been two conflicting arguments regarding Japan’s right of collective self-defense. When we look at the overall framework of these arguments, however, most agree that Japan should provide defense to the US “in such times as the United States is under attack by a third party.” In this reasoning, however, there still remains a crucial question as to whether defending of the United States is to be classified as “individual” or “collective” self-defense. If Japan accords itself the right of “collective” self-defense, the possibility for Japan to get involved in international conflicts led by the US becomes higher, because virtually there would be no restrictions on the use of force. After all, all these issues can be resolved if Japan takes on the constitutional revision. Yet there still remains a strong anti-revisionist sentiments among the Japanese people. Under these circumstances, it is crucial to pay attention how far the “interpretational revision” can suffice in dealing with Japan’s changing defense framework.

      • KCI등재

        日本의 近代 學術思潮와 陽明學

        신현승 한국일본사상사학회 2008 일본사상 Vol.0 No.14

        Japan’s modern period is the time when the theoretical basis of the modern Japan’s imperialism, Asianism, national polity, and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere existed and was introduced. Among them, Kongzi and Mengzi’s advanced Confucianism, Zhuzixue started from Song Period, and Neo-confucianism(新儒敎) were introduced and transferred to Japan with Edo(江戶) era. It became one part of Japan’s spiritual history regardless of being negative or positive. Also, Neo-confucianism created Japan-styled thoughts or Japanized thoughts different from the form of China’s Neo-confucianism through Shugo(習合) process, since it was introduced to the modern Japan. At the outset, Kogaku revolted against Zhuzixue, and then Kokugaku carried on. Then, Mitogaku significantly affected the national polity of Japan’s modern period. Such thought school formed one part of Japan’s spirits. This study was intended to execute the discussion ranging from the introduction of Neo- confucianism and to the birth of Kogaku(古學). This discussion was the process which extracted the core ideological factors in the consecutive process that Zhuzixue and Yang-ming Studies of Neo- confucianism were introduced to Japan and then were re-born as the new Japanese Zhuzixue and Japanese Yang-ming Studies. Accordingly, it described the active role of Yang-ming Studies in Japan’s modernization process. Besides, how modern Japanese intellectuals understood Yang-ming Studies(陽明學) and what Yang-ming Studies was positioned in Bushido, was discussed. Finally, it was indicated that Yang-ming Studies movement was succeeded as the studies school which was vivid in Japan’s history by taking the period of Yang-ming Studies movement as the example, after Japan’s modern period. Also, in Japan’s modernization process, how much Confucianism was affected in Japan’s society as the ideological basis of Meiji or in Japan’s society after Meiji, was intensively discussed through connecting with Yang-ming Studies. Also, This paper covered the spiritual world of Kogaku appeared as the transcendence and overcoming of Chinese Sinocentrisim or Antithese. It contained the advent of Japanese spirit and the establishment of self-identity. There was the fusion of compromise and harmony. As more detailed proof, the scholarship spirits of Ito Jinsai (1627~1705), Ogyu sorai(1666~1728) and Yamaga soko (1622~1685) who were the representative men of Kogaku were examined. In their scholarship spirits, there was commonly the strong opposition against Neo-confucianism (specifically, Zhuzixue).

