러일전쟁기 일본육군의 대러시아 작전 계획과 사할린 점령 문제

조명철(Cho, Myung-chul) 고려대학교 글로벌일본연구원 2018 일본연구 Vol.31 No.-

의화단 사건 이후 러시아군이 만주의 요지를 점거하자 일본의 참모본부는 대러시아 작전계획을 수립하기 시작했다. 당시 대러시아 작전계획에는 연해주 방면 작전은 삽입되어 있었지만 사할린 점령 작전은 전혀 포함되어 있지 않았다. 영일동맹 이후 러일간의 위기가 고조되던 시기에도 대러시아 작전계획은 더욱 구체화되어 갔지만 사할린 작전은 언급되지 않았고 오히려 한반도에 대한 작전 비중은 높아져갔다. 전쟁 초기에 일본군의 작전계획이 모두 수립될 때까지도 사할린 점령작전은 대본영, 만주군총사령부, 육군성 어디에서도 정식으로 검토되지 않았다. 사할린 점령 작전계획은 러일전쟁 초기까지 전혀 존재하지 않았다는 사실을 확정지을 수 있다. 사할린 점령작전은 나가오카 대본영 참모차장의 개인적 차원에서 반복적으로 주장되고 요청되었다. 결국 나가오카의 집요한 설득작업으로 대본영은 사할린 점령 작전이 수면 위에 떠올랐으나 주위의 비협적인 분위기 속에서 쉽게 실행에 옮기지 못했다. 결국, 발틱함대의 괴멸이후 일본의 승리가 확정적으로 되면서 사할린 점령작전은 추진되었다. 아무리 전시라 하더 라도 전쟁의 목표와 무관한 작전은 절실한 정치적 외교적 필요성을 동반하지 않으면 성립하기 힘들다는 사실을 알 수 있다. 즉 순수한 군사적 이유만으로 성립할 수 없는 작전이 사할린점령작전이었다. 이점에서 스스로 정치적 판단을 내리고 그것을 근거로 작전계획을 수립하고자 했던 나가오카의 의도는 성공하지 못했다. 즉 나가오카는 정부의 정략적 요구에 대응하는 군사적 작전만을 검토해야 할 참모본부 본연의 권한을 벗어나고 있었다. 이러한 돌출 행동은 전시이기 때문에 용납될 수 있었겠지만 나가오카는 이미 군의 영역을 벗어나 정치의 영역에 들어서고 있 었다. 정치적 판단에 신중하지 못한 나가오카의 행동에 대해 전후 비판적인 시각이 나타나지 않았다는 사실도 1930년대 군의 일탈행위를 예고하고 있다고 하겠다. 러일전쟁에서의 승리가 나가오카의 일탈 행위에 대한 비판의식을 무디게 만들었을 가능성도 배제할 수 없겠다. After the Uihadan incident, when Russian troops occupied the main strategic area of Manchuria, Japan’s chief of staff began to devise a plan to counter Russia. At that time, military operational strategy related to the coast of Primorsky was incorporated into the plan, but no considerations related to the desired occupation of Sakhalin were included. At a time of escalating crisis in Russia after the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the plan for counteroperations against Russia became more concrete, but the Sakhalin operation was not discussed, and instead the proportion of planned operations on the Korean peninsula increased. Even by the time the Japanese military’s operational plans had been established in the early days of the war, no operational plan to occupy Sakhalin was formally reviewed by the authorities in Daesung, the Manchurian Army General Command or the Army Department. Therefore it is clear that a plan for the occupation of Sakhalin did not exist during the early days of the Russo-Japanese War. Such a plan was repeatedly requested by Daesung Deputy Chief of Staff Sun-young, Nagaka. In the end, through Nagoya’s persistent efforts at persuasion, a draft plan to occupy Sakhalin came to the surface, but it was not easy to put it into practice amid the uncooperative atmosphere. After all, Japan’s victory was confirmed after the destruction of Russia s Baltic Fleet and the invasion of Sakhalin was pushed forward. Even in wartime, operations unrelated to the goals of the war could hardly be carried out without the impetus provided by urgent political and diplomatic necessity. In other words, the Sakhalin occupation could not be established on the basis of purely military factors. As a result, Nagaoqa’s intention to establish an operational plan was unsuccessful. He was deviating from the original authority granted to staff headquarters, which meant that it could only consider military operations in response to the government’s political demands. Such an overreach could have been acceptable because it was an exhibition of power, but Nagaoqa was already entering the political arena, advancing beyond the military s remit. The fact that his behavior, which was lacking in political judgment, did not suggest any criticism of postwar views, also heralded a departure from the military in the 1930s.

