`제국의 브로커` 아베 미쓰이에(阿部充家)와 문화통치

이형식 ( Lee Hyoung Sik ) 역사문제연구소 2017 역사문제연구 Vol.21 No.1

In this paper, Abe`s activities and viewpoint of governance of Joseon as `a broker of the empire` were examined with focus on the early days of 1920s after 3.1 independence movement. With the recommendation by Tokutomi, the president of Kukmin Newspaper, Abe played the role of an unofficial political adviser of General Saito using his information network that he had established while working as a political journalist, and his human network he had set up while working as a president of Kyungseong Ilbo and Maeil Sinbo. Abe went to Joseon 2 or 3 times every year, met Koreans, caught their secret movements, and reported to the governor the movements among Koreans and Koreans studying in Japan and the situation in the central political circles through letters or interviews. Abe went around all the regions in Joseon as Saito`s personal political adviser in 1920 for almost 2 months, met many Koreans, recognized that Joseon independence theory had been developed into the competence cultivation theory, and suggested the governor the reinforcement of political propaganda, stricter supervision on Koreans studying in Japan and young students, and inducement to the competence cultivation theory. On the other hand, Abe not only helped Choi Nam-seon and Jin Hak-mun to publish a newspaper and a magazine, but also played the role of mediating and intermediating the press in Korea and the colonial power. As the journalists he worked with in KyungseongIlbo or MaeilSinbo, or the `neo-intellectuals` whom he helped to make a de- but as a writer, or interacted with, such as Choi Nam-seon, Lee Kwang-su, and Jin Hak-mun, played the leading role in the foundation of DongaIlbo, Joseon Ilbo, SidaeIlbo and JungoeIlbo in 1920s, Abe became closely related to the media in Joseon. The Japanese Government-General of Korea trained the press of Joseon through censorship, suspension of sale, prohibition of publication and etc., and when their criticism of the rule over Joseon went beyond `the critical point`, the Japanese government coped with them by confiscation, imprisonment of journalists, and suspension of publication, but it couldn`t discontinue the issue of Joseonae Newspaper, the symbol of cultural governance. The media of Joseon forced to suspend publication developed suspension lift movement through Abe, and Abe, who had been asked for suspension lift movement by DongaIlbo and JoseonIlbo, urged the authorities of the Japanese Government-General of Korea to lift the suspension of publication as the channel of suspension lift. The press of Joseon needed `a broker of the empire` as a kind of insurance against the suppression by the colonial power. Abe mediated the asymmetric and unfair `infighting` and negotiations between the media of Joseon and the colonial power as `a broker of the empire` in the colonial political space in 1920 where resistance and cooperation were mixed. In addition, Abe played the role of as the channel of petition as `a broker of the empire` mediating capitalists of Joseon and the colonial power. Abe induced Korean capitalists and influential persons to `autonomy movement`, and important Koreans also negotiated with the governor through Abe regarding the matter of `self-government of Joseon`, and had `infighting` and `close combat.`

