‘북핵 위기’ 사례를 통해 본 북한의 위기관리 연구

정희태(Jeong Hee-Tae) 한국정치정보학회 2007 정치정보연구 Vol.10 No.1

본 연구의 목적은 1990년대 초의 제1차 북핵 위기와 2002년의 제2차 북핵 위기 양 사례를 분석함으로써 위기상황하에서 이루어지는 북한 당국의 위기관리를 분석하고 이를 평가해 보고자 하는 것이다. 보다 구체적으로는 1,2차 북핵 위기 사례를 통해 드러난 북한의 위기관리 과정을 위기관리 분석 틀에 놓고서 북한 위기관리의 주요 측면들을 살펴봄으로서 북한의 위기관리 능력을 평가해보고자 한다. 이에 따라 본 연구는 1,2차 북핵 위기 사례에 드러난 사실에 근거하여 가능한 한 북한의 시각에서 현상을 바라보고자 하였으며, 연구의 대전제는 독특한 사회주의국가 북한의 여러 알려진 특징들에 주목하기보다는 북한도 다른 일반국가(정상국가)들과 다를바 없이 어느 경우에나 자국의 이익 확보에 최선을 다한다는 것이다. 그리하여 본 연구는 북한은 위기상황하에서 이미 설정된 국가목표에 부합하는 위기목표를 마련하고 이를 달성하고자 이에 적합한 수단을 선택하면서 이익 확보에 주력하면서 위기를 관리해 나갔는지를 확인코자 하였다. 이를 위해 북한 정책결정자의 환경에 대한 위협인지 및 위기인식과 철저한 손익계산에 기초한 국익우선의 정책결정 그리고 위기관리 전략 및 행태를 중심으로 분석하였다. The purpose of this study is to explore the overall crisis management of North Korea under the crisis situation through analyzing both cases of the 1st unclear crisis in the early of 1990 and the 2nd unclear crisis in 2002. This study intend to evaluate the crisis management competence of North Korea through identifying characteristics, patterns, dilemma and limitation of North Korea' crisis management based on the both nuclear crisis cases. For this purpose, analysis frameworks was constructed focused on five factors like as crisis perception, crisis objectives, crisis solution means, crisis management strategies and behavioral analysis of crisis management, and then crisis management of North Korea was analyzed according to the analysis framework. This study was tried to understand phenomenon on the North Korea's perspective if possible, based on the explicit facts of 1st and 2nd nuclear crisis. The major premise of this study was focused on not a various of unique characteristics of North Korea as a socialistic state, but the facts that North Korea made all efforts to ensure the national benefit, no matter what the cases were, like as the other countries. The finding of this study are as follows: First, North Korea paid attention to the intention of US and was sensitive the crisis dynamics simultaneously. Second, North Korea tried to accomplish both the first objective of preventing an armed clash and the second objective of avoiding sanctions towards North Korea of UN. Third, North Korea used the defensive crisis management strategy effectively. Futhermore, tit-for-tat strategy as a core strategy was used positively. Forth, North Korea made effort to maintain the balance between the politic-diplomatic behaviors and armed behaviors under crisis situation. And then North Korea used the informal communicative channel positively for resolving the crisis situations.

북한위기에 따른 국가위기관리방안연구

안성호 한국동북아학회 2009 한국동북아논총 Vol.14 No.2

This study analyses device of state crisis management of Korea according to crisis of North Korea. I try to study about national security and crisis from comparative perspective both within Korea and North Korea themselves as a whole. This study analyses the goals of achieving the mutural assistance system of Korea and USA and the preparation of crisis of North Korea . It examines several devices of state crisis management including agent, public official, Chief of National Intelligence Service, Minister of defense, Minister Foreign Affairs, and President. This study analyses change scenario of North Korea compares after KimJongil and Kimilsung to check state crisis of Korea according to crisis of North Korea effectively. The current menace in North-East asia is leading to the emergence of North Korea nuclear development crisis after inauguration of Lee MyungBak Government. The competitive nuclear development and struggle for bad background during the 2008-9 has caused countries to move away from a process of regional peace system which existed under bad nationalism to regional divergence. Inflows Global assistance has encouraged the stabilization in North-East Asia countries needed to further peaceful and co-development. This study focuses on the mutural assistance system in Korea and USA using security crisis of South and North Korea after Kim Jongil. This study give emphasis on smart and solid Control Tower System in Korea to solve state crisis management effectively. 북한은 한국의 국가안보전략에서 우선적으로 고려해야할 대상이다. 한국의 국가위기는 미래 어떤 시점에 확실히 있을 총체적인 북한의 위기에 항상 대비해야 한다. 단계별로 위기의 폭과 내용이 점점 더 크게 확대되면서 발생할 수 도 있다. 본 연구는 북한의 위기와 실패에 중점을 두기보다는 분단국으로써 직접적으로 한국의 안보체계에 위기를 가져다 줄 수 있다는 점에 중점을 두고 이에 대비한 한국의 국가위기관리구축방안이 있어야한다는 점을 강조하였다. 한국은 국가위기를 최소화하기위하여 다음과 같은 원칙을 확고하게 견지해야한다. 첫째, 어떠한 형태의 전쟁에도 반대하며, 모든 갈등과 현안은 대화를 통해 평화적으로 해결한다. 둘째, 남남공조와 국민적 합의를 토대로 국민과 함께 하는 정책이 되도록 한다. 셋째, 모든 한반도 문제는 한미공조와 국제협력을 통해 남북 당사 원칙에 기초해 해결한다. 넷째, 선진국진입은 국방의 선진화, 정보의 선진화, 그리고 안보의 선진화에서 모색해야한다. 다섯째, 안보․외교․국방․정보의 각 부처가 다양하게 다양한 정보와 전략을 갖고 있으나 콘트롤 타워를 구축하여 그 산하에서 상호 유기적인 네트워크를 갖고 위기대처에 총체적으로 임하여야 한다. 여섯째, 항상 국가위기관리에 대한 거버넌스적 관점을 유지하고 국민의 수준과 눈높이에 맞추어서 국가위기관리를 해야한다. 향후 국가위기의 최소화와 국가안보는 갑작스런 어떤 종류의 북한위기에도 능동적이고 유연하게 대처할 수 있는 고도의 전문적인 다양하고도 다각적인 기능과 전략을 갖춘 전천후 콘트롤 타워 시스템을 구축해야한다.

