언론을 통해 본 한일협정 인식 50년

오제연(Oh, je-yeon) 역사비평사 2015 역사비평 Vol.- No.111

This study discusses how the South Korean press has recognized the Korea-Japan Treaty and Agreement concluded in 1965 and the relation between Korea and Japan on the 10th, 20th, 30th and 40th Anniversaries. During the Post-Cold War era, South Korean newspapers acknowledged that the South Korean economy could develop itself through economic cooperation between Korea and Japan after conclusion of the Korea-Japan Treaty and Agreement on the 10th Anniversary in 1975. However, at the same time, because of an increasing adverse balance in trade between Korea and Japan, South Korea strongly insisted that the existing vertical economic cooperation should be changed to one of horizontal and reciprocal economic cooperation. In 1985, the 20th Anniversary of the Korea-Japan Treaty and Agreement, during the Post-Cold War era, cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan reached its peak, and relations between Korea and Japan were very friendly. Nevertheless, as it was during the 10th Anniversary, the adverse balance of trade between Korea and Japan continued to be problematic, and concern that the Korean economy might be dependent on Japan"s capital and technologies increased. In particular, university newspapers showed great concern about military dependency represented by the trilateral national security system among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. In the 1990s, as the Post-Cold War system came to an end and Koreans politically and economically improved greatly, the relationship between Korea and Japan changed to a more horizontal one. Accordingly, in 1995, the 30th Anniversary of the Korea-Japan Treaty and Agreement, the issue of past affairs between Korea and Japan became a significant controversy. Of these, the legitimacy of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1910 was the biggest issue. In summary, the 30th Anniversary of the Korea-Japan Treaty and Agreement was the first year when a war of memory over past relations between Korea and Japan became as serious issue while radical problems of the Korea-Japan Treaty and Agreement were presented. In the 2000s, the relationship between Korea and Japan improved, and in particular, as private exchanges became vitalized, both governments declared 2005, the 40th Anniversary of the Korea-Japan Treaty and Agreement, as ‘Korea-Japan Friendship Year.’ However, because of Japan"s Provocation over Dokdo Island started in the beginning of the year, Korea-Japan relations cooled rapidly. The conservative media still emphasized the economic and security cooperation between Korea and Japan, but generally, public opinion in South Korea took a firm line on the Japan"s Provocation over Dokdo Island. In addition, the conservative shift in the private sector of Japan expressed on the Internet only heightened Korean people"s anti-Japanese sentiment. This, in turn, caused a vicious circle that would worsen Japanese people"s sentiment of Koreans. Such confrontation and conflict between Korea and Japan was caused by the limitations inherent in the Korea-Japan Treaty and Agreement, neglecting the settlement of past colonialism and insisting only on economic and security cooperation.

Japan and Two Koreas in the Changing East Asia : Contests with the Foe and the Friend

