카이로선언과 대한민국 임시정부

한시준 한국근현대사학회 2014 한국 근현대사 연구 Vol.71 No.-

Cairo Declaration guaranteed Korean independence was announced on December1, 1943. The leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and China adoptedthe so-called Cairo Declaration in Cairo. Therefore the study of Cairo Declarationneeds diverse materials from the United States, Great Britain, and China. Thispaper reviewed previous studies worked on the basis of the U.S. materials andscrutinized the decision making process by Chinese materials left unused untilnow. There are some materials on Cairo Declaration also in China. For example,they are “KailuoHuiyi QuanMao”(『開羅會議全貌』) published in December, 1943just after Cairo Conference by Liu Ziqin(劉自勤), “ZhonghuaMinguo ZhongYaoShiLiao ChuBian”(『中華民國重要史料初編: 對日抗戰時期』) published in 1981 byQin Xiaoyi(秦孝儀) which was originated from Jiang Jieshi’s secret documents,“ZongTongFu JiYao DangAn”(『總統府機要檔案』), and “KailuoHuiyi RiZhi”(『開羅會議日誌』) by Wang Chung-hui(王寵惠) who was a secretary of Jiang Jieshi,attended in Cairo Conference. The Chinese recorded minutely conferencenegotiating process between Roosevelt and Jiang Jieshi, contents prepared for theconference, and the schedule and negotiating process of Cairo Conference. Cairo Conference was held by Roosevelt’s proposal to Jiang Jieshi in June,1943. Both sides promised to have a conference in Cairo, Egypt from November22 until 26. Chinese Military Commission and the Supreme DependenceCommission prepared papers for the conference respectively and wrote in it thatChina would propose Korean liberty and independence at the same time. JiangJieshi also wrote “Korean liberty and independence” in his diary before theconference. From preparatory process, China had a plan to propose Korean independence. With his wife Song Meiling, Jiang Jieshi had a dinner with Roosevelt inRoosevelt’s lodgings for 4 hours on November 23. At this time Jiang Jieshi proposedRoosevelt to return Manchuria and Taiwan to China and to make Korea liberaland independent after Japanese defeat. Roosevelt also consented to these proposals. Roosevelt had a secretory Hopkins record what he agreed on with Jiang Jieshi,so a draft was prepared by Hopkins. Hopkins had this draft amended under instruction of Roosevelt and then broughtthis draft to Song Meiling and Wang Chung-hui on November 24. Jiang Jieshialso consented this draft translated in Chinese by Wang Chung-hui. This draftwas delivered to Great Britain on November 25. Wang Chung-hui, British viceforeign minister Cadogan, and the U.S. ambassador to Soviet Union Harrimandiscussed this draft on November 26. At this time an unexpected dispute happenedas Cadogan made an objection to Korean independence. Great Britain insisted a phrase of “to make Korea escape from Japanese control”instead of “to make Korea liberal independent state”. In addition, Great Britainasserted to remove a phrase about Korean independence under the pretext ofthat British Cabinet didn’t discuss Korean problem or the Soviet Union wouldoppose. On the other side, Wang Chung-hui repelled it strongly under the reasonof that a problem of Korean independence was very important on the side ofChina and the Far East. In the fierce dispute, the draft fixed as it was as Harrimaninsisting no debate with the Soviet Union consented Chinese opinion. The problemof Korean independence was included in Cairo Declaration along with a consentof tripartite summits. It was Jiang Jieshi to propose Korean independence and it was Korean provisionalgovernment to persuade Jiang Jieshi. Leading figures of the provisional governmentpaid a visit to Jiang Jieshi just after taking the information about Cairo Conference. President Kim Koo, Foreign Minister Cho So-ang, Propaganda Minister KimGyu-sik, and the Supreme Commander of Korean Independence Army(KIA) Yi Cheong-cheon asked Jiang Jieshi for the problem of Korean independence to bedealt in Cairo ...