Japanese Response to the Renewed North Korean Nuclear Crisis

( Matake Kamiya ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2003 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.8 No.2

North Korea`s recent nuclear brinkmanship may have alarmed the United States and escalated tension in Northeast Asia, but it has not shocked Japan, already inclined to think the worst of Pyongyang. The relatively low-key Japanese reaction to the renewed North Korean nuclear crisis reflects the perception that North Korea`s nuclear weapons development is not an isolated issue, but part of a broader North Korea problem that includes the nuclear weapons development, ballistic missiles development, (Nodong [Rodong] as well as Taepdong), abductions, and the dispatch of North Korean spy ships to Japan``s territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Relatively calm reactions of Japan and its people to the renewed North Korean nuclear crisis, however, have not meant that Tokyo has taken a soft policy stance toward Pyongyang. By contraries, since the crisis started in last fall, Tokyo has consistently taken a hard-line approach toward North Korea similar to that of the Bush administration and the Japanese public has come to support it. Such a seemingly contradicting outlook of Japan`s current North Korea policy is derived mainly from the following two factors: First, Japanese attitude toward North Korea had started to shift to a tougher direction well before the current nuclear crisis resurged. Second, further fueling Tokyo`s hard-line approach was the grave impact of the first Japan- DPRK summit meeting in history on September 17, 2002. The resurgence of North Korea`s nuclear weapons program took place at a time when the reputation and credibility of North Korea among the Japanese public had already hit rock bottom. Consequently ?the Japanese public has strongly demanded that the government not to make any concession on the nuclear issue, as well as on abductions. Reflecting these views, the Koizumi administration has repeatedly emphasized that there will be no normalization of relations and no economic assistance to the North until the nuclear and the abduction issues are solved. This policy line is similar to the Bush administration`s stance that the U.S. is ready to consider to take a bold approach toward Pyongyang but only after it verifiably abandons its nuclear weapons programs. There are however at least three significant differences between Japan`s North Korea policy and that of the United States: First, while aiming earnestly at the termination of North Korea`s nuclear weapons program, Japan has more to fear from a military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula; Second, while Washington remains focused on the nuclear issue, the Japanese government wants the nuclear and abduction issues solved simultaneously; Third, with regard to the security threat posed by North Korea, Tokyo has more to fear from its ballistic missile capability than Washington. Despite a growing awareness among the Japanese about the shortcomings of Japan`s policy of exclusively defense-oriented defense in the era of continuing proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the possibility of Japan`s acquisition of its own nuclear arsenal is rejected by the vast majority in the Japanese society. Increasing number of politicians as well as security experts in Japan have however started to discuss possible ways to modify its security posture so that Japan will be able to meet future security challenges like the ongoing nuclear crisis more comfortably without abandoning the spirit of exclusively defense-oriented defense completely. The long-term effect of the current North Korean nuclear crisis on Japanese security policy could be significant.