      • KCI등재

        한일수교와 일본표상 -1960년대 전반기의 한국영화와 영화검열-

        오영숙 ( Young Sook Oh ) 한양대학교 현대영화연구소 2010 현대영화연구 Vol.6 No.2

        This paper seeks to closely examine the characteristics and contexts of the Park Jung-Hee regime`s cultural politics and Korean Cinema in the first half of the 1960s by focusing on the truth behind censorship and cinematic phenomenon during a specific era before and after the establishment of amity between Korea and Japan. Korea-Japan amity was meant not only to develop Korea-Japan relations but an issue of legitimizing the Park Jung-Hee regime and as a critical plan intimately correlated to establishing the nation`s future. The Park Jung-Hee regime actively pursued a Korea-Japan summit for the purpose of economic development and concluded a Korea-Japan framework agreement in 1965, establishing amity and normalizing diplomatic relations. However, the majority of citizens found the government`s consistent humiliating and modest posture throughout the process of establishing this agreement problematic and began to express intense infuriation. The opposition struggle of the Korea-Japan agreement culminated with a student protest on June 3, 1964 and went on to expand further than mere anti-Japanese sentiment to rage at the Park Jung-Hee administration`s betrayal of nationalism and democracy, an administration who had previously committed publicly to uphold `national democracy`. Meanwhile, there was the rise of Japanese culture in Korean society which began in the early 1960s. In the 1950s, the Rhee Seung-man administration cried out for a `clean sweep of Japanese ways` and suspended all exchanges between Korea and Japan. However, subsequent to the April revolution and the seizure of power by the Democratic Party, humanitarian exchange along with cultural exchanges between Korean and Japan were generously permitted. As a result of print materials, music, and movies, the domain of popular culture and the so-called `Japanese rage` began to stir. Looking ahead at the point of signing the Korea-Japan agreement, the discussion enters a more serious level than that of Japanese films, Korean films and their exchanges. The movie industry began to accelerate the production and distribution of Japanese cultural goods. The Korean movie industry conveyed three different postures regarding Japan around the same time. 1) Adhering to the equation of `Japanese ways = box office hit`, various methods were utilized to attract Japan unto the screen 2) Adapting to the opposing atmosphere of the Korea-Japan agreement and appealing to the anti-Japanese sentiment of citizens by advocating nationalism. 3) Providing imaginary reconciliation via the narrative and spectacle of attaches between Korean and Japanese(romance, family relationship) in which beautiful and good Japanese woman sacrifice herself for Korean lover or persons. Although these three tendencies seem to be contrary to each other, these cinema was addressing the dual identity of Korean people as colonial subject. They reflect public need to solve the problem imaginarily by socially symbolic act such as cinema and cultural exchange. These cultural efforts were made vigorously to seek new relationship with Japan but reached a deadlock by the Park Jung-Hee regime`s cultural politics and cinema censorship. In the first half of 1960s, cinema censorship and policies of cinemas in regard to Korea-Japan relations were oppressive but more or less unprincipled, temporary or easily fluctuating. Ultimately, one government`s cultural policies acted as the leading cause to the promotion of malformations of Korea-Japan relations. Fixation on anti-communism became linked to the fear of cultural exchanges between Korea and Japan, the inconsistencies of the censorship policy extinguished the trust cultural artists had in the government and in tandem, disheartened the volition of Korea-Japan cultural exchanges. Furthermore, the anti-Japanese sentiment maintained by citizens was utilized as a foreign alibi to prop up the Park Jung-Hee regime`s inability to hold a liberal posture towards the Korea-Japan cultural exchanges. Such cultural policies of the Park Jung-Hee regime ultimately became the cause of discord between economic, political, and cultural levels of the Korea-Japan relations during the Cold War period, which more or less languished in a state of disproportionate deformity.

