금융회사에서의 Legal Risk 관리 (서완석)

서완석 기업소송연구회 2009 기업소송연구 Vol.7 No.-

국제항공운송법의 연혁과 전망

서완석 한국기업법학회 2005 企業法硏究 Vol.19 No.2

상법상의 소수주주 축출제도 -소수주식 강제매수제도와 교부금 합병제도를 중심으로-

서완석 한국상사법학회 2011 商事法硏究 Vol.30 No.2

This paper is intended to discuss the controversial issue of the system of Squeeze-Out or Freeze-Out. Squeeze-Out or Freeze-Out is a term referring to the compulsory acquisition of the stakes of a small group of shareholders from a joint stock company by means of cash compensation. In Germany, a pool of shareholders owning at least 95% of a company's shares has the right to “squeeze out” the remaining minority of shareholders by paying them an adequate compensation. This procedure is based on the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG). An alternative procedure is governed by Articles 327a-327f of the German Stock Corporation Ac (AktG), valid since January 1.st 2002. In the meantime, under the U.S. squeeze-outs are governed by State laws. For example, Delaware Corporation law permits a parent corporation owning at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to merge with that subsidiary, and to pay off in cash the minority shareholders. The consent of the minority shareholders is not required. They are merely entitled to receive fair value for their shares. In Korea, now, the squeeze-out system is introduced in Articles 24 of 360 - 26 of 360 under the amended Korean Commercial Code. According to new articles of amended law, controlling shareholders who own 95%of the stock issued by a company Compulsory purchase the stocks of minority shareholders who have under 5% of issued stocks of the company, so that controlling shareholders can squeeze out minority shareholders. Thus, under the new scheme of Korean law, the issues of ensuring the fairness or justice related the protection of minority shareholders become controversial. The most important thing is to guarantee fairness under the legal system. Also, it is necessary to arrange systematic and effective methods for a protection of minority shareholders. It is time when we should reconsider its legal system with great interest in order to harmonize with the protection of minority shareholders.

한국형 단축형 부모용 Swanson, Nolan and Pelham 제4판 (SNAP-IV) 척도의 신뢰도 및 타당도 연구

서완석,장혜경,김진성,이종범 대한신경정신의학회 2008 신경정신의학 Vol.47 No.1

Objectives:This study was conducted to investigate the reliability and validity of the short form, parental version of the Korean SNAP-IV. Methods:The Korean SNAP-IV, SNAP, CPRS were applied to the groups of 605 control and 94 ADHD children, aged 6- 12 years. Test-retest reliability, internal consistency and split half reliability were performed as a reliability test and criterion validity, factor analysis and discriminant validity were also performed as a validity test. Results:The Coefficient of test-retest reliability and split half reliability were 0.84/0.86 and 0.73/0.78 for both inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity subscales. The Internal consistency was also excellent. The Criterion validity and discriminant validity rates were between 0.59 and 0.82. Three factors were identified in factor analysis. Conclusion:This study demonstrates that the short form, parental version of the Korean SNAP-IV is a reliable and valid instrument in the evaluation and screening of ADHD-related behaviors in children

