Toward a Governance System and Political Understanding to Permit a Verified Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula: Policy Developments and Operational Challenges

( Yun Young Cho ) 한국국방연구원 2014 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.26 No.4

Since 1989 when the North Korean nuclear issue first rose to global prominence, efforts by the international community to resolve the issue have not moved it meaningfully closer to the actual elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and weapon holdings. While North Korea has succeeded in getting the United States to the negotiation table by using the nuclear card and consolidating its own regime security, the process of resolving the issue has been locked in a cycle of negotiation, agreement, abrogation of agreements, the heightening of crisis, and renegotiation. Thus, whereas the Six-Party Talks have yielded agreements to end North Korea’s nuclear programs, notably through the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement of 2007, North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear weapons program. It is therefore clear that the North Korean nuclear issue is showing little, if any, sign of being resolved despite pressure from the international community, including the South Korean government’s suspension of economic assistance and cooperation with the North, and the UN Security Council sanctions against the North. This paper accordingly examines the North Korean nuclear issue-the most pressing security problem on the Korean Peninsula during the past two decades. This paper explores the recurring pattern of the North Korean nuclear crises and North Korea’s negotiating behavior, analyzing the core and critical issues of dealing with the North Korean nuclear program and the difficulties that have arisen in the process. In so doing, policy priorities are identified that could help to bring about a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.

북한의 핵무장과 역대 한국정부의 군사대응정책 연구

최승우,김상훈,장광현,홍성표 육군군사연구소 2019 군사연구 Vol.- No.147

North Korea is demanding the international community to trust and secure their will to denuclearize through the summit between South Korea, North Korea and the U.S. and North Korea. However, experts who deal with objective information are evaluating North Korea's credibility as low and that it has at least 20 nuclear weapons and various means of transport. The North's intentions for nuclear weapons have been mainly explained by the theory of prospects and military defense purpose, but the explanation is limited when considering the fact that the international community, especially the ROK-US, has consistently promised and adhered to the survival and security of North Korea, and the nature of nuclear weapons. If we consider North Korea's nuclear capability realistically and look at the intention of nuclear weapons from a different perspective, the viewpoint of denuclearization case studies and analysis should also be different. Based on Allison's research, which analyzed the Cuban nuclear missile crisis as a policy model, we analyzed the past Korean government's North Korean nuclear response policy. The South Korean government's North Korean nuclear military response policy was reasonable in its goals, but failed to achieve its goals due to lack of awareness of threats and restrictions on alternatives. The main reasons are the defensive military purpose theory firmly entrenched on the soil of a lack of awareness of threats and the double containment policy created by relying on Washington's extended deterrence policy. After applying the organizational output of the Ministry of National Defense, which is in charge of North Korea's nuclear response, to the model of organizational behavior, the ministry has shown compliance with the government's policy of reconciliation, cooperation, and peace, such as removing, reducing, and easing the perception of North Korea's nuclear threat. It has faithfully fulfilled its role in ensuring the U.S. nuclear umbrella through strengthening the Korea-U.S. alliance, but failed to take action to fundamentally suppress the North's nuclear program by utilizing its influence. It can be seen that the characteristics of the bureaucracy, such as the difficulties of fundamental change and gradual budget reflection, have all affected the South Korean government's policy of responding to the North's nuclear weapons. 북한은 남-북, 미-북 정상회담을 통해서 자신들의 비핵화 의지가 확고하며 신뢰해 줄 것을 국제사회에 요구하고 있으나 객관적 정보를 다루는 전문가들은 북한의 신뢰도를 낮게 평가하고 있으며 북한이 최소 20개 이상의 핵무기와 다종의 운반수단을 보유하고 있는 것으로 평가하고 있다. 북한의 핵무장 의도를 분석할 때에 전문가들은 주로 전망이론과 군사적 방어목적설로 설명해왔으나 북한의 생존과 안전보장을 국제사회, 특히 한-미가 지속적으로 약속했고 준수해왔다는 점과 핵무기의 본질과 성격을 고려할 때 이 같은 설명은 한계를 드러내고 있다. 따라서 북한의 핵능력을 현실적으로 고려하고 핵무장 의도를 다른 시각에서 본다면 비핵화 사례연구와 분석의 관점도 달라져야 한다. 본 연구에서는 1962년 10월 쿠바의 핵미사일 위기사례를 분석한 그레이엄 엘리슨의 정책모형을 분석의 틀로 하여 한국 역대정부의 북한 핵 군사대응정책을 분석하였다. 한국정부의 북한 핵 군사대응정책은 그 목표는 합리적이었으나 위협 인식 부족과 정책대안의 제한으로 목표를 달성하지는 못한 것으로 분석되었다. 위협 인식 부족의 토양 위에 확고히 자리 잡은 방어적 군사목적설과 미국의 확장억제정책에 의존함으로써 발생한 이중 봉쇄정책이 주요 원인이다. 북 핵 대응의 주무부서인 역대 국방부의 조직 산출물들을 조직행태모형에 적용해 본 결과 정부의 화해와 협력, 평화라는 대북정책기조에 따라 북한 핵 위협 인식을 삭제하거나 축소, 완화시키는 등의 순응적 모습을 보여 왔다. 한-미 동맹 강화를 통한 미국의 핵우산을 보장받는 역할은 충실히 수행해왔으나 영향력을 활용하여 북한 핵 억제를 위한 근본적인 조처를 하지는 못하였다. 결론적으로 한국정부의 북한 핵 군사대응정책은 전형적인 관료주의 행태 속에서 변화와 혁신의 어려움, 점진적인 예산반영 등 관료조직이 갖는 특징이 정책수립 및 집행과정에 고스란히 영향을 미쳐왔음을 알 수 있다.

Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

이만석 육군군사연구소 2015 군사연구 Vol.- No.140

Despite the 20-year long counter-proliferation policy towards North Korea, why has the United States failed to dissuade North Korea's nuclear ambition? This issue has long triggered a highly divergent debate among policy analysts. One schoolof thought believes security assurance and economic assistance would diminish North Korea’s nuclear weapons‘ valuation and lead it to forgo its nuclear program.The other school of thought argues that regardless of the U.S policy, the abandonment of nuclear weapons program was never a policy option for North Korea. However both schools have given incomplete explanation to the entire spectrum of the North Korean nuclear weapons development dynamics. Faced with such incomplete explanations,this study revisited the first nuclear crisis, where the two divergent arguments originated. This study builds and tests a hypothesis that U.S. counter-proliferation policy was mismatched with what the North actually wanted,and such mismatch eventually caused the failure to completely terminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the first nuclear crisis.This study confirms the hypothesis by using a research concept of critical juncture which method investigates by which factors an event occurs.With a comprehensive review of the history of the North Korean nuclear development and U.S.responses to the first nuclear crisis,this study examines whether U.S.policy was properly suited with North Korea’s internal and external requirements. Finally, This study supports the conclusion thatU.S.counter-proliferation policy has been misaligned with North Korea's actual motivations,and such policy resulted in thesecond North Korea's nuclear breakout in 2002. Keywords: North Korean Nuclear Weapons Development, Counter-proliferation Policy, Theories of Nuclear Proliferation, The First NorthKorean Nuclear Crisis.Weapons of Mass Destruction

