순간압력강하치의 통계적 해석을 통한 경사관내 2상유동양식의 판별

이상천,이정표,김중엽,Lee, S.C.,Lee, J.P.,Kim, J.Y. 대한설비공학회 1988 설비저널 Vol.17 No.5

Characteristics of flow regime transitions in inclined upwards gas-liquid two-phase flow have been investigated based upon a statistical analysis of instantaneous pressure drop curves through an orifice. The probability density functions of the curves indicate distinct patterns depending upon two-phase flow regime, which are very similar to those of horizontal two-phase. The dimensionless intensity of fluctuations of the pressure drops sharply change as the flow transitions such as plug-slug, pseudo slug-slug and annular-slug take place. The effects of inclination angle on the flow regime transitions have been also investigated. The results show that the method to identify the flow pattern based upon the statistical analysis of instantaneous pressure drops is suitable for inclined flow as well as horizontal flow.

行政審判請求人適格에 관한 立法論

李相千(Lee Sang-Cheon) 동아대학교 법학연구소 2010 東亞法學 Vol.- No.46

More than 20 years have passed since the legistlation of the law of administrative trial which defines the locus standi as ‘who has interest in law’. Even though there have been little objection to the revision of the above provision, the expression ‘who has interest in law’ exists still as it is. There have been severe cotroversies whether the legistlation of locus standi of the law of administrative trial has error or not, concerned with the legistlation of locus standi. But Almost all the people agree to the enlargement of locus standi of administrative lawsuit. The crucial error of the legistlation of locus standi is that the law of administrative trial has strong self-cotradictory regulations(Article 1 and Article 9) in itself which don't agree with each other. The Article 1 describes the trial subject as both of illigality and injustice, but The Article 9 describes the locus standi as 'who has interest in law'. This means that all the interests in fact are excluded from protection, because the injustice doesn't go with the concept of interest in law and it doesn't consist with the infringement of right. Thus, all the those who have only interest in fact can't take objection to the injustice. It is not the true purpose of the law of administrative trial. We are under the substantive rule of law by our constitutional law. All the legal rights should be able to be protected through the legal process. But only those ‘who has interest in law’ can be protected through the administrative lawsuit. In reality, it is common that the legistlation of law is not carried out to take the all the interests into account. If the legistlation doesn't rule some interest, it can't be protected. The legistlation designate the sorts of interest which can be proteceted or not. There exist some interests which can't be protected. This result isn't consistent with the true meaning of the above substantive rule of law. Unlike the law of administrative lawsuit, the law of administrative trial rules both of illigality and injustice. The injustice is concerned with interest in fact. But the above law describes the locus standi as 'who has interest in law'. Thus all the interests in fact is ruled out of the adaption of the law. The above Article 9 of the law of administrative trial should be revised at once. The locus standi should be expressed like ‘who has interest worth protecting’. The administrative trial should be used by even those who have only interest in fact.

船舶安全法 제67조의 立法論的 問題點

이상천(Lee Sang-Cheon) 동아대학교 법학연구소 2010 東亞法學 Vol.- No.47

The non-adaptation of ‘principle of liability with fault’ shoud be exceptional. It is be discrepant from eqity and justice. It leads to the relaxation of public order. The original meaning of ‘principle of liability with fault’ is the justifying ground of the restrictive interpretation of “private persons entrusted with public duties” on State Compensation Act. Ship Safety Act Article 67 (Liability of Compensation of Agency) lays down as follows. (1) When the Authority, the classification corporation, an agency for examination, etc. of containers and an agency for inspection, etc. of dangerous articles (hereinafter referred to as an “agency for inspection”) cause damage to third parties illegally in performing the affairs of the relevant agency, the State shall compensate such third parties for such damage. (2) With respect to the compensation for damage under the provisions of paragraph (1), the State may claim the relevant agency for inspection for indemnification when there is an intention or gross negligence by the agency for inspection. (3) The claim for indemnification against the agency for inspection under the provisions of paragraph (2) shall be limited to the amount prescribed by Presidential Decree. The above Article means that the State shall compensate such third parties for such damage. It is unfair and not justified that the agency for inspection which comitted errors doesn't answer fot them. The principle of liability with fault enables the agency to lower and prevent the faults, and to alliviate the finantial load of governments. In consideration of the agency's finantial condition, the law should limit the maimum of its liability. Within the limit the agency shoud cope with its liability. To make up the shortage of its liability, the agency should have the liability insurance by compulsion. The expansive adaptation of State Compensation Act should be restricted reasonably, and Ship Safety Act Article 67 should be revised at once.

