1972년 中美 화해에 대한 “소련위협원인론”의 재고찰: 미-중-소 전략적 삼각관계 하의 중국 외교

김용신 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2019 중소연구 Vol.42 No.4

Sino-U.S. rapprochement, which is symbolized by Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on February 28, 1972, was one of the great turning points of cold war history. Most of the literature which has dealt with Sino-U.S. rapprochement argued that China reconciled with the U.S. in order to enhance its security against the threat from the Soviet Union and this explanation was accepted as “nearly a truism.” This “conventional wisdom,” moreover, was regarded as hard proof of the balance of power in international politics. This article tries to shed new light on the Sino-U.S. Rapprochement by analyzing recently declassified historical archives. Newly declassified American and former Communist Bloc countries’ primary and second archives falsify “Soviet Threat Theory” in three ways. First, Zhenbao/Damansky incidents in 1969, armed conflicts in series between PRC and USSR, was initiated by China, not by the Soviet Union. Contrary to Kissinger’s widely-held perception of the Soviet as an “aggressor,” armed conflicts at the initial state perpetrated by the PRC. Second, during the Sino-U.S. negotiations to rapprochement, China did not emphasize Soviet threat to China. On the Contrary, Kissinger and Richard Nixon tried to persuade Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong of the immediate possibility of a Soviet attack on China. Finally, during the secret negotiations between PRC and the U.S., the U.S. granted major concessions regarding Taiwan, without obtaining China’s concession regarding Viet Nam. “Soviet Threat Theory” argued that China’s negotiating position toward the U.S. was severely constrained by its relative insecurity vis-à-vis the Soviet threat; nevertheless, China gained more concessions from the negotiations with the U.S. Contrary to Kissinger’s widely-held perception of the Soviet as an “aggressor,” in initial stage armed conflicts perpetrated by the PRC. Second, during the Sino-U.S. negotiations to rapprochement, China did not emphasize Soviet threat to China. On the Contrary, Kissinger and Richard Nixon tried to persuade Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong of immediate possibility of a Soviet attack on China. Finally, during the secret negotiations between PRC and US, the U.S. granted major concessions regarding Taiwan, without obtaining China’s concession regarding Viet Nam. “Soviet Threat Theory” argued that China’s negotiating position toward the U.S. was severely constrained by its relative insecurity vis-à-vis the Soviet threat; nevertheless, China gained more concessions from the negotiations with the U.S.Contrary to Kissinger’s widely-held perception of the Soviet as an “aggressor,” in initial stage armed conflicts perpetrated by the PRC. Second, during the Sino-U.S. negotiations to rapprochement, China did not emphasize Soviet threat to China. On the Contrary, Kissinger and Richard Nixon tried to persuade Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong of immediate possibility of a Soviet attack on China. Finally, during the secret negotiations between PRC and US, the U.S. granted major concessions regarding Taiwan, without obtaining China’s concession regarding Viet Nam. “Soviet Threat Theory” argued that China’s negotiating position toward the U.S. was severely constrained by its relative insecurity vis-à-vis the Soviet threat; nevertheless, China gained more concessions from the negotiations with the U.S. 1972년 2월 28일 발표된 상해공동성명(上海公報)으로 대표되는 中美 화해는 미-소 양극 구조의 근본적 변화를 알리는 냉전의 중요한 전환점이었다. 중미 화해에 대한 대부분의 기존 논의들은 “소련의 위협(Soviet Threat)”이라는 공동의 위협에 대항하기 위해 중국과 미국 양국이 화해를 하였다고 주장하였고, 이는 “거의 자명한 이치”로 받아들여졌다. 이러한 “자명한 이치”는 국제정치에서 세력균형의 좋은 예로 지목되면서 중국 연구자들을 비롯한 국제정치학자들의 확립된 견해로 자리 잡게 되었다. 그러나 탈냉전 이후 공산권 국가 문서에 부분적 접근이 가능해지고, 중미 화해 당시 미국의 주요 외교문서들이 비밀해제(declassify)되면서, 전통주의적 해석에 대한 의문이 제기되기 시작하였다. 본 연구는 탈냉전 이후 공개된 다국 사료(multi-national archives)들을 교차 분석하는 역사적 접근 방법(historical approach)을 채용하여, 1969년 중소 무력충돌부터 상해공동성명으로 中美화해가 이루어진 1972년까지의 중국 외교에 대한 분석을 시도한다. 본 연구는 1969년 중소 무력 충돌은 소련이 아닌 중국에 의해 계획되었고, 이후의 미중 양국 간 회담에서도 중국보다는 미국이 중국에 대한 소련의 위협을 강조하였음을 역사적으로 밝힌다.

