상호저축은행 적기시정조치 제도의 효과 분석 및 시사점

박상현 금융감독원 2020 금융감독연구 Vol.7 No.1

It has been several pointed out that the Prompt Corrective Action System of Financial Authorities contributes to minimizing the cost of insolvency of Mutual Savings Banks in Korea, while the delay measure of Prompt Corrective Action undermines the cost-minimizing function of Prompt Corrective Action. This study collected data such as quarterly capital adequacy indicators and data on the amount of support and recovery resulting from 134 Mutual Savings Banks from 2003 to the second quarter of 2018 and verified the effects of correlations and variables through multiple regression analyses. As a result of empirical analysis, this study found that the more time a mutual savings bank continue, the more money it spends after it’s closure, and the better the BIS CAR, the more money it takes back after closing. This study identified a tendency for the BIS CAR to decrease and NPL to increase as the number of times for the Prompt Corrective Action requirements are met in all Mutual Savings Banks. Therefore, this study partly confirmed concerns that the delay of Prompt Corrective Action might increase the burden of national finance. This study suggested that the cumulative frequency of meeting requirements of Prompt Corrective Action and continuing duration of Mutual Savings Bank should be used by the Financial Authorities in determining the likelihood of recovering soundness and the extent of financial support in determining whether the delay of Prompt Corrective Action should be postponed.

주제별 논단 : 연구논문 ; 우리나라 적기시정조치제도의 현황 및 개선방안

노철우 ( Chul Woo Rho ) 한국금융법학회 2014 金融法硏究 Vol.11 No.2

The prompt corrective action (PCA) system was introduced for the first time in Denmark in 1994 when CBSBA was enacted. The USA also introduced the System in 1991 in order to deal with a lot of troubled depository institutions by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. The PCA system of USA has been a successful and desirable model for many other countries. Korea introduced the PCA system in 1992 by the Monetary and Financial Operation Committee in the Bank of Korea as a prudential regulatory measure for the banking institutions. Just before the Financial and Currency Crisis in 1997, the System was implemented very well for the financial institutions such as banks, securities companies, and insurance companies. During the Crisis, the PCA system carried out the important role of restructuring measures for the many troubled financial institutions. Afterwards, the Korean PCA system has been reformed and improved gradually. Recently the System has played an important role in restructuring the troubled mutual savings banks in Korea. However, there are still some areas to be reformed and improved in order that the Korean PCA system works more properly and efficiently. This paper suggests three points. First, the purpose of the Korean PCA includes to minimize the possibility of putting the Public Fund into troubled financial institutions. Second, the forbearance (suspension) of the PCA should be abolished. Third, the power of the Financial Services Commission on the PCA should be checked by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation which manages deposit insurance funds in Korea.

우리나라 적기시정조치제도의 현황 및 개선방안

노철우 한국금융법학회 2014 金融法硏究 Vol.11 No.2

The prompt corrective action (PCA) system was introduced for the first time in Denmark in 1994 when CBSBA was enacted. The USA also introduced the System in 1991 in order to deal with a lot of troubled depository institutions by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. The PCA system of USA has been a successful and desirable model for many other countries. Korea introduced the PCA system in 1992 by the Monetary and Financial Operation Committee in the Bank of Korea as a prudential regulatory measure for the banking institutions. Just before the Financial and Currency Crisis in 1997, the System was implemented very well for the financial institutions such as banks, securities companies, and insurance companies. During the Crisis, the PCA system carried out the important role of restructuring measures for the many troubled financial institutions. Afterwards, the Korean PCA system has been reformed and improved gradually. Recently the System has played an important role in restructuring the troubled mutual savings banks in Korea. However, there are still some areas to be reformed and improved in order that the Korean PCA system works more properly and efficiently. This paper suggests three points. First, the purpose of the Korean PCA includes to minimize the possibility of putting the Public Fund into troubled financial institutions. Second, the forbearance (suspension) of the PCA should be abolished. Third, the power of the Financial Services Commission on the PCA should be checked by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation which manages deposit insurance funds in Korea.

