우크라이나의 EU 가입 추진 과정 분석과 평가

허승철 한국러시아문학회 2016 러시아어문학 연구논집 Vol.55 No.-

Since the national independence in 1991 Ukraine has sought to approach EU to become a full member of EU. However, due to internal upheaval and national discords concerning the membership of EU, Ukraine has encountered much obstacle in the road to EU. Internally, the alternation of pro-European and pro-Russian regimes has blocked establishing a consistent policy towards EU, and international situation, especially EU`s `expansion fatigue` and Russia`s pressure to prevent Ukraine`s EU membership, has made it difficult for Ukraine to become a member of EU. After the collapse of Yanukovich regime, triggered by refusing to sign the Association Agreement in November 2013, the new government of Ukraine announced EU membership as one of the key foreign policy goals. Public support for EU membership in Ukraine has also increased remarkably after the so-called `Ukrainian crisis`. Ukraine signed with EU the political Association Agreement in March 2014 and the economic Association Agreement in June 2014, but postponed the formal enactment of economic Agreement until January 2016 under Russia`s pressure to start sanctions on the import of Ukrainian goods. Although a long-term perspective for EU-Ukraine economic integration not only offsets the loss in free trade with Russia, but also brings about more benefits for Ukraine, it is not an easy task for Ukraine to overcome current economic hardship. Recent developments in Europe, such as Dutch referendum against the Association Agreement with Ukraine, the so-called Brexit, Russia-Turkey rapprochement, IS terrorism and refugee problems, also make it difficult to predict the future of EU-Ukraine relations and the European integration itself. As long as Russia holds various means to undermine Ukraine`s efforts to join the EU, a hurried approach to EU is not recommendable for Ukraine. It is desirable for Ukraine to maintain the current relations with the EU at the Association Agreement level and to seek for a better chance to become a full member of EU. While Ukraine slows down the efforts to join NATO, it should concentrate its efforts to accomplish economic integration with EU. For the time being, this type of two-track approach, reminding the so-called `Finland model`, dividing political and military union with EU and economic integration, seems to be a best option for Ukraine.

2022년 여론조사로 본 우크라이나 동·남부의 내셔널 아이덴티티(National Identity)

박지광 한국외국어대학교(글로벌캠퍼스) 동유럽발칸연구소 2022 동유럽발칸연구 Vol.46 No.3

The Russia-Ukraine conflict over territory is rekindled by the Russia’s military invasion into Ukraine in February 2022. Russia takes it as the pretext of this invasion to protect the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine which accounts for about one-third of the Ukraine population. Russia has insisted that Ukraine does not have a separate and independent national identity distinct from Russia. Russia further insists that Ukraine was historic allyl a part of Russia and should be incorporated into the Russian civilization world. Radical Russian nationalists believe that it is their duty to reclaim the Eastern Ukraine which rightfully belongs to Russia but is mistakenly given to Ukraine. Ukrainian politicians and scholars deny any of these claims made by Russian nationalists. This debate between Russia and Ukraine over Ukraine’s identity largely depends on the definition of national identity. national identity can be defined as ethnical or civic one. Ethnically, Ukraine has a national identity close to Russia’s. However, in terms of civic identity, Ukraine has a distinct identity from Russia’s. Ukrainian scholars emphasize that most residents in Ukraine have Ukraine civic identity and have fortified it in the wake of the Crimean Peninsula annexation and the Donbass war in 2014. On the other hand, Russian nationalists deny this argument. To answer the questions, this article conducts a nationally representative telephone survey in Ukraine in February, 2022. The survey shows that about 70% of the respondents identify themselves as entirely Ukrainian citizen. Even in the East Ukraine, over 50% of the respondents do so. Thus, the Russian nationalists claim that the Russian-speaking people in the East feel Russian national identity is not empirically supported by our survey. However, the Ukrainization of Russian-speaking people in the East has not occurred as widely as some scholars assert although there is clear evidence for the phenomenon. 우크라이나 전쟁이 벌어지고 있는 2022년 현재 우크라이나가, 특히 우크라이나 동남부 지역이, 러시아와 내셔널 아이덴티티를 공유하고 있는지에 대해 뜨거운 논쟁이 벌어지고 있다. 기존의 연구들은 소비에트 연방 해체 이후 우크라이나에 거주하는 혈통적 러시아인들이 점진적으로 러시아인로서의 정체성을 잃어버리고 러시아-우크라이나인라는 독특한 이중 정체성을 발전시켰음을 보여준다. 그리고 크림반도 사태 이후 이러한 이중 정체성이 급격하게 순수 우크라이나 정체성으로 변환되고 있다는 주장이 최근에 우크라이나 학자들에 의해 강하게 제기되고 있다. 본 논문은 2022년 2월 우크라이나에서 실시된 여론조사자료를 바탕으로 우크라이나 동·남부에서 우크라이나 내셔널 아이덴티티가 증가하였지만 기존의 주장만큼 광범위한 변화는 아님을 보여준다. 이러한 우크라이나에서의 내셔널 아이덴티티 변화는 내셔널 아이덴티티 논쟁에 있어서 한 개인의 내셔널 아이덴티티가 출생으로 정해지고 일생 동안 지속된다는 발생주의적 입장보다는 상황에 따라 변화할 수 있다는 도구주의적 입장을 지지한다.

