Tuned Mass Damper를 이용한 Linear Quadratic Gaussian 하이브리드 제진

최요섭 대한건축학회지회연합회 2005 대한건축학회지회연합회 학술발표대회논문집 Vol.1 No.1

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of a LQG Hybrid controller to suppress the earthquake disturbance for the building structure. The ground acceleration of N-S component of El-Centro earthquake is scaled to confirm that the building behaves within the elastic range. The tuned mass damper(TMD) on the top floor regulated by LQG algorithm is designed to control the floor displacements. The displacement responses of the hybrid control are compared with those obtained from an active control along with a passive control. The results showed that the LQG hybrid control used approximately 50% less input forces than an active control to satisfy the performance criteria.

The Issue of the Economic Analysis and Effect-based Approach in the EU Competition Rule of Abuse of Market Dominance: The Recent Opinion of the Advocate General in Intel

최요섭 한국외국어대학교 EU연구소 2017 EU연구 Vol.- No.45

There is no doubt that the EU competition regime has played a crucial role in contributing to the standards of international competition law, and the implementation of EU law has been regarded as a meaningful example of successful legal techniques. In particular, one of the important cases involving the international cases is the Intel judgments. For example, the Korean competition agency imposed sanctions on Intel, and the Seoul High Court upheld its decision. Similarly, the European Commission made a decision. The General Court (GC) also upheld most of the Commission’s decision, and the case is pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). One of the most essential issues in the Intel case was the question of whether an economic analysis was important in the scrutiny of the rebate practice. The soft law of the Commission provides the standard for the economic analysis, but the GC rejected the economic analysis in Intel. Since the 2014 judgment of the GC, there has been much discussion. In October 2016, Advocate General (AG) Wahl finally provided his opinion regarding the problem of the economic analysis, which seems very different from the GC’s judgment. Although the opinions of AGs are not legally binding, AG Wahl’s opinion has stimulated important discussion on the problem of the formalistic approaches in competition cases. Because the development of EU competition law has affected other competition regimes, including the Korean competition regime, the recent discussion on AG Wahl’s opinion is meaningful for the further development. In particular, according to AG Wahl, the role of economics in the implementation of competition laws and policies has been recognised. The final judgment of the CJEU, which will eventually be issued, will influence the global competition law society relating to the issue of economic analysis in monopoly cases.

A Comparative Study of Competition Law Relating to the New Economy: A Case Law in the European Union

최요섭 인하대학교 법학연구소 2018 法學硏究 Vol.21 No.1

The emergence of new technologies plays an important role in competition law: The current approaches of competition authorities around the world have resulted in vigorous enforcement against large multinational undertakings involving the new economy. In particular, the intersection of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, relating to the new economy, and globalisation has attracted worldwide attention. In sum, the emergence of the new economy and antitrust assessments have raised the question of whether competition law should play an active role in this field. Moreover, two fields in the new economy have become crucial: Online platforms and standard essential patents. These cases demonstrate the importance of the intersection of antitrust with intellectual property rights and data protection, which is critical for development in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. As the competition law cases involving the new economy become increasingly crucial, it is necessary to discuss recent developments in competition law and policy applicable to the new economy by assessing the case law of competition regimes of other countries. This may help Korean competition policymakers improve the antitrust approaches to the new economy. In consideration of these issues, this article aims at discussing the appropriate role of competition law and policy in the new economy.

EU Competition Policy Via Controlling State Aid

최요섭 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2010 International Area Studies Review Vol.13 No.2

The European Commission has controlled State aid that would distort competition and affect trade between Member States. The State aid control is, in fact, one of the most important provisions of EU law, aiming at ensuring the process of competition and the integrated internal market. However, its State aid control does not seem very successful, since the current data indicate that the number of unlawful State aid is still significant, although the overall amount of granted aid has not increased considerably despite the current financial crisis in the EU. In particular, it does not give an impression that there are proper guidelines of the State aid exemption to a certain sector, such as R&D. This article discusses about its control of State aid for R&D that can cause incentive loss of the R&D investments due to its comparative advantage. Even though the Commission stresses that State aid for R&D should serve as an incentive for firms to commence R&D activities, it is still difficult to decide which R&D aid can encourage them to carry out R&D efforts effectively. When the Commission lacks the legal techniques to implement an adequate balance test of positive and negative effects of State aid, its State aid policy will fail to contribute to achieving social and pro-competitive goals of the EU.

