嘉道期 鹽政의 危機와 淸朝의 對應 : 長蘆鹽區의 경우 the Case of Changlu District

구범진 명청사학회 2006 명청사연구 Vol.0 No.26

北魏 拓跋族의 祭天儀式에 대한 一考察 - 西郊祭天과 卽位告天의 分析을 중심으로 -

丘凡眞 서울대학교 동양사학과 1998 서울大 東洋史學科 論集 Vol.22 No.-

「李覯(1009-1059) 經濟思想의 構造와 性格」

丘凡眞 서울대학교 동양사학과 1991 서울大 東洋史學科 論集 Vol.15 No.-

1920年代初 梁啓超의 科學認識과 東西文化觀 -『歐遊心影錄』을 中心으로 -

丘凡眞 서울대학교 동양사학과 1994 서울大 東洋史學科 論集 Vol.18 No.-

『동순태호 동아시아 화교 자본과 근대 조선』

구범진 경제사학회 2012 經濟史學 Vol.53 No.-

淸末 直隸 永平府의 鑒務改革과 그 意義

丘凡眞 명청사학회 2004 명청사연구 Vol.0 No.21

It was tremendously difficult to run a salt business in Yongping Prefecture 永平府, located in the northeastern part of Zhili Province 直隸省, because of its vulnerability to the illegal trade of salt. Until 1902, the Qing government had been abandoned Yongping in terms of salt administration. In 1903, Yuan Shikai 袁世凱, Governor-general of Zhili, seeking to increase the salt revenue in order to meet the new financial demands, through the intensification of government activities in the salt administration, introduced a reform program and established a government-managed institution(永平??務總局). Yuan had the new institution run by Zhang Zhenfang 張鎭芳, his protege, who succeeded in this enterprise, at least, with respect to revenue increase. Zhang could supply Zhili provincial government with a fair amount of money, estimated at about 200, 000 teals a year, while this reform inevitably caused a steep rise of the local salt price, which in turn gave rise to peasants revolts in 1909. After Yuan's fall from power and the 1909 popular revolts, the central government, pursuing the centralization of public finance system, began to regain the control over the management of salt business in Yongping and reorganized the agencies there. In contrast with the preference for merchant-operated system in the past, state power in the first decade of the 20th century, both provincial and central, preferred strengthening official control over the salt administration, as they expected stronger official control would bring more money to the treasury, provincial or central. This expectation was exemplified in Yongping Prefecture. The experience and accomplishment in Yongping, I think, encouraged the government to expend government-managed salt business in Changlu Salt District 長蘆監區. For example, when some of Changlu merchants turned out to be incapable of paying off huge debt to the foreign banks in Tianjin, the government decided to place under direct official management almost a third of the Changlu District.

베트남 陳朝(1225-1400) 沒落의 一要因에 對한 考察 - ‘上皇制度’와 ‘皇室近親婚原則’의 崩壞를 中心으로 -

丘凡眞 서울대학교 동양사학과 1996 서울大 東洋史學科 論集 Vol.20 No.-

淸末 北洋陸軍의 편성 과정과 財源

구범진 한국외국어대학교(글로벌캠퍼스) 역사문화연구소 2010 역사문화연구 Vol.35 No.-

이 논문은 北洋常備軍의 창설에서 北洋六鎭의 성립까지 北洋陸軍 각 鎭의 전후 계승 관계와 北洋陸軍의 군비 조달 상황을 자세히 고찰함으로써 北洋陸軍의 성격을 재평가하려는 試論이다. 北洋陸軍은 直隸總督 袁世凱의 주도로 편성되었으며, 光緖 28년부터 32년까지 袁世凱가 조성한 재원이 北洋陸軍의 재원 전체에서 차지하는 비중은, 어떤 기준을 적용하느냐에 따라 달라지긴 하지만, 많게는 약 63%, 적게는 약 40%에 달하였다. 따라서, 北洋陸軍 5개 鎭(第2鎭~第6鎭)에 대한 直隸總督의 ‘지분’은 최소 40%에 달하였다고 평가할 수 있다. 흥미롭게도, 光緖 33년부터 陸軍部가 北洋陸軍에 대한 군권을 장악하였지만, 第2鎭 이하 5개 鎭의 40%에 해당하는 第2鎭과 第4鎭의 군권은 여전히 直隸總督이 유지하였다. 直隸總督이 第2鎭과 第4鎭의 군권을 유지할 수 있었던 것은 兩鎭의 소속 병력 전체가 直隸 경내에 주둔하였다는 점 외에 또 다른 ‘연고’가 있었기 때문이다. 第2鎭과 第4鎭은 각각 北洋常備軍 第1鎭과 第2鎭의 後身이었고, 北洋常備軍 第1鎭과 第2鎭은 光緖 29년 말 이래 練兵處 주도의 군제 개혁 이전에 袁世凱가 直隸의 新軍으로 편련한 北洋常備軍 左鎭과 右鎭의 後身이었다. 다시 말해서, 陸軍 第2鎭과 第4鎭은 그 기원을 따져 볼 때 어디까지나 直隸의 ‘地方軍’이었던 것이다.

