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      • KCI등재

        朝英條約(1883. 11)과 불평등조약체제의 재정립

        한승훈(Han Seung-Hoon) 한국사연구회 2006 한국사연구 Vol.135 No.-

        Korea concluded the treaties with the United States, Britain, and Germany in 1882. Korean government executed the two main policies of concluding the treaty at that time. One side was the political purpose that Korea would deny Korean subordination policy of Imperial China and achieve independence from Imperial China by application of the International law. The other side was that Korea would conclude the treaties that mitigated inequality. On the basis of investigation into unequal treaties concluded between China or Japan and Western Powers, Korean government was able to conclude treaties of mitigating inequality with Britain, the United States, and Germany in comparison with treaties that China and Japan had concluded with Western Powers. But British Government refused ratification of the Treaty concluded with Korea in 1882. The main reason was that the Treaty concluded between Korea and Britain in 1882 was considered as a basis that China and Japan would establish to require the revision of treaties to Britain by diplomats of Britain to East Asia and British General Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, Shanghae, and Yokohama. So Parkes made out draft of new Treaty. The draft was made up of unequal treaties that Western Powers including Britain had forced China and Japan to conclude. Parkes specially reflected on the opinion of British merchants who lived in East Asia on purpose to protect the British economic profit in East Asia. In the meantime, the treaty policy of Korean government gradually began to recede by the Regulations conclude between Korea and Japan on July, 1883. The United States, Japan, and China exercised their influence directly and indirectly in the process that Korean government receded her policy of the treaty. In the end, Korea concluded the new Treaty with Britain on November, 1883. Parkes, though opinion of Tongligyoseoptongsangsamuamun(統理交涉通商事務衙門)’s officials was reflected on just a little, integrated the inequality of treaties that was enforcing in China and Japan in the Treaty. The tariff on foreign imports was an average rate of 7.5 per cent that was enforcing substantially in China by means of main goods that probably formed nine-tenths of the foreign trade with Korea paying 5, 7.5 per cent. In addition, Parkes got his demands such as the freedom of the trade between open ports and interior trade by British, and the exercise of British extraterritoriality perfectly. According to the Treaty, Britain was able to reconstruct the treaty system in East Asia. Since then, Korea concluded treaties with German, Russia, Italy, and France in turn. The Treaty concluded between Korea and Britain in 1883 became the original form of these treaties regardless of existence of the Treaty ratified between Korea and the United States in 1883. The reason was judged that the Treaty concluded between Korea and Britain in 1883 integrated the treaties that were enforcing in East Asia above all things. After all, the Korean government was forced to regard The Treaty concluded between Korea and Britain in 1883 as the basis of Korean treaty policy.

      • KCI등재

        재류 청국인의 일본 내지여행 문제-청일수호조규하의 청・일 대등 관계에 대한 일고찰-

        조국 일본사학회 2018 일본역사연구 Vol.47 No.-

        Under ‘unequal’ treaties with the West, Japan allowed foreigners to travel in the interior of Japan for the academic research and medical care only. On the other hand, even after the Treaty of 1871 between China and Japan(Treaty of Tientsin), Chinese in the Japan treaty ports are forbidden to travel in the interior of Japan. Japan wanted to use the Chinese right to travel in Japan as conditions of the Sino-Japanese treaty revision negotiation. The clause of the Inland travel right was ambiguous in the treaty of Tientsin, which means that only “existing(or old-established) regulation” applied this matter. Although it makes possible to operate the treaty with a flexibility, Japan utilized these ambiguous aspects of the treaty for restricting Chinese right to travel. Ironically, Japan’s measures of prohibition, based on vague rules of the treaty, can be refuted by China with the same rules as well. This is why Terashima(寺島宗則)’s confidence of a ‘precise understanding’ of the treaty was simply changed by Inoue (井上馨)’s understanding of the ‘improper interpretation’ of the treaty. The treaty of Tientsin is known as the first ‘equal’ treaty of Japan and China. However, during the discussing the problems of Chinese right to travel, the equality of the treaty revealed it’s complex layers. The triangular relations with Japan, China, and great powers, are extended this problem from Chinese in Japan to Japanese in China. In other words, the equality varies from what Japan insists(=the same right to trade interior of China) to what China insists(=the same right to travel restricted to academic research and medical care). The statistics of foreigners who traveled to the interior of Japan shows that there are exceptions of Chinese. Not all Chinese are banned to travel to Japan, Chinese consulate or government officials and employed Chinese can travel to Japan. It means not only a Japan’s contradictory policy for Chinese, but also diversity of Chinese in the Japanese treaty ports.

