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      • KCI등재후보

        중국 외자은행에 관한 법제 고찰

        양효령 한중법학회 2011 中國法硏究 Vol.15 No.-

        China’s banking system has shown a quantitative development since the its reform and opening up, but there still exist a double imbalance for its quality falls behind. However, China’s direction of economic development has been switching over from exportation industries to domestics and Chinese government is expected to strengthen the banking system centralizing on banks, and also distribute and mobilize the financial recourses for advanced banking business. China joined WTO in 2001, and it proposed its opened schedule for China’s henceforward financial market for 5 years. In case of China’s foreign-capital bank, ① China expanded its range of foreign capital related business and the branches of the official, ② revocation the regional restriction of handing Yuan and other regions,③ gradual revocation of customer restriction so that all chinese customers at China’s foreign-capital banks can access all the services they provide and enforced national treatment. Also, china permitted hard money, call money markets, issuing foreign credit cards, substitutional issuing foreign credit cards, the abolition of restrictions about Foreign-capital banks’ ownership, management and legal form by January 2005, permitted financial lease of foreign-capital banks and non-bank financial institution’s monthly installment plan for vehicles. China classifies its banks into four types of People’s bank of China as a central bank, Political bank, Commercial bank, and non-bank financial institutions. And the Foreign-capital banks are financial banking institution within China that is approved the establishment by China’s associating laws and regulations. Independent Foreign capital banks, branches and offices of foreign banks’ capitals are obtained from overseas, but in the case of China-Foreign partnership banks it should fulfill all the conditions that its foreign financial institutions’ investment proportions should not exceed 20 percent of total registrated capital, and in case of many out-of-area financial institutions, its total ownership ratio shouldn’t exceed 25 percent. For liaison factors of Foreign-fund banks’ capital, Chinese government established and enforcing the laws and regulations to manage the Foreign-capital banks, which represented as administration ordinance of foreign-capital banks, and minor regulations of it in 2006. In this paper, throughout the legislation of foreign-capital banks, we will examine present condition of WTO agreement and Chinese foreign-capital banks opening, the concept and features of the foreign-capital bank and its market entry, The foreign-capital banks’ foundation, alteration, closure, settlement, and legal responsibilities and review the problems of Korean banks’ entering chinese market and their remedies.

      • KCI등재

        최근 중미관계의 변화추세와 대만문제 트럼프 정부 출범 이후를 중심으로

        김원곤 사단법인 인문사회과학기술융합학회 2019 예술인문사회융합멀티미디어논문지 Vol.9 No.3

        The most conspicuous character of international relations in the 21st century is that the United States and China are G2 countries, which can be defined as an era through which they solve and manage global problems. Peace and common prosperity of the world are expected to be determined by whether the bilateral relations between the two countries will be harmonious with a developmental relationship or go into a conflict. In the United States, Donald Trump is elected president in 2016 and is promoting 'US priority'. Which includes an international strategy to regard China as a strategic competitor and brings about full-scale trade dispute with China in 2018. China is also pursuing a strong China, such as the "one-on-one" project, when Xi Jinping appeared in 2012 as a national leader. In this process, the two countries show the aspect of conflict and confrontation over the hegemony of the international community. It is seen that conflicts and conflicts between the two countries will be surfaced in various fields such as the South China Sea problem, the Korean peninsula problem, and the internationalization of the yuan. This paper starts from the consciousness that the United States can raise the Taiwan issue as a card of keeping China in check between China (which is claiming "one China" and promoting unification with Taiwan) and Taiwan (which is trying to maintain the current situation separated from China). In fact, the Trump government is checking China by strengthening relations with Taiwan, including the issue of arms sales to Taiwan and the enactment of the National Defense Law. I would like to look at what the United States is strategically trying to get, and how China will respond, and the possibilities that can be developed in the future. 21세기 국제관계의 가장 큰 특징은 미국과 중국이 G2 국가로서 세계적인 문제를 해결하고 관리하는 시대라고 규정할 수 있다. 양국 관계가 서로 조화를 유지하며 발전적 관계로 나아갈 것인지 아니면 대립과 갈등의 관계로 나아갈 것인지에 따라 세계의 평화와 공동 번영이 결정될 것으로 전망된다. 미국의 경우 2016년 도널드 트럼프가 대통령으로 당선되며 ‘미국 우선주의’를 내세우고 있다. 중국을 전략적 경쟁자로 간주하는 국제전략을 구사하며 2018년 중국에 대해 본격적인 무역분쟁을 제기하고 있다. 중국 또한 2012년 시진핑(習近平)이 국가 지도자로 등장하면서 ‘일대일로’ 프로젝트를 추진하는 등 부강한 중국을 추구하고 있다. 이 과정에서 양국은 국제사회의 패권을 둘러싸고 충돌과 대립의 양상을 보여주고 있다. 향후 남중국해 문제와 한반도 문제, 위안화 국제화 문제 등 다양한 분야에서 양국의 대립과 충돌이 진행된다고 보여 진다. 본 논문은 ‘하나의 중국’을 주장하며 대만과의 통일을 추진하고 있는 중국과 분리된 현 상황을 유지하고자 하는 대만 사이에서 미국이 중국견제의 카드로서 대만문제를 제기할 수 있다는 문제의식에서 출발하고 있다. 실제로 트럼프 정부는 대만에 대한 무기판매 문제, 국방수권법의 제정 등 대만과 관계를 강화함으로써 중국을 견제하고 있다. 과연 미국은 전략적으로 무엇을 얻으려하는 것인지, 그리고 중국은 어떻게 대응할 것인지, 향후 전개될 수 있는 여러 가지 가능성을 본 논문에서 살펴보고자 한다.