      • KCI등재

        강화와 안보를 둘러싼 미일 교섭과 일본의 전략 - 요시다 시게루(吉田茂)를 중심으로-

        김남은 ( Kim Nam-eun ) 한국일본근대학회 2017 일본근대학연구 Vol.0 No.56

        일본의 안전보장정책에 대한 연구는 `평화지향`적이거나 `대미의존`적인 관점에서 많이 다루어져 왔다. 그러나 현재 일본은 집단적 자위권의 행사를 추구하는 등 매우 의욕적인 외교 행보를 보이고 있으며, 본 논문은 이러한 일본의 안보 전략이 미일 간의 강력한 요구와 이해를 넘은, 다분히 일본 정책결정자들의 전략적 이해에 따른 의도적 결과라는 점에 주목하고 있다. 구체적으로는 샌프란시스코강화조약과 미일안보조약에 이르는 일련의 과정을 통해 일본의 군비확장의 과정이 결코 `소극적`이거나 `대미의존`적이라고만 할 수 없는 측면에서 재고하고 있다. 강화교섭을 둘러싼 최대의 문제는 독립 후 일본의 안전보장을 어떻게 하는가에 있었으며, 요시다는 일본 재군비는 거절한다는 방침을 견지하면서도 경찰예비대 창설 등 국내 치안을 명분으로 한 점진적인 군비확장을 꾀하고 있었다. 그러나 강화조약의 조정을 위한 미일 간의 본격적인 교섭이 시작되자, 요시다는 5만의 보안대 창설을 제안하는 등 미국의 재군비 요구에 적극적으로 대응하는 것으로 조기강화를 실현시키고자 하였으며, 5만 명의 보안대야말로 장래 민주적 군대로서 훌륭하게 육성하고 싶다는 포부를 밝히기도 하였다. 이외에도 요시다가 재군비의 필요성을 주장한 사실은 여러 곳에서 발견된다. 결과적으로 급진적이든 점진적이든 요시다는 재군비에 동의하는 형식을 취하며 강화조약과 안보조약을 체결하였으며, 이는 바꿔 말하자면 강화문제와 기지문제가 재군비라는 단 하나의 행위로 모두 해결된 것을 의미한다. 즉 일본 재군비는 요시다 자신의 생각과 반드시 위배되는 것만은 아니었으며, 군대를 보유하기 위해서 먼저 경제적인 기반을 갖추어야 한다는 요시다의 생각은 결국 동전의 양면과 같은 논리에 불과한 것이다. 또한 일본의 경제부흥과 아시아 여러 나라들의 우려를 근거로 내세운 요시다의 무군비 주장은 이 모든 정치적 전략을 봉인하기에 아주 적합한 수단이었다. Studies on the rearmament of Japan have a strong tendency to be dealt with in a position that Japan had to be led to the change of the US and international situations. However, it is necessary to reconsider a series of processes from the San Francisco Peace Treaty to the Japan-US Security Treaty in the aspect that they are not just `passive`. This is because the rearmament of Japan was not just necessarily against Yoshida`s own thought. The biggest problem over peace negotiation within Japan was “how security assurance for Japan after independence should be”, and Yoshida was holding fast to the policy that Japan refuses rearmament until peace treaty is concluded. But as the full-scale negotiation for adjustment of peace treaty with Dulles started in January 1951, Yoshida changed the existing position about rearmament and suggested the establishment of new security forces with 50 thousand soldiers including army and navy. About this fact, Yoshida himself revealed that there was no way except for yielding to the demand of Dulles but the facts that Yoshida was admitting necessity of Japan`s rearmament after the peace treaty are found in various places. Only, Yoshida was to promote gradual rearmament based on the strategy that economic groundwork should be fully prepared first in order to retain armed forces. In this aspect, Yoshida`s non-armament contention asserting the article 9 of the constitution and Japan`s economic revival and concerns of many Asian countries as the grounds was the means very suitable for sealing his political strategy.

