동학농민전쟁부터 3ㆍ1운동까지, 종교계의 활동으로 본 사회ㆍ사상변화의 대서사 : 이영호, 『동학ㆍ천도교와 기독교의 갈등과 연대, 1893-1919』(푸른역사, 2020)

이영호 역사문제연구소 2021 역사문제연구 Vol.25 No.1

북한 군사력의 해부 : 위협의 정도와 수준-남북 군사력 균형 평가를 중심으로 Assessment on the Degree and Level of the Threat by Measuring the Balance of Military Capabilities between South and North Korea

이영호 한국전략문제연구소 1997 전략연구 Vol.4 No.3

The fall of communism and collapse of the cold war regime in the international arena, it seems, cannot keep North Korea from concentrating all her efforts building the legitimacy of Kim Jung-il' s political succession by maintaining and strengthening the monolithic ideological thought of Kim Il-sung. Despite of the strained national economy having created more difficulties for regime's preservation, North Korea has been domestically indulged herself into building the cult of personality for Kim Jung-il since the death of Kim Il-sung last year: needs for the demonstration of his abilities as a "general" and "Highest Commander-In-Chief of the North Korean Peoples Armed Forces(NKPA) seems to have made the Border Guards be under the direct control of defense ministry. NKP A now is consisted of more than one million personnel in active service: armed with more than 3,800 tanks, 10,000 artillery pieces, 850 combat aircrafts and 460 various naval combatants: which has been continuously reinforced by the deployment of newly built tanks, amphibious combat vehicles, APCs, hovercrafts, long range artillery pieces at the front, the introduction of newly tested ballastic missiles and forward redeployment of combat aircrafts; all of which will eventually enhance the NKPA's capabilities for surprise attack. Since an assessment of balance between two rivals' military capabilities is perhaps more important in judging the probability of a war than any other factor because national capabilities (including military capabilities) are relatively more static or constant than national intension (including political intension) when you presume war is functional outcome of both variables, national capabilities and intension, this paper will mainly focus on quantified comparison of forces' capabilities to provide general outline on the degree and level of North Korean military threat to South. And if the dictum, "war is an extension or a tool of politics", is an acceptable hypothesis, some what reversed hypothesis "military capabilities will set the boundary of political intension" is perhaps acceptable one since national capabilities will often decisively work in setting the political goals and means. If so, then, the correct analysis and assessment of military balance between two Koreas can provide significant symptoms for the boundaries of North Korea's political intension in near future. It is goes without saying that even the fundamental problems inherited in he quantified analysis of military capabilities using such method as ADE(Armor Division Equivalent) Scoring, which this paper applies, is remained unsolvable.: however. this is the only available method that, in a current warfare, quality factor of weapons system and intangible factors of military capabilities such as C3I, which appear to be very important at the contemporary war such as Gulf War, can be counted. In case of ground forces' capabilities, NKPA is armed partly with some obsolete weapons system of PRC and Soviet Union and in large part with self produced weapons system of relatively high quality. The total ADE scores of NKPA's ground forces is about 1.4~1.8 times of those of ground forces of Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKA). More significant is that the force structure of NKPA's ground forces is formed to exercise its combat fighting capability more effectively than ROKA's ground forces: Of its total ADE scores, 65.7% are composed with major attack weapons system which is consisted of fire powers and maneuver capabilities at the ratio of two to one. In comparisons with this, of total ADE scores of the ROKA's ground forces, 60% are composed with major attack weapons system and 40% with foot soldiers, 5% higher than that of NKPA's. In addition, NKPA already reorganized its Spear Head Units for infiltration and break-through operations into formidable numbers of brigades. after having had field maneuver tests of brigade's size units that is optimally operational under condition of the Korean terrains and its main forces with large scale mechanized units which can. perhaps. be used at the maneuver operations at the step of both exploit and pursuit after the break-through. Accounting all of these. it can be said that NKP A may be capable of exercising its own ''britz- krieg". perhaps North Korean's prototype of OMG against South Korea. In case of naval capabilities. the ratio of ship fire power index between