인허가 기준의 법적 문제와 개선방안

김민호 한국공법학회 2009 공법연구 Vol.38 No.2

The terms of Licensing contains various meanings like as granting, denying, suspending, revoking, renewing, permission, and so on. Also, in Korea, the terms of Licensing using in statutes are different from the terms of Licensing using in practical business. However, in spite of meaning's complexity, at least in Korea, Licensing is a sort of regulation. Korean government tries to carry out project of deregulation. The Legislative is also trying hard to reform provinces of current statues which regulates business excessively or unnecessarily. Therefore, it is very important that we work out scheme for requisite or standard of Licensing previously. The requisite or standard of Licensing, the first, should be kept the openness. To achieve it, ① it have to try to distribute a regulation requisite or the standard of Licensing among a law, a order, and an administrative regulation because the law reservation must be practiced more thoroughly. ② When it is entrusted the requisite or standard of Licensing entrust, I suggested a legislative form that should be appointed possible in the concrete. The second, to improve a definitude of the requisite or standard of Licensing, I proposed that ① a provision of enumeration method of Licensing, ② an enactment of standard for an examination or an imposition of duty of official announcement about standard of Licensing. The third, to plan convenience or speed of Licensing, I suggested that ① it raises a possibility of prediction through a system for transom, ② it fires up a system of a prior conference and ③ it is dutied a notice or a drawing of guiding for simplification of process. In conclusion, to improve a system of organ in charge of Licensing, I suggested that ① raising a professionalism of officer in charge of Licensing, ② supplement of the personnel on the line of a new regulation, ③ raising a quality of review, ④realization a one step service on the line of organization of Licensing alliance, ⑤offer incentive about a prompt treatment with a delay handling of Licensing, ⑥intensive arrangement on the relevant government ministries of quality talent, ⑦leading of administration participation of a clearing enterprise for a civil application. 인허가 기준의 기본원칙은 명확성ㆍ투명성의 원칙과 법률유보의 원칙이라 할 수 있다. 인허가의 실체적 기준으로는 ①법률에서 인허가 기준을 명확하게 규정하고 있는지 여부, ①인허가 기준의 하위법령 위임시 법률에 위임근거규정을 두고 있는지 여부, 중요사항은 법률에서 직접 규정하고 있는지 여부, 구체적인 사항은 하위법령에 규정하고 있는지 여부, ②법률에 행위의 성질인 재량행위ㆍ기속행위가 명확히 규정되어 있는지 여부, ③인허가 요건이 명확하게 규정되어 있는지 여부, ④조문명이 인허가와 일치하고 있는지 여부, ⑤인허가 결격사유가 규정되어 있는지 여부, ⑥사전결정제도가 규정되어 있는지 여부, ⑦복수의 인허가가 동시에 규율되고 있는지 여부 등을 들 수 있다. 인허가의 절차적 기준으로는 ①인허가 발급여부 통지기간과 미통지시 인허가 의제규정을 두고 있는지 여부, ②인허가 처리지연사유 미통지시 인허가 의제규정을 두고 있는지 여부, ③절차간소화 지침 작성ㆍ고시 규정 여부, ④서류ㆍ도면 첨부 적정 여부 등을 생각해 볼 수 있다. 인허가 기준의 개선방안으로는 첫째, 인허가 기준의 투명성 제고를 위하여 ①법률유보의 원칙이 보다 철저히 실천될 수 있도록 법률, 명령(대통령령, 부령), 행정규칙간의 인허가요건 규정을 적절히 배분하는 노력을 경주하여야 하고, ②인허가기준을 하위법령에 위임할 때에는 그 입법형식을 가능한 구체적으로 지정할 것을 제안하였다. 둘째, 인허가 기준의 명확성 제고를 위하여 ①인허가 대상의 열거방식 규정, ②인허가 기준에 대한 해석기준의 제정 및 공표의무 부과 등을 제시하였다. 셋째, 인허가의 편의성 및 신속성 도모를 위하여 ①사전결정제도를 인허가에 도입하여 인허가의 예측가능성을 높이고, ②사전협의제도를 활성화하고, ③절차간소화지침의 작성 및 고시를 의무화 할 것 등을 제안하였다. 마지막으로 인허가 담당기관의 조직 개선을 위해 ①인허가 담당공무원의 전문성 제고, ②규제신설에 따른 인력충원, ③심의의 질 제고, ④인허가 협의체 구성을 통한 원스톱 서비스 실현, ⑤인허가 지연처리에 따른 책임부과와 신속처리에 대한 인센티브 제공, ⑥우수인력의 인허가 관련부서에의 집중배치, ⑦민원 대행업체의 인허가 행정참여 유도 등을 제시하였다.