      • KCI등재

        수신사와 조사시찰단 일행이 경험한 海國日本

        조세현 국립목포대학교 도서문화연구원 2022 島嶼文化 Vol.- No.59

        This study aims to deal with the view of marine civilization by analyzing travelogue of parties of Joseon’s Envoys Sent to Japan and courtier’s observation mission dispatched several times from Joseon to Japan immediately after the opening of port. Although they were not an overseas mission who made a visit to the society of the U.S. or Britain, they are considered a mission of Joseon who indirectly realized the Western civilization first in the way that they crossed the sea and experienced an island country, Japan. In the travelogue of Joseon mission, various records such as internal structure of steamship and method of navigation, memory of ocean voyage, experience of wind and waves or seeing a lighthouse, impression of port and harbor, observation of navy and shipbuilding industry, liberation of Northeast Asia and public law of all nations can be found. Through the aforementioned, this study searched a fact that Meiji Japan converted from the ‘the savages of island country’ to a ‘maritime nation’. As a result of examining materials related to Joseon’s Envoys Sent to Japan and courtier’s observation mission, this study found that the sea route from the port of Busan (or port of Jemulpo) of Joseon to Yokohama, Japan was a short sailing distance, but was constantly differed from the sea route of the envoy to Japan in pre-modern times, showing changes in conception of time and awareness of space. Travel in the record of Joseon’s Envoys Sent to Japan was mainly memorized as time, not as distance, or the first appearance of the term ‘Pacific’ using seaway from Kobe to Yokohama instead of land route is considered an example. Reading the details and context of travelogue, however, it is assumed that amazing experience of voyage was not connected to the revolution of outlook on the world. Joseon mission was able to read the image of island country Japan through the visit to various relevant facilities in Japan. Especially, the process of handling the wrecked people or the first use of national flag is interesting to show conversion of tributary system to the system of public law of all nations.

      • KCI등재

        전후 일본의 국가 대전략과 북일관계

        강용범 ( Jiang Long-fan ),왕해범 ( Wang Hai-fan ) 조선대학교 동북아연구소(구 통일문제연구소) 2016 동북아연구 Vol.31 No.1

        역사적으로 한반도는 일본이 무력으로 지역패권을 도모하고 이른바 “동아시아공영권”의 야망을 실현하는 전초기지가 되어왔다. 제2차세계대전후 일본은 보통국가의 지위와 신분을 회복하고 나아가 아시아지역 강대국으로 부상하는 것을 국가전략의 최종목표로 삼아왔다. 이러한 국가전략을 실현하는 과정에 과거 식민통치에 대한 청산은 비켜설 수 없는 걸림돌이 되었다. 냉전이 한창이던 1965년, 미국의 적극적인 중재하에 한·일양국은 국교정상화를 실현하였다. 따라서 북한과의 관계개선은 전후 일본외교의 중요한 과제로 부상하게 되었다. 일본의 정치가들은 흔히 일본은 전략이 없는 국가라고 한다. 허나 냉전 이후 20여년간 전개되어 온 일본의 대북정책을 살펴보면 일본의 국가전략이 얼마나 교묘한가를 알 수 있다. 우선 북한과의 국교정상화를 통해 정상국가로서의 신분과 지위를 회복하고, 다음으로 북한의 “안전위협”을 빌미로 “군사대국화”를 실현하며, 나아가 6자회담에 끼어들어 한반도다자안보협의에 깊숙이 개입함으로써 정치, 군사 대국화를 위한 기틀을 마련하였다. 뿐만 아니라 일본의 대북정책은 반성과 사죄 그리고 배상이라는 근본적인 문제를 떠나 북한의 핵·미사일과 납치문제에만 집착하고 있다. 더욱이 일본은 중국이나 한국과의 관계가 악화되어 외교적으로 고립될 경우에는 북한과의 관계 완화를 통해 위기를 탈출하려 시도하고, 안보법안과 헌법개정을 위해선 “북한위협론”을 들먹여 제재를 강화하는 등 교묘한 전략을 구사하여왔다. 제4차 북핵실험 후 북·일관계는 또다시 최악의 위기를 맞고 있다. 북한은 일본인납치피해자에 대한특별조사위원회를 해체하였고 일본은 유엔안보리제재는 물론 독자적이고 더욱 강경한 제재를 실시하고 있다. 헌법개정을 본격적으로 추진하고 있는 아베 내각으로 말하면 북한위협이 고조되고 양국관계가 악화되는 것이 더욱 바람직한 전략적 선택일 수도 있다. In history, the Korean peninsula has been an advanced base of Japan to pursue local hegemony through force and realize an ambition to achieve Mutual Prosperity in East Asia. After World War II, Japan has had a final goal of recovering the position and status of a normal country and furthermore, raising its status to one of the top countries in Asia. In the process of realizing such a national strategy, its colonial rule in the past has become a setback which can not be overcome. In 1965 when the Cold War was at its peak period, under the active intervention of the U.S.A, South Korea and Japan normalized diplomatic relations. Therefore, a better relationship with North Korea has become an important task for Japan`s diplomacy before and after the war. Japan`s politicians said that Japan does not have any strategies. However, to look at the policies against North Korea which have been developed for about 20 years after the Cold War, it can be understood how clever Japanese strategies against other countries are. First of all, through normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea, it recovered the status and position of a normal country. Then, under the pretext of the security threat of North Korea, it realized “Military Power” and furthermore it joined in six-party talks to intervene in the multilateral security talks and were prepared for a great military power. As well, Japan`s policy against North Korea has adhered to nuclear technology ,missiles, and kidnapping out of the fundamental problems of reflection, apology and compensation. In addition, as Japan has had worse relations with China and South Korea, and is isolated diplomatically, it attempted to escape from this crisis through mitigation of relations with North Korea, and for security law and constitution revision, it mentioned the North Korean Threat Issue to reinforce restraint. After the 4th North Korea Nuclear Test, relations between North Korea and Japan faced the worst crisis. North Korea dismantled a special investigation committee into Japanese kidnappings and Japan has implemented more independent and resolute restraints as well as restraints in the U.N. Security Council. To the Abe administration which has actively executed Constitutional reform, it is suggested that the severe threat of North Korea and aggravated relations between the two countries would be a more desirable strategy.