North and South is about 100 to 90 which can be said almost even. The capabilities of component operations. however. differ each other. The ship fire power index of NKPN in missile boat and submarine out-numbers ROKN as much as 4 times. while in case of destroyer and patrol craft, ROKN out-numbers the NKPN from 2.5 to 5 times. NKPN is so structured withlarge numbers of small combatants as to exercise ''hit and run" operations around coastal area; and in the fields of short distance surprise landing, infiltration support. sea lane harassment, mine laying and coastal defense NKPN can probably perform the operations more effectively than ROKN; except for the submarine attack. as the high-sea operation capabilities are very limited. KKPN' s main fleet perhaps cannot but avoid direct confrontation against South Korean Fleet at high sea. As for ROKN have more capabilities of high sea operations than NKPN, it is expected for ROKN to conduct relatively independent naval operation with more effectiveness than KKPN in the areas of anti-submarine warfare. some what large scale landing support. and cutting the line of communications on the sea. As for the case of air forces capabilities. even if fire power index of Air force of North Korean Peoples Armed Forces(NKPAF) appears to be about 10% to 20% higher than that of Air Force of ROK Armed Forces (ROKAF). disparity of capabilities between two Korea's air forces may be neglect able when technologically advanced electronic equipments and higher skill of pilots of ROKAF were considered. And in case of the force structure, NKPAF is consisted by 44% of its total fire power index with obsolete type of aircrafts, MIG-17/19 in contrast to ROKAF of which total fire power index only 31% is consisted by the relatively obsolete type of aircraft F-5C/D. This well indicates ROKAF is more modernized than its rival. Considering the disadvantages posed by the inferior qualities of weapons system and pilots' skills of NKPAF as well as the advantages of absolute superiority in the quantities of aircrafts, NKPAF may believe that in case of war, to maximize the effects of initial surprise attack is the only way to preserve the parity, if not superiority, of air power. And to achieve this goal. NKPAF can, most likely, utilize those obsolete aircrafts as the suicidal commando forces infiltrating deep into South to strike strategic targets such as communication posts, air fields or aircrafts at lots and perform "dog-fighting" with large scales of wings to disrupt the effectiveness of electronics. Then, as for the ROKAF, early warning capabilities and counter measures to the initial surprise attack as well as break-down of "dog-fighting" will be the key for achievement of air superiority at the initial stage of war. Of other North Korean military capabilities, not-neglectable are both the chemical warfare and the infiltration capabilities. Since NKPA has formidable amounts(1.000 tons to 3,000tons) of all kinds chemical agent in stock. but also large numbers of delivery means such as IL-28 bombers, 150mm/170mm artillery pieces, FROG-5/7 and SCUD missiles, it is highly possible that NKPA in case of war will launch a chemical warfare in order to make a break-through at front or to achieve a strategic goal by direct attack on Seoul. capital city with high density of population. In contrast to North Korean capabilities of chemical warfare, South Korea's protective capabilities remains at the very rudimentary level. The individual protective equipment at combat field under CBR warfare is proved with very limited sustainability of combat fighting and group protection and regional counteraction system for the high densely populated area is turned out to be in need of urgent improvement. NKPA is accounted of its capabilities to infiltrate all at once about 3 brigades by aireal and naval means and 6 to 7 brigades through ground routes. These units, after having infiltrated just into ROKA's front or/and deep into South, can work decisively, it is believed, for securing the high speedy maneuver of the main attack forces, NKPA's ground forces by opening up the routes for their maneuver and by checking free advance of ROKA's combat reserves through the assault or occupation of strategic position of operation. ROKA's counter-infiltration operations which in general is due to rely on much to the reserve forces's operations, seems mainly to focus on counter measures against the operation of the infiltrated troops within South Korean regions instead on early detection and strike on the way of initial infiltration movement. Of various fields of military capabilities, advantageous area for South Korea includes such intangible factors as logistics, C3I. training and exercises, morale which are often regarded as