증권거래법상의 부실표시에 대한 손해배상책임

서완석 한국기업법학회 2004 企業法硏究 Vol.16 No.-

A registered offering under the Securities and Exchange Act (hereinafter it'll be epitomized 'The Act') requires that a registration statement be utilized. A key policy underlying this requirements is to enable prospective purchasers to make informed investment decisions based upon the disclosure of adequate and truthful information regarding the issuer, its associated persons, etc. This policy is frustrated when a registration statement(including the prospectus that comprises part of the registration statement) contains materially false or misleading statements. In view of the above, investors under certain conditions may recover their losses if they purchase securities pursuant to a registration statement containing a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure. The Act's provisions most likely to be invoked in this context are Section 14, 15, 16. The Act has special provisions for damaged investors due to the false or misleading statements in a registration statement and prospectus. The above provisions originally was promulgated to make damages upon breach of The Act appropriate in consideration of the characteristics of securities market in which trade is usually made by non-face-to-face among many or unspecified parties. In other words the focus should be upon the harmonization between the principle of perfect investor protection and adequate criteria to obliger for damages in order to make securities market function properly. Therefore in order for a bit of truthful information and fair rule to be permeated generally in securities market, the institution that make possible appropriate liability against the violation of laws, proper damages and relief is needed. In the final analysis in micro perspective it is needless to say that the provision of damages upon false or misleading statement in a registration statement be articulated meticulously. Futhermore with the introduction of class action system in The Act, motives for bringing a suit among investors will be stronger so I think a research how to optimize the problem of assessment of the amount of damages in macro perspective is urgently necessary in view of the limitations of established provision in solving the above assessment problem and in the long term the introduction of punitive damages should be reviewed positively.

해상운송인의 면책사유 검토

서완석,김영주 가천대학교 법학연구소 2010 가천법학 Vol.3 No.2

본 논문은 해상운송인의 면책사유와 관련한 2004년 대법원 판결에 관한 해석론을 피력하면서 항해과실 면책을 그대로 존속시켜야 하는지에 관하여 논하고 있다. 대법원 판결에서의 쟁점은 해상운송인의 면책사유 중 특히 항해과실 면책에 관한 가부를 쟁점으로 하는 것이었다. 법원은 사안에서의 사고가 상법 제795조 제2항 소정의 항해과실 의한 사고이므로 운송인에게 손해배상책임을 지울 수 없다고 판시하고 있는데, 이에 관하여는 재검토가 필요하다고 본다. 우리 상법은 항해과실면책(화재면책 포함)과 기타 운송인의 개별적인 면책사유를 따로 분리하여 규정하고 있으므로 이에 대한 정확한 구별이 필요함에도 법원에서는 이에 관해 명시적인 판단을 하고 있지 않다는 점, 국제적으로는 항해과실면책이라는 운송인의 중대한 면책사유가 현재 폐지되는 추세이므로 법원이 해상운송인의 항해과실면책을 상법 제796조의 각호와는 달리 보다 좁고 엄격하게 해석했어야 하지 않는가 하는 아쉬움이 있다. 대법원이 이 사건에서 인정한 해상운송인의 항해과실 면책은 상법상의 문리적 해석을 충실이 따른 것으로 보이나, 이와 같은 해상운송인의 항해과실 면책은 이제 그 존폐여부에 관한 검토가 필요하다고 생각한다. 