기업의 스톡옵션 부여 및 부여비율이 이익조정에 미치는 영향

한경희,이계원 한국기업경영학회 2012 기업경영연구 Vol.19 No.6

Most of the previous studies focused on characteristics of companies to which stock option was granted, responses of stock price to its public announcement, and executive compensation in respect to stock option. Also previous studies on earning management dealt with whether earnings management was made in the year immediately before the grant of stock option was given, but this study focused on the followings:Whether companies which extended the period into three years before the stock option was given had earnings management continuously before or only in the year immediately before the grant of stock option was given, (2) whether there were difference a in the points when stock option was granted between the groups which upgraded and lowered their earnings with the groups divided based on the medians of revised earnings according to the Revised Jones Model, and (3) whether there were differences between earnings management of groups according to the stock option grant ratio. Firstly, it was discovered that throughout the years from three years before stock option was granted to the year when stock option was granted, positive coefficients were shown and earnings kept being revised. In addition, it was discovered that the companies with net profits and negative cash flow earnings management. In particular, statistically significant values were shown in the year immediately before the stock option grant and the year when stock option was granted, which indicates that they were more actively engaged in upward earning management involving stock option grant. It is interpreted that it reflects a possibility that the executive select strategies to reinforce their positions in a long term point of view rather than lower stock option price in a short term point of view Also, it reflects the possibility that the executive may emphasize that it is justifiable for themselves to have stock option granted by continuously increasing earnings as stock option may be granted as compensation for the past performance. As most of the companies have stock option granted in regular general meetings which announce performance of the last year and shares, the possibility that the executive may increase earnings of the past years is bigger. It is thought that there may more variables which have explanatory power in addition to variables used in the study as the Revised Jones Model did not reflect business environment or economic conditions of our country properly. As a result of verifying (2), it was discovered that the group which upgraded earnings based on the median lowered earnings immediately before the stock option grant and upgraded earnings at the point of the stock option grant, which was not statistically significant. Also, the group which lowered earnings had positive values in all the period, which indicates that earnings were upgraded. As a result of analysing (3), it was discovered that in analysing differences in means between companies with high and low grant ratios, the companies with high ratio lowered earnings at the point of stock option grant while the companies with low ratio upgraded earnings. As presented in the results of (2) and (3), the executive kept revising earnings regardless of stock option grant to maximize compensation according to stock option grants and granting ratios. It is suggested that various institutions or regulations to improve it should be developed in the future. This study has a meaning in that it focused on whether the companies which extended the year into three years before the stock option was granted had revised earnings continuously before while previous studies focused on whether companies revised earnings in the year immediately before the stock option grant, and it was discovered that the companies did not lower their earnings only in the year immediately before the stock option grant. Therefore, it is suggested that they revise earnings for various purposes such as maximum compensation or... 스톡옵션의 부여시점 직전연도에 이익조정을 실시하는지의 여부를 주로 다룬 선행연구와는 달리 본 연구는 스톡옵션의 부여시점 전 3개연도로 기간을 확장하여 (1) 경영자가 이익조정을 지속적으로 행하고 있는지 아니면 스톡옵션을 목적으로 직전연도에만 행하는지 (2) 수정 Jones 모형에 의한 이익 조정치의 중위수를 중심으로 집단을 구분하여 상대적으로 이익을 상향조정한 집단과 하향조정한 집단에 있어서 스톡옵션 부여 시점 간에 차이가 있는지를 살펴보고, (3) 스톡옵션 부여비율에 따라 이익조정에 차이가 있는지를 검증하기 위하여 부여비율의 상․하위 집단 간 차이분석을 실시하였다. 분석결과, 스톡옵션을 부여하기 전 3개년과 부여년도까지 전체기간에 걸쳐 양(+)의 계수 값을 보이고 있어 지속적으로 이익조정을 행하는 것으로 나타났다. 다음으로 이익조정의 크기를 중심으로 중위수 이상의 집단에서는 스톡옵션 부여직전에만 스톡옵션부여와 음(-)의 관계를 나타내고 다른 기간에서는 양(+)의 관계를 나타내고 있으며, 중위수 이하의 집단에서는 스톡옵션부여와 관련하여 모든 기간에서 양(+)의 관계로 나타났으나 통계적으로 유의하지는 않았다. 또한, 스톡옵션 부여비율이 높은 집단에서는 이익을 감소시키는 이익조정을 하고 스톡옵션 부여비율이 낮은 집단에서는 이익을 증가시키는 이익조정을 하고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이와 같은 결과는 경영자가 단기적 관점에서 스톡옵션 행사가격을 낮추려 하기 보다는 좋은 실적을 바탕으로 자신의 입지를 강화하기 위한 전략을 택하고 있는 것으로 해석되며, 또한 경영자가 보상극대화를 위하여 기회주의적으로 이익조정을 행하고 있음을 보여주는 결과라 할 수 있을 것이다

