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      • Value of Cash Holdings: the Impact of Cash from Operating, Investment and Financing Activities

        Yenn-Ru Chen,C.S. Agnes Cheng,Yu-Lin Huang 한국재무학회 2011 한국재무학회 학술대회 Vol.2011 No.09

        The literature shows that increases in cash holdings can increase firm value but the marginal value of cash decreases with the level of cash holdings. Increases in cash holdings may come from operation, investment, and financing activities and their implications to the value of cash holdings shall differ. This study examines the effects of cash sources on the value of cash holdings. Consistent with both of the trade-off motives and the agency theory of cash holdings, our results show that the decreased marginal value of cash holdings is significantly lowered when the additional cash comes from operating activities (CFO), indicating lower incentive to accumulate cash and potential higher agency problem concern from accumulating cash internally in profitable firms. On the contrary, the marginal value decrease is significantly mitigated when the additional cash comes from the investment activities (CFI) or financing activities (CFF), and the positive impact of CFF mainly comes from the equity-based financing, suggesting positive signal of managers’ confidence on future growth. In addition, investors value the cash higher if firms also payout cash dividend, except in low-levered firms. Overall, the agency explanation to the value of cash holdings is more pronounced in firms with higher capability of generating cash internally. For firms with better access to external financing for cash holdings, the value of cash holdings is highly determined by the economical rationales of holding large cash.

      • KCI등재

        Market Reactions to the Split-share Structure Reform and the Determinants of Compensation: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

        Li Cheng,Jeng-Ren Chiou,Yenn-Ru Chen,LEEBONGSOO 한국증권학회 2012 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.41 No.2

        The split-share structure is a unique characteristic of corporate ownership in China, and is often linked to poor firm performance and inefficient corporate governance. In this paper, we investigate market reactions around several important event days during the process of the split-share structure reform (share reform) in Chinese listed firms. The market reacts differently to different events during the process. First, the market reacts positively to firms’ intention of implementing the share reform when the reform prospectus is disclosed and when the compensation is actually paid. Second, after the reform is actually implemented, the market reacts negatively when the expiration date of the lockup agreement is announced, because the restricted trading shares can be freely traded and thus share supply increases after the expiration date. In addition, the compensation paid to tradable shareholders by non-tradable shareholders is determined by the stock liquidity before the reform, the proportion of restricted trading shares, and the type of ultimate shareholders. We further find that the payment of compensation, the proportion of restricted shares after the share reform, and a time gap between suspension and resumption days are the main factors affecting the market reaction.

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