1920년대 중후반 아베 미쓰이에(阿部充家)의 조선에서의 정치 행보

이형식 ( Lee Hyoung-sik ) 고려대학교 민족문화연구원 2018 民族文化硏究 Vol.78 No.-

본고에서는 1924년 이후 ‘제국의 브로커’로서 아베의 행적과 조선민족운동과의 관계를 살폈다. 아베는 조선과 일본의 경제통합의 강화, 민족운동의 실력양성론으로의 유도를 주장했었고, 중국의 국민혁명이 격화되자 ‘조선의회’설립이야말로 민족운동세력을 체재안에 끌어들여 제국의 안정을 꾀할 수 있다고 믿게 된다. 하지만 동아일보그룹와 최린은 총독부가 설사 조선자치에 동의한다고 하더라도 일본정계에서 ‘조선의회’에 대한 찬반여론이 엇갈린 상황에서 그 실현 가능성을 의심했다. 아베는 이러한 의구심을 불식시키기 위해 식민지 로비(colonial lobby) 기관인 중앙조선협회의 설립을 주도하였고 일본에서 조선의회를 선전할 선전도구로 협회를 활용하고자 했다. 한편 아베의 자치운동에 관한 관여는 제2차 자치운동과 제3차 자치운동에서 차이를 보이고 있다. 1926년 말부터 신간회의 창립과 중국국민혁명의 급진전 등 조선총독부를 둘러싼 국내외 통치환경이 급변하자 아베는 중국혁명이 조선에 미치는 영향을 심각하게 우려하면서 조선의회 설치와 그 공표를 사이토 총독에게 제언했다. 또 중앙조선협회를 통해 최린과 동아일보그룹이 중심이 된 제2차 자치운동에 적극적으로 대응하려고 했다. 하지만 제3차 자치운동에서는 사이토 총독과 고다마 정무총감과의 관계가 소원해지고, 조선총독부가 광주학생운동을 강경진압하자 자치운동보다는 광주학생운동 선후책에 개입하였다. 아베는 경찰의 강경진압을 강하게 비판하고 관대한 처분을 주장하여 강경진압으로 일관한 총독부와 대립했다. 총독의 정치고문이자 ‘비선’이 총독을 비판하게 된 것이다. 나아가 중앙조선협회에서 拷問을 비롯한 경찰당국의 가혹한 처사를 비판하여 총독부 출신 간부들과 대립하기도 하였다. 조선총독부의 ‘조선지방의회안’이 중앙정부의 반대로 좌절되고 광주학생운동의 선후책을 둘러싸고 총독부와 대립하면서 권력에 의존해 자신의 생계를 꾸려가는 전형적인 권력추수형 인간이었던 아베의 조선사회에 대한 영향력은 현저하게 줄어들게 되었다. In this paper, the relation between Abe's course of life as 'a broker of the empire' since 1924 and Joseon's nationalistic movement was investigated. Abe tried to contact and appease influential figures of Joseon and induce them to conduct an autonomy movement, but ‘the autonomy group’ wasn't bought off and used by Abe one-sidedly. Abe may have thought that he could control autonomists and he did, but he ended up being controled by autonomists so that he propagated Joseon's assembly in Japan. Abe argued that the economic consolidation between Joseon and Japan should be reinforced and the nationalistic movement should be induced to capacity cultivation theory, and as the national revolution in China became intense, he came to believe that the establishment of 'Joseon's assembly' was the very way to engage the nationalistic movement power into the system and attempt the stability of the empire. However, Donga Ilbo Group and Choi Lin doubted the possibility of its realization in the situation where the public opinions of pros and cons of 'Joseon assembly' were in disagreement in Japanese political world even though the government-general agreed to Joseon's autonomy. In order to eliminate this suspicion, Abe led the establishment of Jungang Joseon Association, a colonial lobby organization, and tried to use it as a propaganda tool to advertise ‘Joseon assembly’ in Japan. On the other hand, Abe's engagement in the autonomy movement showed differences in the second autonomy movement from the third one. Since the end of 1926, with rapid changes in the domestic ruling environment surrounding the Japanese Government-General of Korea, such as the foundation of Shinganhoe and the rapid progress of Chinese national revolution, Abe suggested the establishment of Joseon assembly and its official announcement to Saito governor-general while worrying a lot about the impacts of the Chinese revolution on Joseon, and tried to cope actively with the second autonomy movement centered around Choi Lin and Donga Ilbo Group through Jungang Joseon Association. However, in the third autonomy movement, as the relationship between Saito governor-general and Kodama state affairs inspector general became weak and the Japanese Government-General of Korea suppressed students' movement in Gwangju cruelly, he interfered with the countermeasure to the students' movement in Gwangju rather than with the autonomy movement. Abe strongly blamed the harsh suppression by the police and argued generous measure, so he came to confront the government-general that was consistent in tough repression. The political advisor of the governor-general and 'secret influential figure’ came to criticize the governor-general. Furthermore, Jungang Joseon Association criticized harsh treatment including torture by police authorities, and conflicted with executives from the government-general. While ‘the plan for Joseon local assembly’ of the Japanese Government-General of Korea came to fail because of the opposition of the central government and he came into conflict with the government-general with regard to the measures to the students' movement in Gwangju, the influence of Abe, a typical power-pursuing person who earned his living by relying on authority, on Joseon society came to remarkably decline.

