피평가자의 인센티브가 성과분포에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구

최연식 ( Youn Sik Choi ),황인이 ( Iny Hwang ),송승아 ( Seung Ah Song ) 한국회계학회 2012 회계학연구 Vol.37 No.4

성과기준보상(performance-based compensation)을 다루는 실증연구에서 피평가자가 노력배분 의사결정을 하는데 중요한 영향을 미치는 목표(target)에 대한 분석이 활발히 이루어지고 있지 않다. 특히 성과평가제도에 포함된 다양한 특성이 피평가자의 노력배분 인센티브에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구는 거의 없다. 본 연구는 피평가자의 노력배분 결과를 반영하는 성과분포를 이용하여 전형적인 성과기준보상계약을 체결한 피평가자가 목표에 어떻게 반응하는지를 분석한다. 실증분석 결과, 목표를 기점으로 한 피평가자의 비대칭적 노력배분으로 인해 성과분포가 목표보다 약간 큰 수준에서 가장 높게 나타나는 단절성을 발견하였다. 평가지표를 공통지표와 고유지표로 구분할 경우, 이러한 단절적인 성과분포의 속성은 고유지표에서 강화되지만, 상대평가의 위험이 높은 공통지표에서는 사라지는 것으로 나타났다. 한편 이러한 단절적인 성과분포의 속성은 가중치로 측정한 성과보상에 미치는 영향의 정도와는 무관한 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 발견은 동기부여 목적에서 성과평가제도를 성공적으로 설계하거나 적용하는데 중요한 시사점을 제공한다. 우선 평가자는 목표를 기점으로 피평가자가 전력적인 노력배분을 한다는 점을 이해할 필요가 있다. 또한 목표를 기점으로 한 피평가자의 전략적인 노력배분으로부터 평가자가 궁극적으로 양(+)의 순효과를 이끌어 낼 수 있도록 평가전문가들은 정교한 성과보상기준을 개발할 필요가 있다. To design and implement effective performance evaluation systems, it is crucial to establish relevant performance targets (Murphy 2001). Empirical research in performance-based compensation, however, provides limited insights on the impact of target performance on the agent incentive. This study approaches how ratees respond to targets with respect to performance distributions. We find that there is a discontinuity in performance distributions on the targets: a large jump from the right below the target to the right above the target. We interpret that when performance is expected to be realized right below the target, rates encounter stronger bonus compensation. On the other hand, if rates perceive that there is very little chance to meet their target performance, they are likely to give up working hard because there would be no incremental rewards as far as the performance is below the target, We also find that this shape of performance distribution around the target prevails with unique measures but lapse with common measures. Our findings suggest that, in order to successfully implement performance-evaluation system in accordance with the motivational purpose, raters should understand how rates alter their exertion level in response to characteristics of target setting mechanism.

재벌기업의 비대칭적 원가행태에 대한 연구

신재용(Jae Yong Shin),황인이(Iny Hwang),권세원(Sewon Kwon),최세라(Sera Choi) 한국경영학회 2016 經營學硏究 Vol.45 No.6