1943년 카이로선언의 방점 찾기와 한국 독립운동가들의 대응

윤종문 한국민족운동사학회 2023 한국민족운동사연구 Vol.- No.117

The Cairo Declaration on Dec. 1, 1943, was announced to the world through the American media. It promised Korean independence after the war. When the Cairo Declaration was announced, independence activists in the Americas welcomed the announcement with double arms. The Korean American Association Committee held an emergency meeting on Dec. 4. They issued a resolution to "completion of Korean independence of the motherland" and "relent sponsorship of the Allies." The Cairo Declaration was also passed on to the Korean community in Hawaii. Hawaiian independence activists cheered that Korea now "has qualified as a candidate for an independent country," saying that strong unity of the Korean people is most necessary if it wants to become an independent country in the future. Officials of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea and independence activists working for independence movement organizations in Chongqing, China, also placed strong importance on the guarantee of independence in the Cairo Declaration. Officials from the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea said in 1946 that the Declaration of the Three Kingdoms at the 25th anniversary of the March 1st Movement clearly indicated that the purpose of the operation of the Republic of Korea was to establish a new world order of freedom and peace, and that it would lay the foundation for peace in Asia by guaranteeing Korea's freedom and independence after the war. The Central Executive Committee of the Korean National Revolution Party also issued a statement on the Cairo Declaration. They also made the point of guaranteeing the full independence of Joseon after the war, although they regret the “right time”. Some focused on ensuring independence, while others focused on "the right time." On December 5, 1943, Kim Gu, the President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, unfiltered his rejection of the political implications of the expression "Of course, the right time" to reporters from around the world. He was well aware that the right time meant trusteeship. Kim Gu firmly rejected any joint management or trusteeship, saying that unless unconditional freedom and independence were granted after the war, the historical war would continue. Koreans in the Americas also responded to the rejection. He said the Cairo Declaration did not immediately mean independence, but would give independence according to an appropriate policy like Austria, which in the end meant trusteeship. The Cairo Declaration became a new momentum for the Korean independence movement. Independence activists in China, who had made strides in the meantime, began to unite around the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. The