우크라이나전쟁이 한국안보에 주는 시사점

홍성표 ( Sungpyo Hong ) 한국군사학회 2023 군사논단 Vol.113 No.-

Russian military invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Ukraine applied European Union membership, and many East European countries already joined the EU. Thus, it is natural to join the EU for Ukraine, but Russia tried to stop Ukraine’s moving towards the EU by the invasion. International community, headed by the United Nations, immediately reacted against Russia’s illegal invasion and assisted Ukraine with a lot of military equipment and weapon systems and rescue funds. Russia’s invasion unexpectedly became a protracted war instead of rapid victory. Ukraine military has fought well and defeated Russian army almost all over the frontal lines. Russian military now takes a defensive posture. The lesson of this war for the ROK is as follow: First, the ROK should maintain a liberal democracy that secures basic human rights. Second, the ROK should have reasonably sufficient military power for its national defense. Ukraine failed to defend its nation country due to insufficient defense capability. Without foreign military assistance, Ukraine could not but surrendering already. Thus, the ROK should build a reasonably sufficient defense capability including Kill chain, KAMD and KMPR. Third, Korean-made-defense products are highly evaluated by international community through Ukraine war. Poland already contracted with Korea purchasing 48 FA-50s fighters, 980 K-2 tanks and 648 K-9 Howitzers. And many countries are actively trying to purchase K-defense products. Forth, strategic alliance is crucial for strengthening national security. Ukraine is still fighting well owing to foreign military assistance. Thus, it is very important for the ROK to strengthen the alliances and friendship with foreign countries in peacetime. Finally, the unity of national people is the most important thing for the survival. When the war broke out, President Zellenskii and former president Poroshenko campaigned for patriotic war-fighting against Russian invaders, and it strongly appealed to international community. Thus, many countries joined in supporting Ukraine and provided a lot of military assistance. Owing to this support Ukraine could strongly resist against Russian invasion.

