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북한의 ‘사회주의문명국’ 건설 담론의정책적 실천과 그 함의 - 위락·후생시설 건설사업을 중심으로 -
최봉대 ( Choi Bong Dae ) 동국대학교 북한학연구소 2021 북한학연구 Vol.17 No.1
The policy of building a ‘civilized socialist state’ during the 2010s produces some results of political and economic importance with regard to the prospect of North Korea’s transformation: (1) The middle and upper strata in large cities pursue market-oriented leisure consumption, which results in the subsumption of their leisure activities under market hegemony. (2) Through leisure activities urban people are self-conscious of their own stratum status and the social distinctions agaginst the lower stratum are visualized. (3) The provision of cultural convenience facilities for a few of exemplary factories by the state has the aim of building a kind of ‘productivist factory welfare regime’, but it seems to have a poor incentive effect for workers. (4) The influence of ‘market force’ on the state’s leisure facilities is constrained by the state which acts as the powerful market regulator and as a main market player.
1950년대 지방 자치제와 농촌 지역 사회의 정치적 지배 집단 형성
최봉대 ( Bong Dae Choi ) 한국사회사학회 1998 사회와 역사 Vol.54 No.-
This paper focuses on the recruitment of members of the Local Assembly (L.A.) in the town and myon level in the 1950s. Main findings of this study that covers three guns in Kyunggi-Do are as follows. First, the recruitment of the landlord class in L.A decreased when compared with the Local Council under Japanese Imperialism in the late 1930s. The primary cause was its weakened economic power after the Land Reform in 1950. Second, in terms of the political career most of L.A, members were recruited from the lower lever ex-officials, their assistants and local rightists, reflecting the effects of the Korean War. Most of them did not belong to the landlord class. Rather, they assumed a key role in controlling the local people, being an agent of the central government. Third, the dominance of family lineage, especially in the consanguineous villages in Ii area, had considerable influences upon the recruitment of L.A. members. There were t w o types of the consanguineous villages; one consisted of wealthier farmers including a few former landlords, and the other many small farmers with various political careers. In the 19505 these three features dominated the recruiting process of the L.A, which was tantamount to the formation of dominant political groups in the local area.
최봉대 ( Bong-dae Choi ) 평화문제연구소 2014 統一問題硏究 Vol.26 No.1
북한의 대다수 국가기관들과 인민경제부문 공장.기업소들이 자력 존속을 위해 시장에 의존하게 됨에 따라 시장 활성화가 촉진되고 국가의 경제적 역량은 더 약화되었다. 그럼에도 아직까지 시장에 기반한 유력한 사회집단의 형성이나 사회세력화 가능성을 찾기 어려운데, 그 주된 이유는 특수단위들의 독특한 자기재생산 기제 및 강제력 행사방식에 있다. 특수단위들은 사민 외화벌이 종사자들을 활용하여 자체 운영자금을 마련하는 한편으로 이들에 의한 잠재적인 상인자본 축적 가능성을 제거하고, 또 공장.기업소 지배인 등의 잠재적인 사적 자본축적 가능성도 차단한다. 따라서 당분간 북한정권이 시장을 철폐하거나, 정책적 의도대로 관리할 수만은 없지만, 시장 활성화가 촉진된다고 해도 ‘위로부터 관리되는 방식의 이행’같은 경우를 제외하고는 기존 지배질서에 변화를 가져올 가능성은 별로 없다는 점을 시사 받을 수 있다. In North Korea, most of the state apparatuses and state-owned factories have relied more and more on the informal market relations in order to be financially self-reliant. However, the further marketization and the state’s weakened economic capacity have not resulted in the strengthening of ‘market forces’ because the state has successfully used its repressive capacity to curb the key market agents. The judicial-security state apparatuses(JSSAs) use some non-cadres’ business abilities and investment funds to earn foreign currency. JSSAs spend some large parts of the dollar income to maintain their repressive capacities. JSSAs tolerate the non-cadres’ ‘illegal’ market activities for some years and then JSSAs get rid of them. JSSAs also inspect factory managers’ ‘illegal’ activities which may link to potential and private capital accumulation. It seems that the state can’t control completely the marketization pressure as it wishes, while at the same time the marketization process can’t bring about a ‘non-state led transition’ in the near future.