경쟁법에서의 착취남용에 관한 연구 - 비교법적 방법을 중심으로 -

최요섭 경북대학교 법학연구원 2018 법학논고 Vol.0 No.62

Competition rules on abuses of a market-dominant position usually prohibit both exclusionary and exploitative abuses. In particular, exploitative abuses widely include business conducts of pricing abuses like excessive pricing and price discrimination, except predatory pricing. Most competition regimes, such as of Korea, the EU, and the US, are concerned about exclusionary abuses. Therefore, there is no doubt that the legal techniques and theories of exploitative abuses have developed in the EU. However, it is also true that the number of exploitative abuses is not noteworthy because the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has established a significant burden of proof regarding exploitative abuses, especially in excessive pricing. In particular, the CJEU issued a landmark judgment on MEO in April 2018, and many believe that this case will influence the case law development across the border. The MEO Court held that a mere practice of imposing a competitive disadvantage does not conclude distortion of competition. This appears that it is necessary to consider economic analyses in the assessments of Article 102 TFEU cases of both exclusionary and exploitative abuses. The European more-effects-based approaches may affect the competition regimes in the developing world including Korea. 경쟁법에서의 시장지배적 지위의 남용 금지는 일반적으로 배제남용과 착취남용의 금지를 포함한다. 배제남용은 거래거절, 끼워팔기, 리베이트와 같이 시장지배적 지위의 사업자가 시장에서의 다른 사업자를 배제하는 활동을 포함하는 반면, 착취남용은 부당염매(혹은 약탈적 가격)를 제외한 가격남용을 중심으로 가격차별과 같이 차별하는 내용의 시장지배적 지위의 사업자의 행위를 말한다. 특히 가격남용과 차별내용을 포함하는 착취남용 관련 법리는 유럽연합을 중심으로 발전하고 있다. 2018년 4월에는 가격차별과 관련하여 유럽법원의 MEO판결이 있었는데, 법원은 단순한 경쟁적 불이익을 주는 것이 경쟁을 왜곡하는 것은 아니라고 판시하였다. 유럽법원은 MEO판결에서 2017년 인텔판결을 인용하여, 유럽에서는 배제남용 뿐만 아니라 착취남용에서도 경제 분석이 필요한 것으로 보고 있다. MEO판결은 우리나라를 포함하여 유럽경쟁법을 참고하고 있는 아시아 경쟁법에 영향을 줄 수 있다. 따라서 이 논문은 경쟁법에서의 착취남용 일반을 포함하여, 유럽경쟁법의 판례 발전을 중심으로 비교법적 방법으로 착취남용에 대한 최근 논의에 대해서 연구하는 것을 목적으로 한다.

Competition Law and Policy on Issues Relating to Standard Essential Patents

최요섭 국민대학교 법학연구소 2017 법학논총 Vol.30 No.2

The relationship between competition law and IP law has been debated for a long time. Although there are some existing presumptive tensions between the two bodies of law when the exercise of IP rights (IPRs) conflicts with the goal of competition law, many believe that both laws have the same objective – to encourage innovation and improve competition, thereby maximising welfare in society. In particular, with the recent rapid globalisation, it has become important to understand different competition regimes in order not to infringe their competition rules, and this is especially true for multinational undertakings that exercise IPRs in the global market. In addition, over recent decades standardisation has become crucial in areas involving technology, and the issues arising from standard setting organisations (SSOs) and related topics, such as standard essential patents (SEPs) and fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitments, have led to theoretical and practical arguments in the field of competition law because the number of cases concerning this topic has increased noticeably in many competition jurisdictions. Furthermore, a comparative study of competition laws, focusing on the approaches in the United States, the European Union and Korea, may help to develop harmonised competition rules on this subject. In one particular case, the Korean competition authority, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), has imposed a cease-and -desist order and a surcharge on Qualcomm for its abuse of market dominance and its unfair business practice. Considering the importance of new economy issues, this article aims at discussing recent developments in competition law and policy on IPRs as they relate to SSOs and the topics of SEPs and FRAND commitments.

A Study of Competition Law and Policy on Predatory Pricing -Comparative Perspectives-