성과연동형 스톡옵션 부여와 기업가치:한국 금융업을 대상으로

김수정,설원식 한국재무관리학회 2010 財務管理硏究 Vol.27 No.2

Using the financial institutions that have adopted performance-based stock option plan, this paper examines whether performance-based executive stock options improves effectively firm value. Over the period 2002~2005, we investigate short-term and long-term effects of the performance-based stock options on stock price. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, the announcement of plain vanilla stock options generates no significant effects on firm value. Meanwhile, the announcement of performance-based stock options results in negative and significant abnormal returns, which is contrary to the expectation. In addition, we find that there are strong, significant and negative announcement effects when banks grant performance-based stock options. Secondly, there is no significant difference between the long-term performance of the sample granting stock options and that of the benchmarks, which is similar to the findings of the previous research. Also, we fail to get any evidence that performance-based stock option awards have improved the long-term firm value. 본 연구에서는 성과연동형 스톡옵션을 가장 활발하게 부여한 국내 금융업을 대상으로 경영자에 대한 성과연동형 스톡옵션 부여가 과연 기업가치를 유효하게 증가시켰는지를 실증분석을 통해 검증하였다. 2002~005년 동안 스톡옵션을 부여한 금융기관을 대상으로 실증분석을 수행하여 다음과 같은 결과를 얻었다. 첫째, 스톡옵션 부여공시에 따른 단기 주가반응을 분석한 결과, 고정형 스톡옵션 부여공시는 기업가치에 별다른 영향을 미치지 않았다. 반면, 성과연동형 스톡옵션을 부여한 경우 기대와 달리 공시일 전후 유의한 음(-)의 초과수익률이 발견되었다. 금융기관별로는 은행의 성과연동형 스톡옵션 부여공시가 강하고 유의한 음(-)의 초과수익률을 산출하였는데, 이는 선행연구에서 제시한 것처럼 은행처럼 규제가 많은 산업에서는 경영자가 경영의사결정을 내릴 때 재량권이 제한적이므로 투자자들이 스톡옵션 부여에 따른 유효성을 낮게 평가하기 때문으로 해석된다. 둘째, 스톡옵션 부여 이후 기업의 장기성과를 검증한 결과, 스톡옵션 부여가 기업가치를 증가시켰다는 증거를 발견하지 못했으며 이는 선행연구와 동일한 결과이다. 성과연동형 스톡옵션을 부여한 금융기관에서도 장기성과가 개선되었다는 결과를 얻지 못했으나, 고정형 스톡옵션 부여와 비교하여 볼 때, 스톡옵션 부여 후 1~4개월 및 1~6개월의 초과수익률이 상대적으로 높게 나타났다. 이는 향후 성과연동형 스톡옵션제도가 보완되고 보다 정교하게 설계되어 실행된다면 기업가치 개선에 기여할 여지가 있음을 시사한다.

기업특성별 스톡옵션제도 도입효과

김선구 ( Kim Seon-gu ),홍정화 ( Hong Jeong-hwa ),이장희 ( Lee Jang-hee ) 한국회계정책학회 2005 회계와 정책연구 Vol.10 No.2