공법 : 항고소송(抗告訴訟)과 국가배상(國家賠償)과의 기능적(機能的) 조화(調和)를 위한 시론(試論)

이상천 ( Sang Cheon Lee ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2010 법학논총 Vol.27 No.4

In consideration of property continuance security in face of the phase of nontypical situation it is needed that we should elevate the practical use degree of Appeal Litigations. And the system of Administrative Remedies should be repaired to make it possible that State Compensation is managed more comprehensively than Appeal Litigations. Firstly, the Administrative Remedies should be divided into the two; one group which contains Appeal Litigations and State Compensation and the other ones which is destined to be treated according to the designated way via law or contract. it is unreasonable to divide them as Actions in Administrative Law and Compensation for Damage. The previous way of division enables the Administrative Remedies not to omit necessary remedies. Secondly, the leading idea of Appeal Litigations should be the continuance security of property. The concrete ways of fulfillment of it are the enlargement of Legal Interests in Administrative Law, the development of new unknown kinds of Appeal Litigations, the wide recognization of illegality conception in Appeal Litigations. Thirdly, the scope of remedies through State Compensation concerned with Reflexive Interests should be extended. It should be different from that of Appeal Litigations. Especially it is recommended that the requisite of protecting private inerests in duty performance is not necessary in the shape of State Compensation. it shoud be estimated as the reference material in measuring liability. Hitherto, the Actions in Administrative Law and Compensation for Damage which contains State Compensation and Compensation for loss has been discussed unconnectedly. Thus the Appeal Litigations and State Compensation have been treated unconnectedly each other in a degree. And There have been some deficits in the fulfillment of the constitutional idea of property continuance security in case of informal phase. By that, we have had no comprehensive consideration of the two. It is true that there have been some fragmentary discussions about the connection the two, but we have not taken into consideration the two mixingly in one. The two serves for just the one purpose of administrative remedy in case of informal phase. In this essay some problems of the two have been discussed. The Appeal Litigations should take the duty as the first remedies, and State Compensation should take the duty as the second ones. I hope that we could have great steps toward the legal theoretical development in Administrative Remedies via mixing the above two in case of informal phase.

