미⋅중 전략적 경쟁시기 양안관계: 수렴과 확산의 이중성

이상만 중국지역학회 2019 중국지역연구 Vol.6 No.2

The full-fledged US-China trade war that began in 2018 has led to several pieces of evidence that suggest the bilateral relationship that, up until now, was based on both competition and cooperation, has now entered a phase where strategic competition is its defining characteristic. The recent US-China relationship is complicated because it involves a global hegemony competition China's that has followed rise. The relationship is one that involves the structure of international politics and time will be required to resolve the issues that the relationship faces. There is an imperative to analyze the current situation through a perspective of confrontation that is centered on the core interests of both sides. Cross-strait relations issue are very important hotspots that may be the site of real clashes between the Chinese and the Americans. The basic issues and contradictions inherent to the current Sino-American relationship include the following: 1) from a political and diplomatic perspective, the issues of travel to Taiwan, National Defense Authorization Act and Taiwan Assurance Act issue; 2) from a military perspective, the blockading of China by the US through its Indo-Pacific strategy and freedom of navigation strategy in the South China Sea; and, 3) from an economic perspective, the Belt and Road policy and the trade war between China and the US to dominate advanced fields of technology. Of course, while the two countries are clashing due to the contradictions that have emerged from these basic issues, China and the US are still coexisting under the framework of competition and cooperation, in contrast to the confrontational relationship that existed between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This means that the US-China relationship is not a zero-sum game and that there is space for the two countries to cooperate across many different spheres. China's From perspective, the aim is to complete unification of the country. Chinese leaders believe that the goal is peaceful unification and desire avoiding people unification by force, yet focus on the feelings of the and believe that the barrier to unification is the US. The Taiwan issue is a very big card that countrys the US can play to put China in line. The issue involves both interests carrier and neither can abandon it. Taiwan is like an unsinkable aircraft to the mainland. US, and, to China, territory that must be reunified with the Both the US and China cannot back down on the issue. In short, there are four phenomena that will not change in regards to US and Chinese involvement in Taiwan. As a result, as long as the US and Taiwan maintain their current policies, China will be forced to maintain a hardline response toward them. 2018년 본격화된 미중 간 무역전쟁을 기점으로 경쟁과 협력이 병존하던 양국관계가 전략적 경쟁이 주가 되는 시기에 접어들었다. 최근 미중관계는 중국의 부상에 따른 글로벌 레벨의 패권경쟁의 문제이기 때문에 1) 복합적 성격을 가지고 있고, 2) 국제정치에서 구조적인 문제이고, 3) 문제를 해결할 시간이 필요하며, 4) 쌍방이 핵심이익을 두고 대치적인 관점에서 현 상황을 분석해야 한다. 특히 양안관계는 미.중관계에서 실제로 발생할 가능성이 있는 핫스팟(hot spot)에 해당한다. 현재 미중관계의 모순은 첫째는 정치외교적으로 대만여행법과 국방수권법과 대만보증법 문제이고, 둘째는 군사적 측면에서 인도-태평양전략과 남중국해 항행의 자유전략을 통해 중국을 봉쇄하는 것이며, 셋째는 경제적 측면에서 일대일로 정책과 첨단기술분야의 패권 장악을 위해미.중간의 무역전쟁이다. 물론 미.중간에 이러한 근본적인 문제에서 모순이 발생하여 충돌을 하고 있지만 여전히 냉전시대의 미.소대결 양상과는 달리 경쟁과 협력이 병존하고 있는 상황이기 때문에 미중간 제로썸 게임은 아니고 다방면에서 협력할 수 있는 공간은 확보되어 있다중국입장에서 대만문제를 바라보는 시각은 목표는 평화통일이고, 무력통일은 억제되어야 하며, 관건은 민심이며, 장애는 미국이라는 생각을 가지고 있다. 또한 대만문제는 미국이 중국을 적절히 통제하는데 아주 유용한 빅 카드이기에 미.중이 모두 포기할 수 없는 중대한 국익이 걸린 핵심사안이다. 그래서 미국과 대만이 현재의 정책 방향을 변경하지 않는 한 중국은 강경 대응 기조를 유지할 수밖에 없을 것으로 판단된다.

