李爾瞻의 斥和論과 對明義理

허태구(Huh, Tae-koo) 서강대학교 인문과학연구소 2020 서강인문논총 Vol.0 No.59

광해군대 정치·외교사의 정밀한 복원을 위해서는 집권 세력의 핵심 인물이었던 이이첨에 대한 집중적 고찰이 필요하다. 본 논문은 이러한 시도의 시발점으로서 광해군대 대명·대후금 외교를 둘러싼 광해군과 이이첨의 갈등 양상과 그 정치적·사상적 함의에 대해 정리하였다. 아울러, 이이첨이 어떤 배경 아래 척화론과 대명의리의 고수를 주장했는지 살펴보았다. 광해군대의 대부분 신료들은 政派를 가리지 않고 명에 대한 지원과 후금에 대한 강경책을 주장하였다. 그들은 조선군이 후금군에 비해 전력상의 우위를 점하지 못하고 있으며, 명군조차 후금군을 압도하지 못한다는 사실을 명확히 알고 있었다. 그리고 조선이 명의 요청을 수락하여 원병을 파견할 경우 후금의 보복 우려가 있다는 사실 역시 모르지 않았다. 이이첨 역시 시종일관 事大의 義理, 재조지은에 대한 보답 등을 강조하며, 명에 대한 원병 파견과 후금과의 화친 불가를 주장하였다. 그는 대명사대 또는 대명의리의 부정을 人倫의 멸절로 인식하였다. 흥미롭게도, 인조반정의 주도 세력 또한 동일한 修辭를 사용하여 광해군 축출의 정당성을 표명하였다. 심하 전투 패전 이후의 상황은 이전보다 훨씬 더 조선에 불리해졌지만, 이이첨을 비롯한 조정의 신료들은 그들의 주장을 굽히지 않았다. 그들의 척화론은 기본적으로 외교안보적 대안의 성격이라기보다 利害를 초월한 義理의 차원에서 제기된 것이었기 때문이다. 이이첨 또한 인조반정의 공신들과 마찬가지로 척화와 대명의리를 불변의 진리이자 보편적 당위로 간주하는 당대의 지적 분위기에 깊이 매몰된 인물이었다. 그의 강직한 기질과 원리주의적 실천가로서의 정치적 성향 등은 그가 앞장서 척화론을 제기한 또 하나의 배경으로 주목해야 한다. 이와 관련하여 그는 류성룡의 현실주의적 외교 노선을 主和誤國이라 부르며 맹렬히 공격한 바 있으며, 대명 외교의례의 철저한 준행을 강조하는 행적을 남기기도 하였다. For the precise restoration of political history and diplomacy during the reign of Gwanghaegun(光海君), intensive consideration needs to be given to Yi I-chum(李爾瞻), who was a key figure in the ruling power. As the starting point of this attempt, this paper summarized the aspect of the conflict between Gwanghaegun(光海君) and YiI-chum(李爾瞻) over the diplomacy with Ming and Hugeum(後金) during the reign of Gwanghaegun(光海君) and its political and ideological implications. In addition, we looked at the background and motive of YiI-chum(李爾瞻)"s argument for the master of chirping theory and Daemyeongeurie(對明義理). During the reign of Gwanghaegun(光海君), most of his officials insisted on support for Ming and a hard-line policy against Hugeum(後金), regardless of political factions. They were clearly aware that the Joseon army did not have a military advantage over Hugeum(後金) army, and that even the Ming army could not overwhelm Hugeum(後金) army. And they were also well aware that if Joseon accepted Ming"s request and sent relief troops, Hugeum(後金) might retaliate. YiI-chum(李爾瞻) also consistently emphasized the Sadaeeuirie(事大義理) and in return for Chaejochieun(再造之恩)’, and insisted on sending soldiers to Ming and the impossibility of reconciliation with Hugeum(後金). He recognized the denial of Daemyeongsadae(對明事大) or Daemyeongeurie (對明義理) as the extinction of ethics. Interestingly, the leading forces of the Injo Banjeong(仁祖反正) also used the same rhetoric to justify the expulsion of Gwanghaegun(光海君). The situation after the defeat of the Battle of Simha(深河) was even more unfavorable to Joseon than before, but the officials of the royal court, including YiI-chum(李爾瞻), did not change their arguments. Because their Cheok’hwa-ron(斥和論) was basically raised from the dimension of righteousness that transcends interest, rather than as a diplomatic and security alternative. YiI-chum(李爾瞻) was also a person who was deeply buried in the intellectual atmosphere of the time, who regarded Cheok’hwa and Daemyeongeuirie(對明義理) as unchanging truths and universal reasons, just like the meritorious retainer of Injo Banjeong(仁祖反正). His strong temperament and political disposition as a fundamentalist practitioner should be noted as another background in which he took the lead in raising the Cheok’hwa-ron(斥和論). In this regard, he fiercely attacked Ryu Seong-ryong(柳成龍)"s realist diplomatic line calling it Juhwaogug(主和誤國) and also left a track that emphasized strict adherence to diplomatic rites related to the Ming.