러시아의 한반도 정책과 북핵 해결 협력 방향

엄구호 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2018 중소연구 Vol.41 No.4

문재인 정부의 북핵 문제 해결의 접근은 이제까지의 양국간 많은 이견에도 불구하고 상대적으로 역대 어느 정부보다 러시아와 공유하는 부분이 적지 않다는 점에서북핵 해결에서의 양국 해결 협력 가능성을 검토해 볼 실익이 크다는 것이 이 연구의기본 의의이다. 이런 맥락에서 이 글은 러시아와의 북핵 해결을 위한 국제 대화에서의 협력 가능성과 북핵 해결을 위한 건설적 중재자 역할 가능성을 중심으로 북핵해결에서의 양국 협력의 가능성과 바람직한 방향을 분석하고자 한다. 러시아의 북핵 전략과 정책 목표는 다음과 같이 정리할 수 있다. 첫째, 역내 NPT 체제는 유지되어야 하며 이를 위한 한반도 비핵화에 대해서는 미국과 제한적이나마공조한다. 둘째, 북핵 해결과정에서 미국의 역내 패권 강화를 막기 위해 다자적 대화에 의한 북핵문제의 평화적 해결을 추구한다. 셋째, 러시아 동북지역의 안정 유지를위해 북한에 대한 고립화 및 봉쇄 반대와 북핵문제의 군사적 해법을 거부한다. 넷째, 한반도에서의 지정학적 영향력 확보를 위해 북핵 6자회담의 주도적 참여를 통한 자국의 정치적 역할 공간 확대한다. 다섯째, 북핵의 해결과정을 동북아 다자안보 및 평화체제에서의 러시아 위상 확대와 연계한다. 한러간 북핵 해결의 전략적 협력의 가능성을 판단하기 위한 논점들은 러시아의 건설적중재자 역할 가능성, 대북 제재의 적극적 참여 가능성, 쌍중단을 출발점으로 하는 러시아의 모르굴로프 로드맵은 실효성, 6자회담이 아닌 새로운 대화 채널 수립의 가능성 등이다. 이상의 논점 판단을 근거한다면 한․러간 북핵해결의 전략적 협력은 UN 북핵제재의성실한 이행과 북한의 대화 참여 유도 협력을 통한 6자회담을 대체하는 UN 주도의새로운 국제적 대화 플랫폼 형성차원에 이루어져야 한다. 또한 단기적으로 한반도위기관리 협력 채널 구축과 중장기적으로 러시아가 중국과 독립적인 입장을 취하는데 도움이 되는 신북방정책의 적극적 추진이 이루어져야 할 것이다. 이런 원칙 하에서 다음의 몇 가지 협력 방안을 고려해 볼 수 있을 것이다. This study starts from a proposition that there is a great opportunity to examine the possibility of cooperation between South Korea and Russia in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue at this time because there are more areas where the two countries share much in common in the Moon Jae-in government’s approach for the North Korean nuclear issue than in any previous governments. In this context, this study analyzes the possibility and the desirable direction of bilateral cooperation in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, focusing on the possibility of cooperation with Russia in international dialogue and Russia’s role as a constructive mediator for the resolution of the issue. As to the North Korean nuclear issue, Russia's strategy and policy goals can be summarized as follows. First, the NPT system in the region should be maintained and for this, Russia can restrictively cooperate with the United States to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Second, Russia pursues a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through multilateral dialogues in order to prevent the strengthening of the US supremacy in the process. Third, in order to maintain stability in the northeast region of Russia, it rejects the isolation or containment of North Korea and any military solution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Fourth, Russia expands the space for its political role through a leading participation in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue to 188⋅ 제41권 제4호, 2017/2018 겨울secure its geopolitical influence on the Korean peninsula. Fifth, the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will be linked to the expansion of Russia's position in the multilateral security and peace regime in Northeast Asia. The issues to determine the possibility of strategic cooperation between South Korea and Russia in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue include the possibility of Russia’s role as a constructive arbitrator, the possibility of Russia’s active participation in sanctions against North Korea, and the feasibility of Morgulov’s roadmap for Korean settlement, and the possibility to establish a new dialogue channel other than the six-party talk. Based on the above arguments, strategic cooperation between South Korea and Russia for resolving the North Korean nuclear issues should be pursued to form a new UN-led dialogue platform replacing the six-party talks through sincere implementation of the UN nuclear sanctions and cooperation in encouraging North Korea to engage in dialogue. In addition, it will be necessary to aggressively promote the new northern policy that, in the short term, will be conducive in establishing a cooperation channel for crisis management on the Korean Peninsula and that, in the mid to long term, will help Russia to take an independent position from China.

The Ethics and Politics of North Korea’s Denuclearization

박정원 한국윤리학회 2017 윤리연구 Vol.116 No.1

With its six nuclear tests, North Korea aims to be regarded as a nuclear power by international society. However, such a status has been denied to North Korea, especially after its fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016 and the sixth in 2017. North Korea's international isolation has been strengthened with the UN Security Council resolutions, and the tensions in the relations between North and South Korea and between North Korea and the U.S. have been heightened. The problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons is both political and ethical one. There are four political and ethical approaches to nuclear weapons: nuclear maximalism, nuclear minimalism, nuclear reductionism, and anti-nuclearism. A nuclear maximalist approach to North Korean nuclear weapons may cause a second Korean War, and a nuclear minimalist approach to them also has the danger to increase and escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, either a nuclear reductionist approach or an anti-nuclearism approach to the problem of North Korean nuclear weapons is more desirable. Three models of denuclearization can be helpful in achieving the North Korean denuclearization: Ukraine model, South African model, and Libya model. Each model can provide its own lessons and implications. Especially, considering the importance and significance of the Budapest Memorandum in the process of the Ukraine model, an East Asian version of Budapest Memorandum is needed for the successful North Korean denuclearization.

