상호저축은행의 부실경영에 대한 경영진의 상사책임과 형사책임

정대(Chung, Dae) 한국법학회 2013 법학연구 Vol.49 No.-

상호저축은행은 서민과 중소기업을 위한 금융기관이라고 할 수 있다. 상호저축은행의 본래의 명칭은 상호신용금고였는데, 1990년대 말의 외환위기 이후 상호저축은행으로 그 명칭이 변경되었다. 최근 상호저축은행의 부실화가 큰 사회문제가 되고 있는데, 그 부실의 원인은 경제적 원인, 규제완화의 부작용, 경영진의 문제 등에서 찾을 수 있다. 그 중에서도 특히 문제가 심각했던 것은 대주주의 경영권 남용과 경영진의 불법행위였다고 할 수 있다. 상호저축은행의 부실경영과 관련하여 첫째, 상호저축은행의 이사는 선관주의의무의 내용으로 감시의무와 내부통제의무를 부담하고 있는데, 상대적으로 일반사업회사의 이사보다 더 고도의 주의의무를 부담하고 있다고 해석할 필요성이 있다고 본다. 둘째, 상호저축은행법상 상호저축은행의 이사는 예금채무에 대해 연대책임을 부담하고 있다는 점에서 일반사업회사의 이사보다도 더 엄격한 책임을 부담하고 있고, 나아가 금융기관인 은행의 이사의 경우와 비교해서도 더 엄격한 책임을 부담한다고 할 수 있다. 셋째, 상호저축은행 경영진의 부실대출과 관련된 형사책임의 경우 업무상 배임죄의 성립이 문제가 된다. 이러한 배임죄의 적용과 관련하여 상법상의 경영판단원칙의 적용을 통한 경영진의 형사책임의 면제가 논의될 수 있지만, 상호저축은행의 부실대출에 대한 검찰의 기소내용을 고려해 볼 때, 그러한 예는 극히 예외적인 경우에 한정될 것이라고 생각된다. Mutual savings banks is a financial institution which is useful for ordinary people and small or medium sized business. Many mutual savings and finance companies failed in the process of restructuring financial institutions in the late 1990s and then the name of mutual savings and finance companies was converted into mutual savings bank in 2001. Again many mutual savings banks are in danger of failure in the late 2000s. Failure of mutual savings banks is caused by mismanagement, absence of prudential regulation, improper lending practices and problems of deregulation. For example, both several directors and large shareholders unlawfully and improperly made large loans, and most large loans turned out to be bad. In addition, they often violated the lending limit under the relevant laws. According to Article 382 of the Commercial Code of Korea, a corporate director has a duty of care, a duty to monitor and a duty of internal control. Like a corporate director, a director of the mutual savings bank has also a duty of care, a duty to monitor and a duty of internal control because the mutual savings bank is a business corporation. In this connection, a director of financial institutions including banks and mutual savings banks has a higher duty of care because financial institutions have public nature. The US courts have traditionally imposed higher standards of duty on bank directors than corporate directors, so the business judgment rule has also contracted in the banking cases. In addition, the Japanese courts have recently imposed a higher duty of care on a director of financial institutions. In reality, a director of the mutual savings bank is still held to a stricter liability than that of a corporate director in order to protect depositors under the Article 3 of 37 of the Mutual Savings Bank Act. Lastly, a director of the mutual savings bank should bear criminal liability because he failed to observe laws and regulations. In general, a director of the mutual savings bank is charged with misappropriation under both the Criminal Act and the Mutual Savings Bank Act because of charges of misappropriation of funds of the mutual savings bank. In conclusion, the court should strictly impose civil and criminal liability on a director of the mutual savings bank, so that prudential management of the mutual savings bank may be ensured.

상호저축은행 재무건전성 평가지표로서 BIS비율

이무성(Mooseong Lee) 대한경영학회 2020 大韓經營學會誌 Vol.33 No.7

Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance and Internal Decision-making Mechanism in Mutual Savings Banks

Bong-Nam, Kim,So-Hyung, Kim 보안공학연구지원센터 2016 International Journal of u- and e- Service, Scienc Vol.9 No.5