Licensing Strategies by an Eco-monopolist : Two-part Tariff Licensing

김승렬 ( Seung-leul Kim ),이상호 ( Sang-ho Lee ) 한국환경경제학회, 한국자원경제학회 ( 구 한국환경경제학회 ) 2013 한국환경경제학회 학술발표논문집 Vol.2013 No.하계

This article examines patent licensing strategies of eco-technology by an innovator. In the presence of emission tax, we consider a model of vertically related market between upstream monopolistic innovator and downstream polluting duopolistic firms where firms may purchase a license of pollution abatement technology from an upstream patentee. When the government imposes an emission tax on downstream polluting industry, we analyze two-part tariff licensing strategies and compare the incentives of innovator on other licensing strategies.The main findings of this paper are as follows: First, the innovator always prefers two-part tariff licensing to fixed-fee licensing. Second, the innovator always prefers to no exclusion licensing under two-part tariff licensing.Moreover, ecomonopolist improves social welfare with no exclusion licensees under two-part tariff licensing. Third, two-part tariff licensing can reduce welfare loss which is from exclusive licensing strategy under fixed-fee licensing. That is, two-part tariff licensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing in specific tax ranges. Finally, we suggest that the optimal emission tax without exclusive strategies can improve the welfare.

The Difference in the Determinants of Licensing-in and Licensing-out: Evidence from Korean Firms

Park, Kyoo-Ho East Asia Business Economics Association 2018 East asian journal of business management Vol.6 No.4

Purpose - This paper aims to analyze the determinants of licensing behaviors of manufacturing firms empirically in non-advanced exporting countries. Research design and methodology - We try to approach licensing behavior from the perspective of innovation strategy and open innovation, and deal with two activities composing licensing, i.e. licensing-in and licensing-out using the result of Korean Innovation Survey Results - Firstly, Organizational characteristic factors, particularly the size and size related factors influence the firm behavior of licensing-out, but not in case of licensing-in. Secondly, innovation strategy influences the firm behavior of licensing-in, but not in case of licensing-out. Lastly, the determinants of licensing-in and that of licensing-out are different. Conclusions - In general, firms doing licensing-out have many complementary assets and orientation for global markets. Meanwhile, firms doing licensing-in are innovative firms utilizing patent as an appropriation mechanism. Licensing-out have relevance with product market-related factors and licensing-in have more relevance with technology market-related factors

The Difference in the Determinants of Licensing-in and Licensing-out: Evidence from Korean Firms

박규호 동아시아경상학회 2018 The East Asian Journal of Business Economics Vol.6 No.4

Purpose – This paper aims to analyze the determinants of licensing behaviors of manufacturing firms empirically in non-advanced exporting countries. Research design and methodology – We try to approach licensing behavior from the perspective of innovation strategy and open innovation, and deal with two activities composing licensing, i.e. licensing-in and licensing-out using the result of Korean Innovation Survey Results – Firstly, Organizational characteristic factors, particularly the size and size related factors influence the firm behavior of licensing-out, but not in case of licensing-in. Secondly, innovation strategy influences the firm behavior of licensing-in, but not in case of licensing-out. Lastly, the determinants of licensing-in and that of licensing-out are different. Conclusions – In general, firms doing licensing–out have many complementary assets and orientation for global markets. Meanwhile, firms doing licensing-in are innovative firms utilizing patent as an appropriation mechanism. Licensing–out have relevance with product market-related factors and licensing-in have more relevance with technology market-related factors