북한의 평화협정 주장에 관한 미·중의 전략적 입장과 한국의 대응 방향

윤정원 ( Yoon Jeongwon ),나영주 ( Nah Young-ju ) 한국세계지역학회 2017 世界地域硏究論叢 Vol.35 No.2

이 글은 북한 김정은 정권 하에서 제시되어 온 미북 평화협정 제안을 살펴보고, 미북 평화협정에 대한 미국과 중국의 인식과 전략적 입장을 살펴보고, 이를 토대로 미북 평화협정에 대한 한국의 바람직한 대응 방향을 논의하였다. 북한은 미국의 대북 적대시정책이 폐지되어야 하며, 이를 위해 미북 평화협정이 체결되어야 북한 비핵화가 실현될 수 있다는 `선 평화협정, 후 비핵화`의 입장을 견지해 오고 있다. 북한은 미북 평화협정을 통해 한미동맹을 약화시키려 하는데, 이러한 보상이 먼저 주어져야 비핵화에 협조할 수 있다는 것이다. 미국은 북한의 미북 평화협정주장을 근원적으로 거부하지는 않지만, 북한이 먼저 비핵화를 실현해야 미북 평화협정을 체결하겠다는 입장이다. 중국은 북한 비핵화와 미북 평화협정 논의의 병행을 중재적 대안으로 제시하고 있으며, 우선 미북이 상호 대화를 시작해 나가는 것을 중요하게 보고 있고, 이러한 중재안이 중국의 전략적 이익에 부합되고 한반도 평화에도 기여할 수 있다고 본다. 한국은 미북 평화협정이 정전협정을 대체하는 형식적 합의에 머물 수 있기 때문에 한반도 평화를 실질적으로 보장하는 항구적 평화체제 구축을 주장하고 있다. 한국은 또한 북한 비핵화와 미북 평화협정 논의 과정에서 한국이 배제되지 않도록 하는 한미공조를 중요시 하고 있다. 나아가 북한문제를 둘러싼 미국과 중국의 전략적 갈등 속에 휘둘리지 않으면서도 자주적인 대응 능력을 향상시키는 것이 긴요해 지고 있다. 결국 한국에게는 북한의 비핵화 실현을 목표로 하면서도 남북한이 주요 당사자가 되는 한반도 평화협정 내지 평화체제의 구축, 미국 및 중국과의 전략적 협력, 자주국방에 기초한 군사역량 강화 등이 긴요하며, 한국이 지향하는 한반도에서의 항구적 평화체제 구축을 지지하는 세력을 확충할 수 있도록 주도적, 자주적, 균형적 외교의 지혜가 필요하다. This paper discusses what proposals were suggested with regard to US-North Korean peace treaty under Kim Jong-un regime, analyzes what positions were taken strategically on that treaty by the US and China, and recommends what policy directions are desirable for South Korea. North Korea argues that the US should eliminate its hostile policy toward North Korea and conclude a peace treaty with North Korea. North Korea asserts that these demands are prerequisites for its own denuclearization. North Korea keeps the principle of "Peace Treaty First, Denuclearization Next." North Korea wants to actualize its denuclearization only after it can take advantage of the weakening of the ROK-US alliance through signing the US-North Korean peace treaty. Although the US does not ultimately refuse the peace treaty with North Korea, it argues that the peace treaty should be signed only after North Korean denuclearization. China suggests its arbitrary option that North Korean denuclearization and US-North Korean peace treaty should be negotiated simultaneously. China puts an emphasis on the initiation of dialogues between the US and North Korea, and estimates that its arbitration is in compliance with its strategic interests and contributes to peace on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea favors the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula which can substantially guarantee the peace in Korea because it concerns about the possibility that the US-North Korean peace treaty may become just a de jure treaty which substitutes the existing armistice treaty. South Korea also highlights the ROK-US cooperation which prevents South Korea from being excluded in the negotiation process of denuclearization as well as peace treaty. In addition, it is required for South Korea to advance its own self-reliant policy capability while overcoming the possibiity of being intrigued in the vortex of strategic conflicts between the US and China. Ultimately, while pursuing the goal of North Korean denuclearization, South Korea should emphasize the establishment of Korean peace treaty or peace regime, the strategic cooperation with the US and China, the enforcement of military capability based on self-reliant defense. Furthermore, it is necessary for South Korea to have the wisdom of active, self-reliant, and balanced diplomacy which can enlarge the advocate nations supporting the South Korean idea of permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Effect of US11 and hDAF Gene for Cytotoxicity Regulate and Transgenic Pigs Breeding