1780년 열하의 칠순 만수절과 건륭의 ‘제국’

구범진 명청사학회 2013 명청사연구 Vol.0 No.40

This paper examines the historical context of the Qianlong emperor's seventy-sui birthday celebration in Chengde, 1780. To many scholars, this birthday celebration was historically significant mainly because of the Third Panchen Lama's presence there. While it is true that Qianlong gave special treatment to the Panchen Lama to showcase his role as the great protector of Tibetan Buddhism, this element of the event reveals at best one part of the whole and there is another important aspect that deserves our attention. This paper pays attention to Qianlong's seventy-sui birthday, which was unprecedented in Qing history, as a special moment to commemorate his military and political achievements as a Qing ruler, and argues that this birthday celebration was his way of commemorating his empire building in Central Eurasia in the presence of those very peoples who had newly submitted to him. Qianlong chose to celebrate his seventy-sui birthday in Chengde, not in Beijing where all the previous Qianlong's decennial birthdays had been celebrated until the sixty-sui birthday. By choosing Chengde over Beijing, Qianlong was able to bring together all the top leaders of the Dörböt Mongols as well as Uriyangkhais and the Torghut Mongols. Most of these peoples had no immunity toward smallpox and could not have come to Beijing. Qianlong knew very well that the Panchen Lama's presence would make them more willing to come to Chengde since they were followers of the Geluk sect of Tibetan Buddhism. In addition to these peoples, however, Qianlong also brought to Chengde the Muslim begs of East Turkistan and the Tibetan tusi chieftains of western Sichuan. Here it is important to note that it was under the rule of Qianlong that all the above peoples were newly incorporated into the Qing empire. In the 1750s Qianlong completed the conquest of the Zunghars, which brought the Dörböts and Uriyangkhais under his rule, and subjected the Uyghur Muslims. In 1771 the Torghuts returned to the pasture of their ancestors, who had migrated from Zungharia west to the Volga in the 1630s, and declared their allegiance to Qianlong. In addition, in the second Jinchuan campaign of 1771-76 he pacified the Tibetan people in western Sichuan. It is evident, then, that Qianlong's seventy-sui birthday celebration on the 13th day of the 8th lunar month in 1780 was designed not only to commemorate his ties with Tibetan Buddhism. Qianlong's intention was grander: he wanted to orchestrate a spectacular celebration of his lifetime achievements in Qing empire building in Central Eurasia.

조선의 청 황제 성절 축하와 건륭 칠순 ‘진하 외교’

구범진 서울대학교 규장각한국학연구원 2014 한국문화 Vol.68 No.-

Starting from 1637, Joseon was required to send to the Qing capital Shenyang regular embassies for three annual events in addition to the annual tribute mission: the imperial birthday, the winter solstice, and the New Year's Day. In 1645, the Qing court, which then had moved its capital to Beijing, ordered the king of Joseon to combine all the regular embassies into one and to send a combined embassy at the New Year's Day. Since then, the Joseon court did not send its official missions for the imperial birthdays. In this historical context, three speical embassies that King Jeongjo dispatched in 1780, when the Qianlong emperor turned seventy-sui, deserve our attention. Firstly, when King Jeongjo sent a regular embassy for the New Year's Day of 1780, he assigned to the embassy an unusual mission: Celebrating Qianlong's unprecedented longevity in Qing history. Secondly, Jeongjo dispatched a special embassy solely to commemorate Qianlong's seventy-sui birthday on the thirteenth day of the eighth lunar month. Qianlong was highly delighted by this, and had the emissaries from Joseon come to Chengde and attend the celebrating ritual and feistivities there. Thirdly, Jeongjo sent an independent embassy to give thanks for the emperor's favorable treatment to the embassy and special gifts for him. It is noteworthy that Jeongjo decided to send this independent embassy regardless of the fact that a regualr embassy for the New Year's Day of 1781 was scheduled to depart for Beijing only three days after. King Jeongjo did not dispatch these embassies because he was ordered to do so by the Qianlong emperor; Jeongjo did so out of his own volition. And a further of investigation of the embassies that Jeongjo sent to the Qianlong's court in other years reveals that Jeongjo was attempting to cultivate a better relationship with the Qing court by dispatching special embassies as often as he could. Qianlong would repond to his actions of sincerity as a tributary king by granting special favors. It can be said that the Joseon court under King Jeongjo, having overcome, if not completely, the trauma it had to suffer in the 1630s, was at last steering toward a new stage in its relation with the Qing court.