This paper investigates whether and how the degree of SG&A cost stickiness differs between chaebol and non-chaebol firms in Korea. The unique feature among Korean firms is the prevalence of large business groups called chaebols and, the differential natures between chaebol and non-chaebol firms drive cost behavior to diverge between two groups. The ownership structure of chaebol firms is characterized by the dominance of single largest shareholder and his family members who typically participate in the management of the firm directly or indirectly and influence most of the importance management decisions. Moreover, the dominant owner plays an influential role in deciding whether to promote the managers or how much to reward based upon the performance of managers. Thus, such monitoring mechanism brought out by unique ownership structure of chaebol system suppresses managers’empirebuilding incentives, a particular Type Ⅰ agency problem, which are known to drive sticky cost behavior as in Chen, Lu and Sougiannis(2012). Under this agency perspective, chaebol firms may have lower degree of cost stickiness compared to non-chaebol firms. To further extent, the agency problems for chaebol firms are not merely on the conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers (Type Ⅰ agency problems) but, also concentrated on the conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders (Type Ⅱ agency problems). Therefore, the differential agency problem among chaebol firms may result in different cost behavior, relative to non-chaebol firms. Although a few literature attempt to examine the cost behavior of chaebol firms, the empirical results have been mixed. We revisit the link between chaebol and cost stickiness in order to resolve inconclusive findings. Based on a comprehensive dataset of Korean firms listed in KOSPI market from 2001 to 2013, we empirically find that the degree of cost stickiness is on average, lower in chaebol firms than in non-chaebol firms, even exhibiting anti-sticky behavior. We further conduct several cross-sectional analyses to examine the effect of firm size and corporate governance (e.g. board independence, the existence of controlling owner as a board member) on chaebol firms’ cost behavior. First, the anti-stickiness in chaebol firms is more prevalent when the firm size is small. Large chaebol firms must bear political costs induced by high media attention making them difficult to divest the resources in response to sales changes whereas, small chaebol firms can have more flexibility in resource adjustments, resulting in a lower degree of cost stickiness. Second, in terms of corporate governance, the anti-stickiness in chaebol firms is more prevalent when the firm has a higher degree of corporate board independence or a controlling owner as a board member. Because good corporate governance measured by board independence effectively monitors managers’ perverse incentives (i.e. empire-building incentives) in addition to controlling owners monitoring managers, less sticky behavior is presented among firms with an independent board. Apart from board independence, the existence of a controlling owner as a board member also reduces the agency problems between shareholders and managers thus, results in a lower degree of cost stickiness. Our study makes several important contributions to the accounting literature. First, we increase the understanding of chaebol firms, in particular how chaebols adjust the resources committed to activities. We contrast the cost stickiness of chaebol versus non-chaebol firms to articulate the differential cost management of chabols compared to non-chaebols. Second, cross-sectional analyses provide further implications on the effects of firm size and corporate governance on differential cost stickiness between chaebol and non-chaebol firms. Lastly, we converge cost behavior studies, which is the primary stream of research in manag

성과평가시 목표설정에서의 톱니원리 적용과 목표달성도에 관한 연구: 객관지표를 이용한 실증분석

최연식 ( Youn Sik Choi ),황인이 ( Iny Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2012 회계학연구 Vol.37 No.2

성과기준보상(performance-based compensation)을 다루는 실증연구에서 목표달성도(target achievability)를 결정하는 요인에 대한 분석이 활발히 이루어지고 있지 않다. 본 연구는 이번 기의 성과에 기초하여 다음 기의 목표가 설정되는 톱니원리(ratchet principle)가 적용되는 상황에서 피평가자가 어떠한 조건에서 목표를 보다 잘 달성하는지를 분석하였다. 우리나라 공기업 경영평가제도의 평가결과를 이용하여 분석한 결과, 피평가자가 이번 기에 목표를 달성한 경우, 이번 기의 성과가 다음 기 목표에 더 많이 반영될수록(즉, 톱니원리를 많이 적용할수록) 피평가자가 다음 기에 목표를 달성할 가능성이 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 반면, 피평가자가가 이번 기에 목표를 달성하지 못한 경우에는 이번 기의 성과가 다음 기 목표에 더 많이 반영될수록(즉, 톱니원리를 많이 적용할수록) 피평가자가 다음 기에 목표를 달성할 가능성이 높아지는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 본 연구에서 발견한 톱니원리와 목표달성도 사이의 관계는 다양한 목표설정방식(즉, 목표를 공식에 의해 설정하는지, 또는 평가자와 피평가자가 상호작용하여 목표를 설정하는지 등)에 관계없이 일정하게 유지되는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 동기부여 목적에서 성과평가제도를 성공적으로 설계하거나 적용하는데 중요한 시사점을 제공한다. 우선 평가자가 조직의 장기적 성과향상을 유도하려는 목적에서 톱니원리를 비대칭적으로 적용하면 피평가자의 목표달성도 역시 비대칭적으로 나타난다는 점을 평가자는 사전에 고려할 필요가 있다. 또한 목표달성도를 높이기 위한 피평가자의 전략적 노력배분으로부터 평가자가 궁극적으로 양(+)의 순효과를 이끌어 낼 수 있도록 평가전문가들은 톱니원리와 목표달성도 사이의 관계를 고려하여 정교한 성과평가 시스템을 개발할 필요가 있다. This study investigates the association between the probability of target achievement and the sensitivity of target to actual performance. Building on prior literature that documents asymmetric ratchet principle, we find that target achievability varies in the opposite direction depending on whether the target has been met or missed. Our results show that when ratees succeed (fail) in meeting targets, the probability of achieving targets in the following period decreases (increases) with how sensitively target ratchets in response to actual performance. The results largely remain unchanged when we control for alternative target-setting methods. Our study implies that raters should understand the asymmetric nature of target achievability in order to successfully design appropriate benchmark performance in performance evaluation systems.