아베 신조의 피살과 정치적 파생 문제들

김숭배 현대일본학회 2024 日本硏究論叢 Vol.59 No.-

아베 신조의 피살은 다음과 같은 정치적 문제들을 파생시켰다. 첫째, 피살 사건 직후, 일본에서는 테러의 역사가 상기되었다. 다만 원래 습격자의 표적은 교단(세계평화통일가정연합)에 있었고, 그의 삶이 밝혀짐에 따라 일본 국민의 시선은 교단에 집중되었다. 이 사건은 일본의 기성 좌⋅우익계열의 테러와 다른 변종적인 양상이 있었다. 둘째, 정치인과 교단의 관계는 기시 노부스케 시대부터 아베 시대까지 지속해 왔다. 확고한 반공주의자였던 기시에게 교단의 존재는 유익했지만, 그러한 관계 지속의 자세한 역사성은 아베 본인의 사망으로 인해 봉인되었다. 셋째, 1967년 요시다 시게루의 국장이 사망 11일 후에 실시되었다면, 아베의 국장은 사망 81일 후에 실시되었는데, 이 시간폭은 아베의 국장에 대한 논쟁을 불러일으켰다. 아베의 국장 반대에는 지속하는 교단 관련 문제, 국정 실시를 둘러싼 법적 근거의 취약성, 물가 상승에 따른 경제적 압박 속에서의 국비 사용, 상반하는 아베의 정치적 평가 등이 작용했다. 넷째, 기시다 후미오의 추도사를 분석한 결과, 아베가 당한 폭력의 원천 불명확성, 아베와 일본이 바라보는 북한의 존재감, 전후 레짐으로부터의 탈각과 일본적 민주주의의 관계, 영광스러운 근대 일본에 대한 향수, 아베 노선의 계승 등을 도출할 수 있었다. The assassination of Shinzo Abe caused several political problems. First, immediately after the assassination, Japan was reminded of the history of terrorism in the country. However, the original target of the assailant was a religious group (Unification Church). As Abe’s life came under scrutiny, the attention of the Japanese people focused on this religious group. Second, the relationships between politicians and the religious group have continued from the era of Nobusuke Kishi to the era of Abe. Although the existence of the religious group was beneficial to Kishi, who was a staunch anti-communist, the detailed historical nature of the continuation of such relationships was sealed by Abe’s death. Third, while Yoshida’s state funeral in 1967 was carried out 11 days after his death, Abe’s state funeral was carried out 81 days after his death, and this extended period gave rise to controversies. The opposition to Abe’s state funeral was due to ongoing religious group-related issues, weakness of the legal basis, use of government funds amid economic pressure due to rising prices, and conflicting political evaluations of Abe. Fourth, an analysis of Fumio Kishida’s condolence message revealed uncertainty about the source of the violence that targeted Abe, the presence of North Korea in the eyes of Abe and Japan, the relationship between the change of the postwar regime and Japanese democracy, nostalgia for glorious modern Japan, and the succession to Abe’s line.