Sandip Kumar Mishra 한국일본학회 2021 日本學報 Vol.- No.127

일본과 한국 간의 관계는 다소 복잡한 양상을 띄어왔다. 이러한 복잡성은 남북한의 분 단과 한국전쟁과 같은 한반도에서 발생한 두 가지 사건, 정통성에 대한 남북한의 갈등과 더불어 해당 지역 내 변화하는 국가 관계의 공식으로 인한 결과물이라고 볼 수 있다. 이 같은 맥락에서 일본이 정권 수립 이후 바로 구 소련 및 중국과 동맹관계를 맺은 북한과 갈등 관계를 유지할 수 밖에 없었다는 점은 이해할 만하다. 그러나 한일 관계의 경우, 양 국 모두 미국과 우방 관계를 유지하고 있고 중국 및 북한과 관련하여 동일한 우려 사항을 지닌 상황을 미루어봤을 때, 일본이 한국과 불편한 관계를 지속하고 있다는 점은 이해하 기 어렵다. 실제로 일본과 한국 모두 역동적인 자유 민주주의 국가일 뿐 아니라 이들의 경제 발전 모델 또한 상당히 유사하다. 한국과 일본은 또한 지난 수십 년간 문화 및 교육 분야에서 상당한 교류를 이어왔다. 일본이 적국(북한) 및 우방(한국)과 갈등 관계를 지속하 는 것은 식민 역사, 정체성 문제 및 영토 분쟁에서 기인하는 것으로 보인다. 남북한은 해 당 문제의 대부분에 대해 일본과 합의를 이루기 어렵다고 판단하고 있다. 일본의 ‘정상’국 가화 정책이 등장하고 동아시아 국가간 관계가 변화하자, 남북한 모두 과거 역사 경험으 로 인해 경계 태세가 되었다. 공격적인 일본은 용납될 수 없다고 간주되고 있으며 한국뿐 아니라 지역 내 가장 임박한 위협으로 인식되고 있다. 상기 언급한 맥락을 바탕으로 일본 과 남북한 간의 갈등의 본질, 궤도 및 원인을 본 논문을 통해 파악하고자 한다. Japan’s relations with Korea have been quite complicated. The complication is product of both events on the Korean peninsula such as division of Korea, the Korean War and legitimacy contests between North and South Korea as well as changing inter-state equations in the region. In the given context, it is understandable that Japan has been contesting with North Korea which got aligned with the USSR and China after its very inception. But it is difficult to understand the contest of Japan with South Korea as both the countries share common friend in the US and common concerns in the form of China and North Korea. Actually, Japan and South Korea are both vibrant liberal democracies and their economic development models have also been quite similar. Japan and South Korea also have huge cultural and educational exchanges in past few decades. The contests of Japan with a foe (North Korea) and a friend (South Korea) are seemingly located in their colonial history, identity issue and territorial disagreements. On most of these issues, North and South Korea both find difficult to agree with Japan. With the emergence of Japan’s quest to become ‘normal’ power and changing inter-state relations in East Asia, North and South Korea both got alarmed because of their past historical experiences. An aggressive Japan is considered unacceptable and the most imminent threat for Korea as well as the region. In the above context, the paper seeks to explore the nature, trajectory and cause of Japan’s contests with North and South Korea.

脱冷戦期日本と南北朝鮮の歴史和解推進要因に関する分析

松浦正伸 고려대학교 글로벌일본연구원 2019 일본연구 Vol.31 No.-

This paper analyzes post-Cold War diplomatic changes in East Asia, in a period when historical reconciliation advanced among the relevant states through the “Japan–South Korea Joint Declaration of 1998” and the “Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration”. These two declarations were turning-points in the process of settling outstanding issues related to past traumatic events between Japan and the Korean peninsula. Japan and South Korea adopted the former declaration, as