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      • KCI등재후보
      • MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AND BLIGHTED PROMISE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR DPRK TOURISM

        Tim Beal 통일연구원 2001 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.10 No.2

        For many countries international tourism has been a significant driver of economic growth, particularly over the last half century. International inbound tourism to the ROK is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating mainly from the Seoul Olympics, but by 2000 it was, according to World Tourism Organization (WTO) data, the 7th largest market in East Asia, outstripping Japan. Although tourism to the DPRK has captured attention recently, with the Hyundai Asan Kumgangsan venture, it is at a far lower level than ROK tourism. Because of the DPRK’s particular international situation, inbound tourism has never been a feasible option until recently, although the country did join the WTO in 1987. Many countries, particularly ROK and the United States, expressly prohibited their citizens from visiting the DPRK and those countries which were friendly, such as the then Soviet Union or China, did not generate outbound tourism. Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy,’ and the personal commitment of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung, were the catalysts that produced Kumgangsan tourism. However, the number of customers in the early months of 2001 was at half the level of a year earlier, and Hyundai Asan is currently losing 2.5 billion won a month. At this stage, it is uncertain whether the Kumgangsan venture marks the beginning of a take-off for DPRK international tourism, or the end of a brief episode. World, particularly East Asian experience, shows that tourism can produce significant economic benefits. However, it comes at a cost in social, cultural, environmental and political terms. It clearly requires a benign political environment that encompasses the host country and the main source countries. On a practical level it requires certain infrastuctural, transportation and personnel resources, which often need foreign investment and expertise. From a marketing perspective, customer, and travel industry, perceptions of attractiveness, value for money and risk are crucial, and this must be set within the context of competing destinations. This paper surveys the experience of the Republic of Korea in developing international inbound tourism and presents statistics at global, regional and country level, including some countries of particular relevance such as Spain, China, Vietnam and Cuba. It describes current developments in DPRK tourism and attempts to identify the potential for development and the constraints that impede it. In particular, whilst there are formidable infrastructural problems the key constraint is a political one. Pyongyang has not yet moved far enough away from the old, self-defeating approach to tourism which focused on visitors which would eulogize the leadership. It needs to make a firm policy decision that it wants to attract manageable numbers of international tourists, and then analyze rationally how it might achieve that. It is argued that implementation of the June agreement on Kumgangsan - specifically the opening of the land routes and the designation as a special zone - will be an indicator of that decision. The paper was written mid-August 2001 for the conference Korean Studies at the Dawn of the New Millennium held by the Korean Studies Association of Australasia, 24- 25 September at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. The paper has been revised and amended since then in the light of subsequent events, especially 11 September and the current impasse over Kumgangsan and N-S relations generally. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments. For many countries international tourism has been a significant driver of economic growth, particularly over the last half century. International inbound tourism to the ROK is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating mainly from the Seoul Olympics, but by 2000 it was, according to World Tourism Organization (WTO) data, the 7th largest market in East Asia, outstripping Japan. Although tourism to the DPRK has captured attention recently, with the Hyundai Asan Kumgangsan venture, it is at a far lower level than ROK tourism. Because of the DPRK’s particular international situation, inbound tourism has never been a feasible option until recently, although the country did join the WTO in 1987. Many countries, particularly ROK and the United States, expressly prohibited their citizens from visiting the DPRK and those countries which were friendly, such as the then Soviet Union or China, did not generate outbound tourism. Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy,’ and the personal commitment of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung, were the catalysts that produced Kumgangsan tourism. However, the number of customers in the early months of 2001 was at half the level of a year earlier, and Hyundai Asan is currently losing 2.5 billion won a month. At this stage, it is uncertain whether the Kumgangsan venture marks the beginning of a take-off for DPRK international tourism, or the end of a brief episode. World, particularly East Asian experience, shows that tourism can produce significant economic benefits. However, it comes at a cost in social, cultural, environmental and political terms. It clearly requires a benign political environment that encompasses the host country and the main source countries. On a practical level it requires certain infrastuctural, transportation and personnel resources, which often need foreign investment and expertise. From a marketing perspective, customer, and travel industry, perceptions of attractiveness, value for money and risk are crucial, and this must be set within the context of competing destinations. This paper surveys the experience of the Republic of Korea in developing international inbound tourism and presents statistics at global, regional and country level, including some countries of particular relevance such as Spain, China, Vietnam and Cuba. It describes current developments in DPRK tourism and attempts to identify the potential for development and the constraints that impede it. In particular, whilst there are formidable infrastructural problems the key constraint is a political one. Pyongyang has not yet moved far enough away from the old, self-defeating approach to tourism which focused on visitors which would eulogize the leadership. It needs to make a firm policy decision that it wants to attract manageable numbers of international tourists, and then analyze rationally how it might achieve that. It is argued that implementation of the June agreement on Kumgangsan - specifically the opening of the land routes and the designation as a special zone - will be an indicator of that decision. The paper was written mid-August 2001 for the conference Korean Studies at the Dawn of the New Millennium held by the Korean Studies Association of Australasia, 24- 25 September at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. The paper has been revised and amended since then in the light of subsequent events, especially 11 September and the current impasse over Kumgangsan and N-S relations generally. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments.