The intention of this thesis is to analyze the influence on medium and long term business administration results of the enterprise's introduction of stock option, to analyze the effectiveness of the introduction of the stock option on the basis of the characteristic of the enterprise, and to verify if the stock option can be used as a means of the way to promote the result of enterprise. At the positive analysis, this thesis analyzed if the difference is significant or not, centering on the year when stock option was introduced through t-verification. The study results are as followings. First, the enterprise introducing the stock option had not influence on administration result from the introduction of stock option. It was not in accordance with the expectation that the introduction of stock option would plan ahead short term administration results and medium term growth, lead to administrators' decision making for the enhancement of stock price, and enhance stock holders' maximum profits. Second, this thesis analyzed the characteristic of the enterprise introducing the stock option. As for the effectiveness on the basis of enterprise scales, relatively large scale enterprises had difference in introduction effectiveness in some variables, but medium & small enterprises did not have introduction effectiveness. As for largest investors' equity ratio, the groups did not have difference in introduction effectiveness. A theory describes that if the largest investors' equity get increased, it is possible that the agency's cost will be spent more, and they will decrease agency's cost. But the result was not in accordance with the expectation. As for foreigners' equity ratio, the introduction effectiveness did not have difference in groups. An existing study describes that foreign investigators will want the maximum value due to reasonable administration and the fruit of enterprise will be affirmative. But the result was not in accordance with the expectation. As for the analysis of plutocrat group, stock option instruction effectiveness did not have difference in group. A theory describes that non-plutocrat group will introduce stock potion system positively and use the system for the result of enterprise. But, it was different from the study, that is, there was no stock option effectiveness. It is not reasonable that our country accept the advanced countries' system without consideration, though the countries can solve a lot of problems by carrying out stock option system for a long time and controling enterprise situations. It is why the enterprises in our country are different from others from the beginning of introduction. So the adjustment of systems has to be put on the basis of suitable laws and enforcements.

Option volume and stock returns: evidence from single stock options on the Korea Exchange

( Mincheol Woo ),( Meong Ae Kim ) 한국파생상품학회 2021 선물연구 Vol.29 No.4

Informed traders may prefer the options market to the stock market for reasons including the leverage effect, transaction costs, restrictions on short sale. Many studies try to predict future returns of stocks using informed traders’ behavior in the options market. In this study, we examine whether the trading volume ratios of single stock options have the predictive power for future returns of the underlying stock. By analyzing the stock price responses to the “preliminary announcement of performance” of 36 underlying stocks on the Korea Exchange from November 2014 to March 2021 and the trading volume of options written on those stocks, we investigate the relation between the option ratios, which are the call option volume to put option volume ratio (C/P ratio) and the option volume to stock volume ratio (O/S ratio), and the future returns of the underlying stock. We also examine which ratio is better in predicting the future returns. The authors found that both option ratios showed the statistically significant predictability about future returns of the underlying stock and that the return predictability of the O/S ratio is more robust than that of the C/P ratio. This study shows that indicators generated in the options market can be used to predict future underlying stock returns. Further, the findings of this study contributed to a dearth of literature pertaining to single stock options. The results suggest that the single stock options market is efficient and influences the price discovery in the stock market.

성과연동스톡옵션의 고정부스톡옵션에 대비한 효과성 검증

김현아(Kim, Hyeon-A),정성창(Jung, Sung-Chang) 대한경영학회 2011 大韓經營學會誌 Vol.24 No.1

스톡옵션 특성이 조직태도에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구 - 옵션경과시점의 조절효과를 중심으로