미중 전략경쟁과 우크라이나의 대응 전략

김정기 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2022 중소연구 Vol.46 No.2

This article examines the impact of the U.S.-China strategic competition on Ukraine, strategic implications, and countermeasures from a realistic perspective. And this article analyzes the correlation between the US-China strategic competition and the Ukraine war. On February 24, 2022, the Russia-Ukraine War broke out amidst intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China. The impact of the US-China conflict was linked to a strategic actor called Russia and led to the invasion of Ukraine. And the US-China conflict is fixing the confrontational structure between Russia and Ukraine and between the US and Russia. In other words, it can be said that Ukraine became the first strategic victim of the US-China conflict and confrontation. Russia is trying to gain recognition for its sphere of influence, such as “restoring hegemony in Eurasia,” using the US-China strategic competition structure. In the process, Russia is using Ukraine as a means of achieving its goals and is threatening Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. For this reason, Ukraine is concerned and wary of the possibility that great powers may decide Ukraine's own fate regardless of its will. In this regard, the US-China strategic competition can be expected to have similar negative effects on the Korean Peninsula as in Ukraine. Therefore, we need to use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity to reflect on and respond to the preservation of national sovereignty, territory, and security. 이글은 미중 전략경쟁이 우크라이나에 미치는 영향, 전략적 함의, 대응 전략 등을 현실적인 관점에서 고찰하고, 우크라이나 전쟁과의 상관성을 분석하고 있다. 미중 전략경쟁이 격화되고 있는 와중에 2022년 2월 24일 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁이 발발했다. 이는 미․중 갈등의 영향이 러시아라는 전략적 행위자를 움직여 우크라이나 침공으로까지 이어졌으며, 러시아․우크라이나 간/미․러 간 대립적 구조를 고착시키고 있다. 즉 우크라이나는 미중 갈등․대립에 의한 최초의 전략적 희생자가 되었다고 할 수 있다. 러시아는 미중 전략경쟁 구도를 이용하여 약소국 우크라이나를 매개로 ‘유라시아 지역의 패권 복원’ 등 자신의 세력권을 인정받고자 하고 있으며, 그 과정에서 우크라이나의 주권과 독립을 위협하고 있다. 이와 관련 우크라이나는 자국의 의지와 상관없이 강대국들이 운명을 결정할 가능성을 우려하고 경계하고 있다. 이런 점에서 우크라이나 전쟁으로 이어진 미중 전략경쟁은 우리에게도 유사한 부정적 영향을 미칠 것이라는 점에서 국가 주권과 영토의 보존, 안보에 대한 성찰과 대응을 요구하는 계기가 되고 있다.

