Mapping Out the Possible Outcomes of the Security Dilemma in International Politics

Er-Win Tan Institute for International Trade and Cooperation, 2019 Asian International Studies Review Vol.20 No.1

Whilst a significant amount of work has been undertaken in the field of security dilemma theory, there is a gap in the academic literature concerning the possible scenarios that may result from this phenomenon in international politics. To date, no known systematic attempt has been made to consider the full range of scenarios that may result from the security dilemma. Six possible scenario outcomes may be identified, these being: first, the security dilemma is transcended; second, a security-seeking state leaves itself unilaterally vulnerable to external aggression; third, the inappropriate adoption of diplomatic and military assertiveness to reaffirm deterrence instead arouses the fears of another security-seeking state, thereby leading to inadvertent escalation of a crisis into a conflict; fourth, a ‘deep security dilemma’ based on long-running mutual hostility that does not escalate into conflict; fifth, a security dilemma that escalates to the brink of conflict but is then de-escalated; and sixth, mitigation of the security dilemma between rival states. This article will explore these respective scenarios in terms of their underpinnings, as well as their implications for security and diplomacy

Russia and the Korean Peninsula: Central Rather Than Peripheral?

Er-Win Tan,Geetha Govindasamy 한국학술연구원 2021 Korea Observer Vol.52 No.1

The potential role of Russia as an intermediary in inter-Korean relations has been under-studied inasmuch as regional attempts to bring about the denuclearisation of North Korea are concerned. Although Russia had previously taken a less active role during the Six Party Talks, it is apparent President Putin has sought a Russian Pivot to Northeast Asia, with a particular interest in consolidating Russian interests on the Korean Peninsula. Russian involvement as an intermediary acceptable to both Seoul and Pyongyang may mark a possible opportunity to break the current impasse over the denuclearisation of North Korea.

Revisiting the 1983 Rangoon Bombing Covert Action in North Korea s Foreign Relations

Er-Win Tan,Brian Bridges 한국학술연구원 2019 Korea Observer Vol.50 No.1

The assassination attempt on South Korean (ROK) President Chun Doo Hwan during a state visit to Rangoon, Burma (now known as Yangon, Myanmar) in 1983 illustrates the willingness of the North Korean state to engage in state terror not only against its own citizens, but also against the ROK. The authors examine the North Korean state’s adoption of covert operations tactics and terrorist activity in an attempt to undermine the ROK, even when its actions have costs in terms of the North’s relationship with individual Southeast Asian states. In addition, using newly-released archival material from the British National Archives, the authors examine the 1983 Rangoon Bombing as a case study in North Korean covert operations abroad.

North Korea’s Rocket and Nuclear Tests, 2009: A Threatening Pyongyang or an Afraid Pyongyang?

TAN ER WIN 한국학술연구원 2009 Korea Observer Vol.40 No.3

Are the North Korean missile and nuclear tests of 2009 a threat to regional security, or are they indicative of the fears of DPRK? Although it is true that North Korea’s actions bring it closer to the development of a nuclear missile arsenal, a review of the literature on security dilemma indicates that it is possible that North Korea’s actions were driven by fear. This article examines four possible interpretations of North Korea’s intentions behind the nuclear and missile tests, and begins by examining the possibility that Pyongyang’s actions were driven by its fears of Seoul. The second alternative is that DPRK was acting to communicate its resolve against Washington. A third interpretation suggests internal politicking within Pyongyang may have been a factor behind the missile and nuclear tests. At the same time, however, it is also possible that Pyongyang intends to develop nuclear missiles.

Sino-Myanmar Relations in the Aftermath of the February 2021 Coup in Naypyidaw: Continuation and Change in China’s Myanmar Policy

Er-Win Tan,Hyun Chung Yoo 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2022 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.46 No.4

This article examines the realpolitik calculations behind China’s responses to General Min Aung Hlaing’s February 2021 coup d’etat in Myanmar. By seeking to play both sides of the unrest in Myanmar, Beijing hopes to ensure that it can count on a set of regional allies to serve China’s interests. By simultaneously strengthening friendly relations with the Tatmadaw regime and the ethnic minority communities and pro-reformist movements in the country, Beijing can maintain a façade of friendship with the junta, while concurrently strengthening Beijing’s influence over Myanmar’s internal political forces. This enables Beijing to signal that it would be unwise for the Tatmadaw to step out of line away from China’s interests.