오바마 행정부의 대북 위기통제와 강압흥정: 2차 북핵실험 분석

우정민 ( Jeong Min Woo ) 한국세계지역학회 2016 世界地域硏究論叢 Vol.34 No.1

본 논문은 위기관리의 핵심이 되는 위기통제와 강압흥정의 주요 요건을 통합적으로 상정하여 2차 핵실험 시기 오바마 행정부의 북핵 위기관리 행태를 분석하는데 목적이 있다. 위기관리의 양축이 되는 핵심으로서 위기통제와 강압흥정은 목표 및 수단의 제한과 방법의 효율성을 중시한다. 미국의 정책적 유사성과 차이성에도 불구하고 오바마 행정부의 ‘북한의 정권변화를 통한 비핵화’라는 목표의 제한은 세계전략 상에서 일관된 핵확산 방지 원칙에 부합되기 때문에 정치적 요건에 부합된다. 연구결과, 위기통제 측면에서 미국의 정치ㆍ외교적 행동과 조율된 군사행동 및 협상의지와 일치된 외교ㆍ군사적 선택은 어디까지나 북한에 대한 직접적인 군사 행동보다는 제한적 무력시위 등 강압외교, 도발에 상응하는 군사적 압박을 통해 위기확대 방지, 사활적 국익인 확산방지와 연계해서 작동하고 있음이 확인된다. 수단의 행태 측면에서 대화는 미국이 북한에 취한 실질적 강압에 비해 상대적으로 제한된 외교적 방법이 되어왔는데, 이를 보완하고 실질적 효과를 높이기 위해서는 다양한 대화채널 운용, 위기해결을 위한 요구조건 제시, 정치ㆍ외교적 제재 및 제한된 군사적 압박 등 방법이 병행적으로 추진되어야만 할 필요가 있다. 또한 적대국인 북한의 기본이익(체제보장)과 양립되는 미국의 퇴로조성 노력은 비핵화를 행동으로 실천할 수 있는 북한정권의 전향적 태도변화가 가능할 때 미국의 경제적 혜택과 협상 의지를 가능하게 만든다. 한편, 강압흥정 측면에서 순응을 위한 긴박감 전달 및 압박점 확보, 응징위협의 신뢰성 및 확전우세에 있는 미국의 능력과 행동은 북한에 대해 절대 우위에 있지만, 한반도 안보환경의 구조적 제약 속에서 위기의 정도에 따라 탄력적인 군사력 운용을 통해 영향력이 행사되고 있음을 발견할 수 있다. 그래서 미국의 ‘핵불용’과 북한의 ‘핵무장’ 동기가 강하게 충돌하여 지속될 경우, 미국은 회유(당근)보다는 강경(채찍) 중심의 정책으로 북한의 핵개발 진전을 차단할 가능성이 높다. 따라서 북한의 진정성 있는 비핵화 의지가 없는 한, 동기의 상대적 비대칭에 따른 미국의 대북 유인 레버리지(leverage)는 앞으로도 낮을 수밖에 없다. 4차 핵실험 이후 위기관리 측면에서 북한이 핵을 포기하도록 하려면 핵을 보유하는 것이 견딜 수 없이 고통스럽거나 북한정권의 생존을 심각하게 위협하는 상황이 와야 할 것이다. 또한 북한이 핵을 포기해도 생존을 보장받을 수 있는 상황이 오거나, 포기할 수밖에 없는 상황이 온다면 연쇄적으로 인권, 개혁개방, 시장경제 등 미국이 불량국가에 요구하는 핵심가치를 수용하는 국면이 전개될 수밖에 없다. 이러한 맥락에서 미국의 북핵 문제의 해결은 기본적으로 북한의 정권변화(regime transformation)와 별개로 논의되기 어려운 사안이다. This study seeks to examine the United States crisis management behavior in response to North Korea’s 2nd nuclear tests. For this purpose, this study identify and analyze Obama administration’s behavior towards North Korea through a main crisis management theory that deals with crisis control and assumes a coercive bargaining requirement. An integrated analysis of key crisis management theory shows that although Obama administration’s crisis control behavior during the North Korean nuclear crises looks to reek of confusion on the surface, it was found that the driving force of behavior were clear principles (limitation of objectives and means in crisis) and consistent requirements (political and operational requirements). Regarding limitation of means, conversation has been a relatively limited tool compared to substantial pressures imposed by the United States towards North Korea, indicating the need for combined utilization of multiple means such as implementing various channels of conversation, proposing requirements for resolving crisis and executing both political and diplomatic sanctions along with limited military oppressions. In terms of operational requirement, military measure coordinated with political and diplomatic action of the United States, along with diplomatic and military options synchronized with the will of negotiation, need to be understood in relation with coercive diplomacy through limited military demonstration, preventing escalation of crisis through proportionate military oppression against provocation and nonproliferation which is a critical national benefit, rather than direct military against North Korea. Regarding coercive bargaining, the United States is more likely to select a stick than a carrot in case there occurs a strong conflict between its disapproval of nuclear armament and the drive towards nuclear armament by North Korea. This means that unless North Korea shows veracity in their will of denuclearization, the leverage of incentive by the United States should stay relatively low due to the asymmetry of motivation. In terms of crisis management, in order for North Korea to abandon its nuclear activities, Since North Korea’s 4th nuclear tests, the situation will have to become a serious threat to the survival of the regime or unbearably painful to retain nuclear activities. Furthermore, if a situation in which North Korea must abandon its nuclear activities is realized, a development of situation in which North Korea must accept a cascade of core values such as human rights, reformation and opening up, market economy that the United States requires of rogue state. In this context, it is an issue in which it is difficult to basically separate the United States towards North Korean nuclear issue resolution from North Korea’s regime transformation.