Korean community in Hawaii, the Americas, Mexico, and Cuba also agreed to strongly unite around the Korean-American Union Committee and unify divided diplomatic channels. Together with the unity of the Korean-American community abroad, they carried out diplomatic activities to approve the direction of the independence movement of the Republic of Korea and designate a country subject to the Arms Loan Act. Provisional government officials emphasized the legitimacy and necessity of approval of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea against China, the Korean-American Union Committee, and Syngman Rhee. In particular, Syngman Rhee persuaded the U.S. State Department of the need to lend arms by explaining Korea's geopolitical position and the existence of Korean independence forces in China. However, these efforts of Korean independence activists did not work. The U.S. did not recognize the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. The United States did not lend arms to Resistance or Partisan, who were resisting Germany in Europe. It is natural that Korea cannot lend arms. Above all, the provisions of Korean independence in the Cairo Declaration were not won by Korean independence activists, but only guaranteed to be a po... 1943년 12월 1일 카이로 선언이 미국 언론을 통해 세상에 알려졌다. 여기에는 전후 한국 독립을 약속하고 있었다. 카이로 선언이 발표되자 미주에서 활동하고 있던 독립운동가들은 쌍수를 들고 환영했다. 재미한족연합위원회는 12월 4일 긴급회의를 열었다. 이들은 “한인의 조국독립 완성”과 “연합국 잔적 후원”을 하겠다는 결의안을 내 놓았다. 카이로 선언은 하와이 한인 사회에도 전해졌다. 하와이 독립운동가들은 이제 한국이 “독립국 후보의 자격을 얻었다.”고 환호하면서, 향후 독립국이 되고자 한다면 강고한 한인들의 단합이 가장 필요하다고 했다. 중국 충칭에서 활동하고 있던 대한민국 임시정부 요인, 독립운동 단체에서 활동 중인 독립운동가들도 카이로선언에서 독립보장 부분에 강한의미를 두었다. 대한민국 임시정부 관계자들은 1946년 3.1운동 25주년에서 카이로회담의 삼국선언은 민국국가의 작전목적이 자유평화의 세계신질서 수립하는 데 있음을 명확히 표시한 것이며, 전후 한국의 자유독립을 보장하여 아시아 평화의 기초를 다져 놓는 것이라고 의미 부여를 했다. 조선민족혁명당 중앙집행위원회도 카이로선언에 대한 성명서를 냈다. 이들도 “적당한 시기”에 대해서는 유감이 있지만, 전후 조선의 완전독립을 보장했다는 점에 방점을 두었다. 일부는 독립보장에 의미를 두었던 반면, 일부는 “적절한 시기”에 방점을 두었다. 대한민국 임시정부 주석 김구는 1943년 12월 5일 각국 기자들에게 “당연한 순서(적절한 시기)” 표현에 담긴 정치적 함의에 대해 거부반응을 여과 없이 드러냈다. 그는 적절한 시기는 신탁통치를 의미한다는 것을 잘 알고 있었다. 김구는 그 어떤 공동관리나 신탁통치를 단호히 거부한다면서, 전후 무조건적인 자유와 독립을 부여하지 않은 경우 역사적전쟁은 계속해 나갈 것이라고 했다. 미주 한인들도 거부반응을 보였다. 그는 카이로선언은 즉시 독립을 의미하지 않고 오스트리아와 같이 적당한 방침에 따라 독립을 주겠다는 것이며, 결국 이는 신탁통치를 말하는 것이라고 했다. 카이로선언은 한국 독립운동의 새로운 동력이 됐다. 그동안 각개 약진했던 재중 독립운동가들은 대한민국 임시정부를 중심으로 뭉치기 시작했다. 하와이, 미주 본토, 멕시코, 쿠바 한인사회도 재미한족연합위원회를중심으로 강고히 뭉칠 것과 분열된 외교채널을 하나로 통합하기로 뜻을 모았다. 해외 한인사회 단결과 함께 이들은 독립운동의 방향을 대한민국임시정부 승인과 무기 대여법 적용 대상 국가 지정을 위한 외교활동을 펼쳤다. 임시정부 관계자들은 중국, 재미한족연합위원회와 이승만은 미국을 상대로 대한민국 임시정부 승인의 정당성과 필요성을 역설했다. 특히 이승만은 미 국무부를 상대로 한국의 지정학적 위치와 중국에 광복군 존재를 설명하면서 무기대여의 필요성을 설득했다. 하지만 한국독립운동가들의 이러한 노력은 먹히지 않았다. 미국은 대한민국 임시정부를 인정하지 않았다. 미국은 유럽에서 독일에 저항하고 있던 레지스탕스나 빨치산 등에게 무기를 대여하지 않았다. 한국에 무기대여를 할 수 없는 것은 당연한 것이다. 무엇보다 카이로선언의 한국독립 조항은 한국독립운동가들이 쟁취한 것이 아니라 강국으로 보장받은 것에 지나지 않았다는 점이다.

