程頤的工夫論

Gyoel Gim 퇴계학부산연구원 2011 退溪學論叢 Vol.17 No.-

'Ju-Jing居敬"and "Qiong-Li窮理" are two key elements of Cheng-Yi程이's practical theory. He thought that every human being has no difference with moral saints in light of human nature, but the mind containing "nature of matter 氣質 之性" can easily be confused by external objects. Therefore, first of all, we should control our mind if we want to be a saint. That is why Cheng-Yi so strongly emphasized "controlling one's mind", namely Jing敬. On the other hand, "Qiong-Li窮理" means "deliberation about Li理", Cheng-Yi derived it from the "to study the underlying principle to acquire knowledge格物致知" chapter of the Great Learning. It doesn't mean deliberations on a pure knowledge, but it means moral practices in our ordinary life. Cheng-Yi argues that this practice can raise our moral character and put us close to saint. Cheng-Yi describe the above two concepts as phrases "developing one's character needs Jing敬"(涵養須用敬) and "to practice is to widen knowledge"(進 學則在致知). That is, Ju-Jing居敬 is needed to control inner confusions caused by external objects and Qiong-Li窮理 to make right decision. These two concepts of practical theory are not separable. So I'd like to elucidate about these concepts and each would have two parts. At first, about Ju-Jing居敬, I'll dissert why Ju-Jing居敬 become an issue, and secondly introduce the contents of Ju-Jing居敬. Next, the key point of Qiong-Li窮理 is "to study the underlying principle to acquire knowledge格物致知", So to understand Qiong-Li窮理, I'll argue about Chi-zhi致知and Ge-Wu格物of theGreat Learning as a basis of Qiong-Li窮理.

Rethinking the Foundation and Development of “East Asian Silhak”: With a Focus on the Establishment of Its Concept and Periodic Classification

( Gyoel Gim ) 성균관대학교 유교문화연구소 2024 儒敎文化硏究(中文版) Vol.0 No.41

In the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, East Asia witnessed new academic trends emphasizing social practice and reform over theoretical considerations. These trends gave rise to Silhak 實學 (“Practical Learning”) in Korea in the late Joseon dynasty, Qixue 氣學 (“Learning of Vital Forces”) in China in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, and Kogaku 古學 (“Ancient Learning”) in Japan in the Edo period. A concept of “East Asian Silhak 東亞實學 (East Asian Practical Learning)” can be conceived in the context of strengthening the Confucian statecraft in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this academic trend, so-called East Asian Practical Learning, was manifested in the form of “pursuit of Westcentered modernity” in the three East Asian countries. It would be appropriate to understand it as a “modern transformation of East Asian Confucian thought” rather than as the Confucian statecraft in the context of Confucianism. When attempting to incorporate the ideological transformation of Confucianism in East Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into the concept of Silhak, there are issues such as: the conceptual confusion between Silhak of the late Joseon dynasty of Korea and Kaozhengxue 考證學 (“Evidential Learning”) of the Qing dynasty of China; and their pursuit of modernity based on the premise of anti-Zhuzi studies. Given these complexities, this article underscores that the genesis of New Silhak in twenty-first-century East Asia lies in the simultaneous relationship between Zhuzi studies and Silhak, reflecting the Confucian ideal of neisheng waiwang 內聖外王 (“inner sage and outer king”).

親親相隱과 性善의 발견: 영화 <어느 가족>을 예시로

김결 ( Gim Gyoel ) 한국중국학회 2021 중국학보 Vol.96 No.-

본 논문은 먼저 2000년대 초반 중국 대륙 학술계에서 일어난 親親相隱 논쟁을 정리하고, 출토문헌 연구자 梁濤가 주장하는 초기 유가사상 내 孝와 仁의 긴장 및 상충관계를 중심으로 重孝派였던 맹자가 四端설을 세움으로써 重仁派로 향했음을 알아본다. 그 다음 맹자가 도덕형이상학의 관점에서 仁을 性善으로 삼아 본체의 차원에서 끌어올림으로써 공자 이래 상충 혹은 긴장 상태에 있던 仁과 孝의 차등 관계를 확정했음을 논의한다. 마지막으로 영화 <어느 가족>(2018)을 예시로 親親相隱과 性善에 관한 도덕형이상학적 논의가 추상적 담론에서 그치지 않고 우리 현실에서 경험할 수 있는 일임을 살펴본다. This paper proceeds in three stages below. First, we summarize the prolonged debate about the mutual concealment between relatives(親親相隱) among contemporary scholars in the mainland China in the early 2000s, and clarify that how Meng zi diverted his thoughts into the school of benevolence from the school of filial piety, with focusing on the contradictory relationship between the benevolence and the filial piety, which is the argument by Liang Tao who is the researcher of Chinese unearthed documents. In the next place, we discuss that Meng zi turned the benevolence into the goodness of human nature to raise the benevolence to a metaphysical level. In this way, Meng zi settled the dominance relationship between the benevolence and the filial piety, which is being placed in the contradictory relationship after Confucius. Lastly, through the movie Shoplifters (2018), we observe that the discussions of moral metaphysics about the mutual concealment between relatives and the goodness of human nature could be experienced in our reality, not just a structure of abstract concepts.