공공기관 경영실적 평가제도에서 목표설정에서의 불확실성이 공공기관의 노력 감소 인센티브에 미치는 영향

최연식 ( Younsik Choi ),황인이 ( Iny Hwang ),윤주철 ( Joochul Yoon ) 한국행정학회 2015 韓國行政學報 Vol.49 No.3

본 연구는 우리나라 공공기관의 경영실적 평가결과를 이용하여 목표설정에서 톱니원리(ratchet principle)가 적용되는 이유와 그러한 상황에서 대리인이 갖는 인센티브를 분석하였다. 특히 성과평가제도에 설계된 다양한 특성이 대리인의 노력 감소 인센티브(effort reduction incentive)에 미치는 영향을 실증적으로 분석하고, 선행연구와는 달리 노력 감소의 정도를 직접적으로 추정하였다. 분석 결과, 우리나라 공공기관 경영실적 평가에서 평가방법 및 평가지표의 속성에 따라 실제성과가 기대성과에 미달하는 톱니효과(ratchet effect)가 발견되었다. 이러한 분석 결과는 성과평가제도를 보다 합리적으로 설계하거나 보다 성공적으로 운용하는데 실천적 시사점을 제공한다. We revisit the ratchet effect literature and explore the implications of target-setting uncertainty, in association with subjectivity in target-setting and characteristics of performance measures, on the agent``s inter-temporal performance management. In addition, we directly measure the magnitude of the ratchet effect. We find that when the ratchet principle is implemented in target-setting, actual performance is less than the rationally expected performance. We address the ultimate reason that the ratchet principle is usually implemented in practice, despite its dysfunctional motivation on the subordinate.

연구논문 : 정보비대칭과 다차원적 업무하에서 CEO의 노력배분

최연식 ( Youn Sik Choi ),황인이 ( Iny Hwang ),송승아 ( Seung Ah Song ) 한국회계학회 2012 회계저널 Vol.21 No.5