      • Background, Essence and Development Tendency of China-Israel Innovation Cooperation

        Yu Zhongxi,Zhong Dongmei,Bi Runmei 아시아사회과학학회 2022 Jornal of Asia Social Science Vol.8 No.2

        On March 21st, 2017, China and Israel announced the establishment of "Innovative Comprehensive Partnership", which is a new milestone in the development of bilateral relations between the two countries since the establishment of China and Israel in 1992. In the field of scientific and technological innovation, China and Israel have complementary advantages. China's advantages mainly lie in infrastructure and creative output (such as the technology output), while Israel's advantages lie in system, human capital and research, market maturity and commercial maturity. China-Israel scientific and technological innovation cooperation is mainly reflected in two aspects: the mechanism of innovate cooperation and the level of innovation project. (1) The mechanism of innovate cooperation is led by the China-Israel Joint Committee on Innovation Cooperation, and local governments, enterprises and universities actively cooperate to build an Industry-University-Research's innovative ecologically chain; (2) Innovation projects mainly focus on the establishment of international innovation parks and private innovation and venture capital activities. In the future, the two countries should strengthen the mechanism and improve the evaluation in terms of innovation. (1) For the former, the two countries should try their best to attract larger enterprises and scientific research institutes in the province to carry out scientific and technological innovation cooperation with innovative enterprises, scientific research institutes and innovation incubators in Israel. (2) For the latter, for the innovation projects of China and Israel at the government level, an authoritative evaluation and supervision team should be set up on the basis of the China-Israel Innovation Cooperation Joint Committee to conduct a comprehensive investigation and study on the large-scale projects currently cooperating between China and Israel, so as to obtain relevant investigation reports. Although China and Israel have made achievements in the process of building a comprehensive partnership for innovation, they should also be aware of some shortcomings and challenges they are currently facing. (1) The main shortcomings include that there is no scientific and comprehensive evaluation mechanism for innovative enterprises of both sides, and high expense and high risks of the cooperation; (2) The homogenization of Israeli innovative enterprises introduced by local provinces and cities in China is serious, and there is a possibility that different provinces and cities compete for high-quality enterprises to enter the park, resulting in higher introduction costs. Local provinces and cities should be encouraged to discuss and cooperate to reduce the introduction costs; the main challenges are the cultural differences between Chinese and Israeli enterprises and the insufficient protection of intellectual property rights, which leads to the reluctance of some high-quality innovative enterprises to cooperate. Generally speaking, the establishment of an "innovative and comprehensive partnership" between China and Israel has a positive effect on the development of China-Israel relations, conforms to the common interests of both countries, and can effectively promote the exchanges among the governments, enterprises, universities and the public of the two countries, and promote the further development of bilateral relations.