Russia and Ukraine : The historical process and prospect of their relations

홍완석(Hong Wan Suk) 한국외국어대학교 외국학종합연구센터 동유럽·발칸연구소 2010 동유럽발칸연구 Vol.24 No.1

역사적으로 러시아와 우크라이나는 동일한 슬라브 문명권으로서 “키에프 루시”(киевская русь)의 신화와 상징을 공유한 정치적, 경제적, 민족적, 언어문화적, 종교적 운명공동체였다. 그러나 1991년 소연방의 붕괴는 13세기 중엽 몽고 타타르 침입이후 두 번째로 이 슬라브 공동체의 운명을 갈라놓았다. 1654년 양국의 재결합 이래 350여년 동안 제정러시아와 소비에트 제국의 지배 하에서 예속적 동화를 강요받아왔던 우크라이나가 1991년 독립된 국제관계 행위 주체로 유럽의 지도 위에 새로이 등장하면서 러시아에 역사적 반감을 드러내는 탈러(脫露) 독자노선을 걷기 시작했기 때문이다. 실제로 독립이후 우크라이나는 퇴색된 민족적 정체성을 재정립하는 가운데 항구적인 주권국가체제의 확립과 영토적 안전보장 그리고 빈사상태의 경제회생 및 조속한 시장경제체제의 착근을 위해 러시아와는 일정한 거리감을 두고 서구로의 접근을 지향하는 이른바 탈러친서 노선을 대외적 좌표로 설정하였다. 소연방 해체이후 점증하는 우크라이나 민족주의의 고양과 탈러 원심력적 경향의 강화는 모스크바와 키예프간 한랭전선의 원천을 제공하였다. 우크라이나의 서구지향적 대외정책과 이에 대한 러시아의 반작용은 시간의 경과와 함께 양국 간 전방위적 마찰을 초래했다. 실제로 소연방 해체이후 우크라이나와 러시아는 정치, 경제, 외교, 안보, 군사, 종교 등 전 영역에서 심각한 갈등을 노정했고, 때때로 군사적 긴장까지 형성하였다. 슬라브 문명이라는 동일한 역사적, 언어적, 종교적, 문화적 일치성에도 불구하고 러시아와 우크라이나는 왜 다른 민족으로 불리우며, 우호적 협력작용보다는 상호 균열작용이 심화되고 있는가? 우크라이나는 왜 자기충족적인 민족주의 정체성을 강화하고 ‘탈러입구’(脫露入歐)적 외교정향을 추구하는가? 이에 대한 명료한 해답을 찾기 위해서는 외연적으로 드러난 양국관계의 현상적 검토만으로는 부족하다. 이는 무엇보다도 통합과 분열을 반복한 러?우크라이나관계 역사에 대한 기본적인 고찰을 요구한다. 이와 관련하여 본 논문의 연구 목적은 러시아와 우크라이나 양 민족이 어떠한 역사적 환경 속에서 분열과 통합을 반복해 왔는지를 추적한 후, 이를 토대로 향후 러?우 양국관계의 미래를 ‘通時的’(longitudinal) 접근방법과 ‘다층적’ (multilayered) 분석방법을 동원해 전망하는데 있다. This article aims to review the bilateral rivalry and partnership in a historical perspective and to offer an outlook of how their relationship will unfold in the future, based on the longitudinal approach and multi-layered analysis. From a macro-perspective, Russia-Ukraine relationship has been characterized by alternately repeating rivalry and partnership and it has evolved into what it is today through four major phases. In the first phase of ‘forced separation’(1240-1654), the Mongol Tatar invasion caused a cleavage in the Slavic community, separating Russia and Ukraine. In the following phase of ‘voluntary integration’(1654-1917), Ukraine was freed from the Mongolian rule and subsequently subjugated by Poland before it chose to place itself under Russian leadership in the mid 17th century to save itself from the Polish rule. During the ‘forced assimilation period’(1917-1991) which coincided with the Soviet era, much of Ukrainian identity was lost in the aggressive Russification drive. From the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 up to now, Ukraine and Russia have maintained a precarious balance between fragile partnership and lingering conflicts. The distrust and hostility deeply rooted in the minds of Ukranians throughout its history underlie the lingering conflicts it has got into with Russia ever since the Soviet Union was dissolved. In short, anti-Russian sentiment held by Ukranians derived primarily from Russia's colonial rule over Ukraine. In addition to this historical background, the bilateral relations have become complicated by a closely-knit web of political, economic, strategic, geopolitical and national security factors. In light of Ukraine's negative sentiment toward Russia, domestic and external circumstances facing both Russia and Ukraine, a complicated web of multiple-layered national interests that are closely intertwined between the two countries, geopolitical significance of Ukraine in Central and East Region and the CIS region, and fierce rivalry between the U.S. and Russia to sway more influence over Ukraine, Russia and Ukraine will likely choose either to cooperate or clash, depending on individual issues while respecting the boundaries set by their state sovereignty. Considering the geopolitical dynamics surrounding Eurasia, Ukraine will likely remain a buffer zone between the East and the West for the time being.