차성호(Sung-Ho Cha),양동훈(Dong-Hoon Yang) 한국인사조직학회 2006 인사조직연구 Vol.14 No.3

  본 연구는 스톡옵션 특성이 조직태도에 미치는 영향과 스톡옵션의 부여에서부터 매각까지의 시점별로 스톡옵션 특성이 조직태도에 어떠한 영향을 미치는 지를 분석하였다. 본 연구는 연구가설로서 스톡옵션의 기대수익이 높을수록 수혜종업원의 조직태도가 긍정적으로 나타날 것이라 기대하였고 스톡옵션으로 인한 기대수익이 수혜종업원의 조직태도에 미치는 영향은 옵션경과시점에 따라 차이가 있을 것으로 예측하였다. 2003년 2월부터 8월까지 2차에 걸쳐 스톡옵션을 도입한 12개 기업의 수혜종업원 122명을 대상으로 설문조사를 수행하였다. 연구의 실증분석에 의하면 주식가치전망이 긍정적일수록 조직몰입이 높아지고 이직의도가 낮아지는 경향이 있었다. 그러나 스톡옵션의 수혜율이나 보상내 스톡옵션의 구성비는 이와 같이 개인의 조직태도에 유의한 영향을 미치지는 않는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 스톡옵션 경과시점의 기간별로 스톡옵션 수혜율, 보상내 구성비, 주식가치전망이 개인의 조직태도에 미치는 조절효과를 살펴본 결과 스톡옵션의 수혜율과 조직태도의 관계에 대하여 스톡옵션 경과시점의 조절효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 즉, 스톡옵션 수혜율이 높은 구성원일수록 조직몰입과 이직의도의 수준이 행사기간부터 매각 전까지의 단계에 있는 종업원들에게 가장 뚜렷하게 변화되는 경향이 있었다. 이는 수혜율이 높을수록 스톡옵션의 행사기간부터 매각 전까지 단계에 있는 종업원이 상대적으로 높은 조직몰입도와 상대적으로 낮은 이직의도를 갖게 됨을 시사하는 현상이다.   Many Korean companies have begun to adopt stock option plans as a way to provide long-term incentives to employees as well as to top executives. About 20% of 677 publicly traded companies adopted stock option plans in 2003. However, only 52 companies had formal provisions on stock option plans, an approximately 38.8% of companies that introduced stock option plans. Stock option plans are still experimental to publicly traded large firms, spurred by examples from small venture companies.<BR>  This study examines current practices of stock option plans in publicly traded companies to see whether stock option plans influence employees’ organizational attitudes positively. To this end, survey questionnaires were mailed out to 700 employees in 12 publicly traded companies twice, one in February and the other in August, 2003. The response rates are 22.1% and 21.6% respectively. The stock market composite indices for February and August are 500 and 750 respectively, which indicates that samples reflect different stock market conditions. Samples came from 122 individuals who were entitled to, or who have already been provided, stock options.<BR>  In the study, employees’ organizational attitudes are measured by their organizational commitment and intention to turnover. Stock option plans are assessed in several respects: the number of employee’s stock options divided by total number of stock options, ratio of stock option values to total compensation, prospective view on stock prices, and stock option progress time. The number of stock options given to individual employees varied widely from 10 to 30,000 stock options. So the number of stock options was divided by all stock options the company provided to employees. This reduces the screwed distribution of stock options over individual employees. The ratio of stock option values to total compensation shows how important stock option is as a reward. Prospective view on stock prices is a subjective measure based on 5 Likert scale. If one expects stock prices of his own company to rise very highly, he expresses his response as 5 point in Likert scale, while the other extreme is 1 point. Lastly, stock option progress time is divided into four distinctive stages: time before stock option provided, time between stock option provision and excise period, excise period, time after excising stock options. Surveyed respondents were classified into one of these four categories. We expected that organizational attitudes would differ depending on stock option progress times.<BR>  We hypothesize that characteristics of stock option plans have an effect on individual organizational attitudes. When more stock options are given to an employee, he/she will commit more to the company and have less intention to turnover. When stock options have a bigger portion in the total compensation, employees will have stronger organizational commitment and be less likely to turnover. When employees expect stock prices to rise in the future, they will also have more positive organizational attitudes. Employees’ attitudes are more positive in all these instances because they all suggest more return to stock options. That is, the number of stock options, ratio of stock options in total compensation, and future expected stock price contribute to higher expected benefits from the stock options, leading to a more positive impact on employee’s organizational attitudes.<BR>  As to stock option progress time, it is hypothesized that individual employees will commit most and least likely turnover when they are in the excise period. This is why one’s effort will result in higher stock price, and then his expected return to stock options is about to be realized in this period. In the stages other than exercise period, employees are a long way from realizing benefits from stock options because they can’t exercise their stock options. We also tested moderating e

경영자 스톡옵션 보상이 감사보수에 미치는 영향

이상철(Sang Cheol Lee),박재완(Jaewan Park),정갑수(Kapsoo Jeong) 한국관리회계학회 2010 관리회계연구 Vol.10 No.1