대부분의 주인-대리인 관계에서 대리인은 조직의 목표에 차별적 영향을 미치는 다차원적 업무를 부여 받는다. 이러한 상황에서 대리인은 특정 업무에 투입할 노력수준뿐만 아니라, 자신의 노력을 다양한 업무에 적절히 배분하는 의사결정을 하게 된다. 모든 관련 업무가 조직의 가치를 증가시킨다면, 주인은 대리인이 다차원적 업무를 동시에 최선을 다해 수행하도록 동기부여하여야한다. 그러나 대리인의 노력은 직접 관찰이 불가능하기 때문에, 대리인은 주인의 기대와는 달리자신의 성과평가 또는 보상에 더 유리한 업무에 차별적인 노력배분을 할 가능성이 있다. 본 연구는 다차원적 업무를 수행하는 대리인이 자신의 효익을 증대시키기 위하여 다양한 정보비대칭 상황을 어떻게 활용하는지에 대해서 분석하였다. 이를 위해 우리나라 공공기관 경영평가결과를 활용하여 실증분석을 수행하였다. 분석결과, 기관평가와 기관장평가에 동시에 사용되는 지표의 득점률이 기관평가에만 사용되는 지표의 득점률 보다 유의하게 높게 나타났다. 또한 이러한 득점률 분포는 산식에 의해 목표를 설정하는 지표보다 참여에 의해 목표를 설정하는 지표에서 두드러졌으며, 여러 기관에 적용되는 공통지표 보다는 특정 기관에 적용되는 고유지표에서 더욱강화된 모습을 보였다. 본 연구의 결과는 다차원적 업무를 수행하는 대리인이 다양한 업무로부터 기대되는 상대적 효익의 크기를 고려하여 자신의 노력을 배분한다는 것을 시사한다. 또한 대리인은 노력배분 의사결정 과정에서 대리계약을 체결한 다차원적 업무 속에 내재된 정보비대칭을 기회주의적으로 활용한 다는 점을 추론할 수 있다. Under multi-task setting, agents can decide on effort intensity as well as on effort allocation across all relevant tasks. As agents allocate unobservable efforts over multi-tasks, the principal, unfortunately, observes only the results. Agents have chance to maximize their benefits using information asymmetry nested in the nature of multi-tasks setting. It, therefore, is very important to investigate how agents respond to information asymmetry when they allocate their efforts over their various tasks. We address this issue using unique and rich date set that we have manually collected from the Korean Government` annual reports on its performance evaluation public enterprises. The results show that agents allocate greater efforts on performance measures used to evaluate their diverse tasks than on those used to evaluate only a single task. In addition, the results document that uneven effort allocation are much greater as information asymmetry between the principal and agents increases. Our findings imply that agents` effort allocation is determined by the relative benefits they derive on the various tasks. In addition, it is inferred that agents opportunistically utilize information asymmetry imbedded in multi-task agency contract, when they allocate efforts.

한국테크랜드 분식회계 및 부실감사 사례

최종학 ( Jong-hag Choi ),안혜진 ( Hyejin Ahn ),황인이 ( Iny Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계저널 Vol.25 No.1