Russia and Ukraine : The historical process and prospect of their relations

홍완석 한국외국어대학교(글로벌캠퍼스) 동유럽발칸연구소 2010 동유럽발칸연구 Vol.24 No.1

This article aims to review the bilateral rivalry and partnership in a historical perspective and to offer an outlook of how their relationship will unfold in the future, based on the longitudinal approach and multi-layered analysis. From a macro-perspective, Russia-Ukraine relationship has been characterized by alternately repeating rivalry and partnership and it has evolved into what it is today through four major phases. In the first phase of ‘forced separation’(1240-1654), the Mongol Tatar invasion caused a cleavage in the Slavic community, separating Russia and Ukraine. In the following phase of ‘voluntary integration’(1654-1917), Ukraine was freed from the Mongolian rule and subsequently subjugated by Poland before it chose to place itself under Russian leadership in the mid 17th century to save itself from the Polish rule. During the ‘forced assimilation period’(1917-1991) which coincided with the Soviet era, much of Ukrainian identity was lost in the aggressive Russification drive. From the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 up to now, Ukraine and Russia have maintained a precarious balance between fragile partnership and lingering conflicts. The distrust and hostility deeply rooted in the minds of Ukranians throughout its history underlie the lingering conflicts it has got into with Russia ever since the Soviet Union was dissolved. In short, anti-Russian sentiment held by Ukranians derived primarily from Russia's colonial rule over Ukraine. In addition to this historical background, the bilateral relations have become complicated by a closely-knit web of political, economic, strategic, geopolitical and national security factors. In light of Ukraine's negative sentiment toward Russia, domestic and external circumstances facing both Russia and Ukraine, a complicated web of multiple-layered national interests that are closely intertwined between the two countries, geopolitical significance of Ukraine in Central and East Region and the CIS region, and fierce rivalry between the U.S. and Russia to sway more influence over Ukraine, Russia and Ukraine will likely choose either to cooperate or clash, depending on individual issues while respecting the boundaries set by their state sovereignty. Considering the geopolitical dynamics surrounding Eurasia, Ukraine will likely remain a buffer zone between the East and the West for the time being.

Hegemonic Competition over Eurasia and Ukraine's Diplomatic Choice

홍완석 한국외국어대학교(글로벌캠퍼스) 동유럽발칸연구소 2008 동유럽발칸연구 Vol.21 No.1

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the emergence of 15 new entities that can independently engage in international relations. In particular, Ukraine's restoration of the sovereign rights signifies more than just a creation of a country. Geopolitically, Ukraine is an axis power that can tip the scale in the hegemonic rivalry between the US and Russia over the Eurasian Continent. The strategic value of Ukraine was clearly demonstrated in the presidential election in November 2004, which was viewed practically as a proxy war between the two superpowers. Amid the intensifying power struggle between the US‐led West and Russia, Ukraine is left with little room to maneuver between the East and the West. The country remains exposed to various forms of pressure coming from EU and NATO constantly marching toward the East, and Russia on the watch to thwart their expansionary attempts. Squeezed between East and West, Ukraine should design their foreign policies firmly based on the cold reality facing the nation in order to ensure national security and prosperity as well as to cope with the changing international order in a more effective and flexible manner. This foreign policy was embodied in the so‐called "multivectorism" advocated by former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma. In a nutshell, multivectorism denies a conflict of policies that can exist between the European vector and the Russian vector, which presents a source of headache for Ukraine in formulating its foreign policy. How Ukraine sets and prioritizes its policies is not a matter of choice between the two vectors. Rather, it involves multivectors. According to the theory, Ukraine can play the role of a "bridge linking East and West". The Yushchenko government is currently shifting toward a pro‐West stance while weaning itself from Russia. Given the geopolitical reality facing Ukraine, however, multivectorism seems to be the only alternative. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the emergence of 15 new entities that can independently engage in international relations. In particular, Ukraine's restoration of the sovereign rights signifies more than just a creation of a country. Geopolitically, Ukraine is an axis power that can tip the scale in the hegemonic rivalry between the US and Russia over the Eurasian Continent. The strategic value of Ukraine was clearly demonstrated in the presidential election in November 2004, which was viewed practically as a proxy war between the two superpowers. Amid the intensifying power struggle between the US‐led West and Russia, Ukraine is left with little room to maneuver between the East and the West. The country remains exposed to various forms of pressure coming from EU and NATO constantly marching toward the East, and Russia on the watch to thwart their expansionary attempts. Squeezed between East and West, Ukraine should design their foreign policies firmly based on the cold reality facing the nation in order to ensure national security and prosperity as well as to cope with the changing international order in a more effective and flexible manner. This foreign policy was embodied in the so‐called "multivectorism" advocated by former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma. In a nutshell, multivectorism denies a conflict of policies that can exist between the European vector and the Russian vector, which presents a source of headache for Ukraine in formulating its foreign policy. How Ukraine sets and prioritizes its policies is not a matter of choice between the two vectors. Rather, it involves multivectors. According to the theory, Ukraine can play the role of a "bridge linking East and West". The Yushchenko government is currently shifting toward a pro‐West stance while weaning itself from Russia. Given the geopolitical reality facing Ukraine, however, multivectorism seems to be the only alternative.