This study aims to focus on mutual savings banks in financial sector and explore different corporate performances and internal decision-making mechanism based on ownership structure. Especially, mutual savings banks have unique characteristics different from general corporations and financial institution. In this paper, we analyze deciding factors for management performance of mutual savings banks as financial corporations and, through this, to elucidate causes of their bankruptcy or ultimate failure. For case study, Hankook Savings Bank and Dongbu Savings Bank were selected as representative listed large saving banks with assets over 1 trillion won. This study also selected comparison group which can support indexes that caused insolvency of savings banks with assets of over 1 trillion won and investigated industry average and average of healthy and unhealthy savings banks. The results of case study and analysis on group cases in this study are as follows; Unhealthy savings banks tend to have higher asset ratio against capital than healthy ones and under the circumstances without risk management (system) and internal control system, moral hazard occurred by major stockholders who tried to take advantage of expanded asset for their own personal interests. In addition, lax laws and regulations on capital and ownership structure and relaxation policy on operation regulations produced vulnerable capital structure and abnormal asset structure.

상호저축은행의 소유지배구조와 회계정보품질 간의 관련성에 관한 연구

박준범,이호영 한국공인회계사회 2018 회계·세무와 감사 연구 Vol.60 No.4

Many major Mutual Savings Banks (hereinafter referred to as “Savings Banks”), including the first and second Savings Banks in the industry, have been removed from the market due to illegal acts such as misappropriation of major shareholders and deterioration in financial soundness after the global financial crisis in 2008. One of the main reasons for the failure is the ownership structure of Savings Banks. In spite of the importance of the ownership structure of the Savings Banks, there is not much empirical research on Savings Banks due to their small share in the financial sector. However, it is important to understand the relationship between the ownership structure of the Savings Banks and the quality of accounting information of the Savings Banks because they play a key role for the finance of small businesses. In this study, we examine the relationship between the quality of accounting information (discretionary loan loss provision, DLLP) depending on ownership structure. The results of the analysis are summarized as follows. First, the largest shareholder’s ownership and the DLLP have a significant negative association. This implies that the higher the ratio of the largest shareholder, managers are more likely to adjust their earnings to higher levels by reporting a lower DLLP. Second, if the largest shareholder is an individual, there is no significant association with the DLLP. Third, when the largest shareholder participates in management, there is no significant association with the DLLP. Fourth, if the largest shareholder is a corporation and the type is bank - affiliated financial holding company, there is no significant correlation with the DLLP, but, if the type is lender, it has a significant positive association with the DLLP. This means that if the largest shareholder is a lender, there is an incentive for managers to lower earnings by reporting higher DLLP. 2008년 글로벌 금융위기 이후 내로라하는 업계 내 1~2위 상호저축은행(이하 ‘저축은행’)을 포함한 대형 저축은행 다수가 대주주의 분식회계 등 불법행위와 이로 인한 재무건전성 악화로 시장에서 퇴출되었다. 저축은행 대주주의 독단적인 경영 내지는 경영관여는 저축은행의 소유지배구조에 기인하는 측면이 크며 이로 인해 그 동안 저축은행의 부실이 반복되어 왔다. 이처럼 저축은행의 소유지배구조가 갖는 중요성에도 불구하고 저축은행이 금융권내 차지하는 비중이 크지 않아 이와 관련한 실증연구가 많지 않은 편이다. 그러나 저축은행은 새마을금고, 신용협동조합과 더불어 서민금융을 담당하는 한 축으로써 중요성이 있는 바 저축은행의 소유지배구조와 회계정보품질 간의 관련성을 확인해보고 저축은행의 소유지배구조 개선과 관련한 시사점을 찾아볼 필요가 있다. 이를 위해 본 연구에서는 저축은행 최대주주의 지분율, 개인 여부, 경영참여 여부 및 최대주주가 법인일 경우 그 유형에 따라 회계정보의 품질(재량적 대손상각비)간 어떠한 관련성이 있는지를 분석하였다. 분석결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 최대주주의 지분율과 재량적 대손상각비는 평균적으로 유의한 음의 상관관계를 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 최대주주의 지분율이 높은 저축은행일수록 경영자가 재량적 대손상각비를 낮게 보고하여 이익을 높게 조정할 가능성이 높음을 의미한다. 둘째, 최대주주의 개인여부는 재량적 대손상각비와 유의한 관련성이 발견되지 않았다. 셋째, 최대주주의 경영참여 여부는 재량적 대손상각비와 유의한 관련성이 발견되지 않았다. 추가분석 사항으로 최대주주가 은행계열 금융지주사인 경우 재량적 대손상각비와 유의한 관련성이 발견되지 않았다. 다만, 최대주주가 대부업체인 경우에는 재량적 대손상각비와 유의한 양의 상관관계가 있는 것을 확인하였다. 이는 최대주주가 대부업체인 경우 경영자가 재량적 대손상각비를 높게 보고하여 이익을 하향 조정할 유인이 있음을 의미한다.