      • KCI등재

        중국의 대 북한 인식변화 연구 : 북한전문가 심층 면담조사

        신상진 통일연구원 2008 統一 政策 硏究 Vol.17 No.1

        This paper tries to examine how China perceives North Korea through interview research on China's North Korea specialists before and after North Korea executed nuclear test in early october 2006. Under the premise that North Korea's nuclear test changed China's perceptions on North Korea considerably, the author asked 22 China's North Korea specialists how long Kim Jong-Il regime will sustain, who will succeed Kim Jong-Il, how North Korea's nuclear issue will be solved, how the relations between China and North Korea will be developed, and when and how the Korean Peninsula will be unified and how China will respond toward it in order to deduce China's changing perceptions to North Korea before and after North Korea's nuclear test. The main result of this study is that almost all of China's North Korea specialists still perceive North Korea as a 'buffer zone' to China's security although the relations between China-North Korea had strained seriously because of North Korea's nuclear test in spite of Hu Jintao's request not to do. Even though China's North Korea specialists didn't regard North Korea as a military alliance any more, they thought that it would not for China's national security interests to break cooperative relations with North Korea. The result of this interview research also showed that China's North Korea specialists won't so supportive on unification of the Korean Peninsula. And the North Korea specialists in Beijing were more negative on unification of the Korean Peninsula than the North Korea specialists in Yanji which located in northeast China. Another point of this research results is that China's North Korea policy will be affected by Sino-U.S. relations, and China and North Korea will maintain their traditional friendship and cooperation for several years. 이 연구는 2006년 북한이 핵실험을 실시한 기간을 전후하여 중국 내 북한전문가에 대한 면담조사를 통해 이들이 북한에 대해 지니고 있는 실제 인식을 도출해 보고자 하였다. 북한의 핵실험이 중국의 대북한 인식에 큰 변화를 가져왔다는 전제 아래, 북핵 실험 전후 중국의 대북 인식변화를 도출해 보기 위해 북한 김정일 정권의 안정성 여부와 후계체제 전망, 북핵문제 해결에 대한 중국의 인식, 중·북관계에 대한 평가와 전망, 그리고 북한 급변사태와 한반도 통일에 대한 중국의 인식 및 예상 대응을 주요 심층 면담 주제로 설정하였다. 북한의 핵실험 실시로 중·북관계가 극도로 경색된 상황에서도 중국 내 북한전문가들은 여전히 북한을 중국의 안보에 대한 완충지대로 인식하고 있는 것으로 조사되었다. 이들은 북한을 더 이상 동맹국으로 간주하지는 않지만, 대미·일 및 대한국 전략차원에서 북한과 협력관계를 유지하는 것이 중국의 국익에 도움이 된다고 판단하였다. 한반도 통일에 대해서는 중국 내 북한전문가들의 입장이 다소 비관적으로 나타났다. 베이징에서 활동하는 북한 전문가 보다는 옌지의 북한 전문가들이 한반도 통일을 긍정적으로 수용하고 있었다. 중국은 중·미관계를 중요한 변수로 고려하여 대 북한 정책을 전개할 것이며, 상당기간 동안 중·북 간 우호협력관계가 지속될 것으로 조사되었다.

      • KCI등재

        중국(1793-2008), 그 정체성을 묻는다

        李有鎭(Lee You-jin) 중국어문학연구회 2008 중국어문학논집 Vol.0 No.50

        This essay aims to examine the China's identity, with a focus on tracking and portraying key moments in China(1793-2008). China regarded itself as the center of the world, and in this concept, the world was China itself. In 1793, Great Britain sent Lord George Macartney on a diplomatic mission to the Qing dynasty. China considered the British embassy only as a tributary mission and treated it as such. Kowtow meaning submission before the emperor of China was required, but Macartney didn't perform 'three kneelings and nine head knockings' to maintain the dignity of the Britain. Also China had a sense of superiority, believing that China was self-sufficient and had nothing to gain by trading with the barbarians. But after China's defeat in the Opium War, the sense of superiority was shattered. The Opium War made China open against the will of the China, and people came to realize that China was no longer the best. China was forced to give up the tribute system and accept unequal treaty system. China became the arena of competition of imperialist powers. In the early years of the 20th century, with the prevailing theory of Social Darwinism, Chinese intellectuals sought to make China strong so as to survive on the battlefields of 'survival of the fittest'. At that time, the national survival was a matter of life and death to the Chinese. In this vein, the race matter of an 'Exhibition of the Races of Man' at Osaka in 1903 was very symbolic. For the Chinese students studying in Japan, it was a humiliating experience, because the exhibition initially planned to display the inferior races. Students lamented the fact that 'we Chinese' were going to be classified together with other six inferior races, finally they successfully opposed that plan. At that time when China's national survival had become a national obsession, Liang Qi-chao felt a responsibility of striving for national identity and survival. He especially put emphasis on solidarity that was required of Chinese people if China was to survive among many competitive nation-states. So Liang suggested the concepts of Daminzu zhuyi(大民族主義) and Zhonghua minzu(中華民族). In these concepts, the definition of 'Chinese' was expanded to include non-Han ethnicities as part of a comprehensive Chinese nation. After the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen intended to succeed to those concepts including eventual Sinicization, so as to unite all of the different ethnicities of China, mainly composed of the five major groups. It was mainly due to the realization that a narrow definition of Chinese would result in the loss of the territorial legacy of the Qing empire. Up to now, the PRC has asserted that China is unified under the name Zhonghua, and this is merely to continue the nationalistic discourse of the early years of the 20th century. Now China has the ability to host the international event, for example, 2008 Olympic is going to be held in Beijing, and Expo 2010 will be held in Shanghai. In the early years of the 21th century, China is emerging as a major world power. But the painful recollection of China's suffering at the hands of imperialist powers has continued to be a source of Chines nationalistic sentiment. So Chinese nationalism has the potential to become ultranationalism especially with regard to the territorial integrity. At the time of the Olympics, the Tibet crisis stimulates Chinese nationalism. The PRC has faced international blame over its crackdown on protests in Tibet against Chinese rule, and the Chinese are over-reactive toward outside pressures. They are driven by a sense of national urgency. Nevertheless we must know Chinese nationalism is fundamentally an imperialist ideology which in practice has led to the oppression of minority group such as Tibetans and the repression against domestic dissent in the name of national urgency. As Terrill points out, China has never abandoned the attitude as an empire. It looks like nation-building is still going on there.