카이로회담의 교섭과 진행에 관한 연구

조덕천 한국근현대사학회 2014 한국 근현대사 연구 Vol.70 No.-

Up to now, many studies of the Cairo Conference have tended to focus onunderstanding the conference mainly in terms of Korean matters. This approachhas made it impossible to make a positive study of the conference. Therefore,this study aims to organize the whole process from the initiation to completionof the Cairo Conference. To achieve this aim, this study took advantage of materialsthat China has kept which has not been made public as well as materials thatthe USA has made public. The results of this study can be summarized as follows. The development of the Cairo Conference was mainly conducted by the USAand China. In June, 1943, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt made a suggestionto Chinese Leader Chiang Kai-shek holding a summit of four countries: the USA,the UK, the Soviet Union and China. His suggestion was accepted by ChineseLeader Chiang, bringing about a potentially successful conference between theUSA and China. Then Roosevelt tried to persuade Soviet Leader Joseph Stalinto join in the conference, only to fail because the three countries (the USA, theUSSR and China) were differently situated. At this, Roosevelt discussed with BritishPrime Minister Winston Churchill in late October, 1943, to revise his originalplan into separately holding a conference with China and the Soviet Union. Asa result, the USA and the UK were expected to talk with China in Cairo onNovember 22nd, 1943, and with the Soviet Union in Tehran on November 27th,1943. Thus, it was finally decided that the Cairo Conference, a summit of threecountries: the USA, the UK and China would be held. On November 8th, 1943, the three countries of the USA, the UK, and Chinaset out to prepare for the conference. Each country tried to prepare preliminaryagendas in its own way to bring about the greatest of benefits from the conference. The USA and China each prepared preliminary agendas: Burma Operation andChina Securing its Status as One of the Four Allied Great Powers in the sameterms. On the other hand, the UK focused on European matters instead of Asianones, which strongly conflicted with the agendas of the USA and China. Withtheir own agendas, the summit and delegation of each country headed towardCairo. Participants in the Cairo Conference included the summit, military advisorystaff and other suites of each country, amounting to a total of about 180 to500 people. The Cairo Conference was held from November 22nd, when all the participantsof each country arrived, through to November 26th. On the night of November22nd, a preliminary conference was held to discuss the entire itinerary. The mainconference opened on the morning of November 23rd. The conference was dividedinto the summit and the combined military advisory staff meeting. The key contentsthat the conference mainly dealt with concerned military and political matters,which were all discussed on November 23rd when the main conference was held. The military matters were discussed in the morning session of that day, and thepolitical matters were dealt with in the dinner party between Roosevelt and Chiangon the same day. The contents discussed on that day were reflected in the CairoDeclaration published on December 1st, 1943. In short, the principal parties concerned with the Cairo Conference were theUSA and China. This is highlighted by the process of initiation, preparation andcompletion of the Cairo Conference and the contents of the Cairo Declaration. Even though the conference was not attended by the four countries of the USA,the UK, the Soviet Union and China as originally planned by the USA, it wassubstantially meaningful that the Cairo Declaration was made at the CairoConference.