금융기관의 지배구조가 이익조정에 미치는 영향

강현정(Hyun-Jung Kang),유순미(Soon-Mi Yu),김현진(Hyun-Jin Kim) 한국국제회계학회 2017 국제회계연구 Vol.0 No.71

본 연구에서는 금융기관에 적용되는 소유규제의 부재로 타 금융기관에 비해 상대적으로 대주주의 소유집중도가 높은 상호저축은행의 최대주주지분율과 최대주주의 법인 여부가 이익조정에 관련성에 미치는 효과에 대하여 분석하였다. 또한, 저축은행의 2대주주의 지분율과 2대주주의 법인여부가 최대주주의지분율과 이익조정의 관련성에 미치는 효과에 대하여 2005년부터 2014년까지 금융위원회에 등록된 저축은행을 대상으로 분석하였다. 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 최대주주의 지분율과 재량적대손충당금은 양의 상관관계를 보였다. 이는 최대주주의 지분율이 높을수록 재량적 대손충당금의 조정을 통해 이익을 하향조정 즉 유연화하고 있음을 나타내는 것으로, 금융기관의 소유집중도가 높을수록 대손충당금을 통한 이익유연화가 이루어진다는 Bouvatier et al.(2014) 의 선행연구 결과와 일치한다. 둘째, 저축은행의 최대주주가 법인인 경우와 재량적대손충당금도 양의 상관관계를 보였다. 이는 개인주주에 비해 운영효율성이 높고, 정보 접근성이 높은 법인 주주들이 체계적인 이익관리를 하고 있다는 것을 보여준다. 셋째, 저축은행의 2대주주의 지분율과 최대주주의 이익조정사이에는 관련성이 없는 것으로 나타났으며, 마지막으로 2대주주가 법인인 경우에는 재량적대손충당금이 감소하였다. 이러한 결과를 통해 저축은행의 법인 2대주주는 최대주주의 사적 효익을 위한 이익조정을 일정부분 통제하는 모니터링 수단이 될 수 있음을 알 수 있다. 본 연구의 결과들은 상호저축은행의 지배구조 개선에 대한 필요성이 증대되고 있고, 소유구조 개선에 대한 여러 방안들이 논의 되고 있는 현 시점에 저축은행의 소유구조와 이익조정 사이의 관계를 정립함으로써 향후 저축은행 지배구조 개선에 직·간접적으로 기여할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다. This study examines the effects of the largest shareholder’s equity holdings and shareholder types (corporate or individual) on earnings management of Mutual Savings Banks, which have more concentrated ownership structure due to the exclusion from ownership resections that are strictly applied for other financial institutions. Also, we analyze the second largest shareholder’s influence on the relation between the largest shareholder’s equity holdings and earnings management using the sample of mutual savings banks listed on Financial Service Commission from 2005 to 2014. Empirical findings are as follows. First, the mutual savings banks with more concentrated largest shareholder ownership have positive relationship with DALL(Discretionary portions of Allowance for Loan Losses). This means the bigger the largest shareholder’s equity holdings are, the more the managed earnings are. This result is consists with Bouvatier et al’s (2014) study that the largest shareholders with more concentrated ownership use DALL to smooth their earnings. Second, the corporate largest shareholders have positive relationship with DALL. This shows that the corporate shareholders manage their earnings using their information accessibility and management efficiency. Third, the second largest shareholder holdings and the largest shareholders’earnings management is not correlated. Last, the corporate second largest shareholders have negative relationship with DALL. With this result, we estimate that the corporate second largest shareholders of mutual savings banks can eliminate the largest shareholders’earnings management. The results of this study contributes to defining information value of the ownership structure of Mutual Savings Banks when the need for the improvement of governance structure is increasing and various measures for improving the owenrship structure are being discissed. It is expected to contribute directly or indirectly to the improvement of savings banks ownership structure.