조선 초 祈雨祭 시행의 당대적 맥락과 災異論의 특징

허태구 ( Huh Tae-koo ) 인하대학교 한국학연구소 2024 한국학연구 Vol.- No.73

This paper re-examines the historical context of the implementation of rain-making rituals and the features of the theory of portents in the early Joseon dynasty. The perception of and response to disasters in the early Joseon Dynasty has often been understood within the framework of ‘the return or utilization of the Dong Zhongshu(董仲舒)-style’s theory of portents’, and the phenomenon of the weakened Goryeo-style’s rain-making rituals based on Buddhism, Taoism, and shamanism has also been emphasized. While it is true that a Goryeo-like rituals was still in place at the beginning of the Joseon Dynasty, the surrounding intellectual environment and epistemological foundations had already undergone great fluctuations and deconstruction since the introduction of Neo-Confucianism’s theory of portents. In this regard, it is worth noting the following points. First, while it is true that the ruling powers of the early Joseon Dynasty had implemented an Dong Zhongshu(董仲舒)-style’s rain-making rituals, similar to that of Goryeo, the efficacy and legitimacy of responding to certain events in a certain way had already been denied by them. Instead, they emphasized Cultivating the ruler’s virtue and fearing very greatly and Introspection(恐懼修省) as the fundamental solution. Second, while it is true that the non-Confucian style rain-making rituals practiced in early Joseon inherited the Goryeo system, the king and his courtiers neither trusted nor expected the spirituality and efficacy of these rituals to be as high as that of Goryeo. The non-religious national rain-making rituals of the early Joseon Dynasty were implemented out of love for the people and as a temporary measure, and in connection with this, the same justification as the celebration of traditional Confucian rituals(古制) and conducting any means possible(靡神不擧) was mobilized.

