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Power Relationships and the Political Economy of Global Imbalances
THOMAS D. WILLETT,ERIC M.P. CHIU 연세대학교 동서문제연구원 2012 Global economic review Vol.41 No.4
Large global economic and financial imbalances have already contributed to the global financial crisis and the euro zone crisis. A substantial retreat into protectionism may be generated. Huge current account surpluses and deficits have caused economic and financial dislocations in both emerging and advanced economies. In this paper, we argue that such global problem is a result of domestic political pressures that generate strong incentives for governments to postpone needed policy adjustments and the inability of international power relationships to force such adjustments prior to the outbreak of crises. Our analysis leads to the pessimistic conclusion that the pressures from both the public and private sector to bring about substantial policy adjustments before a crisis breaks out are quite weak. In the case of U.S.-China economic imbalances, we find that although China does not have a major policy objective to maintain large current account surpluses as would be implied by the frequent charges that China is practicing mercantilism, political polarization in the USA might make it almost impossible to secure agreement on effective actions. In the case of euro crisis, nor are we optimistic that euro zone will undertake any time soon the types of forceful policy actions necessary to bring the euro crisis under control.
News and the Behavior of the Korean Stock Market during the Global Financial Crisis
Yoonmin Kim,Thomas D. Willett 한국경제연구학회 2014 Korea and the World Economy Vol.15 No.3
Employing a newly constructed data set of good and bad news, we investigated behavioral and efficient market hypotheses on Korean stock market responses to good and bad news during the global financial crisis. Standard efficient market tests passed and several interesting behavioral aspects of market behavior emerged. Optimism and confirmation biases pay less attention to bad news during rising periods; KOSPI investors reacted more strongly to bad news in both rising and falling markets, and unexpected news in negative and positive momentum except for bad hard policy news. Efficient market and behavioral finance hypotheses can be useful explaining market behavior.
김아미,정현선,Rebekah Willett,임주,윤미,김광희 경인교육대학교 교육연구원 2022 교육논총 Vol.42 No.3
This article reports on a study investigating the experiences of family media practices during the pandemic. The article is based on questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with 39 parents in South Korea and the United States who have children aged between 4 and 11. The article employs a framework developed by Livingstone and Blum-Ross to consider different “genres for ‘digital parenting’” (2020: 11). The article argues that although children’s screen time increased dramatically, parents continued to mediate it and make deliberate decisions about children’s media use. In particular, the analysis reveals parents’ decisions about different purposes for children’s media use, embracing many purposes they had previously resisted. These findings indicate that parents are making more nuanced decisions than previously employed when they followed indiscriminate screen time rules.
Currency Market Reactions to Good and Bad News During the Asian Crisis
Gab-Je Jo,Thomas D. Willett 서울대학교 경제연구소 2000 Seoul journal of economics Vol.13 No.4
There is considerable disagreement among analysts about the extent to which the spread of the Asian crisis was based on reasonable changes in expectations about fundamentals versus pure contagion effects resulting from imperfections in the behavior of currency and financial markets. In this paper we focus specifically on the behavior of the foreign exchange market for five Asian countries. We find little support for the hypothesis that the Asian currency crisis was dominated by panic in the markets such that investors and speculators reacted much more strongly to bad than to good news. While the strongest reactions were to home news, there were also a number of significant cross effects. Almost all of these were of the same sign, suggesting that investors typically assumed that what was good for one country was good for all. Again, there was no systematic evidence of stronger reactions to bad than to good news. The markets may have overreacted in general. pushing currencies below the levels justified by the fundamentals, but, if so, this did not undercut the markets ability to respond to good as well as bad news, nor do these responses appear to have been systematically smaller to good than to bad news. The symptoms of the blind panic that has so often been alleged do not appear in the data.