현행 은행 인가제도의 개선방안

양기진 ( Yang Gijin ),강경훈 ( Kang Kyeong-hoon ) 한국금융법학회 2024 금융법연구 Vol.21 No.3

Today, the number of so-called neobanks, which usually provide financial services only through mobile or internet without offline branches, is increasing significantly worldwide, and they are rapidly encroaching on the business areas of existing banks. In Korea, financial authorities are reviewing how to support innovation and competition in the banking market, and are considering whether to ease regulations on bank entry, introducing small [bank] licenses, and easing bank licensing requirements to assist the establishment of challenger banks. Looking at overseas cases, the UK introduced the Small Specialist Bank system to promote competition in its domestic banking market and authorized a large number of challenger banks. In the US, while inducing the entry of fintech companies into the financial industry and authorizing fintech companies as national banks to operate throughout the nation, the OCC restricts the deposit-taking business of fintech companies which acquired the Special Purpose National Bank (SPNB) authorization. On the other hand, when approving a fintech company's application for a bank license, the banking licensing authorities in the UK and the US do not stipulate any separate special exceptions or relaxation of authorization requirements targeting internet banks with regard to a fintech company's application. In the case of Korea, the Banking Act uniformly stipulates minimum capital requirements for each type of bank, but uniform statutory minimum capital requirements do not appear to be helpful in risk-responsive supervision that takes into account the unique circumstances of bank license applicants. In addition, it is necessary to fully utilize the licensing discretion of the supervisory authority to actively impose conditions deemed necessary for financial stability and prevention of risks to the Deposit Insurance Fund and to conduct intensive monitoring for a certain period of time after a bank has been given a main license. Meanwhile, from the perspective of integrated bank supervision, it is desirable to include banks in a broad sense such as mutual savings banks that are conducting business similar to that of regular banks. Considering this need and the demand for fintech companies to enter the banking industry, it may be helpful to revise the current Banking Act to support the establishment of small banks. By introducing a more relaxed licensing system for small banks and/or a licensing system that limits the scope of business, such as a small license, it could be possible to promote the entry of small banks that meet the lowered entry requirements, and expect these small banks to operate or evolve as so-called challenger banks that compete with and/or coexist with existing banks with their own strategies. However, when reviewing bank license applications, it is necessary to assess risks exposed to each bank applicant and conduct a review proportional to the risks so as not to affect a safe and sound banking system.

The Effects of The Second Largest Shareholders on Earnings Management in Korea’s Mutual Savings Banks

Hyun-Jung Kang,Soon-Mi, Yu 보안공학연구지원센터 2016 International Journal of u- and e- Service, Scienc Vol.9 No.3

This study examines whether the second largest shareholders are related to the earnings management of Mutual Savings Banks in Korea from 2003 to 2012. A negative relationship is found between the second largest shareholders and the discretionary portion of the allowance provisions.In general, most of the Mutual Savings Banks in Korea have a single largest blockholder, so the possibility of earnings management for the largest shareholder’s private interest is higher than other financial institutions. However, if the firms have multiple blockholders, the second largest shareholder can exercise their control over banks. Then the shareholders can eliminate or supervise the earnings management for the largest shareholder’s private interest. In this regard, the paper verifies whether Mutual Savings Banks (MSB), with higher equity from the second largest shareholder can reduce the earnings of management by discretionary allowance for loan losses. We find that banks from the second largest shareholder with higher equity, has significant negative relations with the Discretionary portion of Allowance for Loan Losses (DALL). This result suggests that the greater the second largest shareholder’s equity, the less likely the opportunistic earnings management. This paper extends the literature on financial institutions’ earnings management to verify whether governance systems, especially ownership structure and earnings management, have significant relations.

