금융기관 임원의 과도한 보수규제 및 투명성 제고 방안에 관한 연구

맹수석 전남대학교 법학연구소 2014 법학논총 Vol.34 No.1

2008년 글로벌 금융위기 이후 금융기관 임원에 대한 과도한 보수지급 등의 도덕적해이가 금융위기를 초래한 원인의 하나로 지목되면서, 각국은 금융기관 임원의 보수지급에 대한 규제를 가하고 있다. 특히 미국은 2010년 Dodd-Frank Act를 제정하여 금융기관 임원에 대한 보수를 강력히 규제하고 있다. 이 연구에서는 최근 각국의 금융기관 임원에 대한 보수규제 내용을 비교·분석하고, 이를 통해 우리나라 금융기관 임원의 보수체계에 관한 시사점을 도출해 보았다. 특히 회사법은 물론, 은행법과 자본시장법, 금융회사지배구조법(안) 등 금융규제법상 임원보수에 관한 법적 문제점을 살펴보고, 과도한보수지급에 대한 규제방안을 제시하였다. 그동안 우리나라도 금융위기 이후 금융기관 임원의 보수에 관한 규제를 강화하기 위한 입법적 노력을 해왔다. 즉 2010년 개정된 은행법은 은행에 대해 「지배구조내부규범」을 제정하도록 하면서, 그 지배구조내부규범에 ‘임원에 대한 성과평가 및 보수지급 방법에 관한 사항’ 등이 포함되도록 하였다. 그리고 2011년 금융감독원은 「성과보상체계모범규준」을 작성하여 운영하였고, 2013년 개정된 자본시장법은 사업보고서 제출대상법인의 사업보고서에 5억원 이상의 보수를 받는 임원의 개인별 보수와 그 구체적인 산정기준 및 방법을 기재하도록 하였다. 그러나 은행법 및 자본시장법은 임원보수에 관한 기준을 준수하지 않은 경우에 대한규제 규정이 미흡했다. 특히 위반시 감독기관에 의한 제재가 거의 이루어지지 않았다. 따라서 금융감독법제에 임원보수에 관한 사항을 준수하지 않은 경우에 대한 규제를 엄격하게 강화할 필요가 있다. 그리고 과거 금융기관의 부실에 대해 막대한 공적자금을투입하는 등 국가적 대응의 측면과 금융기관의 공공성에 비추어볼 때, 현재 제정을 추진하고 있는 금융회사지배구조법(안)에 부수위원회 설치에 대한 예외 조항을 삭제하고,금융기관 임원의 과도한 보수를 환수할 수 있는 규정을 두어야 한다. 아울러 ‘보수지급에 대한 연차보고서’의 기재사항으로 금융기관 임원의 개별보수액 및 보수책정의 구체적인 기준·절차도 포함시켜야 할 것이다. As moral hazard such as the excessive compensation of officers of financialinstitutions since the global financial crisis occurred in 2008 was pointed as oneof the causes of the financial crisis, countries have been adding to control oncompensation of officers of financial institutions around the world. Especially,the USA legislated Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 to have a strong control on thecompensation of officers of its financial institutions. This study made analysesof the control on the compensation of officers of financial institutions of countriesin comparison and produced suggestions on the compensation system of officersof Korean financial institutions. Especially, this study looked into legal problemswith not only the Corporation Law but the financial regulation laws such as thebanking law and the capital market law and presented methods to controlexcessive compensation. Meantime, Korea too has been making a legislative effort to strengthen thecontrol on the compensation of officers of financial institutions since the financialcrisis. Namely, the Banking Law revised in 2010 stipulated that banks legislate"Governance Structure Internal Norms and include 'Achievement Evaluation andcompensation Payment Method of officers" in the governance structure internalnorms. And the Capital market Law which was revised in 2013 stipulates thatthe individual compensation of the officers which is 500 million Won or morebe included in the business report of the concerned corporations with the specificcalculation criteria and method thereof. However, the Banking Law and the Capital Market Law have no stipulationof control on when the criteria for the officers is not complied with. Therefore,there needs to stipulate a method of control in these laws by imposing finesagainst a violation of public notice duty if information of the compensation ofofficers is not provided. In addition, in the light of the public nature of financialinstitutions concerning enormous public fund investments which were made dueto failures of financial institutions, “Financial Institution Governance Structure Law(draft)”, which is being promoted, should have a stipulation for claw-backs fromexcessive compensation of officers of financial institutions. Additionally, “The Annual Report of Compensation Payments” should include the specific criteriaand procedure for the individual compensation and compensation policy forofficers of financial institutions.

임원의 보수

이영종,최준선 기업소송연구회 2012 기업소송연구 Vol.10 No.-

주식회사 이사의 보수는 규제되어야 하는가?

최준선(Choi, June-Sun) 성균관대학교 법학연구소 2010 성균관법학 Vol.22 No.3

Regulating executive compensation is currently became hot issue in the wake of economic depression of recent few years. Expensive executive-compensation packages, particularly at companies that have performed very poorly were blamed widely. In 2008 the US House had passed a bill addressing shareholder votes on executive compensation, called "Say on Pay", which gives a company’s shareholders a typically non-binding (i.e., advisory) vote on the company’s compensation practices. In the Senate, bills were introduced allowing shareholders to vote on severance agreements and CEO pay. Under the current provision of Korean Commercial Code, director compensation must be approved by shareholders in annual shareholder meeting. Therefore Korea need not to introduce "Say on Pay" vote system. However, Regulating executive compensation is a critical but complex task. Although all measures on executive compensation were taken by SEC and other institutions over the last few decades, CEO compensation increased without cease. Regulating executive compensation by increasing disclosure requirements can be an alternative measure. So, the SEC attempted reform in 2006, amending its executive compensation rules to expand the list of executives who must disclose and requiring issuers to outline all components of compensation in a Summary Compensation Table. I think the disclosure regulations adopted by the SEC are a step in the right direction. In Korea, however, the gap of compensation between executives and general employees is not so steep as that of U.S.A. I think the disclosure requirement by financial authority is enough measure for Korean enterprises, although Executive compensation in Korea does not require detailed disclosure regarding each directors or executive officers.

자본주의의 변천과 주식회사 이사의 보수

최준선 한국상사법학회 2010 商事法硏究 Vol.29 No.3

Executive compensation has been much discussed in academic circle in Korea and the fights over executives' pay is now undergoing. However,nobody has raised the fundamental questions, the reason why to limit executive compensation, how could the executive compensation of the modern corporation be controlled and who would decide the reasonable compensation? This article overlooked the relations between changes in capitalism and the executive compensation. The capitalism has changed from “owner capitalism” to “managerial capitalism”, and then to “shareholder capitalism” and to “stakeholder capitalism”, and at last to “customer capitalism” in recent years. This article not only draws a contrast between the wide-ranging battles of the 1930s and today's more narrow debates on the executive compensation, but also discusses the current situation in Korea. Most important measures to curb pay are providing in relevant Act new requirements for pay disclosure. In the United States 5 highest compensations including CEO and CFO are subject to disclosure. Still other measures, referred to as “say on pay,” would require that shareholders be permitted to offer at least an advisory opinion on the propriety of compensation packages offered to company management. While these opinions would not be binding, compensation committees could ignore them at their peril. This writer concludes that executive compensation is not an urgent issue to manage in Korea, because executives in Korea usually compensated not so much in compare to executive compensations in other countries. Differences in compensation between executives and employees in Korea also are not so sharp (executive average compensation is 7.5 times higher than that of employee) as that of other countries (475 times higher in United States).