한국테크랜드는 홈페이지 구축 소프트웨어 전문개발업체로 설립되었으며, 네트워크보안기술을 개발하며 벤처기업으로 성장하여 2001년 코스닥시장에 상장하였다. 이후 대테러장비 및 기능성 식약품으로 사업을 확장하고, 일본 및 중국으로 진출하는 등 적극적 인행보를 보였으나 계속되는 영업부진 및 투자손실 등으로 경영난에 시달리게 되었다. 한국테크랜드는 결국 증권선물위원회의 감리 결과 분식회계 사실이 밝혀졌고, 경영진의 횡령ㆍ배임 사실이 함께 드러나면서 상장폐지 되었다. 한국테크랜드는 단기대여금을 과대계상하고, 특수관계자 매출 등을 허위계상, 매출액을 과대계상하는 등 분식회계를 하였으며, 분식회계가 이루어지는 동안의 외부감사인인 A 회계법인과 B 회계법인은 재고자산, 매출 및 매출채권 등에 대한 감사를 소홀히 한 것으로 확인되었다. 본 사례를 통해 성공한 벤처기업의 전형이었던 한국테크랜드가 쇠락해 가면서 생겨난 경영진의 도덕적 해이와 분식회계, 그리고 이를 발견하지 못했던 부실감사에 대해 살펴보고, 경영진의 횡령, 배임과 회계부정에 쓰인 구체적인 방법들을 파악해 볼 수 있다. 또한 외부감사인이 회계감사를 통해 왜 회계부정을 적발하지 못하였는지, 그리고 중소기업 감사 시 외부감사인이 어떤 점을 유의해야 하는지 알아보도록 하자. Korea Techland Ltd. (KTL henceforth) was established in 1997 as a software developer. At initial stage, KTL successfully developed networksecurity software and grow rapidly as internet was widely used and homepage became popular in the late 1990’s. As a successful venture enterprise, the firm was listed in KOSDAQ market in 2001. After the listing, the firm expand its business areas to anti-terrorism equipments, related education and consulting, nutritional supplement delivery system, and clothing shopping mall. In addition, KTL started operations in Japan and China. Although KTL pursued aggressive expansion strategy, KTL’s new attempts turned out unsuccessful. The firm’s operating performance was getting deteriorated and the firm actually suffered continuing losses from its operation and new investment. The firm changed its name when the management switched its main business to another. After all, the post-audit review performed by Korean Financial Supervisory Service revealed that KTL committed accounting fraud to inflate firm performance. The management also committed misappropriation and malpractice. As a result, the firm was delisted eventually. KTL was revealed to have overstated short-term loan, sales to the related parties, account receivables and inventory. The firm asserted that the sales of security equipment occurred via the related party located in Japan and considerable inventories were also kept in Japan. However, all the assertions of the management were found to be false. The sales through related parties were fictitious and the inventory did not exist in Japan. Moreover, the firm did not recognize impairment losses from long-term investment asset and intangible asset. Overall, KTL understated net loss amount by 44.4% in 2008, 8.7% in 2009, and 79.4% in 2010. After reflecting all the adjustments, net asset of KTL decreases from 45,550 million won in 2008 to 15,254 million won in 2010. Throughout the 3 years, adjusted sales were all below 3,000 million won which is the amount of criteria for judging delisting. In spite of such a serious problem inherent in financial statement reporting, two audit firms that audited KTL for 2008 and 2009 failed to find out the accounting fraud and did not perform quality audit. Although the two audit firms recognized that KTL experienced consecutive operating losses and was under the pressure of delisting, they did not conduct appropriate audit process. First, they ignored the importance of audit risk assessment which reflects the risk of business, accounting system, and internal control of the client firm. If they have assessed audit risk as high and thus reflect the risk in the audit process, they would expand audit scope and increase substantive tests. Second, they did not evaluate collectibility of loan and did not assess its collateral, which enables KTL to overstate its short-term loan. Third, the auditors did not focus on abnormally large transactions with related parties and thus miss fictitious sales. In addition, they did not confirm the existence of inventory in Japan. Although the inventory was in the foreign country, the auditors should have request cooperation of accounting firms in Japan to confirm the existence of inventory if the amount of inventory was significant. Lastly, the audit firms did not review financial statement of investee to assess the long-term equity investment and intangible asset(sales right). At that time, the operating performance of investee located in U.S. was deteriorated and the operation of main production facilities was already stopped in 2010. But, the auditors did not notice the facts and just accept the amount of equity investment suggested by KTL. Through this case, students can understand the deteriorating process of a venture firm and accounting frauds occurred in the process. More specifically, students are able to learn the ways that the management of KTL used to commit accounting fraud and why audit firms fail to find the fraud. Also, students can find out features of external audit of small and medium-sized firms. Even though the management of small and medium-sized firms are more likely to commit misappropriation and malpractice, and thus exposed to higher audit risk, auditors tend to input relatively smaller audit efforts due to the small audit fees of such clients. From this case, we need to perceive the importance of thorough audit risk assessment for small and medium-sized firms, sufficient audit efforts based on the assessed audit risk, and the realization of audit fees to support the enough audit efforts.

결산 자동화 시스템 사례

권대현 ( Dae-hyun Kwon ),안태식 ( Tae-sik Ahn ),황인이 ( Iny Hwang ),박진하 ( Jin-ha Park ) 한국중소기업학회 2017 기업가정신과 벤처연구 Vol.20 No.1

장부를 마감하고 재무제표를 작성하는 것은 대부분의 기업에 있어서 주요한 과제이다. 본 연구는 결산 자동화 시스템의 도입을 통해 결산과정을 상당부분 개선한 기업의 사례를 조사하고 해당 시스템의 실행과 관련하여 발생한 주요 이슈들에 대해 논의하고자 한다. 이에 본 사례연구에서는 결산 자동화 시스템의 도입목표 및 개선방안, 결산절차, 추진결과와 활용방안 등을 연구하였다. 구체적으로 첫째, 결산 자동화 시스템하의 결산 과정을 상세히 소개하였다. 둘째, 결산 자동화 시스템 도입의 효과를 살펴본 결과 결산 자동화 비율이 극대화 되고, 데이터 검증 작업이 보다 정확하게 이루어짐에 따라 결산 과정에서 발생할 수 있는 오류가 감소한 것으로 나타났다. 또한 결산 순서가 새로이 정의됨에 따라 결산에 소요되는 시간도 감축되었다. 다시 말하면, 결산 자동화 시스템의 도입으로 결산 전반에 대한 속도, 품질, 통제 등이 제고된 것으로 평가되었다. 마지막으로 도입 및 운용 시에 고려해야 할 부분에 대해 제안한다. 본 사례연구가 결산시스템을 개선하고자 하는 기업들에게 구체적인 도입 과정을 예시하고, 또한 운용 시에 고려해야 할 부분에 대한 시사점을 제공할 수 있기를 기대한다. 특히 사례에 포함된 구체적인 예시는 자동화 시스템에 대한 경험이 상대적으로 적은 중소기업에게 도움이 될 수 있을 것이다. Closing the book for the recent accounting period and issuing financial statements is one of the most common challenges for companies. This study examines a case of an automated financial close process and discusses issues related to its implementation. First, the study introduces the closing process of a case company including the purpose, improvement plan, and designing process. Second, the study discusses the impacts of the newly adopted system. Specifically, it reveals that under the new plan, close process automation has been maximized. It also shows that raw data validation has been improved so that past data errors can be categorized by their types and removed before the closing process begins. The order of the process has also been redefined saving closing time. Third and finally, difficulties and considerations for successful use of the system have been discussed. This study aims to provide useful information to companies which consider implementing more organized closing systems. We expect that this study will be helpful to small and medium enterprises which suffer from delayed closing but have little experience with automated BPM system.

투자전략이 원가행태에 미치는 영향

김미옥(Mi Ok Kim),정형록(Hyung Rok Jung),황인이(Iny Hwang) 한국경영학회 2017 經營學硏究 Vol.46 No.3

This paper investigates the impact of investment strategy on asymmetric cost behavior. Managers set up strategy for achievement of target, and run business depending on the strategy. To confirm whether the resource is allocated by strategy or not, we need to understand the cost behavior, one of the cost information. Because, cost behavior can be seen as the results of strategic decision if cost is allocated by firm’s strategy. The aim of this paper is investigating the effect of hysteresis behavior on cost behavior. According to Dixit(1989), hysteresis behavior is manager’s sticky decision about disinvestment against economic unfavorable situation. Again, decision about not disinvestment but keeping investment when sales decreases, is somewhat similar to asymmetry cost behavior, which costs are decline less in response to sales decreases than they rise for equivalent sales increases (Anderson et al. 2003). Therefore, We analyse the impact of hysteresis strategy on asymmetric cost behavior with two hypotheses, and the results are as follows. First, firms with higher ratio of foreign sales, they have an incentive to keep foreign division even though sales decrease. Therefore, cost behavior appeared to be stickiness and hysteresis strategy makes cost stickiness stronger. The results support hypothesis 1. Next, firms belong to competitive or monopolistic industry, have an incentive to keep division form preventing entrance of potential competitors. Therefore, cost behavior appeared to be stickiness and hysteresis strategy makes cost stickiness stronger. The results support hypothesis 2. Lastly, if firms have higher asset intensity and belong to industry with higher asset intensity, firms have an incentive to keep division to holding co-specialized asset. Therefore, cost behavior appeared to be stickiness and hysteresis strategy makes cost stickiness stronger. The results support hypothesis 3. This paper contributes to the accounting research by investigating the influence of strategy on asymmetric cost behavior. Also it shows that manager’s decision for resource adjustment are related with not only resource capacity but also investment, itself. However, further studies are needed to done for sophisticated investigation for the relationship between strategy and cost behavior. Strategy are set up by various determinants, so there are possibility of endogeneity problem. Lastly, the results of multiple period suggest indirect effect of investment strategy on cost behavior, it should be interpreted with caution.