Russia and North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis

주승호 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2008 평화학연구 Vol.9 No.4

Putin sought to make a dent in resolving North Korea’s nuclear crisis. In the process, Russia sought to cultivate its image as an honest broker, mediator, or facilitator. This article examines Russian policy on the second crisis over North Korea’s nuclear issue. Specifically, the research raises the following questions and tries to answer them: What role has Russia played at the six-party talks? What is Russia’s policy on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? What are Russia’s contributions to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? With the convening of the six-party talks in 2003, Russia acquired the first opportunity to make its imprint on North Korea’s nuclear issue. Russia facilitated dialogue and offered suggestions for compromise. Russia at the same time exerted a moderating influence on both the U.S. and North Korea, constantly urging them to return to the negotiating table whenever the talks stalled and patiently reminding them to take into consideration the other side’s concerns and needs during negotiation. North Korea’s denuclearization and peaceful resolution of North Korea’s nuclear crisis coincide with Russia’s interests. Russia’s influence in the six-party talks has been indirect and marginal. The U.S. and the DPRK were the principal actors in this showdown and the DPRK as a host and mediator played a key role in inducing agreements. Putin sought to make a dent in resolving North Korea’s nuclear crisis. In the process, Russia sought to cultivate its image as an honest broker, mediator, or facilitator. This article examines Russian policy on the second crisis over North Korea’s nuclear issue. Specifically, the research raises the following questions and tries to answer them: What role has Russia played at the six-party talks? What is Russia’s policy on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program? What are Russia’s contributions to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? With the convening of the six-party talks in 2003, Russia acquired the first opportunity to make its imprint on North Korea’s nuclear issue. Russia facilitated dialogue and offered suggestions for compromise. Russia at the same time exerted a moderating influence on both the U.S. and North Korea, constantly urging them to return to the negotiating table whenever the talks stalled and patiently reminding them to take into consideration the other side’s concerns and needs during negotiation. North Korea’s denuclearization and peaceful resolution of North Korea’s nuclear crisis coincide with Russia’s interests. Russia’s influence in the six-party talks has been indirect and marginal. The U.S. and the DPRK were the principal actors in this showdown and the DPRK as a host and mediator played a key role in inducing agreements.