이나바 이와키치(稻葉岩吉)의 丁卯·丙子胡亂 관련 주요 연구 검토

허태구 ( Huh Tae-koo ) 조선시대사학회 2017 朝鮮時代史學報 Vol.81 No.0

Examined in this article are studies of Inaba Iwakichi(稻葉岩吉), who was the leading scholar in Colonial historical studies during the Japanese occupation of Joseon, especially in the area of the Manchurian invasion of Joseon which broke out respectively in the Jeongmyo and Byeongja years. Such studies are analyzed here with the intention of determining their characteristics and limitations. First examined are chapters 13 and 20 of his History of Qing(『淸朝全史』), in order to examine how he treated historical records, what kind of emphases he put in his research, and in the end what he left to be desired. In this book, he discussed the situation of the Manchurian Hu-Geum state ‘around’ the time of its invasion of Joseon with great details, and suggested that the reason the relationship between two countries ‘changed’ was in fact economic in nature. But compared to his insight on that matter, his analysis upon Joseon's response was superficial at best, only uttering the end result we all know. And it should also be noted that he placed too much of an importance upon Japan's role and place in the 17^th century Northeast Asia, as well as the changes that were in progress at the time. Then examined in this article is the Relationship between Manchu and Joseon during King Gwang’hae-gun's reign(『光海君時代の滿鮮關係』). This may be the finest achievement of the time for a book that tried to meticulously examine the dynamics between Joseon, Ming and Qing in the Ming/Qing transitional period(明末淸初) as well as what were the issues among these three entities. But considering the perspective we have today, I must say that he overly exaggerated the meaning of the so-called “Suggestion of Protections(‘監護說,’ A Ming Proposal to serve as Superintendence of Joseon),” as well as the role of Mao Wenlong(毛文龍). He also misunderstood the sources of King Gwang’hae-gun's aspirations and ideas(while curiously referring to them as ‘Favoritism to the Public(澤民主義, Populism?)’ of which the supposed stance is not entirely clear or ever fully elaborated), and eventually dismissed some inherent limitations an ‘Evenhanded policy’ could have in diplomatic policy. He then went onto misinterpret how the Ju’hwa(主和) and Cheok’hwa(斥和) voices were colliding with each other inside the Joseon government, and proved that he was never correctly aware of who was on which side. This is ultimately because Inaba Iwakichi never properly understood the nature of the Anti-peace negotiation voice(斥和論) inside the Joseon government, which had a universal quality and an obligatory nuance, with of course a supportive domestic boost. Later, based upon what is examined here in this article, I would like to examine other Japanese scholars’ work upon the Manchurian invasions of Joseon as well, and compare them with each other, to determine various aspects within the entire Colonial historical studies.

[조선후기] 2019~2020년 조선후기사 연구의 현황과 과제: 사료와 실증의 더미에서 탈출하기

허태구(Huh, Tae-koo) 역사학회 2021 역사학보 Vol.- No.251

This article aims to review studies on Late Joseon Period published in Korea between 2019 and 2020. More than 1,300 articles and books have been published in the past two years, and the research trend is largely the same as before. In order to escape from this heap of historical sources and positivism and reconstruct the overall history of Late Joseon Period, this article makes the following suggestions. First, it is necessary to reduce the excessive concentration of research topics on certain themes. Attention should also be paid to failed attempts or leading figures reactionary forces. When a historian analyzes the thoughts of a specific person, he or she must explain the reason why his ideas were not implemented and the limitations they had. Second, for a more adequate understanding of the history of Late Joseon Period, the scope of socio-economic history research should be expanded, and connected with the research themes in other fields of history. Third, as the first step to the exploration of the structure and the character of the period, which constitutes the proper task of history studies, it is necessary that the Association launches an extensive plan aimed at reviewing existing researches and reconstructing them in a long-term perspective for each theme.

