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박래수 ( Rae Soo Park ),백승옥 ( Seong Oak Paek ) 한국금융공학회 2005 금융공학연구 Vol.4 No.2
This paper examines why the firm uses two types of debt in case of information asymmetry about the firm and what the information effects of using the bank loan are. To answer these questions, this paper introduces a standard signaling model using collateralized bank loans. Most of bank loan requires the collateral which is costly to the firm. Therefore, the firms prefer bond financing. In the equilibrium, the good-typed firm using more bank loan than the critical amount has an advantage of using the bond of which the capital cost is cheaper than that of bank loan. But the bad-typed firm has no incentive to mimic the debt choice of the good-typed firm because the cost of using bank loan dominates the benefit of using the bond.