북한의 위기상황에 대한 국제인도법적 검토

최태현(Tae Hyun Choi) 서울국제법연구원 2011 서울국제법연구 Vol.18 No.2

이상에서 살펴본 바와 같이 북한의 위기상황은 단순히 재난을 당한 상황, 폭동 등을 수반한 국내적 소요 상황(이 단계에서는 산발적인 무력충돌도 있을 수 있음), 국제적 또는 국내적 무력충돌 상황, 마지막으로 북한 당국이 국민을 통제할 의사와 능력을 상실한 상황 등의 네 가지 단계로 나누어 볼 수 있다. 각 단계에 따라서, 북한이 각 상황을 규제하고 통제할 능력, 즉 주권(대외주권 또는 대내주권)을 보유하는 정도가 다르게 나타날 것이고, 이에 따라 적용할 국제법의 내용과 종류도 달라질 수 있다. 예컨대, 앞의 두 단계의 상황 하에서는 북한당국이 여전히 북한지역에 대한 통제력을 보유할 것이고 따라서 이러한 단계에서는 외국으로부터의 인도적 지원을 거부할 수도 있을 것이다. 다만, 오늘날의 국제법은 이 단계에서도 북한에게 외부로부터의 인도적 의무를 수락할 의무를 부과하는 방향으로 발전하고 있다는 점을 주목해야 한다. 또한 세 번째 단계 이상의 상황에서는 북한은 외국과의 전쟁이나 인도적 간섭(UN 안전보장이사회의 승인이 있는 경우와 외국이 일방적으로 행하는 경우 모두를 상정해 볼 수 있음)으로 인한 국제적 무력충돌을 겪을 수 있을 뿐 아니라 내전 등 국내적 무력충돌에 처할 수 있다. 이러한 단계에서는 그야말로 국제인도법이 전형적으로 적용될 것이다. 오늘날 국가는 주권국가로서 자국국민의 인권이 침해되지 않도록 모든 노력을 다할 책임을 지고 있다. 그러나 국가가 이러한 책임을 다하지 못하여 국민이 고통을 받고 있는 경우, 특히 그 국가가 오히려 자국국민에게 인도에 반한 죄, 전쟁범죄, 집단살해죄, 인종청소 등의 행위를 가하는 경우 안전보장이사회의 결의에 따라 국제사회가 집단적 책임인 보호책임을 지도록 되어 있고, 이러한 보호책임의 이행에는 군사력의 사용도 포함되어 있다. 따라서 북한의 위기상황이 극단적으로 이러한 상황에까지 치달을 경우, 안전보장이사회는 리비아사태에서 그렇게 하였던 것처럼, 군사력을 사용한 보호책임의 이행까지 고려할 수 있을 것이다. 이러한 단계에서는 국제인도법을 위반한 북한의 지도자들을 포함한 개인은 국제형사재판소에서 형사처벌을 받을 수도 있다. 북한이 국제형사재판소규정의 당사국이 아니어서 규정당사국에 의한 소추나 소추관에 의한 자발적인 수사개시는 어렵겠지만, 수단 Darfur사태나 리비아사태에서 보았듯이, 안전보장이사회에 의한 상황회부에 의하여 북한에서의 국제인도법 위반범은 ICC에서 처벌받을 수 있다. 이 경우 북한이 위기상황에 직면하여 범한 국제인도법위반행위뿐 아니라 이론적으로는 ICC규정이 발효한 2002년 7월 1일 이후에 북한지역에서 발생한 ICC관할대상범죄도 처벌될 수 있다. 어쨌든 북한의 위기상황 하에서는 각 단계마다 인도적 지원 수락의무, 군사적 개입 인정 여부, 국제인도법 적용 여부, 국제인도법 위반범에 대한 처벌 가능 여부 등에 대한 검토가 필요할 것이다. The crisis situations of North Korea can be classified into possible four stages: First, North Korea could be exposed to just natural or man-made disasters. Second, There could be occurrence of domestic turbulence with riot in North Korea, which may entail small scale of armed conflict. Third, international or non-international armed conflict may be prevailed in North Korea. Lastly, situation that North Korean government loses its ability and willingness to control North Korean population. The capacity of North Korean government to control and regulate above-mentioned four situations would vary according to the degree of actual exercise of sovereignty by North Korea. The scope of North Korean government`s capacity to exercise her sovereignty would also affect the substances and categories of international law applied to four situations. For instance, in first two situations, North Korean government would reject humanitarian assistance from foreign states because North Korean government still has the capacity to control over situations in North Korean region. However, according to development of international law, North Korean government would be under duty to accept humanitarian assistance from abroad. In last two situations, North Korea would be placed in international armed conflict situation, such as war with foreign states or humanitarian intervention including unilateral humanitarian intervention or humanitarian intervention on the authorization of the UN Security Council. Also, North Korea would be exposed to non-international armed conflict such as civil war. Undoubtedly, international humanitarian law would be applied to these situations. Under current international law, State has responsibility to make every effort to protect human rights of her people. In case of massive human rights violations, such as crime against humanity, war crime, genocide and ethnic cleansing committed against its people by the State, international society should perform collective responsibility to protect by using even military force. Thus, the UNSC takes into account of applying the idea of responsibility to protect to overcome extreme crisis situation of North Korea. This hypothesis would be supported by the fact that the UNSC likewise responded to the matters of Libyan crisis. In this stage, leaders of North Korean government would be charged with violation of international humanitarian law by the International Criminal Court(ICC). However, there will be great difficulty to envisage possible referral of the North Korea`s situation to the ICC by a state party to the Rome Statute or independent investigation by the Prosecutor on the ground that North Korea is not the state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC. However, Darfur situation in Sudan and Libyan crisis was referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council. Only through this mechanism, individuals who committed the grave violation of the international humanitarian law in North Korea would be prosecuted by the ICC. Theoretically, with this UNSC`s referral it would be possible to punish perpetrators of North Korea for committing core crimes under the Rome Statute in North Korean region after 1 July 2002 when the Rome Statute entered into force. In conclusion, comprehensive reviews on (i) the existence of the duty to accept humanitarian assistance on the part of the affected State, which would be variable according to above-mentioned four stages, (ii) necessity of military intervention into North Korea through the idea of Responsibility to Protect, (iii) possible application of international humanitarian law, and (iv) accountability of North Korean perpetrators of grave violation of international humanitarian law would be needed for confronting with possible crisis situations in North Korea.