      • KCI등재후보

        INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE TWO KOREAS : CONTRASTS, COMMONALITIES,CHALLENGES

        Beal, Tim 연세대학교 동서문제연구원 2001 Global economic review Vol.30 No.4

        The contrast between the two Koreas in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is stark. The South is a world leader in ICT and South Koreans are addicted to the Internet. The Internet scarcely exists in the North and few have access to it. Nevertheless, despite internal and external constraints, the North has many of the attributes, and the aspirations, of developed countries and ICT is a priority area. The North has carved out a niche in computer animation and is pushing to develop software exports. Will it be able to overcome current difficulties and dangers and join the digital revolution?

      • 한국 사드 배치 문제와 미국의 세계 패권 경쟁

        팀빌 ( Tim Beal ) 한국정치평론학회 2016 정치와 평론 Vol.19 No.-

        The deployment of an initial THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) battery in South Korea is part of a wider missile defense strategy which is primarily aimed at the main challengers to US hegemony, China and Russia. The THAAD unit has two principal components - the interceptors themselves and the AN/TPY-2 radar which provides initial identification of the target missile. The literature suggests that the interceptors themselves will be largely ineffective in the context of the Korean peninsula, but the location of the radar offers forward surveillance of launch sites in China and Russia. The surprise election of Donald Trump and the unexpected implosion of the Park Geun-hye administration brings an element of uncertainty to the deployment. However, barring the election of a forceful and determined progressive candidate with a large mandate to succeed Park Geun-hye it seems likely that the initial deployment will go ahead, with more to follow. Missile defense is too important to US global hegemony to be deflected by anything other than a major upheaval.

      • 패권과 저항, 강제와 억지 : 북한 ‘위협’ 해체와 미국의 전략적 대안 확인

        팀 빌 ( Tim Beal ) 한국정치평론학회 2017 정치와 평론 Vol.21 No.-

        We are constantly bombarded with articles in the media and statements by officials, generals, and politicians that the US is under threat from countries such as North Korea and Iran. Before that it was Iraq, and before that the Soviet Union. The propaganda trope relies for its potency - and potent it clearly is since so many believe it - on confusion, often deliberately fostered, between key strategic concepts. The problem is compounded by the fact that the instruments of aggression and defence, of compellence and deterrence, are essentially the same. Thinking clearly about the concepts, complemented of course by actually looking at the data (just how many ICBMs and aircraft carriers does North Korea or Iran have?) is essential if we are to blow away the smoke screen and chart a way to a safer future. It is essential to have a rigorous understanding of the concepts - their differences, similarities and overlaps - and place them into context. Wariness of repetitious propaganda, use of common sense and an avoidance of racist stereotypes all help. By analysing the situational dynamics of the confrontation between the US and North Korea we can identify America’s strategic alternatives. There is a constant stream of articles in the media, quoting politicians, officials, generals and assorted pundits that that the United States is under dire, existential threat from North Korea. This has been going on in various forms for decades but it surges from time to time. Sometimes these are occasioned by a North Korea test of a nuclear weapon, a missile or even the launch of a satellite Sometimes it is a product of events in the American calendar such as the massive biannual invasion exercises or by a change of administration. So we have the spring 2017 war exercises, 300,000 troops, an aircraft carrier fleet, F-22s, F-35s an expression of military power probably unequalled in world history. Operation Barbarossa, in which Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union and the Normandy D-Day landings involved more people but didn’t have the destructive capability of modern weapons systems. At the same time we have a change in administration in the United States and President Trump and Secretary Tillerson have to be constantly reminded, in case they did not already know, what danger the United States faces from this small East Asia country.

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