both countries recognized the necessity and benefits of strategic cooperation to promote regionalism in East Asia. The Kim Dae-jung administration required financial support from Japan in order to proceed with the Sunshine Policy (the South Korean policy of engagement with North Korea) and to deal with the Asian financial crisis. Japan, meanwhile, made further progress toward reconciliation through the “1997 Guidelines” and through legislation dealing with military emergencies in the event of a Korean crisis. Developing trilateral security cooperation was an important factor in achieving progress for Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., but it was felt it would especially enhance the Japan-U.S. alliance. Prime minister Obuchi’s expression of remorse and his heartfelt apology for Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, and his clear naming of the South Korean state in a diplomatic statement for the first time, were also instrumental in advancing the process of historical reconciliation. On the North Korean side, the Sunshine Policy of rapprochement, the increased perception of a U.S. threat, and domestic economic reforms became factors in closing the gap between the interests of Japan and North Korea. The Kim Dae-jung administration assisted the Japanese in furthering proactive diplomatic negotiations with North Korea, a radical departure from the stance of previous administrations which demanded that the Japanese adhere to the theory of “North-South equilibrium”. After 9.11, North Korea recognized a higher level of threat from the U.S., which at that time justified pre-emptive attacks on enemy countries which had weapons of mass destruction. In addition, North Korea urgently needed a massive inflow of foreign capital in order to reform its economy on a large scale. These factors contributed to North Korea’s involvement in the later declaration, which promoted a form of economic cooperation between Japan and North Korea. Rather than employing the traditional approach of “diplomatic normalization first, the abduction issue last,” the two countries chose the approach of reaching a “comprehensive solution,” which encompassed the resolution of historical issues. 本稿は脱冷戦期の日韓共同宣言と日朝平壌宣言によって東アジアに現れた政府間の歴史和解に向けた外交的変化を考察した。両宣言は日本と朝鮮半島の間で、不幸な過去の清算と諸懸案の解決を確認するという意味で、歴史和解の重要な転換点であった。前者は、金大中政権の太陽政策とアジア通貨危機後の対応をめぐる対日協力の必要性と日本の戦略的利益が共鳴した結果採択された。金大中にとって日韓協力の推進は、政権発足前年のアジア通貨危機に対応し、日本の対韓支援を引き出し、東アジア地域主義を推進するため不可欠であり、日本にとっても朝鮮有事を念頭に置いた“97指針”や有事法制が進展する中、日米同盟を強化し日米韓三ヶ国の安全保障協力を構築していく上で重要な関係であった。こうして日本が植民地支配に対する“痛切な反省”を初めて政府の外交文書に盛り込み、日本の首相が韓国という国名を明記し謝罪することで歴史和解に向けたプロセスが進展した。 また金大中政権の南北融和政策、北朝鮮の対米脅威認識、国内経済改革が、従来の日朝関係で存在していた利害認識の懸隔を縮小させた。“南北バランス論”を日本に要求した前政権とは異なり、金大中政権は日本に積極的な日朝交渉を促し、日本外交の対北政策空間を拡張させた。北朝鮮は同時多発テロ事件以降、WMDを保有する敵国への先制攻撃を正当化した米政権に脅威認識を抱き、大規模経済改革により迅速かつ大規模な外資導入が不可欠であった。その結果、日朝は“先国交正常化、後拉致問題”の従来型アプローチから歴史や拉致等の諸懸案を内包する“包括的妥結”アプローチで合意に至り、経済協力方式による宣言が導出された。