      • KCI등재

        일본의 ‘죽도’ 고유영토론 날조에 관한 분석 - 일본의회의사록을 중심으로 -

        최장근 한국일본문화학회 2022 日本文化學報 Vol.- No.93

        This study sheds light on the fabrication of Japan's Jukdo native English debate. First, Dokdo is appropriate to be called Korea's own territory if you look at the ancient documents of both Korea and Japan. Looking at this, Dokdo is not Japan's own territory. Japan began claiming Dokdo as its own territory around 1956. In the 1956 Japan claimed that the northern territories were its own territory in the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, and then applied them to Dokdo Island. During the 1962 Korea-Japan talks, the Japanese government insisted that Dokdo be given its own territory in earnest. This is because South Korea opposed the Japanese government's claim to resolve the sovereignty of Dokdo in the Korea-Japan agreement. Second, the Japanese government proposed to the Korean government to entrust the International Court of Justice to solve the Dokdo issue because Dokdo is Japan's own territory. The Korean government rejected Japan's request. On the contrary, the Korean government was in a tough position that it could never give up its sovereignty to Japan because Dokdo is Korea's own territory. Therefore, the Japanese government insisted that the two countries should solve the problem by sharing the sovereignty of Dokdo. This, of course, was unacceptable to the Korean government. However, in particular, Japanese opposition party members strongly criticized the Japanese government's claim to share. Finally, the theory of Dokdo sharing disappeared, and the International Court of Justice did not resolve the Dokdo issue. In the end, the two countries stated in the Korea-Japan agreement that they would solve the pending issues peacefully without specifying the name of Dokdo in the memorandum of exchange between them. Instead, the Dokdo issue was resolved by acknowledging the actual situation in which Korea effectively controls Dokdo. In addition, instead of abolishing the peace line in the Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement signed at the same time as the Korea-Japan Agreement, Japan recognized Korea's entire waters of 12 nautical miles around Dokdo. Third, immediately after the 1965 Korea-Japan Agreement, the Japanese government criticized the 12-nautical zone measures recognized by Korea. It was argued that the Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement should be revised to secure 12 nautical miles of territorial waters because Dokdo is Japan's own territory. 本研究は日本の竹島固有領土論の捏造に注目している。まず、独島は韓日両国の古文献を見ると、独島は韓国固有の領土と呼ぶにふさわしい。これを見ても、独島は日本固有の領土ではない。 日本は1956年頃から、独島を日本固有の領土だと主張し始めた。そのきっかけは1956年、日ソ共同宣言で日本が北方領土を固有領土だと主張し、これを独島にも適用した。日本政府が1962年の韓日会談の過程で本格的に独島を固有領土だと主張した。日本政府が韓日協定で独島領有権を解決しようという主張に韓国が反対したからだ。 第二に、日本政府は独島が日本固有の領土であるため、国際司法裁判所に独島問題を委託して解決することを韓国政府に申し入れた。韓国政府は日本の要求を断った。むしろ韓国政府は、独島が韓国固有の領土であるため、日本に領有権を絶対に譲歩できないという強硬な立場だった。そのため日本政府内部では、韓日両国が独島の領有権を共有する方式で問題を解決しようと主張した。これは当然、韓国政府は受け入れられない案だった。しかし、特に日本の野党専門委員らは、日本政府の共有論の主張を強く批判した。最終的に独島共有論は消え、国際司法裁判所で独島問題を解決することもなかった。結局、両国は韓日協定で密談として「相互交換覚書」に独島の名称を明示しないまま、懸案問題を平和的に解決するということを明示した。その代わり、韓国が独島を実効的に管轄統治している実際の状況を認める方法により、独島問題を収拾した。そして日本は、韓日協定と同時に締結した韓日漁業協定で平和線を撤廃する代わりに、韓国に対し独島周辺12海里全館水域を認めた。 第三に、1965年の日韓基本条約の直後から日本政府が韓国に認めた12カイリ前管水域の措置を非難し、韓日漁業協定を改正し、独島が日本固有の領土であるため、12海里領海を確保すべきであると主張した。