러일전쟁기 일본육군의 대러시아 작전 계획과 사할린 점령 문제

조명철 ( Cho Myung-chul ) 고려대학교 글로벌일본연구원 2019 일본연구 Vol.31 No.0

의화단 사건 이후 러시아군이 만주의 요지를 점거하자 일본의 참모본부는 대러시아 작전 계획을 수립하기 시작했다. 당시 대러시아 작전계획에는 연해주 방면 작전은 삽입되어 있었지만 사할린 점령 작전은 전혀 포함되어 있지 않았다. 영일동맹 이후 러일간의 위기가 고조되던 시기에도 대러시아 작전계획은 더욱 구체화되어 갔지만 사할린 작전은 언급되지 않았고 오히려 한반도에 대한 작전 비중은 높아져갔다. 전쟁 초기에 일본군의 작전계획이 모두 수립될 때까지도 사할린 점령작전은 대본영, 만주군총사령부, 육군성 어디에서도 정식으로 검토되지 않았다. 사할린 점령 작전계획은 러일전쟁 초기까지 전혀 존재하지 않았다는 사실을 확정지을 수 있다. 사할린 점령작전은 나가오카 대본영 참모차장의 개인적 차원에서 반복적으로 주장되고 요청되었다. 결국 나가오카의 집요한 설득작업으로 대본영은 사할린 점령 작전이 수면 위에 떠올랐으나 주위의 비협적인 분위기 속에서 쉽게 실행에 옮기지 못했다. 결국, 발틱함대의 괴멸 이후 일본의 승리가 확정적으로 되면서 사할린 점령작전은 추진되었다. 아무리 전시라 하더라도 전쟁의 목표와 무관한 작전은 절실한 정치적 외교적 필요성을 동반하지 않으면 성립하기 힘들다는 사실을 알 수 있다. 즉 순수한 군사적 이유만으로 성립할 수 없는 작전이 사할린 점령작전이었다. 이점에서 스스로 정치적 판단을 내리고 그것을 근거로 작전계획을 수립하고자 했던 나가오카의 의도는 성공하지 못했다. 즉 나가오카는 정부의 정략적 요구에 대응하는 군사적 작전만을 검토해야 할 참모본부 본연의 권한을 벗어나고 있었다. 이러한 돌출 행동은 전시이기 때문에 용납될 수 있었겠지만 나가오카는 이미 군의 영역을 벗어나 정치의 영역에 들어서고 있었다. 정치적 판단에 신중하지 못한 나가오카의 행동에 대해 전후 비판적인 시각이 나타나지 않았다는 사실도 1930년대 군의 일탈행위를 예고하고 있다고 하겠다. 러일전쟁에서의 승리가 나가오카의 일탈 행위에 대한 비판의식을 무디게 만들었을 가능성도 배제할 수 없겠다. After the Uihadan incident, when Russian troops occupied the main strategic area of Manchuria, Japan’s chief of staff began to devise a plan to counter Russia. At that time, military operational strategy related to the coast of Primorsky was incorporated into the plan, but no considerations related to the desired occupation of Sakhalin were included. At a time of escalating crisis in Russia after the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the plan for counteroperations against Russia became more concrete, but the Sakhalin operation was not discussed, and instead the proportion of planned operations on the Korean peninsula increased. Even by the time the Japanese military’s operational plans had been established in the early days of the war, no operational plan to occupy Sakhalin was formally reviewed by the authorities in Daesung, the Manchurian Army General Command or the Army Department. Therefore it is clear that a plan for the occupation of Sakhalin did not exist during the early days of the Russo-Japanese War. Such a plan was repeatedly requested by Daesung Deputy Chief of Staff Sun-young, Nagaka. In the end, through Nagoya’s persistent efforts at persuasion, a draft plan to occupy Sakhalin came to the surface, but it was not easy to put it into practice amid the uncooperative atmosphere. After all, Japan’s victory was confirmed after the destruction of Russia's Baltic Fleet and the invasion of Sakhalin was pushed forward. Even in wartime, operations unrelated to the goals of the war could hardly be carried out without the impetus provided by urgent political and diplomatic necessity. In other words, the Sakhalin occupation could not be established on the basis of purely military factors. As a result, Nagaoqa’s intention to establish an operational plan was unsuccessful. He was deviating from the original authority granted to staff headquarters, which meant that it could only consider military operations in response to the government’s political demands. Such an overreach could have been acceptable because it was an exhibition of power, but Nagaoqa was already entering the political arena, advancing beyond the military's remit. The fact that his behavior, which was lacking in political judgment, did not suggest any criticism of postwar views, also heralded a departure from the military in the 1930s.