‘위협균형’ 이론을 통한 동맹형성과 강대국 경쟁의 상호관계 분석: 오커스(AUKUS)의 원자력 추진 잠수함기술 이전 결정을 중심으로

김동은 세종연구소 2023 국가전략 Vol.29 No.3

In 2021, after the launch of the AUKUS alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, many discussions began in Korean society about the transfer and development of nuclear-powered submarine technology. Unlike Australia, which is facing an imminent threat from the growing nuclear capabilities of North Korea and China, South Korea is facing an imminent threat from the growing nuclear capabilities of North Korea and China. In particular, in the academic field, there is an analysis that Australia was selected as the target of the AUKUS system because of the special nature of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Australia. Although these existing studies can also provide meaningful interpretations of current international relations, this study will first examine the factors affecting the threat level through Walt's theory of balance of threat to find out what the motivation for the conclusion of AUKUS is, and how the alliance is formed. However, when the United States actually chose Australia as an actor at the launch of the AUKUS system, there were also factors in the level of threat balance and perception and response between the United States and China, which are international system variables within the strategic competition between the United States and China. It is time to recognize the essence of the AUKUS system and to have insight into how to apply it to Korea's security and military policies.

Europe Divided: How Different Threat Perception Towards Russia Inhibits Military Integration In Europe

임상수 경희대학교 사회과학연구원 2022 社會科學硏究 Vol.48 No.3

Military integration has been the source of debate in Europe ever since the end of World War II, the debate intensifying due to increasing Russian threat since 2010s. However, despite increasing voice for the need to integrate militarily, there has been very little actual progress in military integration in Europe. What factors are behind such stagnant state of European military integration? This paper argues that Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory can contribute to explaining the puzzling phenomenon. Applying the theory to the European case, this paper shows that the Eastern and Western Europeans are likely to have different degree of threat perception towards Russia. Such difference is largely caused by two factors: 1) difference in national aggregate power, 2) different geographical proximity to the Russian threat. As a result, more highly threatened Eastern Europeans tend to distrust European military integration and prefer NATO as more certain way of balancing the Russian threat. The findings imply that it is unlikely for large-scale European military integration to take place in the near future.

북한의 핵․미사일 위협에 대한 한국의 억제 전략

박균열,방원석 한국통일전략학회 2018 통일전략 Vol.18 No.1

The tension on the Korean peninsula has heightened by threats to North Korea's sixth nuclear test as well as statements close to the declaration of war made by U.S. President Donald Trump against North Korea nuclear test. In general, when a country in international politics receives significant external threats, it usually uses balancing or band wagoning strategies. In this military crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula, we will identify the capabilities and threats to North Korea's missiles and nuclear weapons, and try to find out how the nuclear states has responded to the nuclear threat from the hostile countries. We will also present the best strategy, namely our countermeasures on the security basis based on the theory of balance of power through the messages given in these cases. In conclusion, we would like to contribute to establish South Korea's military policy to North Korea through suggesting some implications on nuclear deterrence strategy as military strategy countermeasures based on the theory of balance of power against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. 한반도 정세는 북한의 6차 핵개발 실험에 대한 위협과 이에 대응한 미국 트럼프 대통령의 북에 대한 전쟁선포에 근접한 발언 등으로 긴장이 극도로 고조된 상황이다. 일반적으로 국제정치에서 한 국가가 외부로부터 상당한 위협을 받을 때 일반적으로 균형(balancing) 혹은 편승(bandwagoning) 전략을 사용한다. 현재 한반도의 군사적 위기 상황 속에서, 북한 미사일과 핵무기에 대한 능력과 위협요인을 확인하고, 지금까지 핵 보유 국가는 적대국의 핵 위협으로부터 어떻게 대응했는지 사례를 통해 한국에게 주는 교훈은 무엇인지 확인하고자 한다. 또한, 이러한 사례가 주는 메시지를 통해, 세력균형이론을 근거로 한국이 취해야 할 전략, 즉 한국의 대응책을 안보적 차원에서 제시하고자 한다. 결론적으로 북한의 핵·미사일위협에 대한 한국의 전략적 대응책을 세력균형이론을 기반으로 한 핵 억제전략에 대해 군사적 전략차원에서 몇 가지 시사점을 제시함으로써, 한국의 군사적 대북정책 발전에 기여하고자 한다.

