초서의 궁정풍 사랑(courtly love) : 「시골유지의 이야기」(The Franklin’s Tale)를 중심으로

이동춘 신영어영문학회 2012 신영어영문학 Vol.52 No.-

Courtly love refers to a set of ideas about love that was commonly influential on the literature and cultures of the middle ages. Nearly all of Chaucer’s tales deal in some way with courtly love and courtly codes of conduct. Chaucer’s tales are awash with courtly lovers, courtly love language, courtly love situations and actions, and allusions to the love that can be recognized as courtly. In spite of the pervasiveness and outward trappings of courtly love, however, it is not easy to figure out what Chaucer’s attitude toward courtly love is, because Chaucer sways his thought on or avoids his direct statement on courtly love. It is only through the indirect and subtle ways that Chaucer reveals the fictitiousness and the falsehood of courtly love in his tales like The Franklin’s Tale and The Merchant’s Tale. Chaucer didn’t look upon courtly love in his tales as a viable way of expressing what occurs in the human heart. He seems to have regarded the courtly behaviors and the codes of courtly conduct as anything other than dangerous, even sham or pretense. In no tales did Chaucer ask us to consider courtly love seriously, but he simply employs the conventions of courtly love as some sort of ‘play’ or ‘game’ for his creation of the poetic works.

유럽연합법원과 유럽인권법원과의 관계

박진완 경북대학교 법학연구원 2019 법학논고 Vol.0 No.64

According to the Lisbon Treaty, the protection of the fundamental rights of the European Union is based on two foundations: The new Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the European Union Treaty), which has legally equivalent effect with other treaties and which has legal binding force through these legal equivalents (Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union) and apart from it the basic right of the European Union, which has been in force continuously as a general rule of law of the European Union (Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the European Union Treaty). These two bases for the protection of the fundamental rights of the European Union are complemented by Article 6 (2) of the European Union Treaty in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, which authorizes accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Justice of the European Union, which is referred to as the European Court of justice in its opinion of accession to the European Convention on Human Rights of the European Union on 18 December 2014, was decided that the European Union's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights violated European Union law as an explicit set of limits on the development of the European Union’s international legal action. The European Court concluded that the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights is in violation of Article 6 (2) of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights. The Court of Justice of the European Union judged that the European Union's entry into the European Convention on Human Rights violated the Treaty of the European Union. The Court of the European Union, through this decision, has prevented the European Union from joining the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the continuation of a new phase in the history of European and international human rights guarantees was hindered by the European Court's check, the basic framework of the close linkage between the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights as a system of human rights protection throughout Europe has not been woken up. Notwithstanding Opinion 2/13 of the European Court of Justice, if the European Union is to be admitted to the European Convention on Human Rights, the judicial cooperation and cooperation between the constitutional courts of European countries and the European courts, namely the European Constitutional Court, More complexity will increase. 리스본 조약에 의하면 유럽연합의 기본권 보호는 다음의 두 가지 토대에 근거하고 있다: 조약들과 법적으로 동등한 효력이 부여되고, 이를 통하여 법적인 구속력(Rechtsverbindlichkeit)을 가지고 있는 2007년 12월 12일 새롭게 개정된 유럽연합의 기본권 헌장(Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union) (유럽연합조약(EUV) 제6조 제1항) 그리고 그와 별도로 유럽연합법의 일반적 법원칙으로서 계속적으로 효력을 발생하고 있는 불문의 유럽연합의 기본권(ungeschriebene Unionsgrundrechte) (유럽연합조약 제6조 제3항). 이러한 유럽연합의 기본권 보호를 위한 이러한 두개의 기초는 유럽연합이 1950년 11월 4일의 인권과 기본자유의 보호를 위한 유럽협약(Europäische Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten), 즉 유럽인권협약에 가입할 권한과 의무를 부여하고 있는 리스본 조약에 따른 유럽연합조약 제6조 제2항에 의하여 보충되어진다. 유럽연합법원, 유럽인권법원 그리고 독일연방헌법재판소와 같은 구성국가의 헌법재판소 사이의 권력관계의 균형적 확립의 문제는 유럽의 다면적 인권보장체계에서의 기본권 보호의 핵심적 논의대상이 된다. 이에 대한 평가는 버뮤다 삼각지대라는 비관적 평가로부터 시작하여, 평화로운 공존이라는 중립적 입장 그리고 유럽의 헌법재판소 결합(Europäischer Verfassungsgerichtsverbund)이라는 낙관적 평가로 이어 진다. 유럽법원, 유럽인권법원(E 그리고 유럽의 각 국가들의 헌법재판소 (독일과 같은 연방국가인 경우에는 연방헌법재판소와 각 주의 헌법재판소도 포함된다)가 유럽의 시민들의 권리를 보호하고 있다. 이와 관련하여 유럽에는 4개의 기본권 문서들(Grundrechtstexte)이 존재한다: 유럽인권협약, 유럽연합의 기본권 헌장, 각 국가들의 연방헌법과 주의 헌법. 이러한 유럽에서의 시민들의 기본권 보호를 위한 기본권 문서들의 중복적 적용은 시민들의 권리보호의 최적화 실현에 어느 정도 기여할 수 있는가 2014년 12월 18일의 유럽연합(EU)의 유럽인권협약 가입에 대한 자신의 평가서(Gutachten)에서 유럽법원으로 불리는 현재의 유럽연합법원(Court of Justice of the European Union)은 유럽연합의 국제법적인 활동전개에 대한 명백한 한계설정으로서 유럽연합의 유럽인권협약 가입이 유럽연합법 위반이라고 결정하였다. 유럽법원은 유럽연합의 유럽인권협약가입이 유럽연합조약 제6조 제2항 그리고 유럽연합의 유럽인권협약의 가입에 대한 유럽연합조약 제6조 제2항에 대한 의정서(Protokol)(제8호)에 합치되지 않는다고 보았다. 만일 유럽연합의 유럽인권협약에 가입 후에 유럽연합이 유럽인권협약에 구속된다면, 예를 들면 유럽인권협약 제8조 제1항의 의미 속의 주거개념(Wohnungsbegriff)의 해석과 같이 동일한 기본권 개념에 대한 유럽법원과 유럽인권법원의 판례내용의 차이가 존재한다면, 유럽법원의 유럽연합법에 대한 독점적 해석권이 어느 정도까지 잘 보장될 수 있는가 하는 의문이 제기된다. 유럽연합의 유럽인권협약 가입이 유럽연합조약 위반으로 본 유럽법원의 견제로 인하여 유럽 및 국제적 인권보장의 역사에서의 새로운 국면전개의 진행이 저지되었지만, 유럽전체의 인권보장체계로서 유럽연합과 유럽인권협약의 긴밀한 연계의 기본적 틀은 깨워졌다고 볼 수 없다. 유럽연합법원(CJEU)의 의견서(Opinion) 2/13에도 불구하고, 유럽연합이 유럽인권협약에 가입하게 된다면, 유럽의 각국가들의 헌법재판...