대한민국 임시정부의 국제공동관리안 반대운동(1942~1943)

이재호(Lee, Jae-ho) 독립기념관 한국독립운동사연구소 2014 한국독립운동사연구 Vol.0 No.48

1940년 중국 국민당 정부의 임시수도인 重慶에 정착한 대한민국 임시정부는 연합국으로부터 승인을 받기 위한 외교활동에 주력하였다. 그러나 1942년부터 전후 한국에 대해 연합국이 공동으로 관리한다는 보도가 나오면서 임시정부를 긴장하게 만들었다. 미국이 주도한 이러한 구상을 당시 임시정부는 ‘國際共同管理’라고 불렀다. 임시정부는 ‘국제공동관리’가 일제 패망 후 한국의 즉시 독립을 보장하지 않는다는 점을 알고 앞장서서 반대운동을 전개하였다. 임시정부 외무부장 조소앙은 1943년 2월 1일자 『大公報』에 성명서를 발표하여 국제공동관리안을 반박하고, 한국은 즉시 독립되어야 한다고 강조하였다. 1943년 3월 미국의 루스벨트 대통령과 영국의 이든 외상이 만나 한국을 국제 신탁통치 아래 두기로 합의하였다는 내용을 확인한 임시정부는 본격적인 반대운동에 나섰다. 우선 국제공동관리안에 반대하는 선전활동을 강화하였다. 임시정부 선전부장 김규식이 성명을 발표하여 반대 의사를 재차 천명하였으며, 선전위원 엄항섭도 중국 신문에 장편의 글을 투고하여 반대 여론 확산에 주력하였다. 임시정부는 국제공동관리안에 반대하는 한국인의 통일된 의지를 보여주기 위해 1943년 5월 10일 ‘재중국자유한인대회’를 개최하였다. 당시 重慶에서 활동하고 있던 독립운동가들은 각자가 속한 정당과 단체에 따라 정치적 이념과 노선이 달랐지만, 자유한인대회에서는 이를 초월하여 한목소리로 국제공동관리 문제에 반대의사를 나타냈다. 임시정부의 국제공동관리안 반대운동 가운데 커다란 영향력이 있었던 것은 1943년 7월 26일 임시정부 요인들이 이 문제를 가지고 중국 최고지도자인 蔣介石과 면담한 것이었다. 이 면담에서 임시정부 요인들은 장개석으로부터 한국의 독립을 위해 힘써 싸우겠다는 약속을 얻어내는 성과를 거두었다. 한국이 카이로선언에서 독립을 보장받을 수 있게 된 것은 장개석이 임시정부 요인들과의 면담에서 한 약속을 지킨 것이었다고 할 수 있다. In 1940, Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing(重慶) what the Capital of Kuomintang(國民黨) concentrated diplomatic activity for The Allies’s approval. However, Korean Provisional Government heard about reported that The Allies will be International Co-Management about postwar Korea from 1942. This Plan of The United states of America was named ‘International Co-Management Proposal’ by the executives of Korean Provisional Government. The executives of Korean Provisional Government knew not means ‘International Co-Management Proposal’ is immediately independence. And They started The Opposition Movement about International Co-Management Proposal. The head of foreign affairs of Korean Provisional Government, Cho So-Ang(趙素昻) refuted International Co-Management Proposal and emphasized Korea’s immediately independence Through Dagongbao(大公報) released on February 1, 1943. In Roosevelt-Eden Meeting March 1943, The agreements what trusteeship about Korea draw a conclusion. Korean Provisional Government deployed propaganda activity against ‘International Co-Management Proposal’. The head of propaganda activity of Korean Provisional Government, Kim Kyu-Sik(金奎植) issued statement that against ‘International Co-Management Proposal’. The member of propaganda activity department, Um Hang-sup(嚴恒燮) submitted to Chinese newspaper for against ‘International Co-Management Proposal’. Korean Provisional Government opened The Freedom-Korean Convention in China for the Korean’s willing against ‘International Co-Management Proposal’ in 10th May, 1943. The Korean Activists of independence in Chongqing exposed unified the opposite argument about The Freedom-Korean Convention in China. One of The Opposition Movement about International Co-Management Proposal of Korean Provisional Government, the executives of Korean Provisional Government met Chiang Kai-shek(蔣介石) as the Republic of China’s best leader. In this meeting, the executives of Korean Provisional Government extracted promise out of Chiang Kai-shek what constant exertions for Korean independence. Because Chiang Kai-shek kept his appointment with the executives of Korean Provisional Government. Korea was guaranteed independence in the Cairo Declaration.