      • KCI등재후보

        우리나라 조세조약의 개정 동향과 시사점

        우명강,박일렬,서희열 한국회계정보학회 2015 재무와회계정보저널 Vol.15 No.2

        As the economic environment changes at home and abroad, the tax treaty signing policies also undergo a changing process. Initially source of income jurisdiction was emphasized. Later there was dualistic policy which source of jurisdiction and resident jurisdiction were both emphasized. Then a unified policy came into being which emphasized resident jurisdiction. Especially in recent years, the countries which are often in contact with our enterprises have revised certain parts of tax treaty. This research analyzes the main content of revised tax treaty and concludes the policy orientation of tax treaty in our country. As a member of OECD, our country’s tax treaty revision actively reflects the latest development in OECD tax treaty. Especially the revision on the items in associated enterprises and exchange of information, etc, improves the tax treaty function in avoiding tax evasion and gets closer to the content of OECD Model Convention. Apart from that, the withholding tax of dividends, interest and royalties are decreased. The tax jurisdiction in source country of capital gains is emphasized. also some concepts concerning new trade patterns are redefined. 우리나라의 조세조약 체결 정책은 국내․외 경제 상황의 변화에 따라 변동해 왔다. 원천지국 과세권을 강조하는 입장에서 원천지국 과세권 및 거주지국 과세권을 병행하는 이원화정책으로 변화하다가 거주지국 과세권을 강조하는 일원화정책으로 변화되어 왔다. 특히 최근 몇 년 사이에 우리나라 기업들이 진출하기가 빈번한 국가들과 조세조약 개정 작업을 많이 진행하였다. 본 연구에서는 이들 국가들이 개정한 조세조약의 주요 내용 분석을 통해 우리나라의 조세조약 정책 동향을 도출하고자 하였다. OECD회원국으로서 우리나라는 조세조약 개정에서 OECD모델조약의 최신동향을 적극 반영하는 추세가 보인다. 조세조약의 두 가지 주요 기능은 이중과세회피와 탈세방지가 있는데, 특수관계기업 및 정보교환 등 조문 개정을 통해 탈세방지에 있어 OECD모델조약의 내용에 더 가깝게 되고 있다. 이외에도 배당․이자 및 사용료소득을 비롯한 투자소득의 원천지국 제한세율 인하, 양도소득의 원천지국 과세권 강화, 새로운 무역형식에 관한 개념의 제정의 등을 통해 조세조약을 보완하고 있는 우리나라 개정 조세조약의 최근 동향을 살펴보았다. 아울러 우리나라의 다국적기업의 해외 진출에 주는 시사점을 보았다.

      • KCI등재후보

        한일기본조약의 의의와 한계: 한일관계 50년의 성찰

        김웅희 ( Woong Hee Kim ) 현대일본학회 2016 日本硏究論叢 Vol.43 No.-

        본고에서는 한일 과거사 갈등의 원점이 한일기본조약을 통해 매듭을 제대로 풀지 않은 채 미봉적인 타협이 모색되었다는 데서 기인한다고 하는 시각을 수용하면서도 한일회담 전반에 있어 국익의 충돌이 있었고 당시의 상황에서 최선을 다한 불가피한 선택이었다는 주장도 균형 있게 평가한다. 이러한 입장에 서서 1965년 한일기본조약 체결의 배경과 주요 내용, 그리고 의의와 한계에 대해 살펴보는 것이 본고의 목적이다. 먼저 제2장에서는 한일회담에 있어 과거사 청산의 논리가 냉전과 연계된 안보논리와 경제논리에 의해 압도되어 가는 과정을 한일기본조약 체결의 배경, 한일회담 반대운동과 관계국의 입장, 그리고 핵심 쟁점에 대한 이해를 통해 살펴보았다. 제3장에서는 한일조약에 대한 부정 및 긍정 평가와 한일조약의 구조적 한계를 지적하는 논의를 중심으로 한일기본조약에 대한 평가와 해석을 정리했다. 마지막으로 제4장에서는 조약개정론을 검토하고 기로에 선 한일기본조약 체제의 의의에 대해 살펴보았다. The purpose of this study is to elucidate the Significance and Limitation of the Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan. I agree with the dominant opinion that the origin of the history conflict between Korea and Japan results from not being properly dealt with in the process of normalization talks. but I also accept the assertion that there were conflicts of national interests at large between two countries during the talks, and Korean government had tried to do the best possible. In the process of normalization talks, the logic of historical settlement had become overwhelmed by the security logic associated with the Cold War and the economic logic. To verify these arguments, in Chapter 2, I analysed background of the treaty, campaigns against the conclusion of treaty, key issues of the talks and the position of related countries. In Chapter 3, based on an analysis of structural weaknesses of the Treaty, negative and positive assessment of the Treaty, I tried to examine some evaluation and interpretation of the Treaty. Finally, In Chapter 4, This paper provided an overview of the revision of the Korea-Japan treaty of Basic Relations and reviewed the significance and limitation of the Treaty at the crossroads.