신종 플루 등 대유행 전염병에 대비하기 위한 강제실시 제도의 개선방안

전남대학교 법학연구소 2009 법학논총 Vol.29 No.2

<P>The outbreak of new influenza A(H1N1) in 2009 has heightened possibility of compulsory licensing higher than ever before in Korea. To help relevant persons including the Commissioner of the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), who has authority to decide the licensing, this paper studies: (1) basic concept of (compulsory) licensing, (2) jurisprudence based on the international treaty, TRIPS, (3) provisions and precedents of compulsory licenses both in major foreign countries and in Korea. Based on such study, this paper suggests more flexible attitude on compulsory licensing because: (1) many developed countries have taken flexible attitude on it, especially in the U.S.A. the door for compulsory licensing has been opened wider by the eBay v. MercExchange case, (2) the TRIPS agreement allows a flexible and independent decision by each country, (3) even under the compulsory licensing, relevant damages could be compensated by adequate remuneration, (4) a compulsory license is not much different from a willful infringement, where one methodology of damage calculation is similar to that in an infringement case, and (5) limitation of patent right through compulsory licensing is similar to that of other property rights, which we have accepted as an inevitable one.</P><P> Furthermore, this paper points out some defects or loopholes of current compulsory licensing system, prescribed in articles 106 and 107 of the Korea Patent Act and in addition relevant improvement measures or provision amendment measures as follows: (1) the taking system and government-initiated compulsory license system must not be prescribed in one provision, now article 106, (2) “emergency” should not be a precondition to decide a compulsory license, (3) “commercial use” through compulsory licensing must be easier than now, (4) “just compensation” for takings must be conceptually differentiated by “adequate remuneration” for compulsory licenses, (5) KIPO is encouraged to gather more data on royalty rates, (6) KIPO shall prepared for termination of the compulsory license at issue, (7) a “general” compulsory license system could be introduced to Korea, through which more flexible compulsory licenses might be possible.</P><P> Even after making the compulsory license system more flexible than now, KIPO must still be very prudent to limit a patent right by allowing a compulsory license. Not recklessly over-using it, KIPO may exploit the system as a lubricating tool, which may enhance possibility of a negotiation and agreement among interested persons, such as a patent owner, a willing licensee and KIPO.</P>

The effect of international licensing-in experience on latecomer’s international licensing-out

Byungjun Min(민병준) 한국경영학회 2019 한국경영학회 통합학술발표논문집 Vol.2019 No.8

Numerous papers in international management and strategy have addressed international licensing-out as a type of foreign market entry mode. Scholars, however, haven’t paid enough attention to what firm-level factors determine international licensing-out at the firm-level. To fill this theoretical gap, this paper investigates the effect of firm-level international licensing-in experience on international licensing-out in the context of latecomer firms in the early stage of catch-up. Using a panel dataset of 58 Korean pharmaceutical latecomer firms during 2004 to 2017, we conducted panel Poisson regression to test the influences of international licensing-in experience and international licensing-in experience involving external tacit knowledge transfer on latecomer firm’s international licensing-out. The results show that external tacit knowledge transfer by international licensing-in enhances latecomer firm’s international licensing-out while international licensing-in experience reduces it.

국내기업의 해외라이선싱 특성에 관한 연구

이영덕(Lee, Young-Duck),신미숙(Seen, Mee-Sook) 충남대학교 경영경제연구소 2012 경영경제연구 Vol.34 No.2

1990년대까지 한국기업의 기술수준은 상당히 낮은 상태였던 관계로 내국기업이 외국기업 으로 부터 기술을 도입하는 것이 라이선싱의 주를 이루었다. 따라서 국내에서의 연구도 주된 흐름이 외국기술의 라이선싱 특히 국내기업에 의한 기술도입의 지불대가에 치중하였다. 그러나 2000년대 이후 국내기업의 기술수준은 여러 산업분야에서 1990년대 비추어 상당히 발전하였다. 이에 따라 과거에 미국 및 일본 등의 선진공업국으로부터 기술을 도입하던 국내 기업들이 작금에는 이들 국가에 고도로 발전된 기술을 수출을 증가시키고 있는 실정이다. 그런데, 라이선싱사업부문에서 국내에서 이와 같은 상황의 변화에도 불구하고 이 분야에 대한 국내 연구는 우리 기업의 해외라이선싱 전략에 대한 연구에까지 발전하지 못하고 있다. 또한 선진외국의 연구도 국제라이선싱에 있어서 대다수의 연구가 지불형태, 계약특성, 및 지불수준에 대한 분석에 치중하고 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 한국기업의 해외라이선싱전략 즉 동기, 진입계약특성, 지불형태 등에 대하여 설문조사를 하였으며, 설문에 응답한 37개 기업의 특성을 분석하고자 하였다. 이러한 분석을 통하여 아래의 몇 가지 특징을 발견하였는데, 이를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 국내기업의 해외라이선싱의 중요한 동기는 부품 및 원자재의 추가수출기회의 활용, 무역장벽의 회피 등이었다. 둘째, 라이선싱에 있어서 기업의 규모가 큰 기업일수록 해외직접투자 방식을 선호한다는 것이다. 셋째, 기술수취국의 경쟁이 심할수록 라이선싱 계약에서 경상기술료와 정액기술료를 혼합한 방식을 선호하고 있다. In the 1990s, technology levels of domestic firms were very low. Technology transfers from foreign companies to domestic firms are dominated in licensing. And the mainstream of domestic studies of licensing are focused on licensing foreign technology, especially direct forms of payment by domestic companies. But current technology levels of domestic companies are much more improved compared to those of the 1990s in various industries. Domestic firms which used to import technologies from USA and Japan are now showing tendencies of exporting more advanced technologies to those countries. In spite of these changes in the licensing business, the international licensing strategies of domestic companies are not yet studied in domestic research fields. Moreover, many overseas studies focus also direct forms of payment, contract characteristics, and level of licensing payment in international licensing. Therefore this paper studies the contract characteristics and forms of payments of international licensing by Korean firms with the questionnaire survey. The several useful findings through this analysis are as follows; Firstly, the important motives of licensing by domestic firms are to acquire additional export of the component and raw materials, and to avoid the trade barriers. Secondly, the larger firms will be, they have more tendency of choosing FDI with licensing. Thirdly, the higher levels of technological competition of licensee"s country are, they choose Running Royalties and Lump-sum Fees in the Licensing. Finally, firms with more global business experiences will prefer to Running Royalties and Lump-sum Fee.