1940년대 천주교회의 한국 선교와 대한민국 정부 수립

최선혜(Choi, Seon hye) 한국교회사연구소 2015 敎會史硏究 Vol.0 No.47

This research analyzes the actions of the Catholic Church during the establishment and sanction of the Korean government during the 1940’s, focusing on the activities of the Maryknoll Missioners. The Maryknollers were driven out back to the United States, but they continuously raised awareness of the Korea. The most notable of these efforts is their argument that the recovery of Korean sovereignty and the recovery of religious freedom is an act that exemplifies the shared ideals of ‘Justice’ among the international community. The Maryknollers persistently requested the Truman administration to take a definitive stance on Korean independence. They stressed that the United States must keep Korea become an independent nation. In regards to this, they brought up the fact that the United States had signed the United States-Korea Treaty, and argued that it was ergo honorable for the United States to help Korea become independent, as proclaimed in the Cairo Declaration. Even more, they established an organization called ‘Catholics for Korea’ and attempted to raise awareness of the masses of the United States by educating them about Korea. The organization also received numerous signatures from Catholics who were major figures in their respective field in the United States, and published a public statement in support of the establishment of a self-governing Korea. After the end of the war, the Vatican named Bishop Byrne Patrick as the first Apostolic Delegate to Korea. As the first official ambassador of the Vatican in Korea, Bishop Byrne carried out diplomatic efforts in order to establish a Korean government. From all this, we can conclude that the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea was an affair that the Catholic Church spearheaded in order to fulfill justice in the eyes of the international community.

카이로선언의 지도원리와 한국의 영유권 고찰

이동원 ( Lee Dong-won ) 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 2015 외법논집 Vol.39 No.1