강제징용 배상판결에서 나타난 대일민간인청구권과 소멸시효 - 대법원 2012.05.24.선고 2009다68620 판결을 중심으로 -

이은경 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 2017 외법논집 Vol.41 No.2

In 1965, the Republic of Korea agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan, which had been cut off after liberation in 1945, and finally, in June, the Treaty on the Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, and the annexed Agreement on Property and Claims between the Republic of Korea and Japan Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Resolution. It has been recognized that the claims for Japanese or Japanese nationals during the Japanese occupation of the Japanese occupation, including the civilian claims for Japan, can not claim separate lawsuits under this Agreement. On the other hand, in 1944, the Japanese conscripts were forcibly squeezed by the mobilization of the people, returning to Korea without receiving compensation for the forced labor of Japan in 1945. In 1965, following the Korea-Japan Agreement, they tried to exercise their claims in the “Law for Reporting Claims on the Japanese Private Civil Rights,” but they were excluded from the legislation. The forced victims filed a lawsuit claiming unpaid wages and damages in Japan, but the ruling was decided on the basis of the Korea-Japan agreement. In 1965, when the Korea-Japan agreement was concluded, a request for disclosure of all documents related to the agreement was made, and the court finally issued a public order in the court. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs It has been revealed that the government has negotiated with the Japanese government for compensation for victims of forced evictions, which were previously excluded from the bill in the minutes of the minutes. The complicated government has announced in 2005 that the claims of civilians in Japan are excluded from this agreement. Therefore, the claimant is declared to be able to claim the claim. Based on this, the claim that civilian claims against Japan were possible from the time of the 1965 Korea Their claims were dismissed in the first and second sentences that the statute was completed.(Busan District Court, 2000, 7960, and Busan High Law 2007 and 4288, respectively). However, the Supreme Court ruled that until the publication of the documents related to the Korea-Japan Agreement in January 2005, there is a reason for the failure to exercise the right to claim civilian rights related to illegal activities. In the end, in 1965, at the time of the Korea-Japan accord, it was indirectly acknowledged that the individual claims were extinguished through the articles of the Korea-Japan agreement and press releases, and the revised legislation was created to condemn the expectation of the plaintiffs. If the insistence that the statute of limitations is completed 10 years after the 1965 Korea-Japan Agreement, it can not be said that it is contrary to the principle of good faith and therefore the rejection of the performance of obligations is significantly unfair or unfair It may not be allowed to abuse rights. 1965년 대한민국은 1945년 해방이후 단절되었던 일본과의 국교 정상화에 합의하고 마침내 6월 ‘대한민국과 일본국간의 기본관계에 관한 조약’과 그 부속협정인 ‘대한민국과 일본국간의 재산 및 청구권에 관한 문제의 해결과 경제협력에 관한 협정’을 체결하였다. 여기엔 대일민간인청구권도 포함되어 일제강점기에 일본 또는 일본인에 대한 청구권은 모두 이 협정에 의해 별도의 소송 등을 청구하지 못하는 것으로 인식되었다. 한편 1944년 국민동원령에 의해 강제징용을 당하여 일본의 건너간 징용자들은 1945년 일본의 강제징용에 대한 피해보상도 받지 못한 채 한국으로 귀국하였다. 이들은 1965년 한일협정 후속 조치로 ‘대일 민간청구권 신고에 관한 법률’에서 자신들의 청구권을 행사하려 했으나 입법에서 그들은 대상자에서 제외되었다. 이에 강제징용 피해자들은 일본에서 미지급임금청구 및 손해배상소송을 제기하였으나한일협정을 이유로 패소판결이 확정되었다. 이들은 다시 국내법원에 소를 제기하였고 한일협정에 대일민간인청구권 소멸여부가 문제되자 1965년 한일협정 당시 일본과의 협정 관련 문서일체에 대한 공개청구를 요구하였고 법원에서 마침내 법원에서 공개명령을 내려 외교부는 그간의 고압적인 태도에서한발 물러서서 관련문서를 공개했고 이에 의사록에서 앞서 신고에 관한 법률에서 제외된 강제징용 피해자들에 대한 배상금도 정부에서 일본과 협의했던 사실이 알려졌다. 난처해진 정부는 2005년 대일민간인청구권은 이 협정에서 제외되어 있으므로 청구권자는 청구가능하다고 공식발표하였고 법원에선 이를 근거로 1965년 한일협정 당시부터 대일민간인청구는 행사 가능했다고 보고 이들의 청구는 시효가 완성되었다고 1,2심(부산지법,2000가합7960판결, 부산고법 2007 나4288판결)에서 기각했다. 그러나 대법원판결에선 한일협정 관련문서가 2005년 1월 공개될 때까지는 불법행위 관련 대일민간인 청구권을 행사할 수 있는 객관적으로 권리를 사실상 행사할 수 없는 장애사유가 있다고 보아 이를기산점으로 삼고 소멸시효 완성 주장을 배척하였다. 결국 1965년 한일협정 당시에는 한일협정문 기사⋅보도자료를 통해 개인청구권이 소멸되었다고 간접적으로 시인하고 보상 입법을 만들어 원고들의 기대를 묵인 내지 방치하였다가 2005년이 되어서야비로소 한일협정에 개인청구권은 포함되지 않아 손해배상청구권을 행사할 수 있었다고 하면서 소급하여 1965년 한일협정 후 10년이 지나 소멸시효가 완성되었다고 주장하면 신의성실의 원칙에 반한 것이라 아니할 수 없고 따라서 채무 이행의 거절을 인정함이 현저히 부당하거나 불공평한 경우에 해당하여 권리남용으로 허용될 수 없다고 할 것이다.