우리나라 예금보험기구의 사전적 위험관리기능 제고 방안에 관한 고찰

최운열,이진호 예금보험공사 2014 金融安定硏究 Vol.15 No.2

This study analyzes the status and problems of Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation(KDIC) to minimize the loss of the deposit insurance(DI) fund as one of the requirements for the proactive risk supervision of the DI mechanism. Given the social loss resulting from insolvency of financial institutions, the DI agency should strive to minimize losses of the fund by keeping monitoring their insurance accidents. However, KDIC has a limitation on monitoring the financial risk of insurance accidents. Therefore, this study suggests followings. Firstly, a legal council among a financial safety net mechanism should be established and forced to share information in order to improve KDIC’s availability of information on insured financial institutions. The consultative legal council and their working group will be able to share informations effectively and inspect jointly financial risks. Secondly, the executive authorities of prompt correction action should be shared by KDIC, and then the timeliness of further cleanup procedure will be improved. If KDIC could require the supervisors their enforcement actions based on the results after KDIC’s inspection alone, it would be expected that it prevents regulatory forbearance or neglect. 본고는 예금보험기금의 손실을 최소화하기 위한 필요조건으로서 예금보험기구의 사전적 위험관리기능에 대해 살펴보았다. 금융기관의 부실에 따른 사회적 손실을 감안할 때 예금보험기구는 금융회사의 보험사고 위험을 지속적으로 감시함으로써 예금보험기금의 손실을 최소화하기 위해노력해야 한다. 하지만 현재 우리나라 예금보험공사의 사전적 위험관리기능은 제한적이며, 예금보험기금의 손실 최소화를 위한 사전적 위험관리자로서 예금보험공사의 역할을 명확히 할 필요가있다. 우선 부보금융기관에 대한 정보 활용도를 제고하기 위해 현행 자율협약인 MOU를 대체할수 있는 금융안전망기구 간 법적인 협의체를 설립함으로써 정보공유를 강제하는 것이 바람직해보인다. 둘째, 감독당국에 집중된 적기시정조치의 단계별 행사권한을 예금보험공사가 공유함으로써 추후 정리절차의 적시성을 제고할 수 있을 것으로 판단된다. 요컨대, 예금보험기구의 사전적위험관리기능을 강화함으로써 예금보험기금의 손실 최소화를 통한 금융시스템 안정에 기여할 수있다.

협동조합 금융기관의 자기자본 규제

구정옥 한국협동조합학회 2009 韓國協同組合硏究 Vol.26 No.1

The assumptions underlying rationales for bank capital regulation are not compatible with the governance and risk profiles of cooperative financial institutions. In case of German cooperative banks subject to both the Cooperative Act and the Banking Act, the Cooperative Act has been revised to make it easier for cooperative banks to meet the regulatory and operational capital needs, and as a result their organizational structures and operational methods have been changed. The German Banking Act, however, still reflects the cooperative characteristics of cooperative banks in the definition and composition of capital. The US credit unions which have been organized and operated under Credit Union Acts are not subject to the Basel Capital Accord. The bank-style PCA system was introduced in the late 1990, but the PCA model for credit unions differentiates capital regulations of credit unions based on their size and operational characteristics. German and US cases illustrate the need for timely response to changing circumstances and the appropriate consideration of cooperative characteristics in capital regulation.

협동조합 금융기관의 자기자본 규제

구정옥 한국협동조합학회 2008 韓國協同組合硏究 Vol.26 No.1

The assumptions underlying rationales for bank capital regulation are not compatible with the governance and risk profiles of cooperative financial institutions. In case of German cooperative banks subject to both the Cooperative Act and the Banking Act, the Cooperative Act has been revised to make it easier for cooperative banks to meet the regulatory and operational capital needs, and as a result their organizational structures and operational methods have been changed. The German Banking Act, however, still reflects the cooperative characteristics of cooperative banks in the definition and composition of capital. The US credit unions which have been organized and operated under Credit Union Acts are not subject to the Basel Capital Accord. The bank-style PCA system was introduced in the late 1990, but the PCA model for credit unions differentiates capital regulations of credit unions based on their size and operational characteristics. German and US cases illustrate the need for timely response to changing circumstances and the appropriate consideration of cooperative characteristics in capital regulation.