2020년 도쿄 올림픽과 아베의 올림픽: 부흥 올림픽, 헌법 개정 그리고 올림픽 연기

윤석정 서울대학교 일본연구소 2020 일본비평 Vol.- No.23

The purpose of this article is to analyze the political use of the Tokyo Olympics 2020 by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, focusing on Abe’s Olympics as recovery Olympics ideology and constitutional amendment issue. Also, the paper will cover the postponement of Olympics due to the Covid-19 pandemic in terms of Abe’s Olympics. This paper focused on three points. First, for Abe, the recovery Olympics was not a creation of his own, but a medium to intervene in the Olympics. Abe started as a member of Olympics invitation team, which was led by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and began to develop his own Olympics by gradually taking the initiative of the Olympics as an agent for recovery Olympics Second, Abe made 2020 the year of the Tokyo Olympics as the year to complete the revision of the constitution. For Abe, Tokyo Olympics 1964 was a stage to feel the national pride and sense of unity, hence nationalism, that Japan was rising as a great power. With these memories, Abe wanted to use the energy of nationalism raised after 2020 Olympic games as the force for the constitutional amendment, and that is how Tokyo Olympics 2020 became involved in Japan’s constitutional amendment politics. Third, Abe had prioritized his political schedule in the process of postponing the Olympics in the face of pandemic. Abe was uncertain when Covid-19 crisis would end, but he pushed for a one-year postponement to hold the Olympics within his tenure, which expires in September 2021.

경성일보,매일신보 사장 시절(1914.8-1918.6)의 아베 미쓰이에(阿部充家)

이형식 ( Hyoung-sik Lee ) 고려대학교 역사연구소(구 역사학연구회) 2016 사총 Vol.87 No.-

1914년 8월 아베는 요시노 다자에몬의 후임으로 4대 경성일보 사장에 취임했다. 조선총독부의 요시노 사장에 대한 불만이 팽배해지자 조선총독부와의 의사소통을 강화하고자 도쿠토미는 국민신문에서 가장신뢰한 인물이자 총독과 경무총장들과 친분이 있었던 아베를 후임 사장으로 발탁하였다. 그러나 취임 후 얼마 지나지 않아 요시노 사장 시절의 방만경영과 재정적자가 총독부에 발각되었다. 조선총독부는 경성일보, 매일신보에 대한 본격적인 개혁을 검토하고 도쿠토미로 하여금 개혁안을 제출하게 하였다. 1915년 3월 완성된 개혁안은 데라우치 총독이 추천한 아베 쓰루노스케 주간 주도하에 진행되었고, 총독부의 긴축재정방침이 반영된 것이었다. 이로 인해 아베는 경성일보 경영에서는 조선총독, 고문(총무국장), 경무총장(검열), 감독(도쿠토미), 주간(아베 쓰루노스케:재무담당)이라는 조선총독부와 국민신문 간부의 중층적인 관리체제 하에서 많은 제약과 간섭을 받아 능력을 제대로 발휘할수 없었다. 반면에 아베는 매일신보 경영에서는 최남선, 이광수, 진학문, 심우섭등과 같은 유학생 출신 ‘신지식인층’을 발탁, 등용해서 지면을 쇄신하고 지방기사를 늘리는 등 다각적인 ‘경영혁신’을 통해서 매일신보의 판매부수를 늘릴 수 있었다. 반대로 이들 신진 ‘문학 청년’들은 아베를 통해서 1910년대 최대의 대중매체인 매일신보라는 활약무대에 설 수 있었다. 1910년대 아베와 ‘신지식인층’ 사이의 이러한 ‘밀월관계’, ‘접근’은 1920년대 문화통치에서 식민지권력과 피통치자(특히 민족주의세력) 사이에 전개되는 비대칭적이면서도 불균등한 ‘접근전’ ‘바게닝’(bargaining)의 기본적인 토양이 되었다고 할 수 있겠다. 