      • KCI등재

        ‘일본수산지’의 편찬 배경과 과정에 대하여

        서경순 ( Kyung-soon Seo ) 한국수산경영학회 2020 수산경영론집 Vol.51 No.2

        The aim of this study is to overview what changes happened on the maritime field during the early Meiji period, how the compilation of ‘Japan Fisheries’ linked to the changes, and when the ‘Japan Fisheries’ was launched, completed and published. The trilogy of Japan Fishing Method, Japan Fishery Products, and Japan’s Useful Marine Products are called “Japan’s Fishery.” These were completed in 1895 for almost ten years since the compilation project was launched in 1886 at the Agricultural and Commercial Ministry. Japan Fishing Method selected, improved and recorded excellent fishing and fishing methods in various Japanese regions at that time whereas Japan Fisheries Products chose excellent fish products from various methods of manufacturing and recorded the enactment and sale of fishery products. Japan’s Useful Marine Products is not currently passed on, so it is not known what kind of useful marine products are recorded. However, it can be assumed that the classification method of the “Japanese Fishing Classification Table” published in 1889 was based on the Japan Fishing Index. The cited texts in Japan Fisheries Products are up to 55 documents, including Engisiki and Wakansanzaizukai’s “Report of the Great Japan Fishery Association,” “Ariticle of the Fisheries Fair,” “The Western Fishery Manufacturing Technique” and “Trade Situation with China.” Completed with extensive research from old books to the latest fishery information, “Japan’s Fishery” is Japan’s best “Marine Products Encyclopedia” at the time. It is also a valuable literature that can trace fishing and fishing techniques and methods of manufacturing marine products in each Japanese fishing village before the end of the nineteenth century.