독도문제와 한ㆍ미ㆍ일 공조체제의 미래

이성우 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2010 국제지역연구 Vol.13 No.4

This paper discusses the tri-lateral relationship among South Korea, the United States, and Japan which is remarked as the most critical part of international dynamics in East Asia. Concerning historical and territorial issues, South Korea and Japan have maintained a relationship of traditional rivalry and the U. S. has been recognized as a major power in the area. This paper tests the positive state hypothesis and the responsive state hypothesis about Japanese foreign policy behavior under the given circumstances. While the responsive state hypothesis argues that Japan has minimized its response to conflicts with neighbor countries, the positive state hypothesis explains that Japan have taken an aggressive stance to its neighbor countries concerning territorial and historical issues like the Dok-Do issue. This paper argues Japan has adopted a dual-stances. With passive foreign policy, Japan has tried to achieve support from the United State. At the same time, Japan employed an aggressive and positive stance to achieve its policy goal regarding the territorial issue. The time series analysis informs that the U. S. has been cooperative to South Korea when Japan takes conflictual stance to South Korea. When South Korean leads the cooperative relationship with Japan, the U. S. decreases the cooperation with South Korea. On the other hand, when Japan leads the cooperative relationship to South Korea, the U. S. increases the cooperation with South Korea. These results can be interpreted that the U. S. has competed with Japan concerning bilateral relationship with South Korea. This paper argues Japan has adopted a dual-stances. With passive foreign policy, Japan has tried to achieve support from the United State. At the same time, Japan employed an aggressive and positive stance to achieve its policy goal regarding the territorial issue. The time series analysis informs that the U. S. has been cooperative to South Korea when Japan takes conflictual stance to South Korea. When South Korean leads the cooperative relationship with Japan, the U. S. decreases the cooperation with South Korea. On the other hand, when Japan leads the cooperative relationship to South Korea, the U. S. increases the cooperation with South Korea. These results can be interpreted that the U. S. has competed with Japan concerning bilateral relationship with South Korea. 본 연구는 동아시아의 국제정치 역학관계에서 중요한 의미를 차지하는 한국, 미국, 일본의 3 자관계를 다루고 있다. 전통적인 라이벌 구도를 유지해온 한국과 일본의 첨예한 대립이 일어나는 상황과 관련하여 미국과 관련하여 일본의 행태에 대한 적극국가 가설과 반응국가 가설의 이론을 경험적 분석을 통해 검증하였다. 일본은 전통적으로 주변국가와의 갈등이나 비판에 최소한의 적응만 수행하는 반응국가의 행태를 보여 왔지만 독도 문제와 같은 민감한 영토문제와 관련하여 보면 적극적이며 공세적인 입장을 취한다고 할 수 있다. 본 연구는 일본은 강대국인 미국에 대해서는 반응적 행동을 취하면서 후원과 지지를 획득하는 동시에 주변국과의 영토와 역사문제에 있어서는 공세적인 적극적 행동을 취했다고 주장한다. 본 연구는 시계열 분석을 통해 미국은 일본의 공세적인 대외정책에 대해서 한국에 대해 갈등을 줄였다는 점에서 한국과의 관계에 호의를 보이고 일본에 대하여 지지하지 않음을 의미하는 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 한국이 일본과 협력을 주도하는 경우 미국은 한국에 대하여 협력을 감소시켰지만 일본이 한국과 협력을 주도하는 경우 미국은 한국에 대해 협력을 강화시켰다. 이 결과는 미국은 한국과의 관계에서 일본과 경쟁을 했음을 의미하는 것을 해석할 수 있다.

경제안보시대의 한일 무역 동향에 관한 고찰

송정현 한국일본근대학회 2023 일본근대학연구 Vol.- No.82

The G2 friction ignited by the U.S. tariff imposition on China in 2016 gradually intensified, causing the reorganization of the existing global supply chain, and the concept of economic security using economic means to secure its own security is drawing keen attention. Accordingly, this study conducted three analysis of trade trends by item: 1)Korea-Japan trade trends after 2000, 2)trade trends before and after the Korea-Japan trade dispute in 2019, and 3)trade trends by item. The results of this study are as follows. First of all, in the case of Korea-Japan trade trends since 2000, the trade volume between Korea and Japan more than doubled compared to 2000, and the trade deficit more than doubled compared to 2000 as exports and imports increased at the same time. 2)In the case of trade trends before and after the 2019 Korea-Japan trade dispute, it can be seen that Korea's exports to Japan increased and imports to Japan decreased after the Korea-Japan trade dispute. However, considering that logistics movement between countries was limited due to the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020, the above results are unlikely to be a clear basis for the negative impact of the Korea-Japan trade dispute on Korea-Japan trade.3)In terms of trade trends by item, the top 10 items of import and export in 2000, 2012, and 2022 were similar. In particular, the top three items of import and the top two items of export were major trade items between Korea and Japan. The significance of this study is as follows. First of all, it analyzes the post-war trade structure trends of Korea-Japan semiconductor export regulations that occurred in 2019. With the importance of economic security increasing, it is very important to understand the impact of the implementation of trade regulation policies of a specific country on trade between the implementing country and the target country. The second point is an analysis of trade trends by item between Korea and Japan. Korea-Japan trade has benefited both countries through interdependence. However, the global trade landscape has changed, especially in the era of economic security, and since each trade item will have different ripple effects on the country's military security and economic sectors, it is expected to be used as a basic analysis survey in establishing trade policies and foreign policies.