한국의 자체 핵무장 가능성에 대한 법적 검토 - NPT 탈퇴조건 충족여부를 중심으로 -

이상택 인하대학교 법학연구소 2024 법학연구 Vol.27 No.4

북한의 핵보유가 현실이 되었다. 현재 전세계의 핵무기 제어를 위해 만들어진 최상의국제레짐(international regime)으로 핵무기의 비확산에 관한 조약(NPT)이 있다. 한국은1968년에 동 조약에 조인하였고, 북한도 1985년에 동 조약에 조인하였다. 그러나 북한은가입 → 탈퇴 → 잔류 → 재탈퇴의 과정을 거치며 핵무기 개발에 성공하였다. 북한의 핵개발 과정은 국제적 합의하에 정교하게 짜여진 NPT체제도 어느 한 국가의 핵개발 의지앞에서는 쉽게 무력화될 수 있음을 보여주고 있다. 북한이 수년전에 수립한 ‘한반도 7일 전쟁계획’은 전쟁초기에 핵무기를 사용하여 미증원군이 한반도에 전개되기 전에 전쟁을 승리로 끝내겠다는 내용이다. 북한의 핵위협이목전에 닥친 상황이다. 그런데 한국은 NPT 가입국이기 때문에 독자적으로 핵무기를 개발하는데 많은 제약이 따른다. 그럼에도 불구하고 “핵은 핵으로만 대응이 가능하다.”는핵전략 이론에 근거하여 NPT체제하에서 자체 핵무장이 가능한지 여부를 검토해 보는 것은 의미있는 일이다. NPT는 동 조약의 탈퇴조건을 2가지로 제시하고 있다. 한국이 NPT를 탈퇴하고 자체핵무장을 하기 위해서는 이 2가지 조건이 모두 충족되어야 한다. 조건1은 “북핵이 한국의 최고이익을 위협하는가?”이고, 조건2는 “북핵문제가 한국의 비상사태인가?”하는 것이다. 한국의 NPT 탈퇴조건을 검토한 결과 ‘조건1’과 ‘조건2’가 모두 충족하는 것으로 평가되었다. 따라서 북핵문제는 우리가 평상시 느끼는 것보다도 훨씬 심각하다는 사실을 알수 있다. 한국이 국제사회의 제재를 피해서 안전하게 자체 핵무장을 할 수 있는 방법은 첫째, 단기적인 관점에서 현재 북한의 핵무기 위협에 직면한 한국의 상황이 NPT 탈퇴조건에해당한다는 사실을 국제사회에 알리고, NPT체제와 긴밀히 협조해 나가는 것이다. 둘째, 장기적인 관점에서 한국이 자체 핵무장을 최종목표로 상정하고, 목표 실현을 위해 단계적인 로드맵을 마련하여 추진해 나가야 할 것이다. North Korea’s nuclear possession has become a reality. Currently, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) is the best international regime created to control nuclear weapons around the world. South Korea signed the treaty in 1968, and North Korea also signed the treaty in 1985, but North Korea succeeded in developing nuclear weapons through the process of membership → withdrawal → residual → re-withdrawal. North Korea’s nuclear development process shows that even a finely structured NPT system under international agreement can be easily neutralized in the face of any one country’s will to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea’s seven-day war plan, which was established several years ago, aims to use nuclear weapons in the early stages of the war to end the war with victory before US reinforcements are deployed on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s nuclear threat is imminent. However, because South Korea is a member of the NPT, there are many restrictions on its own development of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is meaningful to examine whether it is possible to arm itself with nuclear weapons under the NPT system based on the nuclear strategy theory that “Nuclear weapons can only be responded with nuclear weapons.” The NPT provides two terms for withdrawal from the treaty. Both requirements must be met for South Korea to leave the NPT and arm itself with nuclear weapons. Condition 1 is “Is South Korea’s survival interests threatened by the North Korean nuclear issue?” and Condition 2 is “Is the North Korean nuclear issue a state of emergency for South Korea?” After examining the conditions for South Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, ‘Condition 1’ and ‘Condition 2’ were evaluated to be satisfied. Therefore, we can see that the North Korean nuclear issue is much more serious than we usually feel. The first way for South Korea to safely arm itself against international sanctions is to inform the international community that South Korea’s current nuclear threat from North Korea is subject to withdrawal from the NPT from a short-term perspective, and to work closely with the NPT system. Second, from a long-term perspective, South Korea should set its own nuclear armament as its ultimate goal and pursue a step-by-step roadmap to achieve that goal.