미국 법원연계형 조정의 운영과 시사점 – 뉴욕동부연방지방법원 (E.D.N.Y.)과 뉴욕카운티 법원의 사례를 중심으로 –

함영주 한국민사소송법학회 2010 민사소송 Vol.14 No.2

Court-annexed mediation reform is being discussed by the Korea Supreme Court and some scholars in Korea. This idea originates from the analysis that Korea’s court-mediation[민사조정(民事調停) in Korean] is totally different kind of mediation in contrast with western country’s mediation. Many Korean scholars and judges says that Korea’s court mediation is actually modified kind of judgment[재정(裁定) in Korean]. Korea’s court judges are supervising the same civil case with a mediator and adjudicator successively. The same judge could be a mediator continuously after the judicial process changed into mediation. After the court mediation process finished, the same judge who supervised mediation as a mediator could adjudicate again the case with a judge. Many lawyers and legal professionals are suspicious about judge’s role in court-mediation and trial. These two roles and two processes are contradictory each other by its own characteristics. Korean judges are forced to finish his case into a mediation in a very short time by the judicial authorities. The rate of mediation is a very important requisites of judge’s performance assessment with a promotion standard. Due to this circumstances, judge’s mediation could be coercing to the parties and lawyers. According to this background, this paper has researched on court-annexed mediation in New York city. Eastern District of New York Federal court and New York county court were selected as a sample of American court-annexed mediation. Strict separation of mediator and judge’s roles are more precisely investigated and focused. The characteristics of confidentiality, impartiality, disqualification of mediators are also reviewed. This paper also introduced the important role of magistrate judges in the Eastern District of New York Federal court. This paper could be helpful to prepare for Korea’s general dispute resolution act and to make differentiated mediation process in contrast with Japan’s ADR promotion act.

The Highest Court In Federal Systems

( George A. Bermann ) 세계헌법학회 한국학회 2005 세계헌법연구(世界憲法硏究) Vol.11 No.2

The courts of last resort within States bear an enormous responsibility for the law, since unless and until the political branches of government have spoken, it is these courts, that ultimately decide what the law means, and it is they who take responsibility for legal coherence within the polity they serve. Of course, even that statement does not go nearly far enough: some - not all - highest courts also determine whether and to what extent decisions taken by the political branches comply with the polity`s basic constitutional precepts and are entitled to be enforced. Such highest courts are thus also constitutional courts in the fullest sense of that term. My focus is highest courts in federal systems, and federal systems immediately raise threshold definitional issues. First, what is the highest court in a federal system? Is it, almost as if definitionally, the highest court at the federal level? Or does it also include (within a sphere that has to be delineated of course) the highest courts at the level of the constituent states? Second, when there happens to be a multiplicity of nominally supreme courts at either the state or the federal level, which court is the highest among them? Is it the court or court whose job it is to give authoritative interpretations of legislation (to state what the law is - be it state or federal - and what it means), or is it the court - assuming that a separate one exists at the federal level for these purposes - that authoritatively determines the constitutionality of legislation, if challenged? All this is to say that, as in other areas of human endeavor - notably architecture - form follows function. It is idle to designate a court or courts as highest without first identifying the judicial functions to be performed. Thus, in a judicially complex federal system, there can be (a) a highest court and (depending on specialization) possibly several highest courts for the interpretation and understanding of the law of the constituent states. (b) a highest court for determinations of the constitutionality of constituent state law under the state constitution, (c) a highest court and (depending on specialization) possibly several highest courts for the interpretation and understanding of federal law, and (d) a highest court for determinations of the constitutionality of federal law, and possibly also state law, under the federal constitution. It is auspicious, for heuristic purposes, that we are sitting in Germany. But even this laborious catalogue of conceivable highest courts can be further complicated by the possibility of having yet a separate court - on the French Tribunal des Conflits model - whose function is to decide in which order of courts within a complex court system a given case belongs, in the event of conflict over that purely jurisdictional question. If I am correct that there are numerous logically defensible ways in which to organize supreme judicial authority within federal systems, the designers of federal constitutions have considerable architectural license. Whatever the drafters or the U.S. Constitution may have originally and specifically intended, they created - or left open - the possibility that centralized in the U.S. Supreme Court would be final authority to determine both the meaning and federal constitutionality of federal law and the federal constitutionality of state law. The further and related, but really not surprising, move that the Supreme Court made was to consider that questions of state vs. federal legislative competence represent constitutional questions and that, as such, their resolution therefore also fell within the Supreme Court`s purview. And so, it is today unquestioned - though it is still not inscribed in the U.S. federal constitutional document - that the Supreme Court would ultimately determine the outer limits of federal legislative authority and state legislative authority vis-a-vis each other. It has, we might say, Kompetenz/Ko

강제매각의 별도집행에 따른 피해의식 연구

권오현(Kwon Oh Heon),전정수(Cheon Choung Soo) 대한경영교육학회 2014 경영교육저널 Vol.25 No.1

본 연구는 법원경매의 제도와 공매의 제도가 서로 달라 공매를 법원경매와 동일한 제도로 혼동한 국민들이 피해당하게 되고 이러한 피해사례분석을 통한 법원경매와 공매의 비교분석을 하여 양 제도의 서로 좋은 면은 받아들이고 문제점은 지적하여 불필요한 부분은 개정하고, 법원경매 와 공매를 대국민 서비스로서의 손색없는 제도를 개선하고자 하는 것이 연구의 목적이다. 채무이든 조세체납이든 강제집행의 대상이 되는 부동산, 동산 그리고 무체재산권의 강제집행과 매각이후 환가배당방법까지 전 방위의 통합방법에 대한 제도적 개선을 하여 중복 강제집행으로 오는 피해를 줄여야 한다. 법원경매는 채무자의 재산을 채권자의 신청에 의하여 집행되고 공매는 조세관청에서 조세를 강제집행하기 위하여 채무자와 체납자가 동일한 재산에 대하여 집행은 각각 진행되어 집행절차와 매각, 매각된 금원의 환가과정 이 모두 중복 진행되고 있어 국가에서도 이중집행으로 인한 지출경비의 국고손실과 매수인의 매각이후 타 집행기관에 의해 매수한 매수인에게 소유권을 박탈당하는 사례가 비일비재하다. 법원 경매와 공매의 중복절차에서 오는 피해를 줄이려면 궁극적으로 양 절차의 합리적 통합이나 조정을 위해서는 강제집행편의 통합이나 특별법의 제정을 들 수 있다. 이러한 단계에 도달하려면 관계관청과 더 나아가 국가의 의지가 있어야 가능하다고 본다. 그러나 설문을 통해서도 나타난 결과를 보면 이 분야의 전문가들도 인식하지 못하고 있는데 국가나 관계 관청에서 인식을 제대도 하지 못하고 있는 실정이 아쉬운 점이다. 따라서 법원경매와 조세체납의 절차, 제도개선이 필요하다. 본 논문에서 살펴 본 바와 같이 이런 일련의 문제를 통해 여러 가지 재산적 피해가 발생하고 있음으로 양제도의 통합 등 합리적 조정과 특별법제정의 입법절차가 필요한 시점이다. Whatever the government's sale of private property Debts due to the creditors, apply to the court to proceed with the court auction to collect delinquent taxes from the tax authorities seized property auction that is enforceable. In the forced sale process Vicarious Execution on the civil court in the course of enforcement and national auction arrears collected on disposal of auction procedure law by national authorities forced sale because of the commonality. Lien against the same property enforcement court for execution based on the delinquent tax credit auctions and disposal procedure, if you are competing with each other auctions occur frequently are. Tills, of course, the debtor fails to repay the debt delinquent taxes are. The public does not pay the money that the tax information that is concurren. The two agencies work separately and have not been able to prevent any damage. I wrote a book auction and auction research and is well aware of the problem because Two enforcement and government agencies to work separately damage occurred. Harm reduction services to the government asking studied Zivilprozessrecht enforcement of the auction was a problem Punish those who bully the buyer did not have the law Difficult to acquire ownership of the buyer to amend the law From 1 July 2002 a new law is created to service. Part still has not improved, and a new problem by finding a great advantage to improve and refocus it, and, on the other hand, the short sale that is the basis of the relevant provisions of the National Tax Collection issues and legislative improvements to complement the deficiencies noted. The property of one of the debts due to the civil court for Vicarious Execution auction by auction by the auction process and the disposal of arrears of the line as a way to reduce the impact of the amount of the existing system of law enforcement agencies to revise the plan and unified. compared to enact new law, review the other hand, the introduction of the advantages of the current system and to improve the implementation of a rapid and low-cost way of emphasis. First, the issue of the court system of auctions and auction presented. The court system and the public auction of the auction, and the problem of the system proposed various theories were determined by the court system, such as auctions and auction sold separately enforced leave the target with the public and interested creditors, debtors who lease all in a relationship due to the confusing and overlapping in progress economic loss was present in the issues In the period from 2004 to the online auction to bid online auction site in the court auction still insist the problem is presented. order to deliver / extradite the court by providing the buyer to go out to the people who live easier way. Public Auction difficult to get out that there should be action proposed, Not intend to send the document to the debtor in court. Served on the debtor to evade court auction residents in brightness due to the sale generated a lot of time and money but it commonplace. Those who avoided service called Public Notice Public Notice to the system, but the process is time consuming and expensive, and the problem was presented, The procedures and time-consuming and expensive problems were presented, public auction bond debt set-off method is a problem, The auction of the court, to proceed quickly, there is next priority number declaration system, the public sale, problem in selling quickly that it does not have now. Court auctions and public auction methods of improving the problems presented. Auctions and estate auctions each court to enforce the same chaos and economic losses avoided coming to a method for operating a plan for the integration of the two major organs were present. Of the system is going to be a modern online. At public sale, and the Court of online auction bidding system and the introduction of the still on-site bidding in the sale