최요섭 전남대학교 법학연구소 2012 법학논총 Vol.32 No.3

There are a number of controversial issues in competition law and policy on abuse of market dominance, and one of them is predatory pricing. However,examining price in the market is almost always a challenging task to competition authorities, especially when diverse theories do not give a clear answer. In particular, predatory pricing is one of the most difficult subjects in competition law enforcement. It may result in harms to competition and consumers after raising prices. However, this type of practice can be somewhat costly and difficult to achieve its exclusionary purpose, particularly where its competitors survive in the market. Predatory pricing can be defined as the practice for excluding competitors on the basis other than efficiency. Nonetheless, competition law normally does not simply prevent a firm from practising this type of exclusionary practice, especially when its rivals successfully compete with it on the merits. To summarise,competition law prohibits firms with sufficient market power from misusing it to eliminate market players. The debates over predatory pricing are diverse, and it is not surprising that the divergent theories over it have introduced a number of standards for competition law and policy. Therefore, some argue that the debate about predation theory has been distorted by a number of imprecise interventions in the market. In particular,each competition law jurisdiction has different standards from each other. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to apply a theory of one school for all cases since there is no one-fits-all type model for predatory pricing. Similar to the substantive competition law provisions in other countries, the Korean competition act, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA),prohibits predatory pricing under Article 3-2 or Article 23. The Korean competition authority, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), considers this type of business practice as an exclusionary one. Exclusion of competitors according to Article 23MRFTA refers to an unfair business practice for excluding rivals in the relevant market. However, there are some contentious issues in its application. Some may argue that Article 3-2 MRFTA, the provision of prohibiting abuse of market dominance, rather than Article 23 should apply to the predatory pricing because it is impossible for a firm without market dominant position successfully to achieve its goal of predation. It is not plausible that a competition authority can scrutinise predatory pricing by a firm without market power. Competition law analysis on predatory pricing requires an assessment of market power, and economics is essential for such assessment. This article aims to provide a better analysis on predatory pricing. This article thus discusses economic debates and current approaches in other competition jurisdictions and their different levels of enforcement, including standards of predatory pricing. It also explains the legal provisions on predatory pricing in Korea and its existing problems in competition law implementations through discussing the case law and KFTC’s decisions. Finally, this article proposes a competition law amendment and suggest criteria on predatory pricing for better and effective enforcement.

The Issue of Information Exchanges Regarding Price under Competition Law: Comments on the Supreme Court’s Judgment on the Ramen Cartel from a Comparative Perspective

최요섭 숭실대학교 법학연구소 2016 法學論叢 Vol.36 No.-

There is no doubt that cartels are one of the most harmful business practices, and most competition regimes have treated this conduct as a supreme evil. In particular, a hard-core cartel directly influences the social welfare because it creates market power through agreements, thereby extracting all consumer welfare. In most competition jurisdictions, there are two important elements for bringing a competition law case against a hard-core cartel: Proof of the existence of an agreement and of its prevention of competition. Likewise, the two-prong test lies at the heart of cartel enforcement. Regarding the requirements for evidence of an agreement, competition regimes have developed their own scrutiny tests. The Korean competition regime is not an exception. Article 19(1) MRFTA sets forth its prohibition of anti-competitive agreements between competing undertakings, and this provision proscribes any anti-competitive conduct by contract, agreement, resolution, or other means of considerable business practices. The Korean competition authority has vigorously enforced this legal measure against horizontal agreements that are concluded by competing economic entities. Nonetheless, the KFTC recently failed to bring direct evidence of the first criterion, the existence of an agreement. The Supreme Court of Korea annulled the judgment of the Seoul High Court and the decision of the KFTC on 24 December 2015, and it has raised some critical issues, such as the importance of direct evidence of an agreement and the market effect of the sharing of price information. In order to discuss the issue of information sharing, this article aims at providing an analysis of the ramen cartel, with a comparative study of the rules regarding the sharing of information on prices.

Competition Laws on Tie-in Sales in the New Economy

최요섭 강원대학교 비교법학연구소 2015 江原法學 Vol.46 No.-

Competition law has developed noteworthy, especially in areas of the new economy. In particular, the Microsoft case of abuse of market dominance regarding its tying has brought an attention to competition authorities around the world. Competition authorities are concerned about tying when it forecloses competition by leveraging its market power in the tying product market to monopolise the tied product market. However, tying can provide positive outcomes as it can be used as an important method to obtain fees for the use of a process or product and for entering a new market. Furthermore, it can provides benefits from economies of scale and scope which may lead to price reduction by lowering production and distribution costs. In addition, tying can reduce consumers’ searching costs for the most appropriate mixture of new products, thereby ensuring quality. Given this complex background, several competition law topics in the Microsoft case arose, including market definition and efficiency justification. Therefore, it would be meaningful to discuss divergence and convergence in law enforcements among the competition regimes, regarding tying in new economy in light of globalisation of competition law. This article is thus concerned with the topic of tying in new economy, and it examines whether the problem from different approaches to market definition and efficiency justification can be solved through adopting the effect-based implementation, which could be used as a global standard.

Market Definition of Online Platforms in the New Economy: Another Foggy Day

최요섭 단국대학교 법학연구소 2019 법학논총 Vol.43 No.1

Platforms, or online platforms in the new economy, have become one of the difficult topics in competition law and policy around the world. Online platforms have a number of distinctive features that make competitive assessments difficult, such as the two (or multi-)sided market. The traditional method of defining the relevant market is the appraisal of substitutability on the demand side, while considering other factors like switching costs, etc. However, this legal and economic tool may not work for the market definition of an online platform. Despite the existing difficulties, the EU and the US have provided some guidance for the market definition in the area of online platforms by developing case law and policy on the digital economy. This article aims to discuss the recent developments involving the market definition of online platforms, thereby suggesting a future policy for the Korean competition regime.