Cyberwarfare and the Weaponization of Information in US–China 21st‐Century Geostrategic Rivalry

Er‐Win Tan,Sayankina Sofiya 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2023 Pacific Focus Vol.38 No.2

Sino–US geostrategic rivalry has carried over into cyberspace and is reflected in how both the United States and China view the internet as a battleground for the propagation of information warfare in their bids to increase global influence at the expense of the other. Both the United States and China have harnessed cyberspace in order to propagate their worldview to a global audience, whilst countering and rebutting the other's information narrative. The flow of information – including the use of cyberspace to inject misinformation, deliberately biased reporting, cover‐ups, and fabricated information – can be seen as a weapon of statecraft in pursuit of global influence and geostrategic objectives. Such ability to shape the information narrative marks a refinement of the use of propaganda, to the extent that private individuals with access to social media can be seen as propaganda tools.

‘Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The ROK’s Diminishing Room for Middle Ground’

Er-Win Tan 통일연구원 2022 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.31 No.2

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine comes amidst Russo-Chinese cooperation in carving out spheres of influence in parts of Eurasia, with Pyongyang as their regional partner. Seoul’s hopes of cultivating China and Russia as interlocutors in inter-Korean relations are not tenable for the foreseeable future, posing three challenges for the ROK’s diplomatic and security interests. First, China and Russia are likely to sow discord in the US alliance network with the ROK and Japan; second, if the US is preoccupied in assisting Ukraine, Beijing may be tempted to invade Taiwan (Seoul remaining aloof in such a scenario would strain the alliance with the US); third, the ROK’s demographic crunch is occurring when North Korea’s partnership with China and Russia may provide Pyongyang with advanced armaments that would enable it to narrow the ROK’s technological edge.

Security Hedging Strategies of U.S. Allies and Partners in the Era of Trump: The ROK, Japan and Singapore as Case Studies

Er-Win Tan,박재적,Tomohiko Satake 한국국방연구원 2020 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.32 No.2

Increasing acrimony in U.S.–China relations poses a challenge for states in the Asia–Pacific region, particularly those that have, whilst benefiting from the U.S. role in underwriting regional security, wish to avoid straining relations with China. In dealing with this challenge, the ROK, Japan and Singapore have blended “minilateralism” alongside hedging strategies. Japan’s approach has combined maintenance of its security ties to the United States, whilst simultaneously increasing security cooperation with other powers in the region. The ROK has positioned itself strategically within the U.S. alliance network in the Asia–Pacific, whilst distancing itself from full security cooperation with Japan, in order to reassure China. Singapore faces additional difficulty due to its small size, and has focused on mobilizing its “convening” power to highlight its own relevance to the interests of the international community, whilst simultaneously increasing security cooperation with the UK and Australia as alternative partners.

North Korean Political Thinking as a Reflection of Regime Survival Strategy

Er-Win Tan,유현정 통일연구원 2021 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.30 No.2

The ascension of Kim Jong-un to the leadership of North Korea signifies the emergence of a unique political entity: a Communist regime led by, what is in effect, a hereditary monarchy. With the transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il in 1994, and from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong-un in 2011, the political philosophical outlook of the North Korean state has evolved in response to the leadership's identification of the challenges to its rule of the country. This is reflected in the adoption of Juche by Kim Il Sung, of Songgum as adopted by Kim Jong Il, and of Byungjin as adopted by Kim Jong-un. This paper will examine how these respective political philosophies may be seen as a reflection of the policy priorities of the North Korean state in its efforts to retain power amidst growing isolation and pressure from the international community.

Byungjin and the Sources of Pyongyang’s Paranoia

Er-Win Tan 통일연구원 2019 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.28 No.2

While 2017 ended amid fears that the “war of words” between the American President, Donald Trump, and the North Korea Supreme Leader, Kim Jong Un, would escalate out of control, 2018 and early 2019 were marked by a series of summits between Kim Jong Un on one side and Moon Jae-in and Trump on the other. With Pyongyang’s continued ballistic missile tests and its increasingly chilly diplomatic tone towards Seoul, it is apparent that Kim Jong Un’s apparent show of diplomacy in 2018 and early 2019 were part of a wider delaying tactic arising from Pyongyang’s fear that Trump was reckless enough to start a war on the Korean Peninsula. Broadly speaking, the Byungjin doctrine serves as a more useful indicator of Kim Jong Un’s policy priorities, including his identification with a nuclear arsenal in ensuring regime survival.