      • KCI등재후보

        1990년대 일본외교정책의 변화- 국제정치적 요인과 국내정치과정을 중심으로 -

        강태훈 한국정치외교사학회 2004 한국정치외교사논총 Vol.25 No.2

        Japan has actively pursued foreign policy shift since the end of the cold war, particularly in the area of US-Japan security cooperation. This study, first of all, examines the content of Japan's security policy changes in the 1990s and try to single out domestic and international factors which influenced this change. Since 1990, Japan has shifted its foreign policy from its passivity to the active pursuit of international role expansion. For instance, Japan dispatched its Self Defense Forces(SDF) overseas such as participation in PKO, and through the new Outline of Defense National Program of 1995, Japan's defense forces were greatly expanded. Furthermore, in 1997, new US-Japan Defense Guidelines was established and supporting laws for the new Guidelines were enacted. This security policy changes occurred in the context of the US’s request for Japan's security role expansion and the emergence of China as a great power status after the end of the cold war. In the domestic front, there was no active opposition against security role expansion and close US-Japan security cooperation in the parliament with demise of Japan Socialist Party in the middle of 1990s. Also, the strengthening of US-Japan security cooperation was made possible not only by Japan's active adaptation to alliance's security dilemma but also by consensus among political parties. 본 논문에서는 우선, 전후 일본외교정책의 기본적 방향과 이념을 살펴본다. 이를 통하여 일본의 외교정책이 1990년대에 접어들어 종래와는 다른 근본적 변화를 가져왔다는 사실을 확인한다. 그리고 미일 관계의 기본적인 틀인 1960년 미일안보조약의 성격과 양국관계를 중심으로 외교정책을 살펴본다. 마지막으로 1990년대에 있어서 일본 외교정책의 변화양상을 미일 관계의 강화와 적극적인 국제역할 증대 정책에 대해서 고찰한다. 특히, 미일 안보협력 강화의 목적, 그 내용과 그러한 일련의 외교정책적 변화가 가능하게 된 배경을 동북아시아의 국제환경과 일본 국내적 상황에 주목하여 살펴보고자 한다.1990년대 이후 일본은 과거의 소극적인 안보정책에서 탈피하여 안보 면에서 국제적 역할증대를 모색하여 왔다. PKO 참여과 같이 자위대를 해외에 적극적으로 파견하였으며 1995년의 신방위대강을 통해 방위력을 대폭 증대시켰다. 뿐만 아니라 미ㆍ일 신안보선언을 통해 미ㆍ일 안보체제를 광역화시켰다. 1997년에는 미일 방위협력 신 가이드라인이 성립되었고 이에 대한 실효성을 확보하기 위한 제반법안이 1999년 성립되었다. 이러한 미일간의 상호의존강화와 안전보장에 대한 일본의 적극적인 대응은 미국의 적극적인 요청과 냉전 붕괴 후 중국의 급부상이라는 새로운 국제환경의 변화 속에서 나타났다. 국내 정치적 요인으로는 1994년의 무라야마 정권성립 이후 55년 체제 당시와 같은 미일 관계에 반대하는 세력이 약화되었기 때문에 가능하였다. 그리고 1990년 이후 미일 양국관계의 강화는 안전보장 면에서의 동맹의 딜레마를 해결하기 위한 일본의 적극적인 대응과 국내 정치적 상황 변화에 따라 정당간 합의가 이루어져 비로소 가능하게 되었다.