본 논문은 이와 관련하여 해상운송인의 항해과실 면책사유를 폐지하는 것에 찬성하며, 그 근거로는 첫째, 항해과실 면책이 사법상의 일반원칙의 중대한 위반이라는 점, 둘째, 현재 항해술과 선박 자체의 엄청난 발전이 이루어졌다는 점, 셋째, 항해술의 주체인 선원들의 전문화가 어느 정도 달성되었다는 점, 넷째, 운송인의 사용인에 대한 통제력이 강화되었다는 점, 다섯째, 항해과실과 상사과실과의 구별이 매우 어렵다는 점, 여섯째, 육상운송이나 항공운송 등 기타 운송법 체제와의 형평성을 고려해야 한다는 점, 일곱째, 선박 자체의 성능과 전문화가 이루어졌다는 점, 여덟째, 현대의 국제해상운송법 체제의 입법 발전 추세와 조화를 이루어야 한다는 점 등을 들고 있다. The exceptions of the carrier's responsibility for cargo has been changed to the development of social and economic aspects of sea transportation of goods as well as the improvement of the transport technologies. Especially, the one of the exonerations of sea carrier, fault or errors in navigation or in the management of the ship, is always controversial and, at times, esoteric issue. The main issue in the Korean Supreme Court Decision, 2004 DA 8494, is whether the sea carrier can be exempted when loss or damage resulting from fault or errors in navigation or in the management of the ship. Under the Article 795 (2) of the Korean Commercial Code, neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or the management of the ship. Thus, according to the nautical fault defense of the Code, the Supreme Court in this case held that the carrier could possibly use liability immunity.However, it is necessary to rethink the nautical fault defense of the sea carrier. The new international convention in 2008, U.N. Convention on the contract of international carriage of goods wholly or partly sea (so-called the Rotterdam Rules), differs from the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules, Korean Commercial Law in that (1) the carrier's exemption from the liability caused by the error in the navigation or management of the ship is deleted; (2) the fire exemption is also slighty modified but remained as one of the exceptions; (3) the traditional catalogue of defenses of the carrier is retained. Therefore, the international main stream of the exonerations system in sea carrier is the abolition the nautical fault defense. Also, there are important reasons for abolishing this exception of the sea carrier. They are as follows: (ⅰ) The nautical fault defense is a material breach of general rules in private law; (ⅱ) The art of navigation, nautical instruments, high efficient vessel, etc., developed rapidly from that time when the nautical fault defense was enacted laws down to this day; (ⅲ) the specialization of seamen or mariner was achieved; (ⅳ) the carriers' control on their employer was strengthened; (ⅴ) it is really difficult to judge whether the nautical fault (errors of navigation) or the commercial fault (negligence in management of the ship); (ⅵ) a maintaining of the nautical fault exception in only sea carriage (on the contrary to this, there is no nautical fault defense in both land carriage and air carriage) loses the principle of equitable treatment; (ⅶ) the trend of current international transportation law system is the repeal of the nautical fault defense. Therefore, it is time we do away with the nautical fault exemption.