아베는 ‘접근전’ ‘바게닝’을 매개하는 ‘제국의 브로커’, ‘비정식접촉자’로서 조선에서 비로소 그 존재감을 점차 높여가게 된다. 즉 조선은 아베에게 도쿠토미의 그늘에서 벗어나 자신의 독자적인 역량을 발휘할 수 있는 무대가 되었던 것이다. In August, 1914, Abe was appointed as the 4th president of Kyungsung Ilbo as Yosino Dajaemon``s successor. As the Japanese Government General of Korea``s dissatisfaction with president Yosino increased, Tokutomi selected Abe as the incoming president, who had been most trusted by National Newspaper and acquainted with the governor and presidents of police affairs, in order to reinforce communication with the Japanese Government General of Korea. However, soon after his inauguration, the reckless management and financial loss during president Yosino``s days were discovered by the Japanese Government General. Japanese Government General of Korea considered reformation of Kyungsung Ilbo and Maeil Shinbo in a full-scale, and made Tokutomi submit a reform bill. The reformation proposal completed in March, 1915, was proceeded with the lead by an editor-in-chief, Abe Tsurunosuke, recommended by governor Terauchi, and the Japanese Government General``s policy of fiscal austerity was reflected. Because of which, regarding Abe``s management of Kyungsung Ilbo, he couldn``t use his abilities fully because of a lot of restrict and interference under the multi-level management system by the Japanese Government General of Korea and executives of National Newspaper including the Japanese Governor of Korea, advisor(a director of general affairs bureau), presidents of police affairs(censorship), a supervisor (Tokutoki), and an editor-in-chief(Abe Tsurunosuke: in charge of finance). On the other hand, as for Abe``s management of Maeil Shinbo, he succeeded in increasing its daily circulation through multiple ‘management innovation’ by selecting and appointing ‘new intellectuals’ with the experiences of studyingabroad, such as Choi Nam-seon, Lee Gwang-su, Jin Hak-mun, and Shim Woo-seop, renovating spaces on paper, increasing local articles, and so on. In other words, these rising ‘young lovers of literature’ could appear on the stage of Maeil Shinbo, the biggest mass media in 1910s, through Abe. This ‘cozy relationship’ and ‘approach’ between Abe and ‘new intellectuals’ in 1910s can be said to have been the foundation for the asymmetric and inequal ‘infighting’ and bargaining developed between the colonial power and the governed (particularly the nationalist group) during the cultural rule in 1920s.