박정희 정권의 한일어업회담

김민석 한국근현대사학회 2010 한국 근현대사 연구 Vol.53 No.-

Park, Chung-hee administration pushed Korea-Japan Conference Agreement ergatively supported by both the political policy of the United States; the U. S. wanted to build anti-communism in Asia, and the economic crisis of Korea. Peace Line proclaimed by Rhee, Syng-man administration, however, prevented normalization accord of two nations; this line had been made to protect Korea coastal fishing ground from Japan's overfishing in that ground. Japan requested the removal of Peace Line very strongly as a prerequisite of Korea-Japan Conference Agreement. While Park, Chung-hee administration recognized the removal of Peace Line was inevitable in the process of negotiation with Japan, the difference between two nations was still very serious from the preliminar stage of Korea-Japan Fisheries Conference. This difference of opinions on Peace Line began to be narrowed down little by little when Kim, Jong-pil, the CIA Director of Korea, and Ohira, the Foreign Minister of Japan, resolved the issues on the right of claims as Korea-Japan Fisheries Conference was in progress. Peace Line in Korean coast used to be a maximum 200-nautical mile exclusive fishing zone, however, as a result of Conference, it fell down into 12-nautical mile exclusive fishing zone as Japan suggested. Also, a joint regulation fishing zone between Korea and Japan was set for the outer of 12-nautical mile exclusive fising zone. Though Korea tried to constitute a system to control Japanese fishing boat in quality within a joint regulation fishing zone and discussed it with Japan, this effort failed to bring agreement with Japan; Japan remained fairly tight-lipped on this issue standing Flaggenprinzip ground. In addition, the amount of loan which Korea required Japan as a return of removal of Peace Line at Korea Japan Fisheries Conference was only $90 million dollors and its redeption conditions was unfavorable for Korea. Nonetherless, the removal of Peace Line was brought not only by Japan' strong request but also by Korea's determined policy since the preliminary stage of the Conference; Park administration wanted to reach an agreement at Korea-Japan Conference and also wanted to introduce money of compensation claims as a result of the Conference. However, against Park administration's unilateral proceeding at Korea-Japan Conference, there was a firm oppressive among parties out of political power and university students inside of Korea. Park administration, however, clamped down on this opposition and finally concluded Korea-Japan agreement. Even after Korea-Japan agreement, there had been perpetual fisheries disputes between Korea and Japan. Japanese fishing boats violated Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement and Korean fishing boats overfished in Japan coastal ground. After all, in 1998, Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement was cancelled due to Japan's one-sided proclaim of discontinuance. The agreement was unfaire to Korean people at the time of agreement and also to Japan people both after the agreement and at the time of cancellation.

북한의 핵 미사일 위협에 대한 일본의 군사 외교적 대응

미찌시타 나루시게(道下徳,成)(MICHISHITA Narushige) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2012 신아세아 Vol.19 No.4