소현세자(昭顯世子)의 심양(瀋陽) 억류와 인질(人質) 체험

허태구 ( Tae Koo Huh ) 한국사상사학회 2012 韓國思想史學 Vol.0 No.40

이 논문은 昭顯世子의 瀋陽 억류라는 역사적 사건을 인질 요구의 배경, 인질의 생활과 체험, 인질의 내면과 인식이란 소재를 통하여 살펴 본 연구이다. 그 주요 내용은 다음과 같다. 청은 고려의 대외관계, 특히 몽골(元)과 고려의 교섭 과정 및 이후의 麗·元 관계에 대해 상세한 지식을 갖고 있었으며 이러한 고려의 前史를 조선과의 교섭 과정에서 압박의 도구로 활용하였다. 원 간섭기의 잦은 王位 교체라는 前例는 父王 仁祖와 소현세자뿐만 아니라, 朝·淸 양국의 교섭을 담당한 관료들에게도 역사적 상상력을 제공하였을 가능성이 높다. 조·청 양국의 외교 관계는 기본적으로 明代의 틀을 크게 벗어나지 않았다. 그러나 滿·蒙·漢을 아우르는 청 제국의 복합적 특성, 소현세자의 장기 체류는 외교 교섭이나 인적 교류시에 明代에는 보기 어려웠던 여러 가지 異例的 상황을 초래하였다. 이에 따라 소현세자와 그를 수행한 조선 인질은 淸 太宗과의 面對, 청 황실의 의례나 연회 참석, 사냥과 전쟁 수행 등의 다양한 체험을 하게 되었다. 병자호란의 참패에도 불구하고 明에 대한 조선인의 내면적 태도는 거의 달라지지 않았다. 이러한 조선의 지배적 정서는 소현세자의 심양 체험을 전하는 『瀋陽日記』나 『瀋陽狀啓』 등의 사료에도 고스란히 반영되어 있다. 흥미로운 것은 이들 사료의 기록이 명 황제에 대한 혹평과 淸軍의 勝戰 상황도 상세히 남기고 있었다는 점이다. 조선은 交戰 중인 明과 淸의 우열에 대한 비교적 상세하고 정확한 정보를 갖고 있었음에도 불구하고, 청에 대한 事大를 당연시하지 않은 채 對明義理를 고수하고 있었다. In this article, the Crown-prince So`hyeon(昭顯世子)`s captivity in Shen`yang(瀋陽) is examined. Particularly explored here are certain issues such as why it was demanded in the first place that he be held hostage, how his life actually was as a hostage during his stay in Shen`yang, and what kind of emotions and sentiments he might have had. The Qing government had detailed information about the Koreans` foreign relationships in the past, including the former Goryeo dynasty`s negotiations with the Mongols(the Yuan/元 dynasty), and not to mention the subsequently formed relationship between Goryeo and the Mongol empire. In fact, they used their such knowledge in pressing the Joseon negotiators into a corner at the negotiation table. During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Goryeo kings were frequently dethroned and re-enthroned, so the memories of such past must have been threatening to King Injo/仁祖 and Crown-prince So`hyeon, and would have even forced the officials of both the Joseon and Qing governments to consider many options in their negotiating sessions. The basic outline of the diplomatic relationship that formed between the Joseon and Qing dynasties was not that much different from the relationship that Joseon earlier had with Ming. Yet the Qing empire was a conglomeration of the Manju[滿] tribes, the Mongol[蒙] tribes, and the Chinese[漢] people, so Joseon was facing a new situation in its dealings with China, and as Crown-prince So`hyeon`s "stay" got longer and longer, diplomatic negotiations and exchanges between personnel had to continue in a form that the Joseon people have never witnessed before. Then again, Crown-prince So`hyeon, and the Joseon hostages who were with him, were able to witness quite a lot of things, as they had the opportunity to meet Qing Emperor Taejong/太宗 in person, and attend ceremonies and banquets, and even join hunting occasions and battles. Despite the defeat by the Qing forces in the Byeongja Ho`ran(丙子胡亂) war, the Joseon people`s reverence and respect toward Ming(明) never changed. The sentiment is well reflected in records such as 『Shim`yang Ilgi(瀋陽日記)』 or 『Shim`yang Jang`gye(瀋陽狀啓)』, which inform us of Crown-prince So`hyeon`s experiences during his stay in Shen`yang. Interestingly enough, these records also include some harsh criticism upon the performances of the Ming Emperor, and references to the victories of the Qing(淸) forces. Joseon was in fact well equipped with information regarding the conflicts between Ming and Qing and also which one was in a strategically superior position, yet was still refusing to ``serve``(事大) the Qing, and was only clinging to their so-called ``moral obligations`` toward Ming("對明義理").