      • KCI등재

        중국-미얀마 관계의 지속과 변화 : 미얀마 3차 군부쿠데타 발생과 지정학적 부상 요인을 중심으로

        정혜영 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2021 중소연구 Vol.45 No.2

        This study discusses the continuation and change of China-Myanmar relations in relation to the geopolitical rise factor of Myanmar and the 3rd military coup d'etat. To this end, this study first examined the historical context of China-Myanmar relations and discussed emerging geopolitics of Myanmar. The military coup d'état, which occurred on February 1, 2021, caused mixed reactions in the international community. This is expected to change China-Myanmar relations. The short-term outlook for bilateral relations can be seen as stronger sustainability than rapid change. As for Myanmar's emerging geopolitical position, United States and Western societies has called for openness and political change. On the other hand, internal politics and diplomacy in Myanmar were consistent with prudence. The current Myanmar government (NLD), in examining the factors of cooperation between India and China, between them, determines that China economic cooperation is more effective if it develops the Yunnan border linked Myanmar. However, cooperation with India and maritime powers in Myanmar’s maritime cooperation, also helpful in terms of security, trade with the West, and balance of Chinese forces. However, in the history of Myanmar, there has never been a cooperative relationship between China, India, and Myanmar, which face borders. The fact that India and China have returned to the conflict phase acts as a diplomatic burden for Myanmar. Opening Myanmar territory to mainland China through the Belt and Road Initiative was a result of Myanmar’s national interest and the decision of the leadership. China has also provided loans and technology to Myanmar, which lacks technology and capital, in exchange for infrastructure construction. However, China’s technology and wealth brought in without internal democratization will return to the benefit of some classes and Chinese companies. The origin of anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar stemmed from the problem of wealth distribution. Decades of ethnic minority armed conflict have also been a headache for Myanmar’s government, but China's its support has worked for indirect intervention of Myanmar’s internal affairs. The Chinese forces that have changed Myanmar’s geopolitics have become vast. The axis that can serve as a support for maintaining that balance, namely the United States and Europe, has demanded more political reform from the Suu Kyi government, and while the Suu Kyi government was neglected due to the Rohingya crisis, Myanmar’s food, energy, natural resources, and security pathways have been come up to China. Myanmar's challenge at the time of the third military coup d’etat in Myanmar is stability in internal politics and sophisticated balanced diplomacy by its leaders. But the ripple of international relations due to the powerful dynamics will make it difficult for the Myanmar government to do anything in a short time. 본 논문은 미얀마의 지정학적 부상요인 및 3 차 군부쿠데타 요인과 관련하여, 중국-미얀마 관계의 지속과 변화를 논한다, 이를 위해 중국과 미얀마 관계의 역사적 맥락을 먼저 살폈으며, 일대일로 사업 협력으로 인해 부상한 미얀마의 지정학을 논했다. 2021년 2월1일 발생한 군부 쿠데타에 대해, 국제사회는 각기 다른 대응양상을 보였는데, 이에 따라 ‘중국-미얀마’ 관계에도 변화가 예상된다. 양국관계의 단기적 전망은 급속한 변화요인 보다는 지속요인이 더 강한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 부상한 미얀마의 지정학적 입지에 대해, 서방사회는 개방과 변혁을 요구해왔던 것에 반해, 미얀마 내부 정치와 외교는 신중함으로 일관했기 때문이다. 아웅산 수찌 미얀마 정부(NLD)는 자신을 사이에 둔 인도와 중국의 협력요인 검토에서, 국경내륙지방과 연계된 중국 윈난 국경을 연계하는 것이, 인도 동북지방을 통한 인도연계 보다 경제협력 효과가 더 크다고 판단했다. 그러나 바다를 접한 해상의 인도 및 해양세력과의 협력은 안보적 측면 및 서방과의 교역 측면에서, 미얀마 국익 및 중국세력 균형에도 도움이 된다. 다만, 미얀마 역사에서 국경을 마주한 중국, 인도, 미얀마가 협력적 관계가 형성된 적은 없었으며, 인도와 중국이 갈등국면으로 돌아선 환경이, 미얀마의 외교적 부담으로 작용한다. 일대일로를 계기로 중국 대륙세력에게 미얀마 영토를 열어준 것은, 미얀마 국익과 지도부 결정에 따른 결과였다. 중국은 기술과 자본이 부족한 미얀마에게 인프라 건설을 조건으로 차관과 융자, 기술을 제공했다. 그러나 내부 민주화가 진행되지 않은 상태에서 들여오는 중국의 기술과 부는 미얀마 일부 계층과 중국기업의 수혜로 돌아간다. 미얀마 반중정서의 기원은 줄 곧, 부의 분배 문제에서 촉발했다. 수 십 년 계속된 소수민족 무장 갈등도 미얀마 정부에게는 골치거리 이지만, 중국에게는 활용효과가 있었다. 미얀마의 지정학을 변화시킨 중국세력은 방대해 졌다. 그 균형 유지를 위한 지지대 역할이 가능한 축, 즉 미국과 유럽은 수치정부에게 더 많은 정치개혁을 요구해 왔으며, 로힝야 사태로 수찌 정부를 방치하는 동안, 식량, 에너지, 자연자원, 안보 통로가 필요한 중국으로 하여금, 미얀마와의 밀착만을 도왔다. 미얀마 3차 군부 쿠데타 발생시점의 미얀마 당면과제는 내부 정치 안정과 지도자들의 정교한 균형외교이지만, 강대국 동학(動學)으로 인한 그 국제관계 파급은 미얀마 정부로 하여금, 그 어느 것도 단시간 안에 이루어지기 힘들게 만들 것이다.