도심(道心)의 탈본체화 - 주희의 도심인심론(道心人心論)을 중심으로 -

김결 ( Gim Gyoel ) 충남대학교 유학연구소 2019 儒學硏究 Vol.49 No.-

본 논문은 주희(朱熹)의 초기와 후기 도심인심론(道心人心論)의 분기가 중화구설(中和舊說)과 신설(新說) 이론체계의 변화에 있음을 주장한다. 본래 중국 유학에서 도심인심은 기본적으로 천리인욕(天理人欲) 구조에 근거하여 이해되었는데, 도심인심이 천리인욕과 같은 강렬한 도덕 윤리적 함의를 부여받으면서 본체와 현상으로 구분되는 이분법적 해석구조를 가지게 되었고, 이러한 구조 아래서 도심은 천리를, 인심은 인욕을 뜻하게 된다. 초기 도심인심론에서 주희는 선유들과 마찬가지로 천리인욕-도심인심의 전통적 해석을 따르고 있으며, 이때 도심은 곧 중화구설에서의 미발본체(未發本體)를 의미한다. 이후 주희의 신설에서 심(心)은 성(性)과 정(情)을 통섭하고 지각(知覺)을 발휘하여 한 몸의 주재라는 함의를 획득하게 되며, 이에 따라 후기 도심인심론의 인심은 지각 그 자체의 역할을 맡게 되는 동시에 감각기관의 자연스러운 욕구가 되며 가치판단에서 벗어나게 된다. 뿐만 아니라, 도심 또한 더 이상 천리나 미발로 대표되는 본체의 범주에 속하지 않고 경험적인 심의 서로 다른 두 가지 현상 중의 하나인 도덕의식으로 자리 잡는다. 따라서 구설의 초기 도심인심론에서 두 개의 다른 근원으로써 본체와 현상을 의미했던 도심과 인심은 신설 이후 하나인 경험적인 심에서 일어나는 두 가지의 다른 지각현상이 된다. 이때 도심은 심의 지각으로 일의 합당함을 분별한 뒤 선택하는 마음이다. 이러한 도심의 주재는 본체인 리(理)에 근거하지만 반드시 심의 지각을 거쳐야만 현실화가 가능한 것으로, 신설의 후기 도심인심론에서 도심은 본체의 영역에서 벗어나 경험적인 심의 다른 한측면이 되어 주재성을 발휘하며, 이로써 적극적인 행위를 이뤄나간다. This paper is the discussion that the division between earlier and later stage of Zhu Xi's DaoXin(道心, the way of heart and mind) and RenXin(人心, the human's heart and mind) Theory is based on the changes in theoretical system of ZhongHe old and new theories. Originally DaoXin and RenXin is comprehended based on the system of TianLi-RenYu(天理人欲, Heaven the Truth Human the False) in Chinese Confucianism. As DaoXin and RenXin is recognized as moral and ethical implications similar to TianLi-RenYu, it started to have dichotomical analytic system which is divided into the Ti(體, substance) and Yong (用, phenomenon). Under this system, DaoXin means TianLi(Heaven the Truth), Renxin means RenYu(Human the False). Zhu Xi along with other scholars, followed the traditional analysis in early theories of DaoXin and RenXin, DaoXin then means the WeiFa-Benti(未發本體, unrisen substance) of the ZhongHe old theory. Later, according to ZhongHe new theory, Xin(心, mind) earned the implications that it is the material of one body as it combined Xing(性, nature) and Qing(情, feeling) and exercised perceptions. As a result, Renxin became the main position of perceptions and the natural desire of sense organs as it escaped the value judgement in late DaoXin and RenXin Theory. Not only that, DaoXin as well did not included to the substance, which was represented as TianLi or WeiFa-Benti, and became the moral consciousness which is one of two different phenomenon of experiential mind. Therefore, early DaoXin and RenXin Theory as two different origins and was meant the substance and phenomenon during the period of ZhongHe old theory, then became two different perceptual occurrences which was driven from one experiential spirit after the period of ZhongHe new theory. That time, DaoXin is the perception of Xin, the heart of distinguishing worthiness and charging one's actions. DaoXin shall leave from substance's area and becomes one side of Xin, then its self-assertiveness will rise and conduct moral practice, this is the principal of Daoxin. This principle is also possible based on its substance, but must pass through the perception of Xin then possible to fulfill, this is the realization of Li(理, substance), practice theory and pursuit of Zhu Xi’s Philosophy.