Hyeon Yeong Shin,Tao Lin,Reza K. Oqani,Jae Eun Lee,Jung won Kang,Joo Bin Lee,Dong Il Jin 한국동물생명공학회(구 한국동물번식학회) 2017 발생공학 국제심포지엄 및 학술대회 Vol.2017 No.10

This study aims to find effect of natural mating and cytotoxicity regulate from US11 and hDAF gene transgenic pig. Piglets that has US11, hDAF or US11&hDAF genes were born from natural mating of female US11 gene transgenic pig and male hDAF gene transgenic pig. Among 10 piglets were born, there are 2 piglets with US11 gene only, 2 piglets with hDAF gene only, 5 piglets with both US11 and hDAF gene, and 1piglets without transgenes. Sex ratio of piglets was 1:1, and transfection rate from natural breeding showed result that only US11 gene was 20%, only hDAF gene was 20%, and both US11 gene and hDAF gene was 50%. In cytotoxicity effect, US11 gene was showed a tendency of reduce human NK cell cytotoxicity in 10:1 ratio. In complement assay, hDAF gene was reduce human complement cytotoxicity in both 1:1 and 10:1 ratio of human complement. hDAF gene was also effected in reduce human NK cell cytotoxicity that showed similar result with US11 gene. Double transgenic piglets fibroblast that has both US11 and hDAF resulted that decrease both human NK cell and complement cytotoxicity compared with wild type cells. In conclusion, Natural mating was effected for US11 and hDAF gene transmitted into offsping piglets, and US11 and hDAF gene were expected to regulate xenograft rejections in transgenic tissues.

1990년대 미국의 쿠바 정책의 성격과 배경 : Characters and Background

김명애 한국미국사학회 2003 미국사연구 Vol.18 No.-

The bitter rivalry between the United States and the Cuba has occupied a position as one of the principal political disputes in the Western Hemisphere for the past 40 years. Given the putative ‘success’ of US policy in achieving its desired outcome (e.g., the dissolution of Soviet ‘empire’), one might expect the United States to respond differently to the subject of Cuba. But to those who formulate and implement US foreign policy, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the spread of democracy throughout Eastern Europe did not necessarily mean that the United States will now respond differently to everything it faces in the post-Cold War world. Accepting the Cuban Revolution and making peace with Fidel Castro―ending the embargo, allowing travel, and ceasing to demand free elections and free markets as a precondition for normalizing relations―meant giving in to the individual who defied the United States. The US Congress therefore passed the Cuban Democracy Act (or ‘Torricelli Bill’) and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which tightened the economic embargo, and President Bill Clinton continued to follow the Cuba policy of President George H.W. Bush, declaring his intention to increase the US pressure on Cuba until democracy and free markets are installed. But there were issues of morality and effectiveness clearly posed by the Cuban Democratic Act and Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. The masses of Cuba, rather than the elites, had to bear the brunt of the hardship. This was why these measures failed in Cuba, where the vast majority of the trade in question was in foods and medicine. Apart from questions of morality and effectiveness, there also was the issue of counter-productivity. The other reason related to the legislation’s effectiveness was the relatively soft line of the US government toward Cuba. The Cuban Air Force’s actions and hard-line domestic crackdown in 1996 forced President Clinton to make a decision. For the first time since the 1962 missile crisis, a President of the United States contemplated ordering the US armed forces to take military action against Cuba. The President could have chosen among several military options of varying degrees of severity. Instead, he rejected all of them and agreed to accept the Helms-Burton Act in their stead. Why did Clinton not order military action against Cuba? Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has twice demonstrated its willingness to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of its near-neighbors, Panama in 1989 and then Haiti in 1994. The principal explanation is probably its assessment that the costs of such intervention remained too high. Although the Cuban armed forces had become a sad, pale shadow of the powerful institution that strutted the world stage in the 1970s and 1980s, they retained sufficient strength and fighting elan to make a US invasion of Cuba much costlier than the US invasions in Panama and Haiti. The size and cost of the US deployment to ensure victory in Cuba, and the casualties that US forces would likely suffer, help to deter a US invasion. The second reason for deterrence was the international atmosphere. Because the hard-line policy of the United States toward Cuba (especially the Helms-Burton Act) was opposed by most US allies, the likelihood of US military intervention in Cuba was lessened. Therefore, the ‘balancing’ of US power by the power of others was also an important explanation for the decision not to invade against Cuba. The other dimension of the soft line of the US government was that it needed to cooperate with Cuba in dealing with several problems between the two nations. The Cuban and US governments have engaged in a number of low-key confidence-building measures in the 1990s. Despite the effectiveness of those measures, why then did the US government take a hard-line policy toward Cuba? Some historians have raised questions about the effectiveness of the hard-line policy toward Cuba, and proposed softer alternatives. They have insisted that the specter of an external threat―whether in the form of a US invasion, sabotage, embargo or a revanchist Cuban exile community poised to return to the island to wreak vengeance and recover lost properties―has long been one of the keys to Castro’s survival that has served to strengthen the regime and made a peaceful transition to democracy more difficult. They have also maintained that the US should soften its own policy to make Castro open the door to US. The reason that the US government did not take the alternative route was complicated substantially by the fact there was a large, politically influential and viscerally anti-Castro Cuban-American community in southern Florida. Cuban-American influence, primarily through the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), has been palpable and has strengthened the hard-line inclinations already dominant in US foreign policy circles.