Abe's Fall: Leadership and Expectations in Japanese Politics

H. D. P. Envall 서울대학교행정대학원 2011 Asian Journal of Political Science Vol.19 No.2

On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzo¯ was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanesepolitics. A year later, Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeatand Abe’s time as his country’s leader was over. As a study of political leadership, thisarticle seeks to explain the leadership outcomes of Abe’s brief prime ministership, inparticular the dramatic fall in public support Abe suffered during his tenure. It is arguedthat, despite the difficult circumstances Abe faced, the nature of his political demisecannot be fully accounted for by structural factors alone. It is also necessary tounderstand the role played by Abe himself and, in particular, his flawed leadershipstrategy. In the end, Abe’s political demise followed a basic logic: high expectationsfollowed by disillusionment characterised by sudden plunges in approval*a tragedy ofhubris leading to nemesis.

아베 신조 『아름다운 나라로』 속의 ‘미’와 ‘국가’: 미시마 유키오의 렌즈를 통해 본 전후 보수주의 미학

남상욱 서울대학교 일본연구소 2014 일본비평 Vol.- No.10

This paper analyzes the concept of “beauty” in Abe Shinzo’s Toward a Beautiful Country: My Vision for Japan by comparing with Mishima Yukio’s political aesthetics, in order to address the problem of aesthetics in recent Japanese conservatism. It has been understood that Abe’s doctrine of “post-postwar regime” is merely his way of idealizing or emulating his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke. In this regard, this paper problematizes Abe’s attempt to overcome the limits of Kishi’s technical politics by bringing the controversial concept of “beauty” into the field of politics. His attempt to accomplish this through “patriotism,” an emotion which cannot be converted into visible value such as “beauty,” is problematic. This is why Abe appears to have radical understanding of postwar democracy, yet on the other hand it can also be understood as a very conservative viewpoint, in light of Mishima Yukio who also advocated the necessity of political aesthetics. Though it was an important political role of the pre-war Emperor (Ten-no) to bestow beauty on the war dead, Abe, deviating from the old understanding of the political role of the Emperor, only acknowledges Emperor as a figure who prays for the safety of life. After all, this shows that Abe’s concept of “beauty” falls into victim of the postwar legal order which paradoxically internalized the conflicting aspects of radicalism and conservatism. Lacking any awareness on the matter, Abe revised the law in order to intensify the legal enforcement under a false pretense of “the safety of life,” which led to further transcendence of the law. In this sense, Abe is more threatening than Mishima, who placed his hope on the beauty in order to suspend the enforcement of the law.

아베정치와 북일 관계 : 납치문제의 정치화, 북핵위협의 안보화

윤대엽 ( Dae-yeob Yoon ) 국민대학교 일본학연구소 2021 일본공간 Vol.30 No.-

2012년 12월 위기돌파내각을 표방하며 출범한 아베 내각은 2020년 9월까지 최장기 집권을 통해 경제회생, 사회안전, 안보개혁 등 포괄적인 국가개혁을 추진했다. 그러나 퇴임연설에서 직접 언급한 것처럼 납치문제는 미완의 통한으로 남았고 북핵위협에 대응하는 대북정책도 제재와 대화, 대화와 제재, 대화 없는 압박, 조건 없는 대화 등 변화가 계속되었다. 아베 내각의 대북정책을 결정한 요인은 무엇인가? 본 연구는 아베-김정은 시기 납치문제, 북핵위협이 어떻게 일본의 국내정치와 연계되어 대북정책에 영향을 미쳤는지 검토한다. 본 연구의 핵심 주장은 세 가지다. 첫째, 김정은 체제에 대한 미국과 국제사회의 대응이 지체되는 가운데 아베 내각은 납치문제를 정치화하고 북한에 접근했다. 둘째, 2016년 이후 북핵문제가 악화되고 트럼프 정부가 최대한의 압박으로 대응하자 아베 내각은 북핵위협을 안보화하고 자위대를 부가하는 개헌전략으로 활용했다. 셋째, ‘대화와 압박,’ ‘대화 없는 압박’, 그리고 ‘조건 없는 대화’ 등 아베 내각의 대북전략의 변화는 납치문제, 북핵문제를 국내정치와 연계하는 아베정치의 결과다. The Abe cabinet, which was launched under the goal of a crisis-breaking cabinet, has promoted comprehensive national reforms such as economic revitalization, social safety, and security reform. However, as Prime Minister Abe mentioned in his resignation speech, the abduction issue remained unresolved, and the North Korean policy continued to change between sanctions, dialogue and pressure. What factors determined the Abe cabinet’s North Korea policy? This study examines how the abduction issue and the North Korean nuclear threat were linked to Japan’s domestic politics and affected North Korea policy. There are three main arguments of this study. First, while the US and the international community’s response to the Kim Jong-un regime was delayed, Abe’s cabinet politicized the abduction issue and approached North Korea. Second, as the North Korean nuclear issue worsened after 2016 and the Trump administration responded with maximum pressure, the Abe cabinet used the North Korean nuclear threat as a constitutional amendment strategy. Third, changes in the Abe cabinet’s strategy toward North Korea, such as “dialog and pressure,” “pressure without dialogue,” and “dialog without conditions,” are the result of Abe’s politics that link the abduction issue and the North Korean nuclear issue with domestic politics.