the multiplier for the capabilities. It can be said that NKPA is outstripped to ROKA in the fields of logistics, communications. and combat intelligence, even to it in the fields of discipline and commanding ability, but still inanimate relatively to ROKA in the fields of morale and training and exercises. It can be presumed that in field of the intangible capabilities as the multiplier, ROKA will be weighted 20% to 30% more than its rival. The net assessment, relied on static analysis of the military balance between South and North Korea shows that ROKA's capabilities is about 73% to 75% of NKPA's and will reach to 85% to 87% of it when we weight ROKA 20% to 30% more with the multiplier of intangible factors. Even if war is an extension of politics and the causes of war vary in accordance with the political purposes, it also can be said that no rational politics of a nation can make a reckless war without close and enough accounts in advance on the winning. So, even though static analysis provides presumption of no expectation for winning to both South and North, still, additionally necessary is the dynamic analysis which enables the close examination on the level and contents of the threat and the war probabilities through a realistic analysis of war game models or war simulations under realistic combat condition and war situation presumed from both rivals' strategies, tactics, military postures, terrain and even climate conditions. Dynamic analysis of the South and North Korean military capabilities is believed to be conducted by the experts within the military services and the outcomes of it is presumed to be used for complement for OP 5027, the defense plan for ROK and eventually applied for force improvement plans. Since it needs more spaces for details of outcomes of any war game. this paper provides. instead of detailed dynamic analysis. only the fundamental frame-work of scenarios for North Korea's offense and its expected outcomes. The NKPA is known to deploy about % of its total ground forces southward Pyongyang-Wonsan line. This posture can be considered as flexible one for both offensive and defensive operation with the ratio of front to reserve forces at 2:1 rather than it is usually understood as one of offensive only. ADE scores of the front units of both side ground forces maintain almost parity in general. although slightly different in accordance with each approach: therefore. in the case of a usual attrition warfare. it might be difficult for anyone side. either South or North. to make any strategically significant break-through of the Front within a short time. There is not, however. little possibility for NKPA to make an unexpected break through of the Front. if not by an unexpected force concentration. by a successful surpTIse attack invaliding early warning system of ROKA (and its allied forces, U.S. Armed Forces), making a significant break-through with the help of the chemical offensive operations and/or large scale infiltration operations followed by the maneuver operations of large scale mechanized units consisting the maneuver group for the exploitation and pursuit before the intersections of the ROKA's reserve forces either directly to occupy the capital city, Seoul or to closely encircle it. Yet. it seems that this doesn't impair much the deterrent provided by the south Korean military capabilities when the available counter measures are considered. Although not with- standing to account other deterrent factors such as allied force capabilities, especially U.S. force's C31 and war-time reinforcements, it can be insisted that two Koreas maintain so highly dense military forces as to enable the mutual deterrence even if current military capabilities is in favor of the North at the Hone) to 0.75 ratio over the South. If both two Koreas continue to improve their military capabilities during next half decade in a manner similar to those they did past decade. south Korea may be hardly able to gain the parity of military capabilities with north before the beginning of the 21'st Century. This slow improve- ment of the disparity of military capabilities between two Koreas seems rather not to impair much the military stability on the Korean peninsular. than to increment the high density of forces confronting each other. Since the confrontation between two high strengths maintains to create a strained condition against each other, it is presumable that the pendulum of the relations between south and North Korea will keep swinging between the high military tension and the political rapprochement and the dangerousness of a war out-break will remain as in the past if not incremental. out of the mutual misunderstandings,miscalculations on the opponent's capabilities or unexpected incidents.