The impact of foreign public evaluations of the US Presidents on the favorability toward the country

Kim Eun Bin,Oh Jinhwan 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2021 International Area Studies Review Vol.24 No.3

This study examines how international publics’ evaluations of US Presidents affect the favorability of their views of the US. More specifically, it investigates the impact of the US Presidents George W. Bush, Barak Obama and Donald Trump on attitudes toward the US in 32 nations. It analyzes the data from Pew Research Center’s Global Indicators Database on opinions of the US and confidence in the US President from 2002 to 2018. The analysis reveals a significant relationship between confidence in the US Presidents and favorable attitudes toward the US among foreign publics. The paper further discusses the implications of global evaluations of US Presidents for US public diplomacy.

북미관계와 한반도 평화체제: 역사적 고찰

신욱희 한국정치외교사학회 2012 한국정치외교사논총 Vol.33 No.2

This paper explores historical cases in which official or substantial attempts to improve North Korean-US relations were made, and tries to find their relevance in terms of the discussion of a peace system on the Korean peninsula. These cases include 1) North Korea’s proposal of a North Korean-US peace treaty in 1974; 2) The US proposal of trilateral (South Korea-North Korea-the US) talks in 1979; 3) North Korea’s proposal of trilateral talks in 1984; 4) the consideration of crossrecognition within the Northern Policy in 1989; 4) the attempt to improve North Korean-US relations through the Geneva Accord in 1994; 5) North Korean-US talks during the Perry process in 1999. The main questions of the paper are as follows: Under what conditions and intentions were the contacts made?; What were the factors progressing or regressing the talks?; What roles South Korea’s policies towards the US and North Korea played?; How were North Korean-US relations related to peace system issues? The main variables in the analysis are the connection with US-China relations, North-South Korean relations, and South Korean-US relations; the problems of real party rules and US troops in South Korea; the domestic politics of North Korea, the US and South Korea; the matter of threat perception; and the prediction of North Korean regime survival. The paper deals with six cases under the consideration of these questions and variables, and concludes with implications these historical/comparative examination could provide for the present situation and South Korea’s policy decisions. 이 논문은 북미관계의 개선이 형식적, 혹은 실질적으로 모색되었던 역사적 사례에 대한 고찰을 통해서 그것이 한반도 평화체제의 논의에 주는 시사점을 찾아보는 것을 그 목적으로 한다. 다루어지는 사례는 1) 1974년 북한의 북미평화협정 제의; 2) 1979년 미국의 3자(남북미)회담 제의; 3) 1984년 북한의 3자회담 제의; 4) 1989년 북방정책 추진 시 교차승인 고려; 5)1994년 제네바 합의 시 북미관계 개선 모색; 6) 1999년 페리 프로세스 추진 시 북미대화 등의 여섯 사례이다. 논문에서 제기되는 핵심 질문은 다음과 같다. 어떠한 조건과 의도에서접촉이 이루어졌는가? 대화와 협상의 진전과 교착 원인은 무엇이었는가?한국의 대북/대미정책은 어떠한 역할을 하였는가? 북미관계와 평화체제의문제는 어떻게 연결되고 있는가? 이와 관련된 주요 요인으로는 미중관계,남북한 관계, 한미관계와의 연관성, 당사자 원칙과 주한미군 문제, 북한,미국, 한국의 국내정치적 변화, 위협인식에 대한 논의, 냉전 이후 북한정권의 생존에 대한 예측의 문제 등이 있다. 본론에서는 이와 같은 질문과 관련요인을 바탕으로 각 사례에 대한 서술과 분석이 행해지며, 결론에서는 이러한 역사적/비교적 검토가 현재의 한반도 상황과 한국의 정책적 선택의문제에 주는 의미에 대한 고찰이 이루어진다.