행정과정상 協議의 法的 地位에 관한 小考

이상천(Lee, Sang-Cheon) 전북대학교 법학연구소 2015 法學硏究 Vol.44 No.-

‘협의’는 적어도 행정을 하는 전형적인 형태라고는 볼 수 없을지라도 어쩌면 가장 편의롭고 상대방인 사인에게도 행정에의 참여를 보장받는 민주행정의 성질을 톡톡히 가지는 행정활동형식이라 볼 수 있다. 그럼에도 위 ‘협의’에 대해 법률적인 터치는 거의 이루어지지 못하고 있었음이 사실이다. ‘협의’는 행정주체?행정기관 사이에서도 이루어지기도 하나 그 경우의 협의는 行政과 私人 사이에 이루어지는 협의와는 사뭇 다른 것이 사실이다. 그 때의 협의는 적어도 일방이 사인이 아니라는 점에서 처분성 유무의 문제는 일어날 여지가 거의 없는 것이고 다만 그러한 ‘협의’의 결과 사인에게 행해지는 처분 등을 다툴 때에 다소 문제가 될 수 있을 뿐 행정절차법이 적용되는 의미의 협의는 아니기 때문이다. 行政과 私人 사이의 ‘협의’는 크게 행정유도적 협의와 행정형성적 협의로 나누어 볼 수 있다. 전자는 행정측이 어느 정도 가이드라인을 정하고 그에 맞추어 私人의 협조를 이끌어내고자 하는 협의이고 후자는 行政과 私人이 실질적으로 서로 향후 행정활동의 내용을 형성하고 설정해 나가는 협의를 의미하는 것이다. 위 어느 경우이든 협의가 법령에 규정되어져 있는 것일 경우에 그를 거치지 않음은 법적인 문제를 일으킬 수 있다고 할 것인데 이에는 그 소정의 협의를 거치지 않을 경우 그 귀책이 사인에게 있을 경우와 행정에게 있을 경우로 나누어 살펴볼 수 있다 할 것이다. 협의를 거치지 않음이 사인에게 그 귀책이 있을 경우에는 그 협의가 법령에 근거를 둔 경우와 행정규칙에 근거를 둔 경우로 나누어 살필 수 있는 등 협의의 법적 효력문제는 깊이 검토해 볼 필요가 있다. 그리고 협의를 어떻게 어느 정도로 활용할 것인가의 문제에 있어서 적극적 활용론과 신중론이 교차하지만 취사선택의 여지로 그 활용의 적정성을 높이는 차원에서 최대한 활용할 것이 요청된다 할 것이다. 마지막으로 협의는 아직은 행정법상 의미형성적 용어이기 때문에 바람직한 협의는 어떠한 것이어야 할 것인가에 관하여 현상론상으로는 사회적 희망의 면에서는 대규모영역으로 빈도가 높은 경우에는 행정유도적 규율이 바람직스럽고 소규모영역에서 빈도가 낮은 경우에는 행정형성적 규율이 바람직하다고 할 수 있다 라고 일응 말할 수 있을 것이지만 그 바람직한 미래상의 정립을 위해서는 다음과 같은 3가지 점, 곧 첫째, 협의의 당사자에 관계되는 희생이나 비용측면에서의 부담을 경감해 주는 것이어야 하고, 둘째, 협의당사자에 있어서의 예견가능성을 확보하여야 할 것이어야 하며, 셋째, 행정에 의한 재량판단의 여지가 넓은 것과 관련하여 그를 통제하기 위해서 전문성을 활용하여야 하는 등이 고려되어야 할 것이다. 특히 그러한 전문적 식견은 협의단계를 지나 처분단계에 이르러도 활용될 수 있으므로 비용이 허락하는 한은 활용할 필요가 있다 할 것이다. The so-called ‘negotiation’ is not the typical type of administration work, but it is useful in democratic administration guaranteeing the benefit of citizens’ taking part in administration. After all, it is true the above ‘negotiation’ has been neglected in administrative law. In this article ‘negotiation’ between administrative authorities and private persons is treated. For ‘negotiation’ between administrative organs each other is different from ‘negotiation’ between administrative authorities and private persons in view of character of the party concerned. It has no relation with the matter of administrative disposal and that of administrative procedure. ‘Negotiation’ between administrative authorities and private persons could be divided into the two, the one is administration-leading ‘negotiation’, the other is administrationforming ‘negotiation’. the previous one means administration lead the private person into accepting administration’ view, but the post other means that the two parties negotiate each other into forming their own consensus. If ‘negotiation’ is omitted or neglected in case of the fact that it is based on the legal rule, it could cause trouble of legal controversy. the legal force in case of that situation is like prescribed. And the use of ‘negotiation’ should be aimed at enhance its utilization as far as it keeps its suitability. At last ‘negotiation’ is in process of being formed in administrative law. Thus the desirable frame of it should be studied on and on. the following three points should be kept carefully. ⅰ. ‘Negotiation’ should abbreviate the load on the side of the private person, ⅱ. The possibility of anticipation should be kept ⅲ. Administration’s discretion should be controlled through using specialist’ view in consideraton of wideness of the discretion on the side of administration.