The influence of CEO equity incentives on licensing

O'Connell, Vincent,Lee, Jong-Ho,O'Sullivan, Don Elsevier 2018 European Management Journal Vol.36 No.2

<P><B>Abstract</B></P> <P>In a study of life science firms, we find that, in accordance with predictions drawn from agency theory and behavioral agency theory, CEO stock ownership is negatively associated with licensing while CEO stock options are positively associated with licensing. Furthermore, by combining theoretical insights from the capabilities literature with both agency theory and behavioral agency theory, we predict that a key measure of capabilities in the licensing context—a firm's alliance experience—significantly influences the ways in which CEO equity incentives impact licensing. More specifically, we find that, in accordance with our theoretical predictions, alliance experience positively (negatively) moderates the relationship between CEO stock ownership (CEO stock options) and licensing. Our study contributes to the wider literature on the determinants of licensing by examining whether licensing is sensitive to CEO equity incentives. We also extend the capabilities literature on licensing by examining the contrasting influences of a firm's alliance experience on the relationship between CEO equity incentives and licensing. Our findings also inform behavioral agency-based research on the effects of equity incentives by highlighting the usefulness of a capabilities perspective in augmenting our understanding of the behavioral role of CEO equity incentives.</P>

Incentive to Raise Rivals' Costs: Patent Licensing in Vertically Integrated Markets

김종민 한국계량경제학회 2020 계량경제학보 Vol.31 No.4

A key input manufacturer with a patent can raise its rivals’ costs in upstream market either by raising the possibility of patent infringement litigation in case a license is not given or by raising the royalty in case a license is given to its rivals. We study under which scenarios the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs. There is related literature investigating the patent holder’s incentive to license its technology to its rivals such as Farrell and Gallini (1988), Rockett (1990), and Conner (1995) or investigating the vertically integrated input monopolists’ (or the patent holder’s) incentive to supply its input to its rivals such as Padilla and Wong-Ervin (2016) and Moresi and Schwartz (2017). This paper differs from those in that the patent holder allows its rivals to use its patent even without a license but keeps the option of patent litigation. That is, the patent holder has an option to grant a license to its rivals in the input market, called the component licensing, or to allow free access to its rivals and to give a license to the device manufacturers, called the end-product licensing. We show that in the component licensing model the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs.

Incentive to Raise Rivals’ Costs: Patent Licensing in Vertically Integrated Markets

Chongmin Kim 한국계량경제학회 2020 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS Vol.31 No.4

A key input manufacturer with a patent can raise its rivals’ costs in upstream market either by raising the possibility of patent infringement litigation in case a license is not given or by raising the royalty in case a license is given to its rivals. We study under which scenarios the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs. There is related literature investigating the patent holder’s incentive to license its technology to its rivals such as Farrell and Gallini (1988), Rockett (1990), and Conner (1995) or investigating the vertically integrated input monopolists’ (or the patent holder’s) incentive to supply its input to its rivals such as Padilla and Wong-Ervin (2016) and Moresi and Schwartz (2017). This paper differs from those in that the patent holder allows its rivals to use its patent even without a license but keeps the option of patent litigation. That is, the patent holder has an option to grant a license to its rivals in the input market, called the component licensing, or to allow free access to its rivals and to give a license to the device manufacturers, called the end-product licensing. We show that in the component licensing model the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs.