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The Countervailing Power Defense for Cartels Under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
( Yong Lim ) 서울대학교 아시아태평양법연구소 2021 Journal of Korean Law Vol.20 No.2
Despite being often raised by respondents being investigated by competition authorities, the countervailing power defense for collusive behavior under the Monopoly Regulation & Fair Trade Act has received relatively little attention so far. Two strands of thought continue to this day, one being that such collusion would increase market concentration by introducing newly minted market power into the market by virtue of the cartel. Another stand of thought is that all or part of the benefits garnered through the countervailing power created by the cartel will be passed on to consumers, thereby increasing their welfare. A closer look at the theory shows that indeed as the market moves from a monopoly to a bilateral monopoly (where the input seller and buyer are a monopoly and monopsony, respectively), consumers may be better off than before as output increases to more optimal levels. There are, however, important caveats to this observation, as various factors may weaken or even reverse the welfare gains mentioned above. Examples include a breakdown in negotiations between the monopolist and monopsonist, and an increase in market power or collusion on the part of the cartelists in the downstream market or other markets where they are present. Indeed, the theory of the second best teaches us that the welfare effects of both inserting and removing the countervailing cartel will be indeterminate, making it difficult for authorities to properly judge the legality of such cartels. Some have argued that a countervailing power defense should be allowed, albeit restrictively and only under certain conditions such as the lack of market power in the downstream market. However, the likelihood of high administrative costs, and concerns of underdeterrence gives one pause in allowing such a defense even in its restricted form from a policy perspective. In any event, even if one were to allow for such a defense, the cartelist(s) should have the burden of proof of showing that their behavior had actually increased consumer welfare. Proving such, however, will likely be a daunting task.
( Yong Lim ) 대한임상검사과학회 2014 대한임상검사과학회지(KJCLS) Vol.46 No.2
Green tea and tea polyphenols have been studied extensively as cancer chemopreventive agents in recent years. Epigallocatechin-3-gallate (EGCG) is widely recognized as a powerful antioxidant and a free radical scavenger. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the protective effects of green tea catechins (GTC) on the Bleomycin- and Cyclophosphamide-induced cytotoxicity. Cell viability was measured by MTT assay. In the protective effect of GTC, the cell viability was significantly increased by the treatment of GTC. Furthermore, GTC showed the higher protective effect than EGCG and vitamin E. These results suggest that GTC has the protective effect which is related to the prevention of cancer. Our studies show that the continuous presence of EGCG can reduce radical-induced DNA damage in Chinese hamster lung fibroblast cells (CHL cells).
What`s Wrong with Competition Law Remedies for Single-Firm Conduct in Innovative Industries?
( Yong Lim ) 고려대학교 법학연구원 2015 The Asian Business Lawyer Vol.15 No.-
It is said that we are deficient of a reliable and robust remedial mechanism when it comes to single-firm conduct in innovative industries. This article attempts to identify certain critical problems that are often the cause of such disappointment, and provide some suggestions for improvement. The first problem is a tendency to aim for a quick fix. Instead, the duration of the remedy must be sufficient enough to allow both the company and the market to perceive the need and opportunity for change. A second problem is the cloud of uncertainty about what the remedy ultimately intends to achieve in terms of restoring competition. There needs to be a more rigorous attempt to identify, and articulate for all parties, the underlying vision of the market and its workings which supports the process to be reinstated, because every competitive process is market specific. The third problem is the tendency to craft remedies based on competitive conditions of the past. Competitive opportunities that are being reinstated through the remedy should be meaningful not in terms of the past, but for the future, and should ideally remain so during the period of the remedy.