아베 시대의 대전환: 자민당 지배 공고화를 통해 탈전후하는 일본

박철희 서울대학교 일본연구소 2021 일본비평 Vol.- No.25

Prime Minister Abe reestablished LDP dominance, stabilized political leader’s tenure, and achieved political concentration of power into the Prime Minister’s Office. This article aims to explore what lied at the bottom of political aims during Abe’s stable and strong political tenure. Author argues that at the heart of his ambitious political goals lies a grand attempt to break away from the postwar regime, or sengo taisei. The attempt to get away from the postwar regime was facilitated by political and social transformation of the postwar regime during the 1990s and 2000s, so-called two lost decades of Japan. Prime Minister Abe made a successful adventure to re-orient the Yoshida Line which has long constituted as the conservative mainstream policy line. In order to make strong and resilient Japan, Prime Minister Abe substantially made international security and proactive engagement in international diplomacy as an integral part of national foreign and security policy. On the other hand, in the name of resuming pride of Japan, Abe kept arms’ length distance from Asian neighbors. However, changing Japan had better not be interpreted as a return to the prewar regime. Nor does it completely be liberated from the postwar regime. It remains to be seen whether Abe’s policy line can be pushed through without Abe.

제2기 아베 정권의 장기 집권 요인

권연이 ( Kwon Yeoni ) 현대일본학회 2021 日本硏究論叢 Vol.54 No.-

본고에서는 수상의 집권에 영향을 미치는 요인을 추출하여 제2기 아베 정권이 장기집권할 수 있었던 이유를 분석하였다. 제2기 아베 정권은 제1기 때와 달리 7년 8개월에 이르는 최장의 재임 기간을 기록하였다. 주된 요인으로서 내각 지지율, 주요 정책의 운용, 양원의 구성, 수상 관저 기능, 자민당 총재 권한, 사전심사제의 운용 등의 측면에서 살펴 보았다. 다약야당의 상황이 지속되는 가운데 내각 지지율은 평균 50%대를 유지하였고, 정권 운영에 치명적인 스캔들로 몇 번의 지지율 하락을 경험하였으나 다시 회복되었다. 경제 정책과 외교정책에서 이전 정권과 차별화된 정책을 제시하였다. 2013년 참의원 선거에서 압승하여 분점국회의 상황이 해소되었다. 아베 정권은 정치주도를 실현하기 위한 수단으로서 관료의 인사권을 장악하여 관저주도 체제를 완성하였다. 자민당 내 총재 권한의 강화와 사전심사제의 활용, 자민당 내 분열 방지를 위한 암묵적 양해가 이루어져 관저-여당 관계가 원만하게 이루어져 왔음을 알 수 있었다. 정권 담당 능력이 있는 야당의 부재 속에서 정치적 안정을 바라는 유권자의 심리와 관저주도 체제의 정립 등이 맞물려 제2기 아베 정권의 장기집권이 가능했던 것으로 평가할 수 있다. This paper discusses why Abe was able to serve continuously as Prime minister for seven years and eight months. To determine the factors that affected the long-term administration, this study examined the cabinet approval rating, operation of the main policy, bicameral system, power of the Prime Minister’s office, Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) President’s authority, and pre-legislation examination system. Under Abe’s second administration, opposition parties were split into many weak parties. Abe’s cabinet maintained a cabinet approval rating of approximately 50%. When political scandals were revealed, the cabinet approval rating sometimes dropped to low but recovered later. They presented a different economic and foreign policy from Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government. Abe won the House of Councillors election of 2013 overwhelmingly, and the problem of a twisted diet was solved. The Abe cabinet had authority over the bureaucratic personnel to realize the politician-led-politics under the initiative of the prime minister’s office. During Abe’s administration, the LDP President’s authority was strengthened. In addition, the pre-legislation examination system was converted to support the prime minister’s office-led politics. Therefore, the relationship between the Prime Minister’s Office and the ruling party was amicable. While the absence of an opposition party that could take charge of the government-under a cabinet-led system with voters longing for political stability, Abe’s second administration could last for the long term, despite the ‘weak boom’ of Abenomics.