[시] 무궁화 동산

서완석 한글학회 1946 한글 Vol.- No.97

훈민정음 머리말

서완석 한국어교육학회 1963 국어교육 Vol.- No.5

1주1의결권의 원칙과 주식의 본질

서완석,김상우 가천대학교 법학연구소 2015 가천법학 Vol.8 No.4

This paper discusses the voting right restrictions, one of the most debated topics in the current Korean commercial law academia. The analysis is mainly based on discussions in Germany and Japan, on the nature of shares. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the legal flexibility of applying the one-share-one-vote rule to the shareholder’s voting right. It is prescribed by the Korean commercial law to observe the one-share-one-vote rule. Therefore it is not allowed to grant more or less than one vote to one share, or to issue stocks that hold nonlinear vote numbers. Thus, multiple voting shares or dual class voting shares are both invalid, even when they are fixed by the articles of association. In traditional understanding, the nature of shares comes from membership rights. Accordingly, stocks are combined with voting rights in nature. From such concepts, the one-share-one-vote rule was derived. One-share-one-vote rule is related to the nature of shareholders, their legal rights, and the nature of corporation, or the legal status of the shareholder or the corporation. Up until now, the one-share-one-vote rule has been supported throughout Korea as understanding the nature of stocks through the membership rights, and it has never been controversial. However, Germany or Japan is different to Korea. These countries have suggested various explanations to the nature of shares within the progress of creating and expanding the theory of membership rights. Especially, Japan has recently changed the permission rate of non-voting shares from conditional to unconditional. This is a typical case that released the one-share-one-vote rule. Furthermore, a new perspective of understanding voting rights as something that legislator freely distributes in perspective of “corporation’s profit maximization” has also appeared. Recently, countries with multiple voting or dual-class voting system have increased because of the benefits that multiple voting shares hold in hostile merger and acquisition. For this reason, Korea has also begun a serious discussion on this matter. Although the one-share-one-vote rule cannot be said to be the absolute good, it is true that it has been treated as an infrangible concept. If so, is it impossible to make the one-share-one-vote rule flexible? In general, property rights can be regulated if there are reasonable causes. Therefore, if the nature of private interest that voting rights hold is emphasized, the differentiation can be justified to hold a relatively bigger public good. It can be further explained that providing different voting rights in purpose of producing larger profits or bigger public goods, is not necessarily violating the shareholder’s rights. In general, all provisions must be interpreted within the belonging act’s purpose of legislation and their functions. Accordingly, the one-share-one-vote rule can become flexible either under the theory of membership rights or non-membership rights. Therefore, multiple voting shares or dual-class voting shares can become valid when fixed by the articles of association. 이 글은 최근 한국 상법학계에서의 가장 뜨거운 주제 중 하나인 의결권규제에 관한 문제를 다루고 있다. 특히 주식의 본질론은 주식회사의 본질론과도 맥을 같이 하는데, 우리나라의 경우에는 주식사원권론이 통설로 되어 있는 탓인지, 다른 논의를 찾아볼 수 없으며, 1주1의결권의 원칙이 상법상 강행규정으로 되어 있다. 그러나 독일과 일본의 경우에는 19세기부터 주식의 성질을 둘러싼 다양한 논의가 전개되어 왔고, 일본은 사실상 1주1의결권 원칙을 포기했다는 평가를 받고 있다. 최근 복수의결권주식이 적대적 인수합병에 유용하다는 점 때문에 복수의결권 내지 차등의결권제도를 도입하고 있는 나라가 증가하고 있으며, 우리나라에서도 이에 대한 논의가 본격적으로 이루어지고 있다. 그러나 아직까지 우리나라 학계의 분위기는 1주1의결권 원칙을 어떠한 생채기도 내어서는 안 되는 성역으로 여기는 경향이 강한 것으로 보인다. 그렇다면 1주1의결권원칙의 유연화는 불가능한 것인가? 일본에서 주장되고 있는 정책설은 주식의 본질론을 전혀 염두에 두지 않은 채, 1주1의결권원칙은 정책적인 것에 지나지 않고, 회사의 이익극대화를 도모하기 위한 배분규제의 하나일 뿐이라고 해석함으로써 회사의 이익극대화를 위하여 또는 의결권 행사의 남용방지를 위하여 경우에 따라서는 동 원칙을 고수할 필요가 없다고 주장한다. 그리고 일반적으로 재산권은 정당한 사유가 있는 경우, 그 제한이 가능하기 때문에 의결권이 가지는 사익성, 즉 재산권적 성질을 강조할 경우, 상대적으로 더 큰 공익을 위한 차별은 정당화 될 수 있을 것이므로, 의결권의 인격권적 성질을 배제하고 주식의 순재산권적 성질을 강조했던 주식사원권론 하에서도 1주1의결권원칙의 유연화는 가능하다고 보아야 한다. 또한 다양한 형태로 주장되고 있기는 하지만 사원권부인론은 공익권의 비이기적 성격을 강조한다는 공통점이 있다. 결국 비이기적인 성격을 갖는다는 것은 더 큰 이익을 위해 제한이 가능하다는 해석이 가능하고 따라서 사원권부인론에 따르더라도 회사의 보다 더 큰 이익을 위해 차별적인 의결권을 부여하는 것이 주주의 권리를 침해하는 것은 아닌 것이다. 결론적으로 굳이 정책설을 취할 필요도 없이 주식의 본질을 둘러싼 학설들은 어느 학설을 취하더라도 1주1의결권원칙의 유연화가 불가능한 것은 아니다.