일본의 대외전쟁과 대본영의 운영실태 - 청일, 러일전쟁을 중심으로 -

趙明哲(Cho, Myung Chul) 동양사학회 2019 東洋史學硏究 Vol.147 No.-

The script was created during the creation of the Navy’s military command, the Navy’s military command. Through this, the Army wanted to take the initiative in wartime. In other words, the script was the product of a conflict between the army and the navy over the military’s desire to create an independent agency that could not reach interference from the government and politicians under the pretext of the emperor’s control. Although the organization was purely for the military, the first of its kind was the one in which a civilian politician representing the government took part, which did not carry out its original intention. However, the first scriptwriter played a very successful role, including the cooperation of the military, the cooperation of the Army and Navy, and the connection with the military. Most of all, it is noteworthy that civilian control has been compromised in the war map. In this process, it is very meaningful that the “coordination of political strategy” has won the consensus of the government and the military as a great principle in conducting the war. After the Sino-Japanese War, the Army wanted to create an army-oriented system in peacetime, but was frustrated when it faced strong opposition from the Navy. The Navy took a step further, saying, “The wartime headquarters ordinance should be revised because it is on a par with the Army, Navy and Army.” The Army, which could no longer pressure the Navy to revise its wartime headquarters ordinance with the Bolmo War, accepted the Navy’s demand just before the opening of the war with Russia and created a war zone ordinance in which the Army and Navy were equal. This earned the Navy equal status with the Army in peacetime and wartime, but there was no institutional mechanism for reaching an agreement between the Army and Navy in the script. Fortunately, by the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the systemic flaws of Scrippyong had been resolved relatively smoothly by experienced and experienced human resources.

1894년 전라도 군용전신선 가설 계획과 일본 해군의 동학농민군 진압

박진홍(Park, Jin-Hong) 고려사학회 2019 한국사학보 Vol.- No.76

1894년 8월 수립된 전라도 군용전신선 가설계획은 일본군 대본영이 육군과 해군의 통제를 위해 육군의 군용전신선과 해군의 ‘근거지’를 연결하고자 한 것이다. 청일전쟁 당시 전라도는 일본 해군에게 서해 제해권 확보를 위해 중요한 지역이었다. 일본 육군의 군용전신선과 일본 해군의 ‘근거지’는 모두 조선 정부의 허가 없이 해당지역에 강압적으로 설치되었다는 공통점이 있었다. 일본 해군은 남해안과 서해안의 경비 뿐만 아니라 육전대를 파견하여 이 지역에서 활동하는 동학농민군을 직접 진압하기도 하였다. 1894년 12월 순천과 좌수영의 동학농민군 진압은 일본 해군 역시 조선군을 지원하여 동학농민군 진압의 한 부분을 담당하고 있음을 확인할 수 있는 사례였다. The Jeolla-do Military Line Construction Plan was established in August 1894. This is what the Imperial General Headquarters wants to link the Japanese army"s military telegraph lines with the Japanese navy"s "base" for control of the army and navy. During the Sino-Japanese War, Jeolla-do was an important area for Japanese Navy to secure naval supremacy of the Yellow Sea. Both the Japanese Army"s military telegraph lines and the Japanese Navy"s "base" were all coercively constructed in the area without the permission of the Korean government. The Japanese navy not only guards the south coast and the west coast of Korea, he also dispatched Japanese Navy Land Forces to suppress the Donghak peasant army in the area. In December 1894, the Japanese Navy"s suppression of the Donghak Peasants" Army in Suncheon and the Jeolla-jwasuyeong was an example of the fact that the Japanese Navy also supported the Chosun Army, which was part of the suppression of the Donghak Peasants" Army.