헌법 제107조 제1ㆍ2항은 추상적 규범통제를 배척하는 의미인가

이상천(Lee Sang Cheon) 행정법이론실무학회 2010 행정법연구 Vol.- No.28

The abstract review of law is not permitted in relationship with the congress due to the damage of democracy. 'The premise of judgement' should be interpreted in relationship with the matter of power separation between Congress and Constitutional Court. The abstract review against legistlative ordinance among administrative legistlations has nothing to do with the damage of democracy, but it should be conrolled in the aspect of administrative work. Thus 'the premise of judgement' should be interpreted not in relationship between Congress and Constitutional Court, but in relationship of power distribution between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. In the meaning of enbroadening the width of letigation possibility and right saving, the abstract review of norm could be permitted in some aspect, but it has the limits of not being violated against the principle of power balance. The abstract review of norm by the Constitutional Court could be permitted, but not by the Supreme Court. In case of Municipal Ordinance, the abstract review of norm against it should be restricted more severely than that against legistlative ordinace. But in the point of principle of power separation, there would be no problem because the Municipal Ordinance is under the law and the local congress is just a kind of administrative organ In conclusion, the abstract review of norm against law would be not permitted. The abstract review of norm against legistlative ordinace by the Supreme Court should be not permitted, but could be permitted by the Constitutional Court. But in the case of Municipal Ordinance, the abstract review of norm against it shuold not be permitted. The premise of litigation should be lightly treated as meaning a little relationship with the case, and the objective litigation would suffice the fulfillment of 'premise of litigation'.

이유식 제조 시 유동층 과립화 공정의 최적화

이상천 ( Sang Cheon Lee ),김은미 ( Eun Mi Kim ),장규섭 ( Kyu Seob Chang ) 한국산업식품공학회 2007 산업 식품공학 Vol.11 No.2

[화학] 휴대용 원자 방출 분광계를 위한 제어 및 분석용 소프트웨어 개발

이상천(Sang Chun Lee),이장수(Chang-Soo Lee),정민수(Min-Soo Jung),류동항(Dong-Hang Ryu) 한국분석과학회 1998 분석과학 Vol.11 No.1

부진정일부취소소송의 성립가능성론에 대한 비판적 고찰

이상천 ( Sang Cheon Lee ) 이화여자대학교 법학연구소 2013 法學論集 Vol.17 No.3

In my thought, the crititical discrimination of burden and ‘the others except burden’ would be wrong. Generally the case law and most of the theories say that only ‘burden’ has a different being seperated from the main administrative act and ‘the other supplementary clauses except burden’ belong to that. Under this mistaken premises, the case law and most of the theories have spread widely. The concept of litigation of impure partial cancellation appeared for control of supplementary clause against reasonability. The mistaken ‘dogmatik’ needs another wrong ‘dogmatik’ to support the previous one. Consequentially, we should treat ‘administrative act with supplementary clause’ as total one act and couldn`t separate supplementary clause from the main administrative act. Reluctantly, the threories thought out the so-called ‘litigation of impure partial cancellation’ to be able to control only just the supplementary clause without touching the main administrative act. In general opinion, ‘the other supplementary clauses except burden’ have no character of disposal. Thus they couldn`t be treated legally as an object of lawsuit. For the object with no character of disposal couldn`t be an object of lawsuit and be written as the text of judgment. Thus the theory of litigation of impure partial cancellation has the error in itself that an object with no character of disposal is taken as the text of judgment. To avoid that criticism, it says that the total ‘administrative act with supplementary clause’ is under legal trial and it has no problem in itself by that. But the expression ‘the total administrative act with supplementary clause is being taken under the legal trial’ doesn`t go with all the theories on the object of lawsuit in administrative litigation. If we try to cancell only just the supplementary clause by the expression of the text of judgment, it would be always just the ‘litigation of pure partial cancellation’, and it shouldn`t differ from that. If ‘the other supplementary clauses except burden’ have no character of disposal, we should say that we could not take them as an elligible object of lawsuit. Thus the theory of litigation of impure partial cancellation couldn`t solve the problem of character of disposal. In connection with the matter of character of disposal, this thesis says only that the theory of litigation of impure partial cancellation couldn`t be taken legally. But it doesn`t mean that the theory of litigation of pure partial cancellation couldn`t be taken legally. On the basis of recognizing character of disposal to every supplementary clause, we could take the litigation of pure partial cancellation for all supplementary clauses.