21세기 미국의 미사일방어 네트워크 동맹 전략: 이론과 실제

고봉준 21세기정치학회 2016 21세기 정치학회보 Vol.26 No.3

This article tries to explain both the nature and theoretical implications of the missile defense network which the United States has recently built up. The current missile defense system is different from the Cold War missile defenses of the U.S. in the sense that it is bringing in diverse countries, whether or not they are traditional allies of the U.S., to the system. In other words, it is expanding by way of recruiting countries which are believed to be relatively safe from ballistic missile threats. Different theories such as offensive realism, balance of threat theory, and balance of interest theory can explain different types of countries under this missile defense network. However, a more satisfactory and comprehensive explanation should be made with the help of the perspective of network theory. The main argument of this article is that U.S. missile defense is actually inducing other countries to the system, taking hold of their preferences, and eventually building up a new kind of alliance network order. While traditional alliances have been understood as a marriage of convenience or an institution, the U.S. is now making use of a strategy that would form a multi-layered missile defense network to remain the most dominant actor in world politics. Accordingly, other countries in the system, at the expense of inclusion to the network, may have more opportunities to utilize resources in the system and increase their power, in the network theory terms, by being granted roles in the network. Therefore, it is necessary for us to think very carefully about strategic ways of enhancing national security of the Republic of Korea with regard to the current U.S. missile defense. The starting point should be to analyze how the U.S. missile defense network is being structured, strategically calculate costs and benefits of the ROK’s role in the system if it would decide to get into the system, and finally understand the relationship between the missile defense network and other(probable anti)networks in order to review the national interest and strategy of the ROK for the future.

미국의 인도-태평양 소다자주의 안보 전략 - 위협균형 이론을 중심으로 -

조현덕 ( Cho Hyun-deok ) 대한정치학회 2023 大韓政治學會報 Vol.31 No.2

미국은 중국을 동아시아 및 서태평양 일대의 ‘규칙에 기반한 질서’를 변경하고자 하는 도전 세력으로 규정하고 있다. 중국이 추진하고 있는 일대일로와 진주목걸이 전략은 중국이 더 이상 평화로운 부상(peaceful rising)을 택하지 않음을 의미한다. 본 논문은 왈트(Walt)의 위협균형 이론(Balance of Threat Theory )을 토대로 미국이 중국의 부상을 위협으로 간주한다는 것을 확인한다. 이에 따라, 미국은 인도·태평양 역내의 균형과 영향력을 강화하기 위해 ‘인도-태평양 전략’을 추진하고 있다. 2017년 QUAD 2.0이 재출범했다. 미·중 양국에서 헤징 전략을 추진하던 중견국가(middle powers) 호주와 인도는 QUAD에 재참여하면서, 미국의 인도-태평양 전략에 동참하는 모습을 보여주고 있다. 일각에서는 2021년 9월 출범한 AUKUS에 대해 미국의 ‘최상위 동맹체’로 간주하고 있다. 본 논문은 미국이 AUKUS, QUAD 및 Five Eyes 등 소다자주의 안보 협의체를 활용하여 스크럼 전략을 추진하고자 한다고 본다. 이는 미국이 인도-태평양 역내에서 전통적으로 중시하였던 양자 동맹(bilateral alliances) 기조에서 새로운 형태의 변화를 추구하는 것으로 볼 수 있다. 본 논문은 미국의 인도-태평양 전략과 연계한 스크럼 전략을 네트워크화시키고, 스크럼 전략의 효용성과 한계를 분석·도출하고자 한다. The United States regards China as a contender that challenges a ‘rule-based order’ in East Asia and the West Pacific. China’s One Belt, One Road and String of Pearls signified the termination of a peaceful rise. This paper confirms that the U.S. considers China’s rise as a threat, based on Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory as developed from Waltz’s Balance of Power Theory. Accordingly, the U.S. administrations have implemented the ‘Pivot to Asia’ and ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ to maintain balance and leverage in the Indo- Pacific region. In 2017, the U.S. re-established QUAD to play a critical role in containing China. The middle powers of Australia and India previously promoted hedging between the U.S. and China. With the establishment of QUAD 2.0, the two middle powers have demonstrated that they are inclined to partake in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. AUKUS was founded in September 2021 and is regarded by some as America’s ‘most important allied entity.’ This paper suggests that the U.S. will promote the ‘scrum strategy’, which consists of AUKUS, QUAD, and Five Eyes. It also implies that the U.S. is looking to complement the traditional framework of bilateral alliances within the Indo-Pacific region. This paper aims to interconnect both the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and the scrum strategy, and then analyze the effectiveness and limitations of the scrum strategy.