우크라이나 고려인과 한.우크라이나 문화산업

임영상(Yim,Young-Sang) 한국외국어대학교 역사문화연구소 2009 역사문화연구 Vol.32 No.-

2005년 한국문화콘텐츠진흥원이 개발한 ‘러시아 고려인 140년 이주개척사’디지털콘텐츠 스토리뱅크는 새롭게 보완되어야 한다. 4년 전의 개발과정에서 우크라이나 고려인 스토리가 전혀 반영이 되지 않았다. 중앙아시아를 넘어 러시아,우크라이나에도 한류의 흐름이 일어나고 있다. 한.우크라이나 문화산업 교류의 활성화에 우크라이나문화를 잘 알고 한국문화 이해가 높은 우크라이나 고려인의 역할이 커져야 한다. 특히 우크라이나 고려인이 다문화 속에서 살아온 이야기는 한국인보다 우크라이나 고려인, 나아가 한국문화를 습득한 우크라이나 현지인이 더 잘 개발할 수 있다. 우크라이나 대학에서 한국어를 전공하고 있는 고려인과 우크라이나 학생들의 스토리뱅크 구축과 영상콘텐츠 제작 능력은 한국과 우크라이나 양국의 문화산업 발전에도 유익하다. 이들에 대한 영상콘텐츠 교육은 우크라이나 고려인협회뿐만 아니라 한국사회의 몫이기도 하다. The digital contents story bank of ‘140 years of Ethnic Korean(Koryosaram)’ in Russia developed by KOCCA in 2005 should be enhanced. The story of ethnic Koreans in Ukraine was not reflected in the development process. Korean wave has spread throughout Russia and Ukraine beyond Central Asia. To promote exchange of Cultural Industries between Korea and Ukraine, Ethnic Koreans(Koryosaram) in Ukraine, who are familiar with both Ukraine and Korean cultures, need to play more active roles. Ethnic Koreans in Ukraine, especially those who incorporated Korean culture, are in a better position than Koreans to tell their own stories about how they have lived in a multicultural society. In Ukraine Universities, there are Ukraine and Ethnic Korean students who are studying Korean. Their skills of setting story bank and producing visual materials are beneficial to Cultural Industries of both Korea and Ukraine. The ethnic Korean society in Ukraine and the Korea government must work together to provide the needed education for producing visual contents.

지명과 관사 사용의 함의: Ukraine 대 the Ukraine

진실로,박선영 강원대학교 인문과학연구소 2022 인문과학연구 Vol.- No.74

This paper aims to explore how the definite article is used in English place names or country names through the examples of ‘the Ukraine’ and ‘Ukraine’. Since names are inherently definite, they don’t need to be accompanied by a definite article except for plurals (the Netherlands) and combinations with a nationality adjective (the Republic of Korea) or other descriptive forms (the United Kingdom). Then, why is Ukraine described as both ‘Ukraine’ and ‘the Ukraine, and what does each name imply? First, ‘the Ukraine’ gives the impression that Ukraine has an incomplete exterior boundary and is under relatively little human influence. Second, from the viewpoint of critical toponymy, ‘the Ukraine’ reminds us of the domination of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union in the past. Therefore, the English name ‘the Ukraine’ can be understood as an indicator of denying Ukraine as an independent sovereign nation, acknowledging that it is a part of Russia, and, on the contrary, using the term ‘Ukraine’ can be understood as an indicator of acknowledging and supporting Ukraine as an independent sovereign nation.