사죄광고의 위헌성 재검토

문재완 한국헌법학회 2019 憲法學硏究 Vol.25 No.3

On April 1, 1991, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled that the article 764 of the Civil Act would be unconstitutional if it were interpreted to include notice of apology as suitable measures to restore the plaintiff's reputation. As the decision of unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court has an binding effect on ordinary courts based upon article 47 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act, courts have not ordered a notice of apology in defamation cases since then. The Constitutional Court holds a firm view that court-ordered public apologies are unconstitutional on the grounds that only a voluntary apology coming from regretful minds of offenders is a suitable measure as a non-pecuniary remedy for defamation and that coerced apologies restrain offenders’ basic rights such as rights to personality more than necessary. Most constitutional scholars in Korea agree with the rationale. However, it should be noticed that apologies, either voluntary or coerced, play an important role in settling disputes of defamation cases. After reviewing all three Constitutional Court cases concerning court-ordered apologies, I have reached the conclusion that court-ordered apologies can be constitutional if court orders were issued with less strict contents than the Constitutional Court has imagined. The Constitutional Court has taken apologies as consisting of two elements: sincere regret of the defendant’s wrong doings and asking the plaintiff for forgiveness. In this strict understanding, court-ordered apologies tend to make the defendant feel degraded. In my opinion, court-ordered apologies are made up of three elements such as admission of fault, saying sorry for what happened, and willingness to restore reputation, which are enough to heal the plaintiff’s wounded mind and resolve disputes. Furthermore, taking account of courts’ discretionary power, court-ordered public apologies can be admissible. Court-ordered public apologies would be issued after courts have concluded that the defendant made a defamatory statements that humiliated the plaintiff. It is reasonable that the defendant who committed an illegal act should tolerate the shame that is inevitably accompanied by court-ordered public apologies. In sum, courts may order a specific kind of public apologies which is suitable to settle a defamation dispute after balancing both parties’ interests. 헌법재판소는 1991년 민법 제764조 ‘명예회복에 적당한 처분’에 사죄광고를 포함시키는 것이 헌법에 위반된다고 결정한 이래 일련의 사건에서 강요된 사과는 위헌이라는 확고한 태도를 보인다. 가해자가 마음으로부터 우러나오는 사과만 진정한 사과이며, 그렇지 않은 상태에서 강요된 사과는 인격권 등 기본권을 과도하게 제한한다는 결정에 많은 법률가들이 동의한다. 하지만 사죄광고 명령 등 강요된 사과도 명예훼손 사건에서 금전배상의 한계를 극복하는 적절한 수단이 될 수 있다. 자발적 사과뿐만 아니라 강요된 사과도 피해자의 손상된 심리를 치유하고 분쟁을 해결하는 기능을 한다. 더 나아가 사과는 사회에 경각심을 주어 유사한 행위가 더 이상 발생하지 않도록 하는 예방기능을 한다. 헌법재판소는 사죄광고가 명예회복의 유일한 제도가 아니며, 비교법적으로 일본에서만 사죄광고의 강제가 인정되고 있으며, 기본권을 보다 덜 제한하는 다른 수단이 있다는 논거에서 비례원칙에 위배된다고 판시하였다. 그러나 위 논거는 다음과 같은 이유에서 타당하지 않다. 첫째, 사죄광고는 명예회복의 여러 방법 중 하나로, 법원이 적당하다고 판단할 때 선택하는 것이다. 반드시 선택해야 하는 유일한 제도는 아니므로 유일한 제도임을 전제로 덜 제한적인 대안을 찾는 것은 잘못이다. 둘째, 헌법재판소가 이해하는 사과는 가해자가 ‘반성’하고 피해자에게 ‘용서’를 구하는 것이나, 사과를 이렇게 강력한 내용으로 구성할 필요는 없다. 사과는 자신의 잘못을 인정하고, 피해발생에 대하여 유감을 표명하고, 원상회복의 의사를 밝히는 내용으로 충분히 그 기능을 한다. 정정보도청구가 인용되는 사안의 경우 잘못에 대한 시정이 이루어지고 있으므로 여기에 추가하여 유감표명을 명하는 것은 과도한 요구가 아니라고 본다. 셋째, 법원의 사과명령은 사죄광고 명령 외에 그 내용, 형식 및 당사자에 따라 다양하게 존재할 수 있다. 각각의 사과명령에 대한 헌법적 판단은 달라져야 한다. 사과로 인하여 약간의 수치심은 부수적으로 발생할 수 있지만, 굴욕감을 느낄 정도에 이르지 않는 내용과 형식으로 사과를 명령하는 것이 가능하다. 넷째, 비교법적으로 보아도 일본 외에 중국 스위스 네덜란드 호주 남아프리카공화국 등 상당수 국가가 법원 결정에 의한 사과 제도를 활용하고 있다. 결론적으로 정정보도가 인정되는 사안에서 법원의 사과명령은 법원이 구체적인 상황에서 원고의 명예회복이라는 목적을 달성하면서도 피고의 기본권을 가장 덜 제약하는 방법을 선택하여 부과할 수 있기 때문에 비례원칙을 충족한다고 본다. 사과명령은 다양하게 존재할 수 있으므로 헌법재판소의 사죄광고결정을 통해서 강요된 사과를 모두 위헌으로 판단하는 것은 잘못이다.