북한의 핵·미사일 위협 대응을 위한 한·미·일 안보협력 방안

송승종 한일군사문화학회 2018 한일군사문화연구 Vol.25 No.-

The ROK-US-Japan Trilateral Cooperation in Its Response to the Nuclear and Missile Threat from the North Korea Song, Seongjong The dark cloud of nuclear crisis is still hanging over the Korean peninsula mainly due to the nuclear threat from the North Korea. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists announced they have moved the Doomsday Clock forward so it now rests 2 minutes before midnight. The problem is that the nuclear crisis does not stop as it is, but triggers the controversy of ‘nuclear war’ which has been regarded as unimaginable just until recently. Some of experts on the Korean affairs warned that the North Korea has been practicing ‘nuclear war exercise’ via a series of repeated nuclear and missile tests. Director of the U.S. National Defense Intelligence, James Clapper, said that there is no one in the world who can stop “fitfully enraged” President Trump from ordering the nuclear attack. Mr. Trump is the very person who questioned “If the U.S has tremendous nuclear weapons stockpiling, why can’t we use them?” The serious nature of North Korean crisis lies in the fact there is “no good options” to resolve this problem. The core essence with regard to the nature of nuclear and missile threat from the North lies in the fact there is “no good options” to resolve the problem. What is the crux of this issue? The cause of North Korea’s crisis can be categorized into two variables : exogenous variable of the North Korea, and endogenous one of the alliance system which consists of the U.S. and its allies such as the South Korea and Japan. The focus will be placed on the latter. The main purpose of this article is to put the root cause of North Korean nuclear crisis in perspective through ‘stability-instability paradox’ theory, and to explore its potential solutions in the context of ROK-US-Japan trilateral security cooperation. To attain the purpose of research, this paper will analyze the dynamism of trilateral cooperation against the backdrop of balance of power theory and balance of threat theory, review the past and present of trilateral cooperation, and propose the future-oriented courses of action for further strengthening the three-country security coordination mechanism. 북한의 핵위협으로 한반도에 핵위기의 그림자가 짙게 드리우고 있다. ‘지구종말의 시계(Doomsday Clock)’는 인류 파멸까지 2분이 남은 23시 58분을 가리킨다. 단순한 핵위기에 그치지 않고 불과 얼마 전까지 상상불가한 것으로 간주되었던‘핵전쟁’이 다반사로 거론되고 있다. 김정은 정권은 핵무기를 들먹이며 초강대국을 협박하는 언동이 어떤 파국을 초래할 것인지는 생각조차 하지 않는 것처럼보인다. 일부 한반도 전문가는 북한이 거듭되는 핵·미사일 실험을 통해 ‘핵전쟁 연습’을실시하고 있다고 경고한다. 클래퍼(James Clapper) 전 국가정보국(National Defense Intelligence) 국장에 의하면 “순간적으로 격분한” 트럼프 대통령이 핵공격 명령을 내리면 이를 중단할 사람은 아무도 없다. 트럼프는 대선후보 시절부터국방·외교 참모들에게 “왜 미국은 엄청난 핵무기를 보유하고 있는데 그걸 사용하면 안 되느냐?”고 반문했던 사람이다. 그러다 보니 북핵위기 사태에서 충동적으로핵무기 발사를 명령할 것을 우려하여 트럼프가 군통수권자임에도 불구하고, 그에게 핵무기 발사 코드를 맡기지 말아야 하다는 주장마저 제기되고 있다. 오늘날북한에 의한 핵·미사일 위협의 본질은 이를 해결하기 위한 “마땅한 해법 없음(no good options)”이 말해 준다. 무엇이 문제인가? 북핵위기의 원인은 북한이라는 외생(exogenous) 변수와 미국을 비롯한 그 동맹국(한·일)이라는 내생(endogenous) 변수로 구분해 볼 수 있다. 연구의 초점은 전자가 아니라 후자이다. 본 연구의 목적은 북핵위기의 근원을스나이더(Glenn Snyder)가 제시한 ‘안정-불안정 패러독스’ 이론의 관점에서 조망해 보고, 그 해결방안을 한·미·일 안보협력 맥락 속에서 모색하는 것이다. 상기의연구 목적을 달성하기 위해, 본 논문은 세력균형 이론과 위협균형 이론의 측면에서 한·미·일 3국협력의 다이내미즘을 분석해 보고, 한·미·일 안보협력의 과거와현재를 검토하며, 미래지향적 한·미·일 안보협력 방안을 제시해 볼 것이다.

Did threat perception shift Pakistan’s diplomatic strategy of alliance : A study of initial years of statehood

Haiyang He(허해양),Bo Tu(두보) 동아시아국제정치학회 2024 국제정치연구 Vol.27 No.2

탈냉전 이후 위협에 대한 인식 변화와 미‧중‧러 삼각관계: 한국에 주는 함의

김선재 국제지역학회 2022 국제지역연구 Vol.26 No.2

본 연구는 스티븐 월트의 위협균형론을 바탕으로 미국 바이든 행정부가 동맹과의 연대를 강조하게 된 배경을 살펴보고, 중국과 러시아가 준동맹 수준의 협력을 하게 된 외부 요인을 분석하고자 한다. 나아가 향후 미국에 대항하는 중국과 러시아의 군사동맹 체결 가능성을 전망함과 동시에, 격변하는 미‧중‧러‧ 삼각관계가 우리의 외교안보전략에 주는 함의를 살펴보고자 한다. 연구 결과 부상하는 중‧러의 국력과 공세적 군사력의 강화는 양국에 대한 미국의 위협 인식을 증가시켰다고 볼 수 있으며, 이에 대응하기 위한 미국의 공격적 의도 표출은 결과적으로 중‧러가 준동맹 수준의 협력을 할 수 있게 된 촉매제 역할을 하게 되었음을 알 수 있다. 상호에 대한 위협 인식은 앞으로도 상당 기간 증가할 것으로 예측되는 바, 중‧러가 미국에 대항하기 위한 동맹 수준의 협력 관계를 구축하게 될 가능성도 배제할 수 없다. 우리로선 미‧중‧러 3개국 간의 긴장관계가 한반도에서 첨예해질 가능성을 늘 염두에 두고 보다 섬세한 외교 전략을 구사해야 할 것이다. This paper examines the background of the Biden administration's emphasis on solidarity with alliances based on the Balance of Threat Theory, and analyzes external factors that led China and Russia to cooperate at the level of Quasi-alliance. Furthermore, while predicting the possibility of a military alliance between China and Russia against the U.S. in the future, we would like to examine the implications of the changing the U.S.-China-Russia Triangle Relationship on our diplomatic and security strategies. Studies have shown that the strengthening of China and Russia's national power and offensive military power has increased the awareness of the U.S. threat to the two countries, and that the U.S. expression of aggressive intentions has consequently served as a catalyst for China-Russia to cooperate at the level of quasi-alliance. Recognition of threats to each other is expected to increase for a considerable period of time in the future, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that China and Russia will establish an alliance-level cooperative relationship to counter the United States. For us, we should always keep in mind the possibility that tension between the U.S., China, and Russia will become acute on the Korean Peninsula and use a more delicate diplomatic strategy.