      • KCI등재

        개헌시 국회동의 대상조약 항목의 재검토

        정인섭(CHUNG In Seop) 대한국제법학회 2017 國際法學會論叢 Vol.62 No.2

        한국 헌법 제60조 1항은 체결시 국회동의가 필요한 7가지의 조약유형을 열거하고 있다. 즉 “국회는 상호원조 또는 안전보장에 관한 조약, 중요한 국제조직에 관한 조약, 우호통상항해조약, 주권의 제약에 관한 조약, 강화조약, 국가나 국민에게 중대한 재정적 부담을 주는 조약 또는 입법사항에 관한 조약의 체결·비준에 대한 동의권을 가진다.” 비교법적으로 볼 때 한국 헌법은 국회동의 대상조약을 상세히 규정하고 있는 편에 속한다. 본고는 약 70년의 헌정 운영을 바탕으로 헌법 제60조 1항이 규정하고 있는 7가지 조약유형이 국회동의 과정에서 적절한 역할을 해 왔는가를 검토한다. 결론적으로 국회의 조약동의권을 전혀 축소시키지 않는다는 전제 하에 만약 개헌의 기회가 있다면 이 조항의 문언을 “국회는 안전보장에 관한 조약, 주권의 제약에 관한 조약, 강화조약, 국가에 중대한 재정적 부담을 주는 조약 또는 입법사항에 관한 조약에 대한 동의권을 가진다”로 수정할 것을 제안한다. In most of States the executive branch has authority to negotiate and conclude treaties, but the legislative branch also have some voice in treaty-making process. In the Republic of Korea, too, Article 60, paragraph 1 of Korean Constitution reads that “The National Assembly shall have the right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important international organizations; treaties of friendship, trade and navigation; treaties pertaining to any restriction in sovereignty; peace treaties; treaties which will burden the State or people with an important financial obligation; or treaties related to legislative matters.” In this paper, author review the practical role of legal basis of the legislative consent to treaties. Based on 70-year experiences, author tried to rewrite the provision to express legislative intention more precisely and concisely under the principle of maintaining current legislative power to treaty consent. Author’s final suggestion is to amend the Article 60, paragraph 1 as: “The National Assembly shall have the right to consent to treaties pertaining to national security; treaties pertaining to any restriction in sovereignty; peace treaties; treaties which will burden the State with an important financial obligation; or treaties related to legislative matters.”

      • KCI등재

        1960년대 한미상호방위조약 개정 검토 연구

        정재욱 세종연구소 2022 국가전략 Vol.28 No.3

        This study explores an issue raised between the ROK and the U.S. in the 1960s, when the ROK government called for revising the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty signed in October 1953. Despite the undisputed importance of bilateral ties with the U.S., few studies have been undertaken to address this question, why the ROK government called on the U.S. administration to enhance the security commitment by amending the legal foundation of the ROK-US relationship, the Mutual Defense Treaty, and why it failed. This study is intended to fill this void. This study presents a framework for analysis to address this issue on a theoretical basis, and describes the historical process in which the ROK government in the 1960s made efforts for the U.S. administration to accommodate its request for a revision of the treaty. Here I argue that the demand for amending the pact stemmed from the ROK government’s changed threat perception, but the Johnson administration refused to accept the demand because of the (perceived) declining U.S. hegemony that began in the early 1960s in the form of a growing balance-of-payment deficit, and of its subsequent need to trim its security commitment rather than bolster it. 본 연구는 1960년대 제기된 한미상호방위조약의 개정 문제를 다룬다. 1960년대 한국정부는 한미관계의 법적 근간이 되는 방위조약의 개정을 미국에 요청한 바가 있다. 왜 한국은 안보공약의 강화를 요구하며 한미방위조약의 개정을 요구하였으며, 왜 미국은 한국의 이러한 요구를 거절했는가의 문제는 한미관계의 중요성을 고려해 볼 때, 상당한 중요성을 갖는 사안으로 보임에도 불구하고, 이 문제에 대한 본격적인 연구는 거의 전무한 상황이다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 이러한 문제인식에 기반하여 위의 문제를 다루고자 한다. 이론적인 관점에서 이 문제를 다루기 위해서 본 연구에서는 분석틀을 제시하고, 또한 한미방위조약의 개정과 관련된 역사적 과정에 대해서도 간략히 기술한다. 이에 근거해서 본 연구는 다음과 같은 주장을 제시한다: 한국은 변화된 위협인식에 근거하여 한미동맹 조약의 개정을 요청하였지만, 미국은 1960년대부터 시작된 국제수지 적자를 패권의 쇠퇴로 인식하고, 방위조약의 개정 요청을 거부하였다. 방위조약의 개정 요청을 수용한다는 것은 한국에 대한 안보공약의 강화를 의미하는 것이었지만, 미국은 자신의 패권 쇠퇴로 인해 오히려 안보공약의 축소를 고려하고 있었기 때문이다.