근세 서유럽 궁정과 시장의 관계 -1468~70년 부르고뉴 궁정 재정집행관의 장부를 중심으로-

조준희 ( Cho Jun-hee ) 한국서양사학회 2017 서양사론 Vol.0 No.134

This paper considers the relationship between the princely court and the urban market in western Europe during the late medieval and early modern era, based on the remarkable set of accounts left by the argentier of the Burgundian court. The courts of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy caught the imagination of their contemporaries and have long intrigued later observers because of their extravagance, and it was well known then as well as now that the source of this splendor was their suzerainty over the economically advanced urban network of the Low Countries. However, the relationship between the princely court and the urban market was tortuous in its time and the study of it has been tenuous in ours. The court is considered at once an expropriator of urban wealth, extending its feudal rule and culture, and a conspicious consumer whose insatiable demand for luxury goods fueled commerce and stimulated the rise of a modern economy. The detailed account of expenditures left by the argentier allows us to excavate this relationship concretely. The accounts reveal how the maintenance and magnificence of the Burgundian court could only be realized by engaging the market, and allows us to probe a history that is often glossed over in the famed chronicles and memoirs of the period. By tracing the goods and services that the court acquired through the market, we can see how the court was an active participant in the market. The court purchased material from “merchants following the court” and organized production through “valets of the chamber,” thereby incorporating urban merchants and artisans. Commercial personnel and market relations were embedded into the court structure under the guise of nominally feudal positions and obligations. This intertwined nature of court and commerce in the Burgundian Netherlands asks us to reconsider the contemporaneous rise of the modern state and capitalist economy, by focusing on their collaboration and commingling.

EC법상 이행강제소송에 관한 소고

김두수 ( Kim Doo-su ) 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 2006 외법논집 Vol.21 No.-

The Court of Justice either finds the infringement made out or dismisses the application. The judgment finding the failure to fulfil obligations is purely declaratory. The infringement existed before the Court made its finding. It does not have the power to require specific measures to be taken in order to give effect to the judgment. At the most, it may indicate such measures as it considers necessary in order to eliminate the infringement found. In addition, the Court may not set a period of time for compliance with its judgment, since Article 228(ex Article 177) of the EC Treaty does not confer power on it to do so. Equally, the Court may not declare acts(or failures to act) on the part of a Member State unlawful, void or not applicable. Only the national courts have the power to do so under national law. The Court of Justice may find only that the act(or failure to act) was or was not contrary to Community law. Article 228( ex Article 171)(1) of the EC Treaty puts the Member State which has been found by the Court of Justice to have failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations under a duty to take the necessary measures to comply with the Court's judgment. That duty, which also arises because the judgment has the force of res judicata, entails a prohibition having the full force of law against applying a national rule held to be incompatible with Community law and an obligation to take every measure to enable Community law to be fully applied. The duty to give effect to the Court's judgment is borne by all institutions of the Member State concerned within the fields covered by their respective powers. The legislative and executive authorities have to bring the offending provisions of domestic law into conformity with the requirements of Community law. The courts of the Member State concerned have to disregard those provisions in determining cases. The judgment finding the infringement of Community law does not as such confer any rights on individuals. Individuals may not rely directly on such a judgment before the national courts, but only on the “provision” of Community law having direct effect which the judgment finds has been infringed by the Member State. In the event that an individual pleads a provision of Community law in his defence which does not have direct effect, but which has been found by the Court of Justice to have been infringed by the Member State concerned, the national court, as an institution of that Member State, must ensure in the exercise of its functions that it is complied with by applying national law in such a way that it is compatible with the obligations that-according to the judgment of the Court-ensure from Community law for that Member State. The finding of a failure to fulfil obligations may potentially form the basis for liability on the part of the Member State concerned. However, it appears from the case law that a Member State may incur liability only in the case of a sufficiently serious breach of Community law. A judgment finding a failure to fulfil obligations is in itself not enough, certainly not for loss or damage which arose before judgment was given. The requirement for a “sufficiently serious breach” of Community law does not square completely with the strict or objective nature of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, since the Court of Justice also takes other factors into account where the Member State had a discretion in applying Community law, such as whether or not the breach was intentional and whether any mistake of law was excusable. It is self-evident that if the failure to fulfil obligations continues after delivery of the judgment declaring the Member State concerned to be in breach of its obligations, that itself will constitute a sufficiently serious breach of Community law and cause the Member State to incur liability to make good any loss or damage which occurred in that period. In addition, it must be noted that the Community provision infringed must confer a “right” on individuals in order for the issue of state liability to arise. It follows that a finding of an infringement in proceedings under Articles 226~227( ex Articles 169-170) of the EC Treaty does not automatically result in the Member State concerned incurring liability under Community law. Yet it may well be that the Member State will incur liability in damages under national law for loss or damage caused by an infringement of a Community provision even though that provision does not directly confer any “right” on individuals. The Treaty itself does not specify the period within which the judgment must be complied with, but the Court of Justice has held that the process must be initiated at once and completed as soon as possible. Because the judgment has the force of res judicata,the Commission may not make an application for interim measures pursuant to Article 243(ex Article 186) of the EC Treaty in order to require the Member State to desist from an infringement of Community law which has already been found by judgment of the Court of Justice. This is because the Member State is required to take the necessary measures under Article 228(ex Article 171)(1) of the EC Treaty. No further decision of the Court, in interlocutory or other proceedings, is required. Where the Commission sought such interim measures, the Court held that they were not necessary within the meaning of Article 243 of the EC Treaty.