본 연구에서는 경영자 스톡옵션 보상이 감사보수에 미치는 영향에 대해 살펴보았다. 첫째, 경영자 스톡옵션 보상 제도를 도입한 기업이 도입하지 않은 기업보다 감사보수가 높은지 여부를 파악하였다. 둘째, 경영자 스톡옵션 보상 제도를 도입한 기업을 대상으로 경영자 스톡옵션 보상비중이 높아질수록 감사보수가 높아지는지 여부를 조사하였다. 2000년부터 2005년까지 한국증권선물거래소 유가증권시장에 상장된 12월 결산 비금융기업 가운데, 경영자 스톡옵션 보상 내역을 파악할 수 있는 231개 기업-연 자료를 분석표본으로 선정하였다. 그리고 분석표본과 동일한 연도 및 산업에 속하며, 경영자 스톡옵션 제도를 도입하지 않은 기업 가운데 자산규모가 비슷하며 유사한 품질의 외부감사서비스를 제공받은 231개 기업-연 자료를 통제표본으로 선정하였다. 분석결과, 경영자 스톡옵션 제도를 도입한 기업이 스톡옵션 제도를 도입하지 않은 기업보다 감사보수가 높게 나타났다. 또한 경영자에게 스톡옵션 보상을 부여한 기업을 대상으로 분석한 결과, 경영자 스톡옵션 보상비중이 높아질수록 감사보수가 높아지는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과는 경영자가 스톡옵션 보상을 받거나 전체 보상에서 스톡옵션으로 받는 보상이 커지는 경우 통제위험이 커질 수 있기 때문에, 외부감사인은 감사계약 체결 시 증가된 감사위험을 고려하여 감사보수를 높게 요구한다는 사실로 해석할 수 있다. This paper investigates the effect of executives’ stock option plans on audit fees. The major benefit of executives’ stock option plans is to achieve goal congruence between managers and stockholders. Executives are generally assumed to be risk-averse but shareholders are assumed to be risk neutral since stockholders can diversify their investment risk. Thus, management might make conservative decisions which might be not optimal in maximizing stockholders’ wealth. The executives’ stock option plan can encourage risk averse managements to make optimal decisions for stockholders through risk-sharing. The stock option plan has been widely used in practice since it was introduced in 1997 in Korea. Many prior papers empirically documented that the stock option plan increased firm value by encouraging managements to have more long-term perspectives and make more value-maximizing decisions. However, the executives’ stock option plan does not always lead to the positive effects. When managements are compensated with the stock option plan, managements might bear excessive risk or focus on short-term earnings to maximize their stock option-based compensation instead of maximizing stockholders’ wealth. It was argued in practice that managements manipulated earnings to increase their stock option-based profits in various accounting fraud cases such as Enron and Worldcom. Audit risk is a combination of inherent risk, control risk and detection risk. The executives’ stock option plans may affect the control risk. Managements are responsible for designing and implementing their entity’s internal control system to prevent or detecting material misstatements in financial statements. Even if the design of the internal control system is completely effective, its operating effectiveness depends on the competency and integrity of managements implementing it. That is, managements might override its internal control system to manage the entity’s reported earnings, leading to increase in control risk. The stock option plan might provide the opportunities for executives to manage the entity’s reported earnings. If external auditors recognize such managements’ opportunistic behaviors caused by the stock option-based compensation plan, they might demand higher audit fees for the firms having the executives’ sock option plan. Up to now, few empirical researches have addressed the impacts of the stock option plan on audit fees. This study tried to empirically answer the following two research questions; (1) Are audit fees higher for firms with the stock option plan than firms without it? (2) Are audit fees significantly related to the ratio of stock option compensation to management’s total compensation amount? To address two research questions, we collect non-financing firms data from Korean listed companies for the period 2000-2005. We use 231 firm-year sample data of firms with the executives’ stock option plan, matched with 231 firm-year control data of firms without it. Sample firms are matched with control firms, based on the year, industry, firm size and audit quality criteria. Our empirical result shows that Audit fees are significantly higher for firms with the stock option plan than firms without it. In addition, Our result strongly supports the second hypothesis that higher audit fees are associated with higher ratio of stock option compensation to management’s total compensation amount. These results might imply that the stock option plan provides opportunities for managers to inflate their reported earnings, leading to increase in audit risk. That is, it can be interpreted that since the stock option plan increases audit risk, external auditors demand higher audit fees to compensate for higher audit risk.