      • KCI등재

        19세기 후반 일본의 琉球병탄과 淸과의 영토분쟁 처리

        김광옥(Kim Kwang-Ok) 부산경남사학회 2007 역사와 경계 Vol.65 No.-

        In 1879 Japan annexed Ryukyu Kingdom and renamed it Okinawa Prefecture. But Chinese Goverment strongly protested against Japanese action, saying that they were ready to carry out military intervention. Japanese leaders wanted to avoid war because of military inferiority. General Grant- ex-president of U.S - meditated the conflicting Sino-Japanese claims over Ryukyu Islands. It was Japanese leaders that suggested the plan of dividing Ryukyu Islands. Japanese foreign Minister-Inoue Kaoru thought that Japan can cede two islands of Ryukyu to China, instead of it Japan can acquire the treaty revision from China. Li Hung-chang expected that by obtaining two islands of Ryukyu Islands, China can restore Ryukyu Kingdom at those islands and can aboid war with Japan. The delegates of two countries met in Peking and after two months' discussion, on 21 October 1880, agreed on a treaty. But Chinese leader rejected the ratification of the Ryukyu division treaty, therefore this treaty was not realized. After 1881, Japanese authorities renegotiated secretly with China on Ryukyu problems. But it ended in failure. Japan possessed Taiwan by Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95. Therefore Ryukyu eventually became subject to Japanese territory.

      • KCI등재

        대통령의 조약체결권한에 대한 국회의 바람직한 권한 행사를 위한 법제 전략 - 미국의 경험을 참고하여 -

        김용훈 ( Kim Yong-hoon ) 경상대학교 법학연구소 2018 法學硏究 Vol.26 No.3

        한국 헌법 제60조 1항에 따르면 상호원조 또는 안전보장에 관한 조약, 중요한 국제조직에 관한 조약, 우호통상항해조약, 주권의 제약에 관한 조약, 강화조약, 국가나 국민에게 중대한 재정적 부담을 주는 조약 또는 입법사항에 관한 조약의 경우 정부의 조약 체결에 대하여 국회는 동의권한을 보유한다. 하지만 헌법의 사실적 특성으로 말미암아 당해 조약 유형을 면밀히 그리고 엄격하게 확정하는 것이 쉽지가 않다. 이러한 문제는 결국 조약체결절차를 둘러싸고 정부와 국회 간 지속적인 갈등 양상을 만들어내고 있다. 이를 해결하고자 국회는 조약체결절차와 관련한 법률안을 제정하고 있지만 문제의 핵심은 정부와 국회 간 상호 협력과 권한 조정이라는 점에서 관련 법률안은 문제의 핵심을 짚지 못하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 이에 본 연구에서는 미국의 경험을 참고하여 조약체결 절차에 있어 정부와 국회 간 바람직한 권한 설정 방향성을 고찰하였다. 미국 역시 조약체결에 있어서의 국회 동의권한에 대한 명시적인 규정이 있지만 여전히 특히 논의의 현실적응력을 위하여 정부와 국회 간 바람직한 권한 설정을 위하여 헌법개정과 관련 법률제정안에 대한 견해를 밝혔다. 다만 가장 중요한 것은 미국 행정부는 줄기차게 국회를 조약체결 절차에 초대하였다는 점에서 정부와 국회의 협력을 위한 의지라고 볼 수 있을 것이다. According to Korean Constitution Article 60 Section 1, Congress has the power to agree the conclusion and ratification of treaties by the government such as treaties pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important international organizations; treaties of friendship, trade and navigation; treaties pertaining to any restriction in sovereignty; peace treaties; treaties which will burden the State or people with an important financial obligation; or treaties related to legislative matters etc. However since the Constitution has the de facto character, it is difficult to decide the treaty type in accurate and precise manner according to constitutional provision. Thus this study aims to find out desirable allocation of powers between the administrative branch(the president) and the legislative branch referring to the case and experience of U.S. In particular, there is opinion on constitutional revision and enactment of legislation in this article for the sake of the desirable establishment of authority between Administration and Congress in order to secure the feasibility of this study. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that a strong will of the Administration and the Congress for the cooperation between both branches is very important taking consideration of the fact that U.S. Administration has persisted inviting the Congress in the procedure of treaty conclusion and ratification.