The Cairo Declaration was signed at Cairo on November 27, 1943 and announced on December 1, 1943. It adapted regulations, saying that Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed and that the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. The former is a 「general regulation」meaning that Japan shall be expelled from the land that she occupied illegally, and the latter is a 「special regulation」meaning that Korea shall be relieved from illegal colonial rule. A leading principle exists in the Cairo Declaration to set 「postwar international order form」 and the leading principle rules the Peace Treaty with Japan. Considered on the interpretation as above, the Peace Treaty with Japan should have been regulated on the premise of unlawfulness over colonial rule as a peace treaty of disciplinary punishment. But, at that time, the principle of guidance the Cairo Declaration was not reflected at the Peace Treaty with Japan because allied powers intended to stabilize international order for fear of the threat of communism. So, the treaty of peace, not the treaty of disciplinary punishment, is not the one in conformity to the profit of Korea in a strict meaning. Korea has to be faithful to the leading principle of the Cairo Declaration in interpretation of the problem of Korean Territorial Sovereignty, Art.2 of Treaty on Basic Relation between the Republic of Korea and Japan, and of the problem over the territorial sovereignty of Dokdo. Four powers adapted the regulations as above in the Cairo Declaration to set postwar international order. So, the Cairo Declaration has a trait of 「supreme norm」 and 「fundamental normality」 over succeeding declaration and treaties. The trait, here, takes a role as a leading principle that the Cairo Declaration heads for, and the leading principles of the Cairo Declaration is interpreted as 「liberalism」 and 「colony liberation」. Interpreted over this leading principle, colonial rule of Japan is illegal from Korea-Japan Protocol of 1904, and it demands that Japan has to be expelled from all other lands Japan seized through treaties, agreements that she made forcibly, and sovereign damage (Japanese transfer of Shimane to the land). So, the Cairo Declaration, interpreted by the leading principle of fundamental normative trait, means Japanese illegal occupation of Korea from 1904 and ineffective land transfer of Shimane Province in 1905.

카이로선언의 기초와 한반도 독립 조항의 의미

장박진(Chang Bakjin) 동북아역사재단 2016 東北亞歷史論叢 Vol.- No.54

1943년 12월 1일자로 선포된 카이로선언은 한반도를 독립시킬 것을 국제적으로 공약함으로써 실제 한반도 독립의 법적·정치적 시초가 되었다는 의미에서 한국 현대사에 크나큰 의미를 지녔다. 무엇보다 선언은 전후 일본의 영토에서 제외하는 지역 문제와 관련해 ‘폭력’, ‘탐욕’, ‘약탈’, ‘노예상태’ 등의 수사(修辭)를 사용했다. 이에 따라 지금까지 한국에서 생산되어온 많은 관련 담론은 선언이 단지 한반도를 독립하게 하는 것에 그치지 않고 독립시킬 근거를 천명한 것이라고 이해해왔다. 즉 한국 사회는 카이로선언이 일본에 의한 한반도 지배를 비합법적이고 부당한 것이었다고 확정했다고 봐왔다. 이는 거꾸로 말해 선언이 한반도 독립이 그런 비합법적인 지배로부터의 ‘광복(光復)’으로서 이루어졌음을 선언한 것이라고 해석하고 있는 것이다. 또한 오늘날 국민적 관심사가 되어 있는 독도의 영유권 문제와 관련해서도 선언은 자주 활용되어왔다. 즉 폭력이나 탐욕으로 인해 약탈한 지역에서 구축된다는 관련 규정에 따라 전후 일본은 이미 독도 영유권을 박탈당했으며 한국 영토로 확정되었다는 논리의 기반이 되어 있다. 그러나 한국 사회에서 흔히 유통하는 이와 같은 정서적 해석이 국제사회 공유의 외교사로서 참으로 실증할 수 있을 것인가 하는 물음은 아직 학술적으로 충분히 검증된 것은 아니다. 물론 최근 발표된 선행연구들로 인해 카이로선언의 기초 과정은 상당히 밝혀졌다. 그러나 그들 선행연구도 카이로선언이 한반도 독립의 성격을 참으로 한국 사회의 정서적인 담론처럼 확정한 것이었는지를 분석한 것은 아니다. 이 글은 바로 선행연구가 충분히 다루지 않았던 이 공백을 규명하고자 했다. 분석 결과 선언 중, 한반도 독립 문제와 관련된 것으로 이해되어온 “폭력이나 탐욕으로 인해 약탈한 다른 모든 지역”은 한반도 문제와 전혀 무관하게 규정되었음을, 또한 ‘노예상태’가 들어간 한반도 독립 조항 역시 그것은 병합의 합법성을 전제로 한 미국 정부가 다른 이유를 댈 수 없는 궁여지책으로 규정했을 가능성이 컸음을 밝혔다. 즉 한국 사회에서 유통되는 정서적인 담론과 달리 한반도 독립이 비합법적이고 부당한 지배로부터의 광복으로서 이루어졌음을 확정한 근거로서 카이로선언을 삼는 것은 적절하지 않음을 밝혔다. The Cairo Declaration proclaimed on December 1, 1943, is extremely important for Korea in the meaning that the declaration was the first legal and political pledge for the independence of Korea. Above all, the declaration referred to rhetoric such as “violence,” “greed,” “take,” “enslavement,” and other terms with regard to the region which was planned to be stripped from Japan after the war. As a result, Korean society has regarded the declaration not only as the simple promise of independence, but also as the grounds which clarified that Japanese rule against Korea had been illegal and unjust. In other words, this interpretation means that Korean society understands that the declaration confirmed that Korean independence was the “liberation” from the illegal and unjust Japanese rule. Further, in Korean society the Cairo Declaration has often been used as the grounds for stating that Japanese sovereignty over Dokdo Island has been stripped and returned to Korea. But an emotional understanding such as this, which has become standard in Korean society, has never been sufficiently verified by academic analysis in international diplomatic history. Of course, several recent studies have greatly contributed to the analysis of the drafting process of the declaration, but those studies did not elucidate whether the declaration actually clarified the character of Korean independence just as Korean society has understood. That is why this study analyzes this problem by focusing on the drafting of the phrases related to Korean independence. As a result, this article clarifies that the sentence “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed” in the declaration was not related with the problems of Korea’s independence. It also is highly probable that the phrase “mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea” was used as a last resort for avoiding presenting the grounds of Korea’s independence because the United States had recognized the Annexation Treaty in 1910 which determined that Korea should be a part of the territory under Japanese sovereignty. That is to say, this article concludes that it is not appropriate to interpret that the Cairo Declaration confirmed that Korean independence was the liberation from the Japanese illegal and unjust rule.