무효인 주식매수선택권부여계약과 회사의 민사상 책임

윤은경(Eunkyoung, Yun) 국민대학교 법학연구소 2015 법학논총 Vol.28 No.2

회사가 상법상 임직원 등에게 주식매수선택권을 부여하기 위해서는 정관에 주식매수선택권의 부여에 관한 근거규정을 두어야 하고, 주주총회의 특별결의를 통해 주식매수선택권을 부여하는 구체적 계획안을 승인받아야 한다. 대법원은 2011. 11. 24. 선고 2010도11394 판결(이하 ‘이 사건 판결’이라 한다)에서 회사의 대표이사가 주식매수선택권 부여안을 승인하는 주주총회를 개최하지도 않았으면서 마치 개최한 것으로 주주총회의사록을 위조하고, 이를 근거로 본인을 포함한 임직원과 주식매수선택권부여계약을 체결한 후, 그 계약에 따라 주식매수선택권을 부여받은 자들의 주식매수선택권의 행사에 응하여 회사의 주식을 발행한 사안에서 업무상배임죄의 성립여부 및 기수시기에 관해 중요한 지침이 될 견해를 밝혔다. 대법원은 대표이사가 회사 명의로 체결한 계약이 법령이나 정관에 위배되어 법률상 무효인 경우, (i) 업무상 배임죄가 성립된다고 보았고, (ii) 업무상 배임죄에 있어서 재산상 손해의 유무 판단은 법률적 판단이 아니라 경제적 관점에서 판단해야 한다고 보았으며, (iii) 법률상 무효인 주식매수 선택권부여계약과 관련된 대표자의 행위에 대한 배임죄의 기수시점의 판단은 회사가 민사상 불법행위책임 등을 부담하게 될 특별한 사정을 고려하여 배임죄의 구성요건인 회사에 대한 재산상 손해가 가해졌는지 여부를 기준으로 하였다. 이 글에서는 이 사건 판결의 사실관계를 전제로 (i) 배임죄의 재산상손해의 의의와 판단기준, (iii) 주주총회의 결의를 결한 주식매수선택권부여계약의 효력 및 (iv) 무효인 계약의 상대방에 대한 회사의 민사상 책임에 관해 살펴보았다. 그 결과, 이 사건 판결에서 대법원은 회사의 대표이사가 자신을 포함한 임직원들에게 주주총회결의없이 허위의 의사록을 작성하여 주식매수선택권을 부여하였고, 임직원들도 이 사건 주식매수선택권이 부여된 경위나 과정을 충분히 알았거나 알 수 있었을 것이라는 점을 인정하였다. 위 인정사실을 토대로 대법원은 회사와 피고인 등이 주식매수선택권부여계약을 체결한 시점에 회사가 위 계약의 상대방인 피고인 등에 대해 민사상 불법행위책임을 지지 아니한다고 판단하였다. 따라서 대법원은 주식매수선택권의 부여시점에는 법률상 무효인 주식매수선택권부여계약에 대해서도 회사의 대표이사의 행위로 회사에 재산상 손해를 가하였다고 볼 사정이 없으므로 배임죄의 기수시기는 주식매수선택권부여계약에 따라 피고인 등이 주식매수선택권을 행사하여 회사가 신주를 발행한 시점이라고 보았다. 이로써 법인의 대표자가 법인 명의로 한 행위가 법률상 무효인 경우라 하더라도 법인에 대한 배임죄의 구성요건이 모두 충족되었다고 볼 수 있는 “특별한 사정”속에는 “회사가 민사상 불법행위책임을 지는 경우”가 포함된다는 것을 대법원이 이 사건 판결을 통해 명시하였다는 점에서 이 사건 판결의 의의가 있다고 본다. Section (1) of Article 340-2 of Korean Commercial Code provides “a company may, as prescribed by its articles of incorporation, grant by a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders as provided for in Article 434 an option for purchasing new shares or its own shares (hereinafter referred to as “stock option”) at a fixed price established in advance (hereinafter referred to as “exercising price for stock option”) to its directors, executive directors, auditors or other employees who will, or will be able to contribute to the promotion of its incorporation and management, technological innovation, etc.: in cases where the exercising price for stock option is lower than the substantial price of the relevant stock, the company may compensate for the relevant difference by cash or transfer its own shares equivalent to the relevant difference. In such cases, the substantial stock price shall be appraised as of the date of exercising the stock option.” and Section (2) of Article 340-3 of the Korean Commercial Code provides “in adopting a resolution concerning the granting of a stock option as referred to in Article 340-2 (1) at the general shareholders" meeting, the following matters shall be determined: 1. The names of persons who are to be granted the stock option; 2. The methods of granting the stock option; 3. Matters concerning the price for exercising the stock option and an assessment thereof; 4. The period for exercising the stock option; 5. Categories and the number of shares to be issued or transferred, in cases of exercising the stock option, to each of the persons to be granted the stock option.” The Supreme Court, Decision Number 2010Do11394 delivered on November 24, 2011,decided that in case where a stock option agreement, based on the forged shareholder’s meeting even without taking place entered into between a representative director of the company and its directors and the company, issued new stocks based on such agreement, such agreement is null in violation of the Korean Commercial Code; and the act of the representative director falls under the Occupational Breach of Trust under the Korean Criminal Act; provided, however, that the consummated period of that crime is not the signing date of such agreement, but the issuance date of new stocks of the company in pursuit of the act of the parties under the agreement without special circumstances such as in case where the company has to compensate parties under the agreement based on tort duty under the Korean Civil Act, at the time of the signing date of the agreement. This Court decision should be noted that the Court suggested a situation in case where the company should compensate under the tort duty under the Civil Act as an example of such special circumstances.