1945년 한반도에서 일본군의 '본토결전' 준비 : 편제와 병사노무동원을 중심으로 The Organization, and the soldiers enlisted as Laborers

신주백 한국역사연구회 2003 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.49

The Japanese troops that were stationed at the Korean peninsula were generally referred to as the 'Korean Contingent', but the contingent's formal designation was changed to 'The Headquarters for the Korean Detachment' in February 1945. The Detachment was also named in charge of the 17th Areal Forces, along with responsibilities for munitions and battle readiness as well. The 17th Areal Forces received reinforcement from China and Japan, indicating that the Japanese' main concentration in this time period was actually upon counteracting the expected attacks of the American forces rather than the Soviet forces. This kind of strategic change was the only mission change for the Japanese troops in this region since they had been established here in 1905. The Japanese forces were facing two major problems as they were preparing for a grand assault upon the Korean peninsula. One was the issue of chain of command between the Gwandong area forces and the 17th Areal Forces. Neither one was a subordinate to the other, but the issue was raised by the Gwandong forces which had to prepare for operations against the Soviet forces in the Northern area of the peninsula. Eventually the Chosun Governor-General and the Commander in chief of the 17th Areal forces layed out a ruling against the Gwangdog forces' position, and also the Emperor was against the idea syggested by the Gwangdong forces. This controversy was a demonstration of the internal situation of Japanese troops, and was also an example of a colony in a particularly fluctuating situation forcing the main land authorities to act accordingly. The other problem was to prepare munition and food supply for the conscripted over 4 hundred thousand Chosun men, but most of these men ever-weakened inner control of the Japanese imperialism at the time. The fact that the major conscription going on at the time was to secure workforce(which would be positioned at oversea areas) should be noted, and inner stages of this period should be suggested on that basis.

한말 일제의 진해만 요새 건설과 식민도시 개발의 변형

김경남 부산광역시사편찬위원회 2012 항도부산 Vol.28 No.-

本稿は20世紀初頭、列强による東アジアでの覇權爭いの中、日本が鎭海灣の要塞地帶を築いていく過程で、その中心であった馬山と釜山が軍事要塞都市として、開發の性格が變化していく樣子を論じる。特に、日露戰爭が勃發していく以前、階鎭海灣要塞地帶の核心をなす馬山、釜山で土地潛買という手法を利用して軍事要塞基地を建設していく過程が、日本帝國政府內のどのような論議 決濟構造で進められたのかを明らかにするのが本稿の目的である. 主に日本の大本營參謀本部、陸軍省、海軍省、外務省が作成した當時の公文書などを分析した結果は、以下の通りである。1880年から1904年にかけて進められた釜山浦と馬山浦の土地潛買は、日本帝國政府がロシアから韓國という利益線を守るため、死活を賭けて進めた戰略的方策であった. 主務機關は日本大本營 參謀本部と陸軍省であり、鎭海灣一帶、すなわち釜山の絶影鳥、富民洞、草梁、「馬山浦事件」で知られる栗九味だけでなく、滋福裏、月影裏、新月裏、阮月裏、正山裏、西城裏など、廣大な土地を潛買した。この時、日本人の迫間房太郞や(韓國の農商工部大臣であった閔泳綺と商議して、韓國人の名義で潛買は進められた。イ ヨンギュンの從者吳氏の名義) など このような日本の韓國での土地潛買行爲は國際法違反である. こうして買い占めた土地をもとに、日本大本營は、1904年2月、連合艦隊の根居地として使うため、兵士を辨論して、武器を一般貨物として送って、馬山を占領した。海軍の要請によって陸軍は1904年8月、巨濟島の外洋浦に鎭海灣要塞の建設を始める。この基地は大韓海峽東側でバルチック艦隊を擊退する際に大きく貢獻した。しかし、この時、日本帝國陸海軍が韓國の鎭海灣基地に上陸したのは國際法違反の無警告の軍事的侵略である。1905年8月には、正式に鎭海灣要塞司令部が設置される. 日本の內閣は、鎭海灣要塞地帶にいる兵士に軍用食糧を提供するため、日本人の補助移住漁村と軍用の缶詰工場を建設した。また鎭海灣要塞地帶の核心都市である馬山と 海、釜山を結ぶ軍用鐵道、道路などのインフラを設置し、陸上 海底ケ一ブルなどの通信網を整備した. よって、1900年の鎭海灣一帶の土地暗買政策は、ロシアの汽船會社と日本の商人の土地をめぐる爭いではなく、日本帝國がロシア勢力の南下を抑えるために國家の死活を賭けて國際法を違反しながら進めた軍事戰略的なものであった。以後、鎭海灣要塞地帶が設置されていく中で日本の假想敵國が變化するにしたがって馬山から釜山に要塞の中心が移動し、土地改良、鐵道、道路、通信網など都市インフラ開發も軍事政策に合わせて變化するのである.