광해군 대 박승종(朴承宗)의 정치적 위상과 대외인식

허태구 ( Huh Tae-koo ) 인하대학교 한국학연구소 2021 한국학연구 Vol.- No.60

This paper explores the process of political status change, including the household, personal connections, and career of Park Seung-jong(朴承宗), a famous servant during the reign of the King Gwanghaegun(光海君). It also considered the role and actions of Park Seung-jong(朴承宗), who was in charge of national defense and diplomacy in the latter half of the reign of the King Gwanghaegun(光海君). Park Seung-jong(朴承宗) emerged as the most powerful man in power in the second half of King Gwanghaegun(光海君)’s regime, filling the gap in power amid the trend of Yi I-chum(李爾瞻) and Yoo Hee-bun(柳希奮), who were influential figures in the regime, retreating together after a fierce political battle. King Gwanghaegun(光海君)'s trust and dependence on Park Seung-jong(朴承宗) increased even more amid the visible armed conflict between the Ming(明) and the Hugeum(後金). His political assets were also his renowned family from generation to generation, his amicable manners, his wide connections, his grandfather's status as a wife of crown prince, and his expert knowledge of defense and diplomatic affairs. Although he was close to a friendly stance on King Gwanghaegun(光海君)'s Perception of Foreign Affairs, he did not give absolute support. He was also a man of universal value and spirit called Daemyeongeuirie(對明義理), as were other subjects.

임진왜란과 지도 · 지리지의 군사적 활용

허태구(Huh, Tae koo) 한국사학회 2014 史學硏究 Vol.- No.113

본고는 조선시대인들이 전투·전쟁 수행의 과정에서 어떻게 지도와 지리지를 인식하고 활용하였는지 문헌 자료를 중심으로 접근한 연구이다. 특히 임진왜란이란 동북아시아의 국제전 속에서 朝·明·日3국의 행적을 군사지리 정보의 확보와 활용이라는 측면에서 고찰하고자 하였다. 조선전기까지 엄격하게 관리되는 것이 원칙이었던 지도·지리지의 군사지리 정보는 임진왜란이 발발하자 군사·외교적인 측면에서 그 수요가 급증하였다. 조선은 국토방어 전략의 구상과 명과의 수륙 연합작전을 조율하는 데에 地圖와 海圖를 적극적으로 활용하였다. 타국의 戰場에서 대규모 군사 작전을 수행해야 했던 일본에게도 조선의 地形地物과 도로 정보 등은 반드시 확보되어야만 하는 것이었다. 일본은 倭館등에 거주한 일본 상인, 전쟁 직전 조선을 오간 일본 사신, 일본으로 도주한 조선인 범죄자 등을 통해 조선의 지리 정보를 입수하였을 것으로 생각된다. 관련 사료의 검토 결과, 일본군이 전쟁 발발 이후 조선에서 더욱 상세한 지도를 입수한 뒤 군사 작전에 활용하였을 가능성 역시 매우 높다는 것이 확인되었다. 부대의 기동에는 이렇게 확보된 지도와 함께 현지인 안내자, 즉 조선인 嚮導의 존재도 필수적이었다. 침략자 일본군뿐만 아니라 지원자 明軍도 조선에 대한 지리 정보가 절실하게 필요하였다. 명의 문?무관 등은 異國정보의 사전 습득, 부대 기동과 작전 등을 위해 조선 측에 지도와 지리지를 빈번하게 요청하였다. 명의 수군이 정유재란을 전후하여 참전하게 되자, 명은 조선에 沿海의 水路정보 등을 자주 문의하였다. 특히 ?新增東國輿地勝覽?은 임진왜란 당시 講和협상을 둘러싼 조?명 간의 외교적 현안 해결에 활용되기도 하였다. Examined in this article is how the Joseon people perceived and utilized maps and geographical manuals in the time of war. The international war of Northeast Asia that broke out with the Japanese invasion of the Korean peninsula involved Ming as well marked a really active usage of obtaining and utilizing military geographical information. The military geographical information contained in maps and geographical manuals were under strict management and protection during the early half of the Joseon dynasty period, but as the war with the Japanese broke out in the 1590s demands for those information of militaristic and diplomatic nature were considerably increased. The Joseon government actively utilized maps and sea maps in devising defensive strategies as well as coordinating joint operations with the Ming command in on-land and maritime operations. For Japan, which mounted a large scale military operation on foreign soil geographical information was vital, and obtaining details of roadways was imperative. The Japanese must have acquired Joseon geographical information through Japanese merchants who were residing at the Wae’gwan(倭館) area, the Japanese emissaries who visited Joseon right before the war, and Joseon criminals who fled to Japan. Examination of data and historical documents reveal that the Japanese troops indeed obtained detailed maps in Joseon right after the war began and used them in military operations. Also, the movement of troops was heavily helped by not only maps but also Joseon guides, the Hyangdo(嚮導). Not only the Japanese troops as invaders but also the Ming troops which came to help were in desperate needs of geographical information of Joseon. The civil and military officials of Ming requested for maps and geographical manuals to the Joseon government in order to be prepared with information of foreign territory that would help them mount and launch necessary military operations. Around the time of the second war that broke out in the Jeong’yu year the Ming naval force joined the war, and the Ming government asked the Joseon government for information of the Korean peninsula’s coastal areas. Especially the Shin’jeung Dong’guk Yeo’ji Seung’ram(『新增東國輿地勝覽』) was used in resolving diplomatic issues that occurred between Joseon and Ming over discussions of truce negotiations.