학문과 생활24:이대 이영호 교수

이영호 북한연구소 1977 北韓 Vol.- No.61

항정신약물과 항우울제의 조합사용

李榮浩 大韓神經精神醫學會 1976 신경정신의학 Vol.15 No.1

From our advantage point as clinicians with a working knowledge of basic pharmacologic research. we thought that certain commonly accepted clinical observations would be of interest to the clinician and psychopharmacological. The clinical observation that antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs may exert their respective therapeutic effects independently when combination therapy in patients disclosing mixed symptomatology seems to have important psychopharmacological implications. In the current psychopharmacological concepts, this clinical observation shows that suggesting the dopamine system is an important factor to the etiology and therapy of schizophrenia and the norepinephrine system is an important factor to the etiology and therapy of depressive illness.

人格敎育과 禪

李英浩 동국대학교 불교대학 1981 東國思想 Vol.14 No.-

소년보호기관에서의 회복적 사법 실천 방안

이영호 梨花女子大學校 法學硏究所 2009 法學論集 Vol.14 No.2

2008년 6월 시행된 소년법에 신설된 화해권고제도는 여러 비판과 한계를 안고 출발하였지만, 당사자 간의 자율적 갈등해결을 위한 회복적 사법의 실천적 토대를 마련하였다는 데에 그 의의가 있다. 본 논문에서는 2007년 서울소년원 출원예정학생 2명 및 소년분류심사원 상담조사소년 3명을 대상으로 회복적 사법을 적용하고 그 문제점을 파악해 보았다. 당사자 사이의 갈등 조정을 법원단계에 이르러 비로소 행한다는 점에서 소년분류심사원에서 의뢰한 회복적 사법을 적용할 대상자를 선정하기 어려웠으며, 조사와 회복적 사법을 병행하기에는 법원에서 제시하는 처리 기한은 부족했다. 회복적 사법의 구체적인 실천을 위한 구체적인 지침의 미비 및 조정 주체의 확보 문제도 드러났다. 또한 합의를 이행하는 데에 지도·감독기관이 없다는 문제가 있었다. 게다가 소년원의 경우 사건 발생 후 오랜 시간이 경과하였기 때문에 당사자들이 자발적인 참여와 협조를 기대하기가 더 어려웠다. 회복적 사법을 활성화하기 위해서는 관련 조문이나 규칙 등 구체적인 지침을 마련해야 하며, 실무를 담당할 전문가 양성 등 전담기구의 신설을 위한 국가 예산의 뒷받침이 필요하다. 또한 회복적 사법이 좀 더 초기 단계에서 시행될 수 있도록 확대해야 하며, 합의에 대한 이행을 점검할 지도·감독기관을 설치해야 한다. 소년원에서의 당사자 참여의 제약을 극복하기는 어렵기 때문에 피해자 관점의 교육을 실시하는 것이 보다 효율적이다. Compromise Recommendation System which was created in June 2008 under the Juvenile Act is started with many critics and limitations. However, it is meaningful because it laid practical groundwork for autonomous problem-solving to both parties. This paper is focused on applying Restorative Justice and figuring out the problem by using samples, 2 juvenile delinquents from the Juvenile Protection Facility in Seoul and 3 juvenile who are counseled from The Juvenile Protection Education Institution. Since conflict mediation was conducted in the court stage, it was hard to select the samples to apply Restorative Justice. It was in a rush to do investigation and application of Restorative Justice at the same time, because the due date from the court was very tense. Moreover, problems were revealed such as imperfection of specific guideline for concrete practice, how to keep mediation subjects and so on. Also, there was no regulator to observe whether both parties perform mutual agreement or not. Especially for 2 juvenile delinquents, it had been a long time since the event was occurred, it was hard to expect their voluntary participation and cooperation. To revitalize the Restorative Justice, it is required to get a budget to establish a task force, in addition to lay down rules. Also, we have to try to operate Restorative Justice in an early stage. Moreover, it is necessary to set up a regulator to check whether both parties perform mutual agreement or not. It is not easy to overcome the lack of voluntary participation of juvenile delinquents from the Juvenile Protection Facility; instead, it would be more efficient to educate the perspective of the victims to them.

강섬유 보강 콘크리트의 휨 피로거동

李英浩,朴弘用,邊炯均 明知大學校 産業技術硏究所 2007 産業技術硏究所論文集 Vol.26 No.-

Steel fiber reinforced concrete is a cement-based material reinforced with short steel fibers. Debonding and pulling out of fibers require more energy, giving a substantial increase in toughness and resistance to cyclic and dynamic loads. This experimental study were carried out in order to investigate the static and fatigue flexural behavior of steel fiber reinforced concrete. Test parameters were the volume fraction of steel fiber, aspect ratio and initial crack depth. The experiments of both static test and fatigue test were conducted. In the static test, the steel fiber reinforced concrete beam specimens of size 150 x 150x 550 ㎜ were tested under 4-point loading to investigate the flexural strength, notch sensitivity and toughness index. The fatigue test was also conducted to investigate the fatigue strength of steel fiber reinforced concrete. Also, RTA round pannel experiment was conduted to find the energy absorption capacity of steel fiber reinforced concrete and consturct in S-N curve to learn the fatigue behavior on test parameters. It was found that steel fiber reinforced concrete shows much better fatigue behavior than norma plain concrete.