      • KCI등재

        「조미수호통상조약(1882)」 체결 당시 미국의 ‘공평함’이 갖는 함의 - 조선의 관세자주권 확보 시도와 좌절을 중심으로 -

        한승훈 전북사학회 2018 전북사학 Vol.0 No.52

        이 글은 조선이 통상 부분의 불평등성을 배제하기 위한 목적에서 미국과 조약 체결을 추진하였던 일련의 과정을 밝히는데 목적이 있다. 1880년대 초반 조선은 김홍집과 조병호의 수신사 파견과 조사시찰단의 조사를 통해서 동아시아에서 시행 중인 조약의 불평등성을 인식하였다. 특히 그들은 관세자주권 상실에 따른 저율의 수입관세율이 청국과 일본에 미친 경제적 폐해를 전해 들었으며, 일본이 서구를 상대로 조약 개정을 추진하고 있다는 사실을 확인하였다. 그와 더불어 조선은 1878년에 미국이 미일관세개정약서를 통해서 일본에게 관세자주권의 회복 및 수입관세율의 상향 조정을 약속하였다는 사실도 알게 되었다. 이에 조선은 청국과 일본에서 시행중이었던 통상의 불평등한 측면을 반복하지 않으려는 목적에서 서구 열강 중에서 ‘공평’한 국가로 인식되었던 미국과 우선적으로 조약 체결을 추진하였다. 그 결과 조선은 관세자주권이 보장된 「조미수호통상조약」을 체결할 수 있었다. 하지만 미국은 최혜국 대우 조항을 근거로 「조일통상장정(1883)」과 「제2차 조영수호통상조약(1883)」을 차례로 균점함으로써 「조미수호통상조약」보다 자국에게 유리한 조건의 상업상 권리를 확보하였으며, 그 과정에서 조선의 관세자주권은 부정되었다. 결국 조선이 관세자주권 확보를 위해서 서구 열강 중에서 미국과 가장 먼저 조약을 체결하였던 전략은 실현되지 못하였다. The objective of this thesis is to investigate the process by which Korea pursued treaties with the United States for the purpose of excluding the unequal contents of the trade section. In the early 1880s, Korea recognized unequal treaties being enforced by Western powers in East Asia through the investigation by Kim Hong-jib and Cho Byeong-ho's diplomatic activities(Susinsa) and the Korean Courtiers Observation Mission’s investigation in Japan(Josasichaldan). As a result, Korea knew that the low rate of import tariffs due to the loss of tariff autonomy brought the economic damage to China and Japan, and that Japan tried to revise the treaties with the West. In addition, Korea also learned that the United States promised Japan to recover the tariff autonomy and raise import tariffs through “Convention Revising Certain Portion of Existing Commercial Treaties and Future Extending Commercial Intercourse between the United States and Japan” in 1878. Thus, Korea first entered into a treaty with the United States, which was recognized as an "Evenhanded" country among Western powers, for the purpose of not repeating the unequal aspects of trade that had been in operation in China and Japan. In the end, Korea was able to sign the Korean-American Treaty, which guarantees the tariff autonomy of Korea. The United States, however, had equal shares of Regulations under which Japanese trade is to be conducted in Korea (1883) and the Second Anglo-Korean Treaty(1883) based on the most-favored-nation provision. The United States secured commercial rights on favorable terms rather than the American-Korean Treaty, and as a result, the Korea’s tariff autonomy was denied. In the end, the strategy that Korea signed the first treaty with the United States among the Western powers to secure tariff autonomy was not realized.

      • KCI등재

        日中条約改正の比较研究 -寺島・井上と北洋政府の条約改正を中心に-

        田永秀 한양대학교 일본학국제비교연구소 2008 비교일본학 Vol.19 No.-

        For amendment of treaty between Japan and China, every opportunity had to be fully explored, and even every possible contradiction between countries had to be taken advantage of. Success of treaty amendment entirely depended on each nation’s capability, the utmost element of success in international community. Peaceful solution has been put into action at the amendment of treaty between Japan and China; however, occasionally taking firm stand might deliver the unexpected outcome. English scholar, Wright pointed out, “China previously demanded tariff autonomy; thus, approval on the demand might have been inevitable. Regardless of tariff autonomy, revolutionary scheme, not through meetings, should be implemented.”

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