      • KCI등재

        중국 온라인 게임 산업 발전 방향 모색 : 중국게임쇼 'China joy'사례를 중심으로

        소뢰,손봉,이장원,윤준성,김규정 한국게임학회 2011 한국게임학회 논문지 Vol.11 No.1

        중국의 온라인게임 산업은 2010년까지 10여 년이라는 길을 걸어왔다. China joy전시행사는 중국 온라인게임의 발전과정의 수요에 따라 게임발전을 위해 만들어졌고 2004년부터 China joy는 7년 동안 8번(2004년 2번 조직)이라는 개최 과정을 거쳐 아세아에서 제일 큰 게임엑스포로 성장하였고 중국 온라인게임업계의 기준을 상징하는 축제로 자리매김을 하게 되었다. 본문은 발전하고 있는 china joy를 세계적인 E3, TGS와 비교 분석하면서 중국 온라인게임 산업의 국제적 위치와 직면하게 될 문제점을 6가지 요소로부터 분석해본다. 1) 참여한 인원 수 2) 외국인의 참여인원 수 3)게임엑스포의 또 다른 매력: 기업 참여수와 기업종류 다양성 4) 참여 기업의 다소와 상품 품질 5) 게임엑스포의 콘셉트 6) China joy 세계적 영향력이다. 2010, the China's online game industry has developed more than ten years. With the fast development of the China's online game industry, the china joy came into true in 2004. After 7 years of development China Joy has become Asia's largest exhibition game. The paper which from the china joy perspective compare and analyze the development process of china joy with the other two related exhibition E3 and TGS. The paper also select 6 important indicators to evaluate the china joy 1) the absolute number of the audiences from the show2) the number of the international visitors 3) the number of participating companies and corporate types4) the number of exhibitors and online game product quality5) the contents of the show 6) the international influence. From this perspective, the paper tries to figure out the status of the China's online game industry in the world online game industry. And after analysis 6 indicators we can make a conclusion of the international status of China joy and international influence. It also tries to find out the main problems in China's online game industry.

      • 미국의 남중국해 ‘항행의 자유 작전’과 중국의 대응이 주는 전략적 함의

        김덕기 ( Kim Duk-ki ) 한국군사학회 2018 군사논단 Vol.96 No.-

        The purpose of this paper is to find out the strategic implications of US Freedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPs) in the South China Sea and China’s response strategy. In recent years, the cause of military tension in the South China Sea related to US FONOPs and China’s respond strategy lies in US-China’s global hegemonic strategies stemming from hegemonic competition in the world, not merely military competition. This paper found the following conclusions. First, the United States will continue to support the Obama administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia Strategy’ and the Trump Administration’s ‘Into-Pacific Strategy’ to strengthen control in the Asia-Pacific region, including the South China Sea. Second, China will respond to the US with a ‘Strategy to Grow into a Big Country’ based on the ‘One Belt and One Road’ and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB) strategies that encompass all areas of politics, economy and diplomacy. Third, the United States recognized that the potential threats to sea lines of communications(SLOCs) in the South China Sea are widespread, ranging from pirates, maritime terror to emerging competitors like China, and will further strengthen the FONOPs in the region. Fourth, the ‘Sea Silk Road’ strategy based on ‘One Belt and One Road’ strategy to connect major SLOCs including the South China Sea will continue to clash with US FONOPs. Lastly, the United States is in the position that the FONOPs can be available in the EEZ of other countries. On the other hand, China has the position that it can have exclusively exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction over EEZ except for some freedom of navigation in the high seas. This difference position between the United States and China is bound to cause conflict. In conclusion, Republic of Korea should express its position on the timely issues related to national vital interests related to US-China conflict over the FONOPs. In the South China Sea issue, even under the confrontation between the United States and China, Seoul must be able to respond with the principle without any hesitation, and we can secure our position in the long term. The ROK government should recognize that disputes arising from the FONOPS in the South China Sea can have a negative impact on our national economy and security, and should cooperate to resolve them peacefully.

      • KCI등재후보

        China's Military Rise and the US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific: PROTECTION of ROK's National Interest

        이상수 J-INSTITUTE 2021 Protection Convergence Vol.6 No.1

        Purpose: This article examines China's military rise in the Asia Pacific region and the US-led response, based on its global strategy." This paper suggests that China's military rise is based on defensive realism as opposed to offensive realism. The basic assumption of this paper is that the US strategy has the goal of counterbalancing China's expansionism. The US response to China's expansionism is to check China's military rise as a superpower by strengthening its network of alliances in the Indo-Pacific region and Northeast Asia. In the Indo-Pacific region, the US has attempted to check China using the QUAD-Plus(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, India, and Australia + Newzealand, South Korea, and Vietnam) which is a sea-based form of security cooperation. Method: In this effort, the article uses a framework of international politics based on the theory of realism, which stresses the salience of "survival," "the maximization of national interest," and "self-help. A realist's perspective of the world rests on the following assumptions: the pursuit of survival, maximization of interests, and self-help. Defensive realists try to preserve power, rather than increasing it as the main goal of states. China's self-assertion in the South China Sea has been galvanized by the survival mindset against the US containment policy toward China. Results: China's self-assertion in the South China Sea has been galvanized by the survival mindset against the US containment policy toward China. China's survival can be better secured by the occupation of the South China Sea to protect its sea lines of communication. China's militarization of the South China Sea and its military build-up can be illustrated as a self-help project for the maximization of its security interest in the Indo-Pacific region. Conclusion: In this article, I have reached the following conclusions. China's military rise is based on defensive realism, not offensive realism. The basic assumption of this paper is that the US strategy is aiming at the coun-terbalance of China's expansionism. First, The US response to China's expansionism is to check China's military rise as a superpower with the network of alliance-making in the Indo-Pacific region and Northeast Asia. Second, China tries to build a military facility in the South China Sea to maximize its interest in terms of energy, fish, and security. Third, China's military build-up can be illustrated as self-help to meet the balance with the US formidable military might. In the Indo-Pacific region, the US tries to check China through the QUAD-PLUS.