러일전쟁과 영토확장 : 사할린 점령작전의 재검토 조명철

조명철(Cho, Myung-Chul) 일본사학회 2021 일본역사연구 Vol.56 No.-

봉천회전 후, 러일 양국의 전력이 소진됨으로써 일본 육군은 더 이상 추격전을 벌일 수 없었고 러시아군도 대규모 반격을 시도할 수 없었다. 이런 이유로 봉천회전의 승리에도 불구하고 전쟁은 종료되지 않았다. 봉천회전 이후 일본 육군은 새로운 작전을 기획했다. 보통 ‘제2기 작전계획’으로 불리는 이 작전계획은 러시아군의 주력을 섬멸시 킴으로써 전쟁을 끝내겠다는 초기의 작전계획과는 전혀 다른 것이었다. 그것은 전쟁의 승패와는 무관한 특정 지역을 영구히 점령하기 위한 작전계획이었다. 먼저 ‘제2기 작전계획’에서 작전의 방향이 갑작스럽게 변경된 과정과 이유를 면밀히 살펴보았다. 다음으로 ‘제2기 작전계획’에서 언급된 점령 대상 중에서 군사적 점령에 성공한 곳은 사할린이 유일했다. 결과적으로 사할린은 ‘제2기 작전계획’의 목적이 가장 충실하게 실현된 지역이었다. 지금까지 사할린 점령작전은 전투의 규모나 치열함, 전략적 중요성 등에 비추어 러일전쟁 연구에 있어서 크게 주목받지 못했지만 전쟁을 통해 자국의 영토를 확장하고자 일본의 욕구가 완전하게 실현되었다는 점에서 새로운 접근이 필요하다. After the Battle of Mukden, the Japanese Army could no longer pursue and the Russian army could not attempt a large-scale counterattack as the power of the two countries was exhausted. For this reason, the war did not end despite the great victory of the Battle of Mukden. After the battle, the Japanese Army planned a new operation. This, commonly referred to as the Second Operation Plan, was a completely different plan from the earlier one to end the war by destroying the Russian military s main power. It was a plan to permanently occupy a specific area unrelated to the victory or defeat of the war. First, the process and reason for the sudden change in the purpose and direction of the operation in the Plan were closely examined. Next, Sakhalin was the only region that actually succeeded in military occupation among the objects of occupation mentioned in the Plan. As a result, Sakhalin was the region where the purpose of the Plan was most faithfully realized. So far, the Sakhalin occupation operation has not received much attention in the study of the Russo-Japanese War in light of the size, fierceness, and distance from Manchuria. But it needs to be reviewed anew in that Japan’s desire to expand its territory through the war has been fully realized.