경영자 인센티브 스톡옵션의 민감도와 기업의 위험관리 특성

정성창(Sung-Chang Jung),김현아(Hyeon-A Kim) 한국산업경제학회 2015 산업경제연구 Vol.28 No.6

본 연구는 경영자에게 인센티브 스톡옵션을 부여한 기업을 대상으로 그들의 스톡옵션가치 변화의 민감도인 델타와 베가가 기업의 파생상품을 활용한 위험헤징전략에 미치는 영향력을 살펴보았다. 스톡옵션의 델타가 클수록 경영자는 위험회피적인 의사결정을 하므로 헤징의 크기를 늘릴 것이며, 베가가 클수록 경영자는 보다 위험을 추구하고자 헤징을 줄이거나 하지 않을 것이다. 구체적으로 보면, 옵션가격을 결정짓는 두 요인(주식가격, 주식가격 변동성)의 변화에 대한 옵션가치의 변화(델타, 베가)를 측정한 후, 각 기업별로 보유 중인 경영자 스톡옵션 수를 반영하여 총민감도를 산출하였다. 그리고 로짓 및 패널 토빗분석을 통해 이러한 총민감도가 위험회피목적의 파생상품 활용에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 2004년부터 2011년까지 총 703개 패널 데이터를 대상으로 하였으며, 이 중 290개가 파생상품을 위험헤지 목적으로 활용한 기업이었다. 분석 결과, 총델타가 클수록 파생상품을 더 사용한 것으로, 총베가가 클수록 파생상품을 활용하지 않은 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 총델타가 클수록 위험헤징 목적의 파생상품 계약금액의 크기는 유의적으로 증가한 반면 총베가가 클수록 파생상품 계약금액의 크기는 유의하지는 않지만 부(-)의 값으로 나타났다. 즉, 경영자는 보유 중인 스톡옵션의 가치를 극대화하기 위해 주식가격 및 주식수익률 변동성에 대해 다른 태도를 보이며, 이는 파생상품을 활용한 헤징의 크기에 영향을 미치는 것으로 판단되었다. 본 연구의 결과는 경영자가 인센티브 스톡옵션을 부여받은 경우 그들의 부를 극대화 하고자 하는 사적 이익 추구 행위가 기업의 위험관리전략에 영향을 미치며, 이는 또 다른 대리인 비용으로서 경영자 보상설계 시 고려되어져야 할 것으로 생각되었다. 한편 국내 대기업의 경우 대주주 중심의 지배구조이기 때문에 이러한 경영자의 사적이익추구행위는 지배구조의 영향을 받을 수 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 한계점을 추후 연구에서 보완하겠다. This study explores whether executive stock options(ESOs) provide managers with risk preferences to maximize their wealth and affect hedging activities. Because there is a direct link between options and stock price, managers have an incentive to utilize derivatives to avoid risk. In contrast, they are likely to decrease the hedging activities in that the value of managers’ stock option portfolio increase with the volatility of the firm’s stock returns. Firstly, we measure the opposing effects of stock options on their wealth with the two sensitivities of options–Total sensitivity to stock price(TDelta) and Total sensitivity of stock return volatility(TVega). Then, we explore how TDelta and TVega have impacts on the derivatives usage through panel Logit and panel Tobit analysis. We analyzed a total of 703 firm panel data whose executives are holding stock options, selected from the listed companies in Korea Stock Exchange(KSE) from year 2004 to year 2011. In univariate analysis, these data are categorized into two groups by the risk hedging with derivatives – ‘derivatives are used’ (n=290), ‘derivatives are not used’(n=413). The results are like followings; Firstly, according to the univariate analysis between groups of derivatives used versus non-used, Tdelta is significantly higher and Tvega is statistically lower for the group of derivatives used. Secondly, in the logit analysis, Tdelta affects positively the usage of derivatives, which means that mangers avoid risk by utilizing derivatives more if their sensitivities of option value to stock price is higher. In contrast, Tvega has an negative effect on the usage of derivatives, implying that derivatives are less used to take risk as Tvega increases. Lastly, in the tobit analysis where dependent variable is the contract value of derivatives scaled by firm size, the same results have been found. But there is evidence that managers are more active in risk hedging than risk taking. This study has an significance in that this is the first in Korea to explore the relationship empirically between sensitivity of managers’ stock option portfolios to stock price and to stock return volatility and risk hedging strategies. Still more this study’s measures are more sophisticated than prior research, because the sensitivities are calculated under the full information method. In the following research, this study would supplement the limitation that it didn’t consider the possibility of corporate governance affecting the Managerial Opportunism. Particularly in a leading conglomerate in Korea, employed managers can have a weak decision-making power in hedging strategies due to its major shareholder’s ownership.