Correlations between the Various Methods of Estimating Prostate Volume: Transabdominal, Transrectal, and Three-Dimensional US

Sun Ho Kim,김승협 대한영상의학회 2008 Korean Journal of Radiology Vol.9 No.2

Objective: To evaluate the correlations between prostate volumes estimated by transabdominal, transrectal, and three-dimensional US and the factors affecting the differences. Materials and Methods: The prostate volumes of 94 consecutive patients were measured by both transabdominal and transrectal US. Next, the prostate volumes of 58 other patients was measured by both transrectal and three-dimensional US. We evaluated the degree of correlation and mean difference in each comparison. We also analyzed possible factors affecting the differences, such as the experiences of examiners in transrectal US, bladder volume, and prostate volume. Results: In the comparison of transabdominal and transrectal US methods, the mean difference was 8.4 10.5 mL and correlation coefficient (r) was 0.775 (p < 0.01). The experienced examiner for the transrectal US method had the highest correlation (r = 0.967) and the significantly smallest difference (5.4 3.9 mL) compared to the other examiners (the beginner and the trained; p < 0.05). Prostate volume measured by transrectal US showed a weak correlation with the difference (r = 0.360, p < 0.05). Bladder volume did not show significant correlation with the difference (r = 0.043, p > 0.05). The comparison between the transrectal and three-dimensional US methods revealed a mean difference of 3.7 3.4 mL and the correlation coefficient was 0.924 for the experienced examiner. Furthermore, no significant difference existed between examiners (p > 0.05). Prostate volume measured by transrectal US showed a positive correlation with the difference for the beginner only (r = 0.405, p < 0.05). Conclusion: In the prostate volume estimation by US, experience in transrectal US is important in the correlation with transabdominal US, but not with threedimensional US. Also, less experienced examiners’ assessment of the prostate volume can be affected by prostate volume itself.

급성 충수염의 진단에 있어서 회색도 초음파, 색 도플러 초음파와 출력 도플러 초음파 검사의 비교 : Comparison between Gray scale, Color Doppler and Power Doppler US