In response to nuclear-armed North Korea, Japan has taken extensive non-nuclear military measures in order to cope with the North Korean threat while being less active in using diplomacy. Analysts estimate that North Korea had possessed 33 to 55 kilograms of plutonium enough for 6 to 13 nuclear devices. Two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 proved that North Korea had successfully produced nuclear devices. The only remaining missing link in determining whether North Korea’s nuclear weapons have become usable is in the issue of miniaturization. On this point, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) assessed in 2009 that North Korea “may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.” Capable of covering almost the entire territory of Japan, the medium-range No Dong missile constitutes the most serious threat to the country. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 kilometers with a payload of 700 to 1,200 kilograms and circular error probable(CEP) of 2.5 kilometers. By 2003, North Korea had deployed some 175∼200 No Dong missiles. A more recent report stated that as many as 320 No Dong missiles had been deployed. As a result, North Korea is already capable of attacking Japan with ballistic missiles. Conventional, chemical, or biological weapons can be used. Given the DIA’s estimate of North Korea’s ability to miniaturize the nuclear device, the assessment is that North Korea “may be able to” now use nuclear weapons against Japan. There are three scenarios in which North Korea might actually use missiles against Japan. First, there is a military-diplomatic scenario in which North Korea would launch missiles as a part of its effort to coerce Japan into diplomatic submission. Second, there is a wartime deterrence scenario in which North Korea would use or threaten to attack Japan in order to deter the United States and Japan from assisting South Korea in case of war on the Korean peninsula. Finally, there is a scenario in which desperate North Korean leaders launch all-out attacks against Japan. Japan’s military response to the North Korean threat has three pillars: ballistic missile defense(BMD), civil defense, and extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States. In 2003, the Japanese government made the decision to procure BMD systems. Based on this decision, deployment of BMD units in the Self-Defense Forces(SDF) began in 2007, and the deployment was completed in 2012. Two different systems are being introduced as key components of the Japanese BMD measures. One is the Standard Missile-3(SM-3) Block IA, an upper-tier, mid-course defense system deployed on Aegis destroyers. The other system is Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3(PAC-3), a ground-based, lower-tier, terminal-phase defense system. Of these two systems, the Aegis-based SM-3 is more important than PAC-3 in the sense that the SM-3 has much wider area coverage. The total expenditure of procuring the entire system is approximately 1 trillion yen, or $12.2 billion. Regarding civil defense measures, the Civil Protection Law was enacted in 2004. It stipulated how the national and local governments should implement evacuation and relief operations and take necessary measures in response to armed attacks. In 2005, the Cabinet Secretariat prepared a new warning siren designed specifically for civil defense purposes. Japan has taken steps to maintain and possibly enhance the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The Nuclear Posture Review(NPR) published by the Department of Defense in April 2010, however, announced that the Tomahawk, nuclear-equipped, sea-launched cruise missile(TLAM-N) would be retired. Some Japanese government officials felt betrayed by this since the TLAM-N had long been hailed as the centerpiece of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent provided to Japan.

전후 일본의 국가 대전략과 북일관계

강용범 ( Jiang Long-fan ),왕해범 ( Wang Hai-fan ) 조선대학교 동북아연구소(구 통일문제연구소) 2016 동북아연구 Vol.31 No.1