시나리오 분석을 활용한 예금보험기금 상호저축은행 구조조정 특별계정의 부채 추정에 관한 연구

이진호,박영석,권일숙 한국FP학회 2019 Financial Planning Review Vol.12 No.4

Restructuring special accounts of mutual savings banks is part of the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) operated temporally until the end of 2026. The purpose of this change in the DIF is to reorganize the insolvent mutual savings banks that occurred after January, 2011. These accounts have greatly weakened 31 savings banks. But because massive debt considerably affects the safety and soundness of the fund until the end of 2026, the due date of repayment, it is vital that when savings bank restructuring is completed, the amount of liabilities is appropriately estimated and repayment policy is prepared. This paper suggests a repayment policy for estimating special account debts and enhancing the stability of DIF using a scenario analysis. As a result of approximating the debt balance of approximately 21.3 trillion won (with special account income until the end of 2026) as of the end of 2018, it is clear that it will be difficult to service the debt with only the present special account income. Given that a massive increase in additional income is unlikely, it could be said that maximizing public fund recovery is extremely important. This study suggests the extension of the repayment schedule as the most realistic alternative, and suggests that it is necessary to actively review the DIF system, including the establishment of joint accounts of integration between similar accounts, and diversification of fund-raising opportunities. 상호저축은행 구조조정 특별계정은 2011년 1월 이후 발생한 상호저축은행의 부실을 정리하기 위해 예금보험기금 내 별도로 설치되어 2026년말까지 한시적으로 운영되는 예금보험기금의 일부 계정이다. 동계정은 그동안 31개 저축은행의 부실을 정리하는 데 크게 기여하였지만, 상환기일인 2026년말까지 막대한 규모의 부채가 기금의 안정성과 건전성에 적지 않은 영향을 미칠 것으로 예상되는 바, 현재와 같이 저축은행의 구조조정이 일단락된 시점에 부채 규모를 적절히 추정하고 그 상환대책을 마련하는 것이 무엇보다도 중요하다. 본 논문은 시나리오 분석을 활용하여 특별계정 부채를 추정하고 예금보험기금의 건전성을 제고하기 위한 상환대책을 제언하고자 하였다. 2018년말 기준 특별계정 부채 잔액 약 21.3조원에 대해 운영기한인 2026년말까지 특별계정 수입으로 부채 잔액을 추정한 결과, 현재의 특별계정 수입만으로 적립된 부채를 상환하기에는 어려운 것으로 파악되었다. 향후 보험료수입의 대폭 증가가 힘든 상황을 고려하면 회수자금 극대화 노력이 매우 주효함을 시사하는 결과라 할 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 상환기한의 연장을 가장 현실적인 대안으로 제언하고, 장기적으로는 공동계정의 설치 또는 유사계정간 통합 등 기금 체계의 개편과 자본조달수단의 다양화 등을 적극 검토할 필요가 있음을 제언한다.

상호저축은행의 수익성 분석: 글로벌 금융위기와 프로젝트 파이낸싱의 영향을 중심으로

신종협 ( Jong Hyup Shin ) 서강대학교 지암남덕우경제연구원 2012 시장경제연구 Vol.41 No.2

We estimate the effects of the global financial crisis and the project financing (PF) loan loss on the profitability of mutual savings banks using panel analyses and cross-section analyses. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), structural income ratio, non-interest income ratio, and the independent variables are growth rate of total assets, equity ratio, loan-to-firm ratio, interest margin ratio, loan loss reserves ratio. Panel analyses show that equity ratio and interest margin ratio have a positive effect on ROA and the loan-to-firm ratio has a negative effect on ROA. The growth rate of total assets and equity ratio are the variables having a positive relationship with ROE. While the loan-to-firm ratio has a positive effect on structural income ratio, the loan loss reserves ratio has a negative influence on structural income ratio. All the independent variables give statistical significance to non-interest income ratio Comparing the analysis result of cross-section data before the global financial crisis with that after the global financial crisis, we find that the negative effects of independent variables on dependent variables have strengthened. The reinforcement of the negative effect of dependent variables on the variables of profitability after the global financial crisis are mainly due to the PF loan loss of mutual savings banks.

상호저축은행 적기시정조치 제도의 효과 분석 및 시사점

박상현 금융감독원 2020 금융감독연구 Vol.7 No.1

It has been several pointed out that the Prompt Corrective Action System of Financial Authorities contributes to minimizing the cost of insolvency of Mutual Savings Banks in Korea, while the delay measure of Prompt Corrective Action undermines the cost-minimizing function of Prompt Corrective Action. This study collected data such as quarterly capital adequacy indicators and data on the amount of support and recovery resulting from 134 Mutual Savings Banks from 2003 to the second quarter of 2018 and verified the effects of correlations and variables through multiple regression analyses. As a result of empirical analysis, this study found that the more time a mutual savings bank continue, the more money it spends after it’s closure, and the better the BIS CAR, the more money it takes back after closing. This study identified a tendency for the BIS CAR to decrease and NPL to increase as the number of times for the Prompt Corrective Action requirements are met in all Mutual Savings Banks. Therefore, this study partly confirmed concerns that the delay of Prompt Corrective Action might increase the burden of national finance. This study suggested that the cumulative frequency of meeting requirements of Prompt Corrective Action and continuing duration of Mutual Savings Bank should be used by the Financial Authorities in determining the likelihood of recovering soundness and the extent of financial support in determining whether the delay of Prompt Corrective Action should be postponed.