강성학,신성란,이호경,육동준,노택수,이민진,이상천 대한초음파의학회 1998 ULTRASONOGRAPHY Vol.17 No.2

유방 병변의 감별에서 탄성초음파와 회색조 초음파의 진단 성적 비교

강지영,이진화,김은경,신수영,김병권,조진한,하동호,박병호,최순섭 대한초음파의학회 2012 ULTRASONOGRAPHY Vol.31 No.4

Purpose: The purpose of this study was to compare the diagnostic performance of ultrasound (US) elastography and conventional B-mode US for discrimination between benign and malignant breast lesions. Materials and Methods: During a 13-month period, 277 women with 335 sonographically visible breast lesions who were scheduled to undergo biopsy were examined with US elastography. Elastographic findings were classified as benign or malignant based on the area ratio, with 1.00 as the threshold. Findings on conventional Bmode US were classified according to the BI-RADS category, as follows: lesions of BIRADS categories 2 and 3 were considered benign, while those in categories 4 and 5were considered malignant. Statistical analysis included sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value (PPV), negative predictive value (NPV), accuracy, and ROC curve analysis for comparison of the diagnostic performance of US elastography and conventional B-mode US. Results: Of the 335 breast lesions, 85 (25.4%) showed malignancy on pathology. Findings on B-mode US showed malignancy in 264 (78.8%) and elastographic findings showed malignancy in 102 (30.4%). The sensitivity, specificity, PPV, NPV, and accuracy of B-mode US and elastography were 98.8%, 28.0%, 31.8%, 98.6%, and 79.4% and 69.4%, 81.2%, 57.8%, 88.8%, and 79.4%, respectively. Elastography showed significantly higher specificity and PPV and lower sensitivity and NPV, compared with B-mode US (p < 0.001). The area under the ROC curve (AUC value) was 0.761 for elastography, and 0.634 for B-mode US (p < 0.001). Conclusions: US elastography can improve specificity and PPV of B-mode US,but with significant sacrifice of sensitivity and NPV. Therefore, US elastography may complement B-mode US for differentiation of breast masses. 목적: 유방의 악성 및 양성 종괴의 감별에 있어서 탄성초음파와 회색조 초음파의 진단 성적을 비교하고자 하였다. 대상과 방법: 13개월 동안 본원에서 유방 초음파를 시행한환자 중 종괴가 발견되어 조직검사가 계획된 277명의 환자,335개의 유방 종괴를 대상으로 탄성초음파를 추가로 시행하였다. 탄성초음파에서 양성 및 악성 종괴에 대한 평가는 단면적비 1.0을 기준으로 진단하였다. 회색조 초음파에서는 BIRADS에근거하여 범주 2와 범주 3에 해당하는 유방 종괴는양성으로, 범주 4와 범주 5의 종괴는 악성으로 분류하였다. 회색조 초음파와 탄성초음파의 진단성적을 비교하기 위해 민감도, 특이도, 양성예측도, 음성예측도 및 정확도를 구하고, ROC curve를 분석하였다. 결과: 병리 결과에서 335개의 종괴 중 악성은 85개(25.4%)이었다. 회색조 초음파에서는 264예(78.8%)를 악성종괴로 진단하였고, 탄성초음파에서는 102예 (30.4%)를 악성으로 진단하였다. 회색조 초음파의 민감도, 특이도, 양성예측도, 음성예측도, 정확도는 각각 98.8%, 28.0%, 31.8%, 98.6%,79.4% 이었고, 탄성초음파는 각각 69.4%, 81.2%, 57.8%,88.8%, 79.4% 이었다. 탄성초음파는 회색조 초음파와 비교하여 특이도와 양성예측도는 높았으나, 통계학적으로 유의하게민감도와 음성예측도는 낮았다 (p < 0.001). ROC curve 분석에서 탄성초음파와 회색조 초음파의 AUC 값은 각각 0.761과0.634 (p < 0.001) 이었다. 결론: 결론적으로 공간 상관도 기법을 이용한 탄성초음파는회색조 유방초음파와 비교하여 특이도와 양성예측도를 향상시키지만 통계적으로 유의하게 민감도와 음성예측도를 낮추므로유방 병변의 진단에 있어 탄성초음파는 회색조 초음파의 보완적인 검사법으로 사용될 수 있을 것이다.

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홍석률(Hong Seuk-ryule) 역사비평사 2009 역사비평 Vol.- No.88

During Johnson Administration(1964~1968), the Republic of Korea and the United States built the most intimate relationship in the history of the ROK-US Alliance due to the Vietnam War. Some Koreans said the relationship of two countries were on honeymoon at the time. President Park Chung-hee sent 50,000 ROK troops, two Army divisions and one Marine brigade, to the South Vietnam for helping US troops there from 1963 to 1973. As a result of dispatch of ROK troops to Vietnam, the ROK government had useful leverage to the US government. The ROK suddenly became a patron, not a client, for the US government as far as Vietnam War concerned. Park's government successfully utilized this leverage to halt the reduction of US troops in South Korea and to get more military and economic aids from the US. However, North Korea did something. North Korea afflicted South Korea with spy infiltrations and military provocations since the last half of 1966. Particularly in January 21, 1968, some members of North Korea's special forces tried to raid presidential residence in Seoul and, two days later, North Korean Navy kidnapped the USS Pueblo in the East Sea. President Park argued for strong counter measure against North Korea including military retaliation. However, the US could not but be passive to respond North Korea's provocations because of the debacle in the Vietnam War. It made some tensions and doubts in the ROK-US relations in 1968. Futhermore, Johnson government started to plan withdrawal of the U.S troops from South Korea in 1968 even though security crisis was still going on Korean Peninsular. The US government had planed the reduction of US Army in Korea in the early 1960s but it had been suspended by ROK's participation in Vietnam War. However, the plan for reduction of the US troops in Korea resumed as soon as US policy toward Vietnam War changed from military triumph to getting out of Vietnam through peace talks with North Vietnam in the early 1968. The honeymoon of the ROK-US alliance during the Vietnam War was dangerous because it invited military tensions and conflicts to Korean peninsular from Vietnam. Also, the honeymoon in the ROK-US relations finished very shortly like every honeymoon did so.