역사적으로 한반도는 일본이 무력으로 지역패권을 도모하고 이른바 “동아시아공영권”의 야망을 실현하는 전초기지가 되어왔다. 제2차세계대전후 일본은 보통국가의 지위와 신분을 회복하고 나아가 아시아지역 강대국으로 부상하는 것을 국가전략의 최종목표로 삼아왔다. 이러한 국가전략을 실현하는 과정에 과거 식민통치에 대한 청산은 비켜설 수 없는 걸림돌이 되었다. 냉전이 한창이던 1965년, 미국의 적극적인 중재하에 한·일양국은 국교정상화를 실현하였다. 따라서 북한과의 관계개선은 전후 일본외교의 중요한 과제로 부상하게 되었다. 일본의 정치가들은 흔히 일본은 전략이 없는 국가라고 한다. 허나 냉전 이후 20여년간 전개되어 온 일본의 대북정책을 살펴보면 일본의 국가전략이 얼마나 교묘한가를 알 수 있다. 우선 북한과의 국교정상화를 통해 정상국가로서의 신분과 지위를 회복하고, 다음으로 북한의 “안전위협”을 빌미로 “군사대국화”를 실현하며, 나아가 6자회담에 끼어들어 한반도다자안보협의에 깊숙이 개입함으로써 정치, 군사 대국화를 위한 기틀을 마련하였다. 뿐만 아니라 일본의 대북정책은 반성과 사죄 그리고 배상이라는 근본적인 문제를 떠나 북한의 핵·미사일과 납치문제에만 집착하고 있다. 더욱이 일본은 중국이나 한국과의 관계가 악화되어 외교적으로 고립될 경우에는 북한과의 관계 완화를 통해 위기를 탈출하려 시도하고, 안보법안과 헌법개정을 위해선 “북한위협론”을 들먹여 제재를 강화하는 등 교묘한 전략을 구사하여왔다. 제4차 북핵실험 후 북·일관계는 또다시 최악의 위기를 맞고 있다. 북한은 일본인납치피해자에 대한특별조사위원회를 해체하였고 일본은 유엔안보리제재는 물론 독자적이고 더욱 강경한 제재를 실시하고 있다. 헌법개정을 본격적으로 추진하고 있는 아베 내각으로 말하면 북한위협이 고조되고 양국관계가 악화되는 것이 더욱 바람직한 전략적 선택일 수도 있다. In history, the Korean peninsula has been an advanced base of Japan to pursue local hegemony through force and realize an ambition to achieve Mutual Prosperity in East Asia. After World War II, Japan has had a final goal of recovering the position and status of a normal country and furthermore, raising its status to one of the top countries in Asia. In the process of realizing such a national strategy, its colonial rule in the past has become a setback which can not be overcome. In 1965 when the Cold War was at its peak period, under the active intervention of the U.S.A, South Korea and Japan normalized diplomatic relations. Therefore, a better relationship with North Korea has become an important task for Japan`s diplomacy before and after the war. Japan`s politicians said that Japan does not have any strategies. However, to look at the policies against North Korea which have been developed for about 20 years after the Cold War, it can be understood how clever Japanese strategies against other countries are. First of all, through normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea, it recovered the status and position of a normal country. Then, under the pretext of the security threat of North Korea, it realized “Military Power” and furthermore it joined in six-party talks to intervene in the multilateral security talks and were prepared for a great military power. As well, Japan`s policy against North Korea has adhered to nuclear technology ,missiles, and kidnapping out of the fundamental problems of reflection, apology and compensation. In addition, as Japan has had worse relations with China and South Korea, and is isolated diplomatically, it attempted to escape from this crisis through mitigation of relations with North Korea, and for security law and constitution revision, it mentioned the North Korean Threat Issue to reinforce restraint. After the 4th North Korea Nuclear Test, relations between North Korea and Japan faced the worst crisis. North Korea dismantled a special investigation committee into Japanese kidnappings and Japan has implemented more independent and resolute restraints as well as restraints in the U.N. Security Council. To the Abe administration which has actively executed Constitutional reform, it is suggested that the severe threat of North Korea and aggravated relations between the two countries would be a more desirable strategy.

한국외교와 한일안보관계의 변용, 1965~2015

박영준 서울대학교 일본연구소 2015 일본비평 Vol.- No.12

Since the normalization of the Korea-Japan diplomatic relations in 1965, South Korea and Japan have developed its security relations in diverse ways. Concerning the causes and mechanisms of Korea-Japan security relations, some researchers paid attentions to America’s role in the Asia-Pacific regions in propelling the two allies into more friendly security relations or estranging each other signalling the prospect of entrapment. Other scholars have emphasized the role of Japan’s diplomacy to manage the Korea-Japan security relations in terms of Japan’s national security policy. In this paper, I tried to shed light on the role of Seoul’s national strategy and diplomacy in developing the Korea-Japan security relations. Each administrations of Park Chung-Hee, Roh Tae-Woo, and Kim Dae-Jung have underscored the importance of Korea-Japan374 일본비평 12호security relations and developed it by suggesting the national strategy of the Motherland Modernization, Northern Policy and so-called Sun-shine policy. In contrast, administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Roh Moo-Hyun, and Lee Myung-Bak failed to develop Korea-Japan security relations due to the rising national sentiment toward Japan during their presidency despite their initial directions of national strategy which had put emphasis on the development of mutual security cooperation. Incumbent Park Geun-Hye administration seemed to set South Korea on the similar path in terms of Korea-Japan security relations like her predecessors such as Lee Myung-Bak or Roh Moo-Hyun. Considering these patterns and tendencies, South Korea’s security relations with Japan in the near future will also be determined by the interaction of its national strategy and national sentiment in the contest of rising China and provocative North Korea.