주주의결권의 사회적 개념

서완석,남기욱,박혁 가천대학교 법학연구소 2021 가천법학 Vol.14 No.1

The variety of rules on shareholder voting in today's companies means that companies are distributing power among shareholders in various ways. However, our commercial law has regarded one share-one vote rule as mandatory provision. However, if you look at the history of shareholders voting from the beginning of the 19th century, you can see that this is not the case. In addition, In addition, despite the completely different concepts of shareholder equality and equity equality, many people have confused the two into the same concept, so far the theory of legislation and interpretation has been lost and confused. Common law in the United States and the United Kingdom has a tradition of one person-one vote rule, unless other voting rules are specified in the charter or other statutes. Behind the phenomenon lies the aversion to plutocratic voting rights, the philosophy that shareholders can have equal rights as members of corporate organizations rather than owners of part of capital, and the intention to limit voting rights to prevent power from being transferred to major shareholders. The current one share-one vote week rule rule allows companies that have lost their self-purification capabilities to corrupt and eventually collapse by expanding plutocracy and neglecting minority shareholders. Therefore, it should not discriminate against shareholders who are members of the general meeting of shareholders, the entity's best decision-making body, and who are the best monitors for protecting corporate interests. After all, shareholder equality has a social concept that prevents corruption and promotes growth by distributing power among shareholders through shareholder voting and protects shareholder as a window for corporate capital raising. And shareholder equality has an important meaning in modern society because it is closely related to corporate social responsibility. Therefore, I would suggest that Article 369 (1) of our Commercial Law should be changed to default rule and shareholder equality must be codified, and the system of prohibition of abuse of authority in Nordic countries should be introduced. 오늘날의 기업들에 있어서 주주의결권에 관한 규칙들이 다양하다는 것은 기업들이 주주들 간의 권력을 다양한 방식으로 배분하고 있다는 것을 의미한다. 그러나 우리나라의 상법은 1주 1의결권 원칙의 강행규정성을 유지해오고 있다. 그런데 19세기 초부터 주주의결권의 역사를 살펴보면 아주 당연한 것으로 여겨지고 있는 1주 1의결권이라는 원칙이 반드시 강행규정이어야 할 이유는 없다는 것을 알 수 있다. 또한 주주평등주의와 주식평등주의는 완전히 다른 개념인데도 불구하고 이 두 가지를 같은 개념으로 혼동하다 보니 지금까지 입법론이나 해석론이 방향을 잃고 혼란을 겪어오지는 않았는가 하는 생각을 해보게 된다. 미국 및 영국의 보통법(common law)은 기업의 헌장(constitution)이나 기타 법령에 다른 의결권 규칙이 명시되어 있지 않는 한 1인당 1개의 의결권만 갖는 것으로 보았던 전통을 가지고 있으며, 이러한 현상의 배후에는 주주들의 의결권이 보유주식 수와 정비례하는 금권주의적 의결권(plutocratic voting right)에 대한 혐오감과 주주를 자본의 일부에 대한 소유자가 아니라 법인단체의 일원으로서 동등한 권리를 가질 수 있다고 보는 철학, 그리고 대주주에게로의 권력쏠림을 막기 위한 의결권제한 등의 의도 등이 숨어 있었다. 현재의 1주 1의결권 규칙은 금권주의를 확대시키고 소수주주를 홀대함으로써 자정능력을 상실한 기업권력이 부패하여 결국 기업의 붕괴로까지 이어질 수 있다. 따라서 기업의 최고의사결정기구인 주주총회의 구성원으로서 기업이익을 수호하기 위한 최적의 감시자인 주주를 차별대우해서는 안 된다. 결국 주주평등주의는 주주의결권을 통해 주주들 사이의 힘을 분산시켜 기업의 부패를 막고 성장을 촉진시키고 기업의 자본조달 창구로서의 주주를 보호하는 사회적 개념을 갖고 있다고 할 수 있다. 그리고 주주평등주의는 기업의 사회적 책임과도 밀접한 관련을 갖고 있으므로 현대사회에서도 중요한 의미를 갖는다. 따라서 우리 상법 제369조 제1항은 임의규정으로 바꾸고, 일반조항인 주주평등주의를 성문화 하며, 북유럽 국가의 권한남용금지 규정에 대한 도입을 검토할 것을 제안하는 바이다.