중봉(重峯) 조헌(趙憲)의 중국(中國)과 중화(中華)

허태구 ( Huh Tae-koo ) 인하대학교 한국학연구소 2020 한국학연구 Vol.0 No.56

이 논문은 조헌의 사행 관련 기록을 당대의 맥락과 지적 환경 속에서 독해하려고 한 시도이다. 그럼으로써, 『동환봉사』 개혁안의 내용과 성격을 中華와 성리학이라는 키워드로 재해석해 보았다. 나아가, 당대 중국, 즉 현실의 명나라가 조선의 중화문물 수용과 어떤 관련을 맺고 있는지 자주-사대의 이분법을 탈피하여 살펴보았다. 아울러, 『동환봉사』 개혁안과 북학론의 관계, 『동환봉사』가 폐기된 이유에 대하여 새로운 견해를 제시하였다. This paper attempts to examine Jo Heon’s records of emissary in the context and intellectual environment of his time. In doing so, I tried to reinterpret the contents and characteristics of the reform proposal written in Donwhan-Bongsa (東還封事) with the keywords of Zhonghua(中華) and Neo-Confucianism. Furthermore, this study attempted to examine the relationship between the Ming China(中國) and Joseon’s acceptance of Chinese culture by breaking the dichotomy between Self-Reliance(自主) and Flunkyism(事大). In addition, I proposed a new view on the reform proposal’s relationship to the Bukhak Thoughts(北學論) and why Donwhan-Bongsa(東還封事) was abandoned.

논문 : 17세기 조선의 염초무역과 화약제조법 발달

허태구 ( Tae Koo Huh ) 서울대학교 국사학과 2002 韓國史論 Vol.47 No.-

崔鳴吉의 主和論과 對明義理

허태구(Huh, Tae koo) 한국사연구회 2013 한국사연구 Vol.162 No.-

Examined in this article, are the basis and contents of the controversy that occurred between arguments to either pursue peace with the enemy or to boycott peace negotiations with the enemy, at the time of the two invasions from Manchu(“胡亂”) in 1627 and 1636. Purpose of such examination is to determine the characteristics of the latter argument, as well as the reason the former argument was never allowed to prevail at the time. Also discussed here is the fact that Choi Myeong-gil’s argument for peace negotiation continued to change its stance and bases, as tension between Joseon and Hugeum(Qing) continued to rise. What Choi Myeong-gil really thought about his own argument of peace pursuit, and the idea of making peace with Qing, and what kind of stance he had after the war when Joseon was forced to aid Qing with troops, are discussed here as well in order to determine the connection between his argument of supporting peace and the issue of Daemyeong Euiri(對明義理). By doing so it is intended here to catch what was missed from previous examinations based upon a perspective which tended to believe that the argument to support peace was based upon an attitude of pursuing practical advantages, and that the argument of boycotting negotiations was based upon an attitude of pursuing a righteous agenda. In retrospect, both arguments were not that different in nature, and the pursuit of either one did not mean either maintaining or giving up the Daemyeong Euiri(對明義理). It was a clash of opinions in an emergency situation in which the stake was the dynasty’s fate itself.