아시아 인권재판소, 그 이상과 현실

김성진 전남대학교 공익인권법센터 2022 인권법평론 Vol.- No.28

Many have constantly raised the need and importance of establishing a human rights court in Asia, which remains to be the only region without a regional human rights system in the world. In particular, this absence of a regional system in Asia became more difficult to ignore, as regional human rights systems became more active in other regions including Europe. Yet, the long-standing discussions on the stated need to fill in the absence were not sufficient to bridge the gap between the ideal and reality. It took almost 40 years before the European Court of Human Rights established in 1959 became a permanent court. Still, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights are not yet permanent courts. A regional human rights court cannot exist on its own: it is just an element comprising a big mechanism for the enactment, application, and implementation of regional human rights conventions or treaties. The most important thing here is the presence of a regional political consultative body that ensures stable operation and management of such a mechanism. The European Court of Human Rights has the Council of Europe, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights has the African Union, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has the Organization of American States. These political organizations in each region work to guarantee the effectiveness of the agreed conventions, coordinate different views among member states, and oversee the imple- mentation of the Courts' decisions. It, however, is by no means an easy task to set up a regional political organization of the said nature. The impetus behind this growth of the Council of Europe, which initially started with 10 member states in 1949 and developed into a successful regional consultative organization that involves most of the countries in Europe, was, above all, the broad and shared understanding on the importance of such a consultative body and the political, economic reasons that motivated member states to give up certain part of their sovereignty despite their clear differences in culture, economy, and politics. The options we could consider in adopting the constituent instrument of an Asian court of human rights include: ① utilizing the existing international human rights conventions to which Asian countries are already a party and encouraging the countries to join without having to sign up for additional obligations under international law, ② allowing countries to voluntarily choose to which provisions they are willing to be bind themselves, as in the case of the European Social Charter (The Charter requires the parties to accept a minimum of 16 out of 31 substantive rights and at least 6 out of 9 core rights), ③ starting with a relatively short list of rights generally agreeable to all and later expanding the scope of substantive rights by adding protocols that include new rights, as is the case of the European Convention on Human Rights, ④ making it optional for countries in accepting the court's jurisdiction and individual applications in the initial stage and later turning this to mandatory jurisdiction once the system takes root, since countries come under pressure not from which substantive rights they agree to but from the fact that they are subject to court's judgments. It is truly regrettable that Asia, which is home to 60 percent of the world's population with 4.3 billion people and has a painful history of tragic human rights violations, does not have a regional human rights system. It may not be an easy journey, but I hope Korea can play an active and central role in creating the Asian regional human rights system. 세계에서 유일하게 지역적 인권보장체계를 가지고 있지 않은 아시아에서 ‘아시아 인권재판소’의 설립의 필요성과 당위성에 대한 논의는 꾸준히 제기되어 왔다. 특히 유럽을 비롯한 다른 지역의 지역인권기구들이 활성화 될수록 상대적으로 아시아의 빈자리는 더욱 커보였다. 그러나 이러한 논의가 이미 오래전부터 진행되어 왔음에도 불구하고 그 이상과 현실 사이의 간극은 좀처럼 좁혀지지 못했다. 유럽인권재판소가 1959년 설립되어 상설재판소가 되기까지 거의 40년이 걸렸다. 미주인권재판소나 아프리카 인권재판소는 아직도 상설재판소가 아니다. 지역 인권재판소는 그 재판소 자체로만 존재할 수는 없다. 재판소는 지역인권협약의 제정, 적용, 집행이라는 큰 메카니즘의 일부를 구성할 뿐이다. 여기서 무엇보다 중요한 것은 이러한 메카니즘을 안정적으로 운용할 수 있는 정치적 합의기구의 존재이다. 유럽인권재판소의 뒤에는 유럽평의회가, 아프리카 인권재판소의 뒤에는 아프리카연합이, 미주인권재판소에는 미주국가기구가 존재한다. 이러한 정치적 합의기구는 그 합의기구를 통해 제정된 인권협약의 실효성을 담보하며 회원국 사이의 이견을 조율하고 재판소의 판결을 집행한다. 그러나 이러한 정치적 합의기관을 세우는 것은 결코 쉬운 일은 아니다. 유럽평의회가 1949년 10개 회원국으로 출범하여 현재 유럽 전역 대부분의 국가를 포괄하는 성공적인 지역협의체로 성장하기까지는, 특히 이들 회원국들 사이에 문화적, 경제적, 정치적 차이가 분명히 존재함에도 불구하고, 이러한 협의체의 필요성에 대한 폭넓은 공감대와 회원국들이 자신의 주권을 일정 부분 양보할 만한 정치, 경제적 동력이 있었다. 아시아 인권재판소의 준거 규범을 제정하기 위해서 생각해 볼 수 있는 방법으로는, ① 아시아 국가들이 이미 가입한 국제인권협약의 내용을 이용함으로써 추가적인 국제법적인 의무의 부과 없이 가입을 유도해 내는 방법, ② 유럽사회권헌장(European Social Charter)과 같이 가입국들이 자신들이 구속받을 조항을 스스로 선택하게 하는 방법(예를 들어 유럽 사회권규약의 경우 총 31개의 실체적 권리 중 최소한 16개를 받아들여야 하며, 중요한 9개의 권리 중 최소한 6개는 받아들여야 함), ③ 유럽인권협약이 사용했던 방법으로, 처음에는 모두가 쉽게 동의할 수 있는 내용으로 한 후, 후속 의정서를 통해 차츰 실체적 권리를 확장하는 방법, ④ 현실적으로 실체적 권리의 내용보다는 이것이 재판소를 통해서 판단되는 것에 대한 부담감이 크므로, 초기에는 재판관할과 개인청구권의 인정 여부를 선택적으로 한 후 제도가 안정되면 이를 강제적 규정으로 대체하는 방법 등을 생각해 볼 수 있다. 세계 인구의 60%에 해당하는 43억 명의 사람이 모여살고 있으며 역사적으로도 참혹한 인권 침해의 아픈 기억을 갖고 있는 아시아에 유독 지역 인권보장체계가 존재하지 않는다는 것은 참으로 안타까운 일이다. 비록 쉽지 않은 길일지라도 아시아 지역인권시스템의 탄생에 있어 우리나라가 적극적이고 주도적인 역할을 수행할 수 있기를 기대해 본다.