미중 전략경쟁과북·미·중 전략적 삼각관계의 변화 - 제3차 북핵 위기를 중심으로 -

이우탁 ( Lee Woo Tak ) 동국대학교 북한학연구소(구 동국대학교 안보연구소) 2021 북한학연구 Vol.17 No.1

김정은 체제 출범 이후 본격화된 북핵 3차 위기를 전략적 삼각관계 이론을 적용해 분석해보면 그 이전과 다른 특징이 발견된다. 특히 변화된 미국과 중국 관계가 가장 큰 변수다. 미중 관계가 갈수록 패권대결 의식이 강화되면서 북핵 문제도 미중관계와 연계된 하나의 현안으로 분명하게 자리 매김 된다. 또 다른 특징은 북한의 핵능력이 사실상 핵보유국 수준에 도달했다는 것이다. 이는 1차 2차 북핵위기 때보다 강화된 북한의 전략적 위상을 보여주며, 고스란히 북미중 전략적 삼각관계에 영향을 미쳤다. 3차 핵위기가 전개된 과정을 시기적으로 구분해볼 때 김정은 집권초기(2009년~2012년 4월)는 3개의 변화된 양상이 나타난다. 먼저 2009년에는 미국(B)과 중국(C) 관계가 여전히 우호적인 반면, 북한(A)과 중국(B) 관계는 악화되고, 북한(A)과 미국 (B)관계도 악화되는 안정적 결혼 모형의 시기였다가 북한의 2차 핵실험(위기조성행위)으로 상황변화가 일어나 일시적으로 북한과 중국이 우호적 관계를 회복하고, 미중 관계도 여전히 우호적 관계를 유지하면서, 3자 공존 모형에 가장 유사한 국면이 됐다. 하지만 2012년 2.29 합의 무산 이후 미국 내에서 대중국 기류가 크게 변한다. 중국의 부상을 용인해서는 안 된다는 중국위협론이 강하게 제기된 것이다. 이에 따라 북한의 핵무력 완성시기(2012년~2017년 3~6차 핵실험)는 줄곧 북한(A)과 미국(B)은 줄곧 부정적인 관계를 유지했고, 미국(B)과 중국(C)도 비우호적 관계로 넘어가는 관계였다. 북한과 중국 관계도 좀처럼 우호적인 관계를 회복하지 못했다. 가장 불안정한 삼각관계의 시기라 할 수 있다. 이후 갑작스럽게 북미 간 화려한 정상외교가 펼쳐진 시기(2018년~2020년 평창에서 하노이 노딜 이후)에는 북한과 미국이 기존의 적대관계에서 전격적으로 협상국면으로 전환하자, 북한과 중국 관계도 비우호적 관계에서 우호적으로 변해 갔음을 알 수 있다. 중국의 접근이 노골화되고, 이를 북한이 적극 활용한 결과다. 물론 미중 관계는 부정적 상태를 줄곧 유지했다. 말하자면 3자 비우호적 삼각관 계에서 전형적인 로맨틱 관계로 전환된 것을 알 수 있다. 당분간 이런 모형이 이 어질 것으로 보인다. 미국이 ‘패권도전국’ 중국을 압박하는 것을 최우선 외교정책으로 설정한 시기 인 만큼 3차 핵위기 시기에는 미국이 전략적 삼각관계의 양상을 결정하는 위치를 차지했다. 이는 북한이 주도했던 1차 핵위기 때와 중국의 주도적 역할이 두드러졌던 2차 핵위기 때와 확실하게 달라진 점이다. 이렇게 복잡하게 얽힌 전략적 상황은 북미중 전략적 삼각관계에도 이전에 볼 수 없었던 새로운 모형이 등장될 가능성을 시사해준다. New power dynamics in the third North Korean nuclear crisis can be explained by Dittmer’s concept of a “strategic triangle. Changing U.S.-China relations was an important factor in this case along with the coercive strategies from the Kim Jong-un regime. North Korea’s nuclear arms has thus become an issue linked to the hegemonic battle between the world’s two superpowers. Another concern is the continued advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. Through six nuclear tests-and a “successful” hydrogen bomb test-the country is now capable of producing plutonium and uranium-based nuclear weapons. This progress shows North Korea’s strategic position in the North Korea-U.S.-China relations, different from that at the time of the first and second North Korean nuclear crises. Early days of the third North Korean nuclear crisis (from Kim Jong-un’s succession, 2009~April 2012) can be divided into three stages. Although U.S. (B) and China (C) had a good partnership in 2009, North Korea (A)-China (C) and North Korea-U.S relations worsened. After North Korea’s second nuclear test, however, the situation changed; crisis brought about China’s rapprochement with North Korea. This ultimately formed a trilateral model of coexistence. Yet, the collapse of the Feb. 29 agreement (or the Leap Day Deal between North Korea and the U.S.) led the U.S. to question its partners. The China threat theory was raised, claiming that Americans must curb China’s rise. Accordingly, U.S. (B)-China (C) relations declined while North Korea conducted its third, fourth, fifth, and sixth nuclear tests (2012~2017). North Korea’s ties with the two countries also became strained. It was the period of an “unstable triangle relationship.” When North Korea and the U.S. entered the negotiation phase (after No-deal Hanoi Summit, 2018~2020), China also reached out to North Korea for friendly talks. North Korea accepted this, but U.S.-China relations remained relatively cold. In other words, there was a transition from an “unstable triangle relationship” to a “romantic triangle relationship,” where A has a positive link with both B and C while B and C has a negative link. This model is expected to continue for the time being. The U.S. was the most influential player in this triangle relationship during the third North Korean nuclear crisis, and it stepped up its pressure on China-the hegemonic challenger. This aspect is clearly different from the first and second North Korean nuclear crises period, when North Korea and China took the main roles, respectively. No one can predict how exactly the North Korea-U.S. relations will unfold in the future. As the saying goes: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies in world politics. What is clear is that denuclearization negotiations with North Korea will require a prolonged diplomatic engagement. Moreover, the U.S. and China’s fight for global dominance is likely to grow more intense. This complex situation suggests the possibility of a new triangular model that will reflect the future of North Korea-U.S.-China relations.