우크라이나의 수출통제제도와 WMD 해체 프로그램에 관한 연구

윤덕찬 한국안보통상학회 2007 안보통상연구 Vol.1 No.2

본 연구는 우크라이나의 수출통제제도를 분석하고, 우크라이나의 WMD 해체 경험을 검토한 후 우리 수출통제제도 및 북핵문제 해결에 대한 시사점을 파악하는 것을 주된 내용으로 한다. 먼저 우크라이나의 수출통제제도를 분석하였다. 우크라이나는 ‘군수품 및 이중용도 물품의 국제이전에 관한 국가통제법’이라는 단일 수출통제법을 2003년 제정해 운영하고 있다. 특히 우크라이나는 헌법에서 대통령에게 수출통제에 대한 최종책임을 규정하고 있어, 대통령 직속의 ‘군사․기술적 협력 및 수출통제 정책위원회’와 내각 산하의 ‘국가수출통제원’ 이 수출통제를 전반적으로 관리하고 있다. 우크라이나는 독립국가연합 중 가장 먼저 5대 다자간수출통제체제에 모두 가입한 국가이며, IAEA의 원가입국이지만, EU 및 NATO에 가입코자 현재 유럽 수준의 수출통제체제 구축을 위한 노력을 경주하고 있다. 이러한 우크라이나 정부의 노력은 우리에게 시사하는 바가 크다 할 것이다. 한편 본 연구에서는 우크라이나가 보유한 WMD, 특히 핵무기와 그 운송수단의 해체 경험을 검토했다. 우크라이나는 1991년 독립과 함께 구소련으로부터 승계한 핵탄두 및 ICBM 등 핵무기 약 5,000여기를 러시아에 전량 이전하는 조건으로 러시아와 미국 등 서방국가들로부터 안전보장과 경제지원을 약속받았다. 합의에 따라 1996년 우크라이나는 핵 비보유국이 됐으며, 미국은 이 과정에서 넌-루거법에 의거한 ‘협력적 위협 감축프로그램’(CTR)으로 핵시설의 불능화 및 핵물질의 불법유출 방지와 핵과학자의 재취업 교육 등을 지원했다. 이러한 우크라이나의 경험은 배경과 상황은 조금 다르나 북핵 문제에 적용할 수 있는 좋은 모델이 될 것이다. 다만 보다 중요한 것은 좋은 WMD해체프로그램의 개발이 아니라 양측간의 합의 이행 보장에 대한 신뢰 구축이다. 따라서 북한에게 필요한 중유 등 에너지자원의 제공을 시작으로 점차 신뢰를 구축함으로써 우크라이나처럼 하루빨리 한반도가 비핵화 됐음을 선언하는 날이 오기를 기대해본다. The purpose of this study is to analyze a export control mechanism of Ukraine, review experience of Ukraine's Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD) elimination, and take lessons for our export control system and issue of North Korean nuclear weapons program. On February 2003 the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the "Law on State Control over International Transfers of Military and Dual-Use Goods". According to Ukrainian Constitution, the overall management of national export control policy is the responsibility of the President of Ukraine. The national export control policy is implemented by duly authorized administrative agencies responsible for national export control including the State Service for Export Control of Ukraine(SSEC) as a specially authorized independent body responsible for national export control, reporting directly to the Cabinet of Ministers, and Committee for Policy on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control, reporting directly to the President. Ukraine is one of the founders of the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) and party to all multilateral international export control regimes including Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Zangger Committee. The fact that Ukraine was the first State of the former USSR to join all multilateral international export control regimes is noteworthy. Now Ukraine have tried to develop export control mechanism for admission to European Union and NATO. Ukraine experienced elimination of WMD, especially nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. After the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine found itself in possession of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. Under the trilateral agreement signed in Moscow on 4 January 1993 by the United States, Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine removed all tactical nuclear weapons inherited from the former Soviet Union, and Others agreed to guarantee national security and economic assistance. Ukraine announced in June 1996 nuclear-free, and agreed to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Such a transition could not succeed with Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That is some different; Nevertheless, experience of Ukraine is good model to solution of North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program.