임원과 기술직원에 대한 스톡옵션 부여가 중국 기업 주식수익률에 미치는 영향

쩡웨이 양,김성환 경희대학교(국제캠퍼스) 국제지역연구원 2018 아태연구 Vol.25 No.2

This paper studies the market effects of stock option compensation on firm values in China. Using the combined 240 firm data of RESSET and GTA databases from 2006 till 2014, we perform empirical tests whether stock options play a role as incentive and compensation schemes for executives and employees with expertise and technology in a way reduce the agency cost between agencies like executives and employees. We perform the empirical tests for 40 trading days around the announcement day. The main test results are summarized as follows. First, the empirical test results show a higher abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. Second, the amount of stock option, both executive option and core-technology option, do not have any statistically significant effect on short-run CARs. Third, the dispersion of stock option, both executive option and core-technology option, measured by the ratios of numbers of option recipients to total employees, has a statistically significant positive effect on one-year HPRs (holding period returns). The results with respect to the announcement effects are basically same as those of the prior studies while the long-run effects of stock options are contradictory to the prior studies that report positive effects of stock options. Our results also support some of prior studies which the positive effect of wide dispersion of stock option endowment contributes on stock market returns. 본 연구에서는 2006년부터 2014년까지 중국 상하이 증권거래소와 선전 증권거래소에 상장한 기업 중 스톡옵션을 부여한 기업 240개를 대상으로 부여 공시일 20일 전부터 부여 공시일까지 [-20, 0], 부여 공시일부터 부여 공시일 20일까지 [0, +20], 두 기간의 누적초과수익률(Cumulative Abnormal Return: CAR)과 공시 후 1년간의 보유기간수익률(Holding Period Return: HPR)을 분석하였다. 전체 주식대비 스톡옵션 비율, 경영자 스톡옵션 부여비율과 종업원 중 핵심기술자 스톡옵션 부여비율을 분리하여 스톡옵션 부여 공시 전후의 주식시장 반응을 검증하였다. 회귀분석 결과, 스톡옵션 부여 공시가 스톡옵션 부여 전후의 누적초과수익률에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타난 반면, 스톡옵션 부여량은 1년간의 보유기간수익률에는 통계적으로 유의한 영향이 없는 것으로 나타났다. 한편, 스톡옵션 부여 대상자 수가 1년간의 장기 보유기간수익률에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 연구 결과는 소수에 편중된 큰 혜택보다 보편적으로 다수에게 제공되는 보편적 보상수단으로써의 스톡옵션의 긍정적 기능이 기업의 장기적 가치를 제고한다는 점을 시사하고 있다.