미연방대법원 최근 판결(United States v. Windsor, Hollingsworth v. Perry)을 통하여 살펴본 미국에서 동성혼 관련 헌법적 논의

최경호 ( Kyung Ho Choi ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2014 법학논총 Vol.31 No.1

Korean courts have not recognized same-sex marriage as a type of legitimate marriage. The issue of same-sex marriage, including one movie director`s announcement of his same-sex marriage, is becoming gradually a topic of discussion in the Korean society. Since 2000 several countries, including some in the E.U. and North & South Americas, have recognized same-sex marriage. On the other hand, courts of some other countries have decided that their societies are too premature to allow legitimate same sex-marriage. In the United States, as of present, 18 states and Washington D.C. recognize lawful same-sex marriage. On the federal level, there was the U.S. Supreme Court`s recent decision to support same-sex marriage. In United States v. Windsor, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that Defense of Marriage Act(DOMA) Section 3, defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman, is unconstitutional. While writing the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court`s case, Mapp v. Ohio(1961), Justice Tom Clark stated “[t]here is no war between the Constitution and common sense.” In Windsor(5-4 decision), it seems that Justices writing the majority opinion agree that allowance of the same-sex marriage is near to common sense. It means that sexual orientation should not be a discriminatory classification. On the same day the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of California Proposition 8, which defined the meaning of marriage as a union between a Man and a Woman. By saying that the party did not have standing, the court did not express a direct opinion about Proposition 8. However, in the future it is possible that lower level federal courts and states` courts might be influenced by Windsor`s endorsement of same-sex marriage. Windsor and Perry give us an opportunity to rethink the role of courts. Courts must think seriously whether they should always support majority rule, monitor the possibility of tyranny of the majority and listen to carefully minority`s interests, or balance between those values. When we see issues of same-sex marriage, we should not forget the days when we ignored several fundamental rights which we should have given full respect to at the time. In the not so distant future, Korean courts may be forced to decide whether same-sex marriage is simply different or if it is wrong. In this way, the U.S. Supreme Court`s concerns regarding same-sex marriage could have value for comparative research.