      • KCI등재후보

        최근 일본의 안보정책 변화와 향후 전망: 미중 대립과 북한 비핵화를 중심으로

        권태환 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2018 한국국가전략 Vol.3 No.3

        본 연구는 최근 일본의 안보정책 관련 주요동향과 쟁점 분석을 통해 한반도 안보에 미치는 영향을 살펴보고 이를 토대로 바람직한 한일관계 발전을 위한 제언을 도출하는데 목적이 있다. 이를 위해 먼저 일본 정부의 안보 관련 위협인식을 살펴보고, 이를 토대로 최근 전 방위적으로 대립과 갈등이 심화되어 가고 있는 미국의 인도-태평양 전략과 북한 비핵화를 둘러싼 일본의 안보정책 관련 주요 동향과 쟁점을 분석하였다. 왜냐하면 일본은 우리와 같이 미국과의 동맹을 안보정책의 기축으로 삼고 있으며, 유사시 미국의 후방지원기지 역할을 담당하고 있기 때문이다. 또한 북한 비핵화가 이제는 일본 안보에 직접적인 군사적 위협이 되고 있음은 물론 일본인 납치문제 해결을 위해서도 긴밀한 대북 한미일 공조는 중요한 시점이다. 그러나 일본은 최근 아베 총리의 3기 연임과 함께 헌법 개정의 임기 내 추진 등 보통국가 행보를 가속화하고 있으며, 이를 뒷받침하기 위한 적극적 평화주의와 자위대의 전력증강을 본격화하고 있다. 뿐만 아니라 일본 정부가 연내 국가안보전략과 방위계획대강 개정을 추진하고 있으며, 미래전장의 선점 전략 차원에서 사이버와 우주전략 등 첨단전략을 증강시켜 가고 있다. 이를 종합해 보면 일본은 안보 전 영역에 걸쳐 독자적 전력 투사능력과 함께 상호 의존성을미일 동맹을 진화시켜 가면서 대중 견제를 강화해 나가고 있다. 한편 이러한 주요 동향과 관련 쟁점을 분석과 동시에 안보 관련 일본 국민의 여론을 살펴보는 것은 향후 일본의 안보정책 방향과 속도를 가름하는 중요한 변수의 하나라고 볼 수 있다. 이러한 관점에서 한일 안보협력은 대단히 중요하다. 그러나 현재의 한일관계는 역사문제를 포함한 갈등이 지속되고 있다. 본고에서는 이를 극복하고 한반도 평화정착과 통일로 나아가기 위한 제언으로 첫째, 미중 대립과 갈등의 구도에 대비하며, 둘째, 정부의 신남방 및 북방정책을 추진하는 데 있어 일본을 전략적으로 활용하는 정책개발이 중요하며 이를 위한 국민적 공감대를 형성해 나가야 할 것이다. 금년도는 1998년 미래지향적 한일 파트너쉽 체결된 지 20주년의 해이다. 『한일이 함께하는 동북아 이니셔티브』를 통해 진정한 신뢰구축의 기반을 다시 한번 새롭게 구축해 나가야 한다. The purpose of this study is to examine the impacts on the security of the Korean peninsula through the analysis of major trends and issues related to the Japanese security policy and to derive suggestions for the development of desirable relations between Korea and Japan. First of all, this study focus on the Japanese government's perception of security-related threats and analyze key trends and issues related to the US-led Pacific strategy and the Japanese security policy regarding the denuclearization of North Korea because just like us, Japan is taking the alliance with the US as the axis of its security policy and they are taking role as US rear support base in case of emergency. In addition, denuclearization of North Korea is now a direct military threat to Japanese security, and a close cooperation with North Korea is crucial for resolving the abduction of Japanese citizens. However, Japan has been accelerating the normal course of the country, including Prime Minister Abe's third consecutive term and the amendment of the Constitution in his tenure, and he has been aggressively promoting peacekeeping and strengthening the SDF's strength. In addition, the Japanese government is pushing for revision of national security strategy and defense plan in this year, and it is increasing the advanced strategy such as cyber and space strategy in the preemptive strategy of future battlefield. These actions indicate that Japan is evolving the US-Japan alliance with its own power projection capability across the entire security spectrum meanwhile strengthening public restraint. On the other hand, analyzing these major trends and related issues as well as the public opinion of Japanese people related to security is one of the important variables that will determine the future direction and pace of security policy in Japan. In this respect, Korea-Japan security cooperation is significantly important. However, the present Korea - Japan relationship is continuing the conflict including the history issue. This study proposes to overcome these problems and prepare for peace settlement and unification on the Korean peninsula by 1) prepare for the composition of the conflict between the US and China, 2) prepare policy for the strategic use of Japan It is important to form a national consensus. This year is the 20th anniversary of the signing of a future-oriented Korea-Japan partnership in 1998. Through the "Northeast Asia Initiative with Korea and Japan", we need to build up a foundation of trust building once again.

      연관 검색어 추천

      이 검색어로 많이 본 자료

      활용도 높은 자료

      해외이동버튼