중국의 부상과 북한의 위기 : 중국 대한반도 정책의 딜레마

홍면기 통일연구원 2004 統一 政策 硏究 Vol.13 No.1

The rise of China, from the reform era since 1978, came to be an important and salient factor not only in the alliance formation of East Asia, in Cross-Straits relations, and in North-South Korean relations, but also in the regional stability and development of East Asia. And the relationship between the North Korea and China also now places an emphasis on its practical interests in mutual relations, not on blind alliance as past. In the other hand, the unification of North-South Korea came in practical and strategic area in that the durable and structural dimension of the crisis of North Korea and the development of mutual cooperation between North and South Korea, with a changing divided system, brought some change in balance of power surrounding them. The persistent crisis of North Korea and “the shaking divided system” in Korean peninsula give her the risk and chance at the same time. Taking advantage of the crisis of North Korea, the China can maximize her influence on North Korea and take initiatives in Far East, but also can be situated, regardless of her preference, in an inevitable dilemma when the crisis of North Korea becomes risky one. The China already considered the implication and effect of the crisis of North Korea and the ramification and consequence of “the possible problems” in the process of unification between North and South Korea, and preemptively takes measure. In this regard, there is an urgent need to more strongly institutionalize strategic cooperation and mutual collaboration in order to solidify the relationship between the China and South Korea. Most of all, it can be started to converse, through an epistemic community approach suggested by constructivists, on creative issues and themes for the prosperous future. Especially, the author's emphasis is that the north-east region of China should be treated with a strategic manner.

북한의 남북한 군사협상 결정요인 고찰

이미숙 ( Mi Sook Lee ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2010 국방연구 Vol.53 No.1

북한은 체제위기요인을 극복하기 위한 방편으로 남북한 군사협상을 활용하였다. 2000년 6·15이전 북한은 남한과의 군사협상을 통해 불가침을 포함한 ``남북기본합의서``을 채택하였지만, 사회주의체제의 붕괴로 인한 흡수통일에 대한 위협과 내부정치의 위기를 모면하는데 급급하였다. 그러나 북한은 6·15이후의 군사협상에서 다소 변화를 보였다. 북한은 6·15이전 군사협상시 정치외교적 요인을 중시하였으나, 6·15 이후의 군사협상시에는 경제적, 군사적 요인 특히 경제적 요인을 중시하였기 때문이다. 하지만 6·15이후의 실리적 요인도 군사외적인 요인에 불과했다. 북한의 경제적 요인에 의해 결정된 남북한 군사협상은 군사적 긴장완화라는 ``본질적인 군사문제``보다는 경제교류협력을 위한 군사적 지원에 국한되었기 때문이다. 군사적 요인도 마찬가지였다. 북한이 ``선전활동 중지와 선전수단 제거``라는 군사적 위기요인을 해소하기 위해 남북한 장성급군사회담을 개최하였지만, 이는 북한이 당면했던 문제로 낮은 수준의 군사적 신뢰구축문제에 불과했고, ``서해해상우발충돌방지``에 대한 논의도 남한의 경제적 지원을 지속시키기 위한 수단에 불과하였기 때문이다. 따라서 북한이 남북한 군사협상 개최시 경제적 요인과 군사적 요인을 중시한 것은 남북한 군사적 긴장완화를 위해서가 아니라 북한의 체제안정을 위한 현실적이고 실리적인 변화였다. North Korea have come out the military negotiations when she met urgent regime crisis like political and diplomatic emergencies, economic difficulties, and military threats. That is, North Korea made use of the South-North Korea Military Negotiations in order to overcome regime crisis. Despite North Korea adopted the resolution ``Agreement on Resolution, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North`` with South Korea only to get over regime crisis before 2000 the South-North Korean summit, she was just busy escaping crisis according to the collapses of socialist countries, domestic political crisis, and threats of being absorbed by South Korea. As well as it, after 2000 the South-North Korean summit North Korea came out the military negotiations to solve the economic problems. As a result of that, the South-North Korea Military Negotiations had a tendency to focus more ex-military issues than military ones. North Korea`s negotiational patterns somewhat converted after 2000 the South-North Korean summit. Her concentrations on the political-diplomatic factors before 2000 the South-North Korean summit altered economic and military ones, especially economic ones after one. It means that the determinants of North Korea`s military negotiations changed from the justifical factors as political-diplomatic factors to the practical ones as economic and military ones. But, latter factors, I think, were just ex-military ones because the South-North Korea Military Negotiations which were determined by the North Korea`s economic Factors were just limited as military supports than military issue itself in drder to lessen the military tensions. It apply to military factors too. The fact that North Korea used the South-North general-level military talks to solve military crisis factors like ``propaganda halt and removal of propaganda measures` means just low-level military confidence-building which were confronted by North Korea. Besides, the discussion of ``prevention against accidental collision at the west sea`` was just only a temporary expedient to maintain the South Korea`s economic support. In sum, North Korea`s focusing on economic and military factors when she held the military negotiations with South Korea was not to lessen military tension but to aim regime security, that is real and practical change.