항 거식세포(Antimacrophage)혈청이 동종피부 이식에 미치는 영향

柳在德,李英浩 大韓成形外科學會 1974 Archives of Plastic Surgery Vol.1 No.1

Antimacrophage serum(AMS) was first prepared by Unanue (1968), and thereafter AMS has been widely utilized in study the role of macrophage in immunological response of the host. Studies were carried out in the mouse system to establish the effect of AMS on skin allograft survival. Skin transplantation was done by the method of Thoenes (1969). Protective bandage was removed 5 days after transplantation, and survival time was meawured by the time of complete rejection of transplanted skin. To establish the effects of antimacrophage serum(AMS) on skin allograft in mice, a series of experiment was conducted, and the results are summarized as follows; 1) At least 3 precipitation lines were identified between AMS and macrophage antigen by agar gel diffusion test. Among them, only one precipitation line appeared to be macrophage-specific and the other two shared common antigenicity with those of lymphoid cell antigen. 2) In AMS-treated mice, changes in white cell counts of peripheral blood and pathological findings in the spleens resembled closely with observations made by others. 3) Treatment with AMS significantly prolonged skin allograft survival time and this effect was similar to those by X-ray total body irradiation.

콩 양질, 고단백 품종 육성방향

이영호,박래경,김석동,홍은희,황영현,정길웅 한국콩연구회 1989 韓國콩硏究會誌 Vol.6 No.1

人類가 栽培하는 作物中에서 콩 만큼 용도가 다양한 작물이 없고 또한 단위 면적당 가장 蛋白質 生産을 많이 하는 作物이라고 볼 때, 앞으로 安定的인 蛋白質 供拾을 爲해서는 콩이라는 作物을 다시 認識하면서 良質·高蛋白 콩 新品種 育成에 더 많은 努力이 경주되어야 할 때라고 보아 그 間 이 부분에 대한 연구내용을 중심으로 정리한 바, 다음과 같은 결론을 얻었다. 1. 遺傳資源의 지속적인 수집·분류·특성조사 및 보관을 해야 되고, 특허 高蛋白 新品種 育成에 야생콩의 이용에 관심을 두어야 한다. 2. 雜種集團에서 多收性에 촛점 맞추면서 단위면 적당 단백질 生産을 높이는 方向으로 하되, 高蛋白系統을 2次 選拔對象으로 삼는다. 3. 組合에 따라서는 蛋白質 含量도 높고 收良도 높은 경우가 있을 뿐 아니라, 蛋白質 含量의 遺傳力도 比較的 높고 遺傳獲得量도 크다. 4. 11S 蛋白質內에 含硫黃아미노산인 Methionine의 함량이 높아 Germplasm 中에서 11S 蛋白質이 높은 品種을 交配 母本으로 이용하고, 系統選拔時 11S/7S의 비율이 높은 것을 選拔할 수 있도록 한다.

Marjolin's Ulcer 13예 보고

유재덕,김성수,이세일,이영호 大韓成形外科學會 1976 Archives of Plastic Surgery Vol.3 No.1

During the past ten years, from July, 1964, to June, 1974, we have treated 13 cases of epidermoid carcinoma in burn scars (Marjolin's ulcer) at Severance hospital. The results are summarized briefly as follows; 1) The sex distribution was slightly more in male (61.5%_ than female (48.5%). 2) The cause of burn was flame (8 cases) and scald (5 cases). 3) Mean age at the time of diagnosis was 41.6 years and mean age at the time of burn was 13.8 years and average interval from burn to pathologic diagnosis was 28.8 years. 4) Average greatest diameter of ulcer was 8.6cm. 5) Two cases showed bony destruction in ulcer in X-ray examination. 6) The location of ulcer was most frequetly on the lower extremity (10 cases), especially on the popliteal fossa (7 cases), followed by upper extremity (2 cases) and trunk (1 case). 7) Patients were treated by wide excision and skin graft (11 cases), and wide excision saucerization of tibia and cross-leg flap ( 1case_, and A-K amputation (1 case). 8) There was none of metastasis of lymph nodes in all seven cases that performed regional lymph node dissection. 9) In three cases, regional lymph node metastasis after wide excision was occured.