샌프란시스코 강화조약 상 반식민주의 — 일본 영토의 판단기준으로써 포츠담 항복조건을 중심으로 —

오시진 한양대학교 법학연구소 2022 법학논총 Vol.39 No.4

Does Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951) set the territorial scope of Japan prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) as a reference point? Compared to other peace treaties concluded after World War II, the San Francisco Peace Treaty has a peculiarity. The detailed territorial terms in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace do not seem to have any relation to each other. This clause appears to be merely a list of matters that need to be dealt with individually. Moreover, this article does not provide clear guidelines as to how far the territory of Japan extends. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to clarify the criteria for determining the territorial scope of Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951). The argument of this study is that when interpreting Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, “the Potsdam surrender terms” which is the Japan’s instrument of surrender, become a binding criterion, and accordingly, 1894, the starting point of “violence and greed” presented in the Cairo Declaration, which Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration invokes, can be the standard for the scope of Japanese territory. In 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers. Therefore, this instrument of surrender is a special case of capitulation and it is legally binding regardless of the scope of its contents. In particular, it can be confirmed that the 1947 draft of the Peace Treaty tried to return Japan's territory to 1894, so it can be confirmed that the views of Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek were maintained until then. This part can be interpreted as reflecting the Cairo Declaration in the 1947 draft because the Potsdam Declaration was used as the standard in the “Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” by the Far Eastern Commission in 1947. As Dulles stated at the San Francisco Peace Treaty signing conference, the Potsdam surrender terms bind the Allies and Japan. After the signing of this peace treaty, there was also a case in which Japan regarded the terms of Potsdam's surrender term as a criterion binding on Japanese territory. Accordingly, it can be said that the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration have legal effect when interpreting the scope of Japanese territory under Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In other words, it could be said that there is an anti-colonial element in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 샌프란시스코 강화조약(1951) 제2조는 일본 영토 범위를 청일전쟁(1894-1895)이 발발하기 이전 시기의 그것을 기준 시점으로 하고 있는가? 제2차 세계대전 이후 체결된 다른 강화조약과 비교했을 때, 샌프란시스코 강화조약은 특이점이 있다. 본 강화조약 제2조의 세부 영토 항목은 서로 아무런 관련성이 없어 보인다. 본 조항은 개별적으로 처리가 필요한 사안들을 나열한 것에 불과한 것으로 보인다. 게다가 본 조항이 일본 영토가 어디까지인지에 대한 명확한 지침을 제공하고 있지도 않다. 따라서 본 연구는 샌프란시스코 강화조약(1951)의 영토 범위의 판단기준을 밝히는 것을 목적으로 하였다. 본 연구의 주장은 조약 해석의 원칙에 따라 샌프란시스코 강화조약 제2조를 해석할 때 일본의 항복문서인 포츠담 항복조건이 구속력 있는 판단기준이 되고, 이에 따라 포츠담 선언이 원용하는 카이로 선언에서 제시하는 “폭력과 탐욕”의 시작점인 1894년이 일본 영토의 범위의 기준이 될 수 있다는 것이다. 1945년 일본이 연합국에 대해 무조건적 항복을 하였는데 이 항복문서는 일반 군 지휘관의 항복의 수준을 벗어난 무조건적 항복이기에 그 내용의 범위와 관계없이 법적 구속력이 생긴다. 한편, 본 강화조약의 1947년 초안에서 1894년으로 일본의 영토를 되돌리려 하였다는 점을 확인할 수 있다. 이 부분은 1947년 극동위원회의 “일본의 항복 후 기본방침”에서 포츠담 선언을 그 기준으로 삼고 있기에 카이로 선언이 1947년 초안에 반영되어 있다고 해석될 수 있다. Dulles가 샌프란시스코 강화조약 체결 회의에서 밝혔듯이 ‘포츠담 항복조건’이 연합국과 일본을 구속한다. 본 강화조약 체결 이후 일본도 포츠담 항복조건을 일본 영토에 구속력 있는 판단기준으로 본 사례도 있다. 이에 따라 카이로 선언 및 포츠담 선언은 샌프란시스코 강화조약 제2조 상 일본 영토의 범위를 해석할 때 법적 효력이 생긴다고 할 수 있고, 샌프란시스코 강화조약 제2조 상 일본 영토복원 시점이 1894년이라 해석될 수 있다. 즉, 샌프란시스코 강화조약에 반식민주의적 가치가 남아 있다고 할 수 있다.

카이로회담의 한국 문제 논의와 카이로선언 한국조항의 작성 과정

정병준(Jung, Byung Joon) 역사비평사 2014 역사비평 Vol.- No.107

The Korea clause in the 1943 Cairo Declaration reads:"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The Korean problem was discussed during Roosevelt-Chiang dinner meeting on November 23, 1943. It was the Chinese government and Chiang Kai-shek who focused on the term of "free and independent." Roosevelt thought that the Chinese assertion of Korean independence reflected China"s wide aspiration including the reoccupation of Korea after the war but agreed to put that article into their joint communique. The United States agreed to the independence of Korea as one of the general principles of World War II to let oppressed nations be free. But the official policy of U.S. toward Korea during World War II was a two or three nation international trusteeship, manifested in the Cairo Declaration as "in due course." The U.S. draft of the joint communique was made by Harry Hopkins, Special Advisor to Roosevelt on November 24 and revised by Roosevelt the same day. The United Kingdom rejected inclusion of the Korea Clause into the joint communique and there was dispute over the joint communique between them and China-U.S. between November 24 to 26. The result of this disagreement was that the terms of the Korea Clause became more ambiguous and unclear after Great Britain’s attempt to delete the entire clause had been blocked by the U.S. and China. The Korea Clause in the Cairo Declaration was outcome of discussion, dispute, and agreement by the U.S., China, and Great Britain who all had their own agendas and policies toward Korea. The wording of the Korea Clause in the 1943 Cairo Declaration may therefore be interpreted differently by those nations who formulated and signed it.

Article 2(a), Peace Treaty with Japan (Sept. 8, 1951), San Francisco, and Dokdo Islets (Liancourt Rocks, Take Island)

Hong-ju NAH(나홍주) 영남대학교 독도연구소 2016 독도연구 Vol.- No.20