북한비핵화문제의 실질적 해결책과 우리의 통일전략

정경환 한국통일전략학회 2022 통일전략 Vol.22 No.2

This paper presents a practical solution to the problem of North Korea's denuclearization. The North Korean denuclearization issue is the most urgent and critical issue in inter-Korean relations at this stage. I think stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula are impossible without a complete solution to the North Korean denuclearization problem. In order to present a practical solution to the North Korean denuclearization problem, first, the resolution of the North Korean denuclearization problem is the minimum prerequisite for solving the Korean Peninsula, and second, the resolution of the North Korea denuclearization problem is the minimum component of building peace order in Northeast Asia. Based on this, I would like to present a practical solution to the problem of denuclearization of North Korea. First, it should no longer be left unattended in recognition of the seriousness of the North Korean denuclearization problem. Second, it should not raise the North Korean regime's flag, so it should make the North Korean regime recognize that there is no place to go unless it gives up its nuclear weapons. Third, the international community must continue to implement strong sanctions and pressure measures against the North Korean regime. Fourth, it is necessary to increase support and trust in the regime by promoting the health of the system. Finally, we should focus all our efforts on strengthening the Korea-U.S. alliance system and strengthening the nation's military power based on it. 본 논문은 북한비핵화문제의 실질적 해결책을 제시하고 있다. 북한비핵화문제는 현 단계 남북한관계에서 가장 시급하고 위중한 문제이다. 북한비핵화문제의 완전한 해결이 없이는 한반도의 안정과 평화는 불가하다고 생각한다. 이런 인식 하에서 북한비핵화문제의 실질적 해결책의 제시를 위해 우선 북한비핵화문제의 기본 구조와 성격을 살펴보고자 한다. 첫째, 북한비핵화문제의 해결은 한반도문제의 해결을 위한 최소한의 전제조건이고 둘째, 북한비핵화문제의 해결은 한반도 평화질서 구축의 최소한의 구성요소이고 셋째, 북한비핵화문제의 해결은 동북아 평화질서 구축의 최소한의 구성요소이다. 이를 기초로 하여 북한비핵화문제의 실질적 해결책을 제시하면 첫째, 북한비핵화문제의 심각성을 인식하여 더 이상 방치해서는 안 된다는 것이다. 둘째, 북한정권의 기를 키워서는 안 된다는 것으로 북한정권으로 하여금 핵무기를 포기하지 않으면 더 이상 갈 곳이 없음을 인식하게 해야 한다는 것이다. 셋째, 국제사회는 북한정권에 대해 강력한 제재와 압박책을 지속적으로 전개해야 한다. 넷째, 체제의 건강성을 도모하여 정권에 대한 지지와 신뢰를 높여야 할 것이다. 마지막으로 한미동맹체제를 굳건하게 하고 이를 토대로 우리 국가의 군사력을 강화하는데 모든 역량을 집중해야 한다.

A comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush's Handling of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Power and Strategy

김일수 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2004 Pacific Focus Vol.19 No.1

The purposes of this paper are: 1) to examine and analyze how the two presidents' policy goals in dealing with North Korea actually materialized; 2) to illustrate how these two Presidents implement their policy goals toward North Korea; 3) to discuss the Congressional responses to the president's policy goals toward North Korea; and 4) to provide comparative analysis of the two presidents' handling of North Korea. This study shows that different Presidents have dealt with North Korean issues in different ways. Two such presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, tried at the beginning of their terms as president to ignore the brewing problems in North Korea. However, both were forced to solve the North's nuclear issues early on in their respective administrations. Their decisions in dealing with North Korean nuclear capabilities help to define their early reputations as foreign policy makers. Yet, the domestic as well as international contexts that President Clinton and Bush faced were somewhat different. President Clinton maintains that the North's nuclear crisis arose from North Korea's security fears: Abandoned by its two Cold War patrons, economically bankrupt, and internationally isolated, the North Korean government saw the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the only path to survival and security for their regime. In this regard, Clinton's actual efforts to resolve the issues surrounding the North's nuclear program appeared ambiguous and inconsistent. This led to the temporary suspension of the North's nuclear ambitions through an Agreed Framework. However, President Bush stuck to more of a hardnosed approach. He continues to demand a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the nuclear program first, before any provision of economic or humanitarian assistance is extended toward North Korea. Bush favors multilateral negotiations, which leads the DPRK to feel more isolated than before. Although the second six‐party talks ended without a major breakthrough, it seems that all parties except the North think the meeting was successful in terms of lowering tensions in Korea. This case study demonstrates several observable features that characterize the president's role in shaping North Korean policy. A president who wants to take a new approach to some element of U.S. policy can be caught between the diplomat's desire for flexibility and the power of domestic political forces. The president can achieve success, but only if the new direction in policy finds acceptance on Capitol Hill.

A Comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush's Handling of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program : Power and Strategy

Kim, Ilsu Center for International Studies, Inha University 2004 Pacific Focus Vol.19 No.1

The purposes of this paper are: 1) to examine and analyze how the two presidents’ policy goals in dealing with North Korea actually materialized; 2) to illustrate how these two Presidents implement their policy goals toward North Korea; 3) to discuss the Congressional responses to the president’s policy goals toward North Korea; and 4) to provide comparative analysis of the two presidents’ handling of North Korea. This study shows that different Presidents have dealt with North Korean issues in different ways. Two such presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, tried at the beginning of their terms as president to ignore the brewing problems in North Korea. However, both were forced to solve the North’s nuclear issues early on in their respective administrations. Their decisions in dealing with North Korean nuclear capabilities help to define their early reputations as foreign policy makers. Yet, the domestic as well as international contexts that President Clinton and Bush faced were somewhat different. President Clinton maintains that the North’s nuclear crisis arose from North Korea’s security fears: Abandoned by its two Cold War patrons, economically bankrupt, and internationally isolated, the North Korean government saw the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the only path to survival and security for their regime. In this regard, Clinton’s actual efforts to resolve the issues surrounding the North’s nuclear program appeared ambiguous and inconsistent. This led to the temporary suspension of the North’s nuclear ambitions through an Agreed Framework. However, President Bush stuck to more of a hardnosed approach. He continues to demand a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the nuclear program first, before any provision of economic or humanitarian assistance is extended toward North Korea. Bush favors multilateral negotiations, which leads the DPRK to feel more isolated than before. Although the second six-party talks ended without a major breakthrough, it seems that all parties except the North think the meeting was successful in terms of lowering tensions in Korea. This case study demonstrates several observable features that characterize the president’s role in shaping North Korean policy. A president who wants to take a new approach to some element of U.S. policy can be caught between the diplomat’s desire for flexibility and the power of domestic political forces. The president can achieve success, but only if the new direction in policy finds acceptance on Capitol Hill.

무기체계 및 개발과정 관점의북한 핵무기 분석과 전망

박진호 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2024 한국국가전략 Vol.9 No.3

North Korea restarted its experimental light-water reactor in October 2023, and its military exchanges with Putin of Russia are becoming closer, as activities are observed at its nuclear test site. In particular, with the US presidential election approaching, North Korea is expected to engage in some behind-the-scenes maneuvers to enhance its previously stagnant nuclear capabilities. However, past predictions, which have interpreted North Korea's nuclear tests as merely a reflection of our expectations, have failed to grasp the core intentions behind these actions. Therefore, in this paper, I assumed that North Korea's nuclear test process was part of developing a weapons system, estimated what efforts the six nuclear tests entailed, and presented their current status and expected future efforts. As a result, I concluded that North Korea is pursuing two tracks for developing fission and fusion weapons. Specifically, the 3rd and 5th nuclear tests were efforts to develop fission weapons, while the 4th and 6th tests focused on fusion weapons. The fission weapon is currently in the process of mass production after establishing standard specifications through the 5th nuclear test. For its fission weapon development, North Korea is likely using highly enriched uranium as the primary nuclear material for mass production, as it is less detectable than plutonium. Plutonium is likely used as the main initiator in the fission-fusion process. However, it has been identified that North Korea's fusion weapon design differs somewhat from conventional fusion weapon detonation systems. Specifically, while plutonium serves as the initiator, the overall system may deviate in certain technical aspects from standard designs. Furthermore, it is believed that the comprehensive systematic tests necessary for standardization for mass production still remain. Next, we ought to take an interest in the related technologies, component materials, and techniques that North Korea is seeking for its next nuclear test.