공공기관의 정보공개에 관한 법률 제9조 제1항 제1호의 법체계적 정합성

이상천(Lee Sang Cheon) 인하대학교 법학연구소 2010 法學硏究 Vol.13 No.2

이미 공공기관의 정보공개에 관한 법률 제4조 제1항에서 ‘타법령에서 정보의 공개ㆍ비공개를 규정한 경우에서의 그 적용할 규범’에 관해 규정하고 있음에도 동법 제9조 제1항 제1호에서 다시 ‘타법령에서 비공개를 정한 경우 공개하지 않을 수 있다’ 라는 취지로 규정하고 있음은 이해하기 어렵다. 이미 타법령에 비공개로 되어 있다면, 새삼 다시 공개ㆍ비공개를 규정할 필요도 이유도 없기 때문이다. 또 당연히 법령상 비공개로 되어 있을 경우도 비공개할 수 있는 재량적 사유의 다른 항목과 같이 규정하여 명실공히 비공개대상을 모두 묶어 표현하고자 하였으면, 위 제1호의 경우는 동법 제9조 제2호 내지 제8호의 경우와는 다른 표현을 썼어야 하는 것이다. 위 재량적 표현을 두고 타법령상 비공개대상정보를 정보공개의 원칙에 대한 예외로서 비공개할 수 있음을 규정한 취지를 정보공개청구권과의 법률상 의무의 충돌을 해결하기 위한 것이라는 논리를 펴나, 엄격히 말하면 그것은 그 타법령의 적용한계론상의 해석론일 뿐이다. 곧 위 제9조 제1항 제1호를 입법한 것 자체가 불필요한 것이고, 법규 명령상의 비공개정보를 의무적 비공개로 하지 않고 ‘공개하지 아니할 수 있다’ 라는 재량적 표현으로 연접(連接)하여 버린 것은 참으로 이해할 수 없다. 또 정보의 비공개대상을 정할 수 있는 법규의 형식을 총리령ㆍ부령은 제외하면서 그보다 하위규범인 조례를 넣고 있는 것은 규범력의 단계적 구조를 크게 흔들어 놓는 결과를 초래하고 있다. 이 밖에도 위 제9조 제1항 제1호가 위임명령 중 대통령령만 정보의 비공개를 정할 수 있는 법규형식으로 정하고 총리령ㆍ부령은 제외한 것은 합리적이지 않고 규범의 단계적 구조를 흔들어 놓는 혼란만 부추긴다. 이상과 같이 적어도 위 제9조 제1항 제1호의 존재는 법체계적 정합성을 크게 저해하는 불필요한 규정이므로 삭제되어야 마땅한 규정이다. 입법상 가장 기초적인 논리가 결여될 때 국민적 감시만이 효율적인 개선책인지 모른다. If once some information is fixed to be disclosed in an Act or Decree, it doesn’t have to be regulated again in a new norm like Act or Decree. Perhaps the Article 9-(1)-① of Official Information Disclosure Act was legislated in the purpose of expressing all disclosed informations in one article as the Article 9-(1). The above Article 9-(1)-① should be deleted because it is needed no more in legislation. The same Act has the Article 4-(1) which is legislated for the case of the other Act of Decree regulating closing some information concerned. Thus the presence of the above Article 9-(1)-① occurrs only the possibility of interpreting its meaning in several ways. It is not only of no use, but occurring crowdedness in interpreting the Article. If they insisted that all the disclosed information should have been expressed in only one article as the Article 9-(1)-①, The ① of the Article 9(1) should have been expressed otherwise, unlike the others from ② to ⑧. In case of the Article 9-(1)-①, it should be expressed like that ‘follow to the other Act of Decree’ or ‘should not be disclosed’. The expression which is fit in the others from ② to ⑧ is adapted to the Article 9-(1)-①, which is too rude in legistlation. The kinds of administrative mandate legistlation which can fix the objects of information disclosure contains the Municipal Ordinances which is lower than ordinances of the Prime MinisterㆍExecutive Ministry in legal enforcement power, but excludes doesn’t ordinances of the Prime MinisterㆍExecutive Ministry. The legistlation swings the stepped structure of legal norms. And the Article 9-(1)-① designates Presidential decrees but ordinances of the Prime MinisterㆍExecutive Ministry as the kinds of legal norms which can treat the objects of information disclosure, which is unreasonable and occurrs the crowdness swinging the stepped structure of legal norms. The unreasonability could have been pointed with only a little care, and it is the very fundamental matter in legistlation. It is regretful that such mistake happened in making ‘Official Information Disclosure Act’ which is very important in this information society. This is just a farce. Aftwards the logics should not be disregarded in legistlation.