북한의 위기조성전략과 한국의 대응방향

김재철(Jae Chul Kim) 한국아시아학회 2009 아시아연구 Vol.12 No.1

이명박 정부의 출범이후 남북관계는 북한의 반발로 거의 단절된 상태를 유지하고 있다. 또한 북한은 2009년도 1월 오바마 행정부가 들어서자 4월5일 장거리 로켓 발사와 5월25일 2차 핵실험을 강행함으로써 미국을 실험하고 있다. 북한의 위기조성은 한국전쟁 이후 지금까지 계속되어 왔다. 냉전시대에 북한의 위기조성의 목적은 ‘한반도 공산화’라는 궁극적 목표에 치중한 반면, 탈냉전 이후에는 ‘정권안보 및 체제유지’와 경제난 극복 등 당면목표에 비중을 두고, 핵과 미사일을 위기조성의 수단으로 하여 생존전략을 모색하고 있으며, 전통적인 충격요법으로 벼랑끝 전술과 살라미 전술 등을 계속 사용할 것이다. 김정일 3기체제하에서 북한의 위기조성전략의 성격은 오바마 행정부와 새로운 협상과정이며, 종국적으로는 잠재적 핵보유국으로서 지위를 모색하고 있다는 점이다. 이를 위해서 핵과 미사일 주 수단으로 활용하겠지만, 과거의 경험에 비추어 볼 때 국지 제한적 군사적 도발도 배제할 수 없을 것이다. 이러한 북한의 전략에 대해 바람직한 방향은 사안별로 구분하여 ‘강온전략’을 선택하는 것이 것이다. 이에 대한 한국의 대응은 북한의 군사적 도발에 대한 대비태세를 갖추는 것과 북한을 핵보유국으로 인정되는 사태 방지, 대북정책 개선을 통한 남북교류협력 활성화, 한미공조체제 유지, 6자회담 재개를 위한 주변국과의 외교적 노력 강화 등에 중점을 두어야 한다. 북한은 유엔안보리의 대북결의 1874호에 따라 적용되는 국제사회의 제재에 맞서 위기조성의 수위를 더욱 높여갈 것으로 보인다. 따라서 향후 한반도의 안보정세의 향방은 오바마 행정부의 대북정책에 달려 있다고 해도 과언이 아니다. 한미양국은 강온전략을 통해 북한에 대한 제재와 유인책을 병행하면서 위기국면을 대화국면으로 전환할 수 있도록 노력해야 할 것이다. 단지 어떠한 경우라도 북한을 핵보유국으로 인정되는 사태를 방지하고, 북한의 무력도발에 대한 철저히 대비하는 조치는 한국안보의 사활이다. Since the inauguration of Lee Myeong-Bak`s government, relations between South Korea and North Korea has almost ruptured as North Korea has resisted against the more practical North Korea policies. North Korea launched a long-distance rocket when the government led by Obama was inaugurated in January 2009 to test the United States. Its crisis making has continued since the Korea War. The purpose of such crisis making is aimed at `communization of the Korean peninsular` an ultimate goal in the Cold War whereas it aims at `maintenance of its system` and `overcoming economic crisis` in the Post Cold War period. North Korea is developing strategies for survival using weapons of mass destruction and will continue to use conventional shock treatments such as brinkmanship and salami tactics. North Korea`s crisis making strategy is characterized by negotiations for maintenance of its system and overcoming economic crisis under the System Period 3 of Kim, Jeong-Il and it is promoting its post as having potential nuclear weapons while negotiating on nuclear weapons. For the purpose, it uses nuclear weapons and missiles as the main means, but in term of past experiences, it will keep face with local and limited military stimulation. So our desirable direction against North Korea`s strategies is to develop the `strong and mild strategy` according to respective situations. Our directions should focus on: Being prepared against North Korea`s military escalation; Preventing recognition of North Korea as having nuclear weapons; Separation of the issues of nuclear weapons and the relations between South and North Korea, and reinforced effort to reopen exchanges between North Korea and South Korea Maintenance of the mutual assistance system between Korea and the U.S.A. and Reinforcement of diplomatic effort with surrounding countries for reopening of the six-party talks. North Korea appears to escalate the level of crisis making against the punishment imposed by international society in accordance with the joint statement of the Security Council. Therefore, it is no exaggeration that the future direction of security in the Korean peninsula depends on the North Korea policy led by the Obama government. Korean and the U.S.A. should try to change this crisis into peace by providing both punishment and incentives for North Korea through the `strong and mild strategy`. However, in any case, the situation that North Korea has nuclear weapons has to be prevented and we should be completely prepared against North Korea`s armed provocation for our security.