      • KCI등재

        신흥 강대국 중국의 국제질서 인식과 실천

        유희복 경희대학교(국제캠퍼스) 국제지역연구원 2017 아태연구 Vol.24 No.3

        Since the opening-up and reform in 1978, China has emerged as a rising power based on its steady economic growth. As a result, Western developed countries, mainly the United States, that designed and established the existing international order, have raised concerns that China, as a rising power, will seek to change the existing international order. China argues that it has grown within the existing international order and therefore has no reason to revise it. As a result, the attention of the international community has been focused on China’s state orientation, whether it is a status quo power or a revisionist power, and many related research results have been produced. However, there is no consensus on China’s state orientation, and it seems that there are more views on China, though discontent with the established order, as a status quo power, than as a revisionist power. Besides, there are claims that, rather than concentrating on defining China’s state orientation, there needs to be more comprehensive and future-oriented researches related to the emergence of China, including the desirable international order, the problems of the existing international order and the status and role of China in it, China’s vision of international order, etc. This paper focuses on the fact that China has consistently raised complaints and required reforms to the existing international institutions and rules, despite the existing research results and China’s own claim that China is a status quo power. Accordingly, this paper examines the content of the complaints and reforms that China has raised as a rising power and its related actions based on its multiple identities such as socialist country and Asian country, and argues that such actions are intended to supplement and reform rather than to make a full-scale revision, being pursued as part of China’s great power strategy. 1978년 개혁개방 이후 중국은 꾸준한 경제성장을 기초로 신흥 강대국으로 부상했다. 이에 따라 기존 국제질서의 설계자이자 수립자인 미국 등 서구 선진국들은 신흥 강대국으로 부상한 중국이 기존의 국제질서에 대해 변화를 추구할 것이라는 우려를 제기해 왔다. 중국은 이에 대해 자신은 기존의 국제질서 내에서 성장했으며 따라서 이를 수정할 이유가 없다고 주장한다. 이에 따라 중국이 현상유지세력인가 수정세력인가에 관한 연구가 진행되어 왔다. 그간의 연구는 중국을 불만은 있지만 현상유지세력에 가깝다고 보는 시각이 다수인 것으로 보이나, 중국의 국가성향에 대한 의견은 일치하지 않는다. 한편, 중국의 부상과 그에 따른 국제질서의 변화와 관련하여, 중국의 국가성향을 규정하는 데 집중하기 보다는 향후의 바람직한 국제질서, 기존 국제질서의 문제점과 중국의 지위와 역할, 중국이 주장하는 국제질서 등 보다 포괄적이고 미래지향적인 연구가 진행될 필요가 있다는 시각도 존재한다. 이러한 차원에서 본 논문은 중국이 기존의 국제제도와 규칙에 대해 꾸준히 불만과 수정의 요구를 제기해 왔다는 사실에 주목하고, 중국의 국가성향을 규정하기보다 중국이 구상하는 국제질서의 모습이 무엇인지 살펴보는 데 비중을 둔다. 이에 따라 본 논문은 신흥 강대국으로 부상한 중국이 증강된 국력과 자신의 정체성을 바탕으로 기존의 국제제도와 규칙에 대해 제기해 온 불만과 개혁의 내용 및 관련 행위를 검토한 후, 중국은 국제경제신질서의 구축과 신안보관을 통해 향후 국제질서에 대한 보완과 개혁을 추진하려 하며, 이것이 중국의 강대국화 전략의 일환으로 추진되고 있다고 주장한다.

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