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- 저자 : 신현익(Shin, Hyun-Ick) (검색결과 42 건)
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실시간 영상형성 및 원시데이터 획득용 SAR 테스트 베드
신현익,권경일,윤상호,김형석,황정훈,고영창,유응노,김진우,Shin, Hyun-Ik,Kwon, Kyoung-Il,Yoon, Sang-Ho,Kim, Hyung-Suk,Hwang, Jeonghun,Ko, Young-Chang,You, Eung-Noh,Kim, Jin-Woo 한국군사과학기술학회 2017 한국군사과학기술학회지 Vol.20 No.2
Synthetic aperture radar(SAR) has been widely used for reconnaissance. It provides high-resolution, day-and-night and weather-independent images for a multitude of applications. Because SAR coherently combines many viewing angles to effectively create a large aperture(narrow beam) radar, the test-bed should be capable of moving straightly SAR sensor for the integration angle to meet resolution. This paper describes the test-bed developed to test and evaluate the SAR performance. It forms high-quality images in real time and saves the raw data for the purpose of post processing on the ground.
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1979년 한국 신군부의 12·12쿠데타와 미국의 관망정책
신현익(Shin, Hyun-Ick),오영달(Oh, Young-Dahl) 한국정치사회연구소 2020 한국과 국제사회 Vol.4 No.2
미국 카터행정부는 12·12군사쿠데타 발생에 대하여 적극적 개입의 미국내 여론에도 불구하고 한국 군부 내 국수적 민족주의적 저항과 한국민의 제2의 이란화 가능성을 염려하여 ‘불개입 자세’를 취했다. 미국은 이쿠데타에 조성된 사태의 역전을 강하게 시도할 만큼 비용을 지불할 준비가 되어있지 않았으며, 한국의 내부적 군권쟁탈 문제가 그들에게 그럴만한 가치가 있는지에 대해 확신이 없었다. 따라서 미국은 현상유지에 만족하여 신군부세력을 군의 실권세력으로 받아들이고 현실적으로 인정한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 신군부가 고도로 조직화되어 있어 정권 수행능력을 갖추고 있으며 무엇보다도 친미적 정향을 띠고 있는 것으로 평가하였던 것이다. 또한 미국은 동북아에서 자신들의 핵심이익인 안보·경제적 이익을 수호해 줄 수 있는 측면을 감안했을 때 불개입적 ‘관망(wait and see)’정책을 추구했던 것으로 해석된다. 미국의 이러한 불관여정책, 즉 ‘신중한 불개입’ ‘관망’정책은 신군부 병력이 특별한 저항 없이 쿠데타 상황을 종료하고 궁극적으로 성공하게 하는 데 결정적 역할을 하였다. 신군부에 대한 뚜렷한 세력 경쟁자가 없는 상황에서 미국의 관망 정책은 결국 강자를 선택하는 결과가 되었다. 뿐만 아니라, 미국정부의 이러한 정책은 ‘최소비용에 의한 최대효과’를 지향했으며 또한 ‘대세편승적 승자승 논리’에 바탕을 두었다고 볼 수 있다. 결론적으로, 미국은 ‘안보·안정’적인 기존 정책노선에 충실했다고 할 수 있다. Right after the coup took place in Seoul on Dec. 12, 1979, the Carter administration of the United States was alleged to maintain a policy of non-intervention, contrary to the American public opinion, for fear of possible resistance from the chauvinistic Korean military and of a possible second Iranization of the Korean people. In this context, nobody was certain whether the United States was ready to pay the cost for its attempt to turn the tables here or whether the political leaders in Washington found it worthwhile to pay attention to the power struggle within the Korean military. This assumption leads naturally to the conclusion that the U.S. leaders apparently did not want to intervene in the political upheaval in Korea to such an extent as to further affect the reality. Satisfied with the status quo, the United States’ leadership seemed to have recognized the new Korean military leadership as the de facto power holders. It is evident that Washington took a wait-and-see approach to carefully watch the new military group in Korea, regarding it as a highly organized powerful group with the ability to take care of state affairs on its own, as a pro-Washington organization, and as a group with potential to safeguard and protect security and economic interests of the United States in Northeast Asia. Washington s decision to adopt a non-intervention policy, or a careful wait-and-see approach, turned out to be decisively conducive to the new military group in Korea putting an end to the upheaval without remarkable resistance and pulling off a successful coup in the end. Washington s wait-and-see approach resulted in supporting the stronger side in a situation where the new military leadership had no rival to compete with. Besides, it also seems that Washington sought to achieve the largest effect with the minimum cost based on the logic of jumping on the bandwagon by rooting for the top dog. As it turned out, the United States toed the line for security and stability not to cause trouble by intervening in the upheaval in Korea.
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신현익 ( Hyun Ick Shin ) 아시아.유럽미래학회 2010 유라시아연구 Vol.7 No.3
President Park Chung-hee``s assassination on Oct. 26, 1979 shocked the entire world, as well as Korea. This was all the more so because South Korea was considered a developing country that had made remarkable achievements under Park``s leadership and under the aegis of the United States, despite it being one of the last few nations under the Cold War system. Faced with a crisis on the Korean Peninsula due to threats from North Korea, the United States pledged to defend U.S. interests in Korea. And it was determined to cope with the crisis on the peninsula also from the standpoint of defending its interests in Japan. The United States did not let its guard down against the possibility of a power struggle among various South Korean factions, while confirming its economic and military interests in Korea. Showing a very sensitive response to rumors about its involvement in Park``s assassination on the one hand, the United States saw his death as an opportunity for South Korea to achieve democratization on the other. Then U.S. Ambassador to South Korea William Glysteen dismissed the rumors, calling them nonsense. As he implied, there is no open or explicit evidence that substantiated the rumors. But based on what Kim Jae-kyu, Park``s assassin, had said and how he had behaved and on various publications and papers published in the United States earlier, speculation was rife that leaders in Washington may had aided and abetted Kim``s action consciously or unconsciously. At the time, Glysteen said that such rumors had been created due to some ambiguous circumstances in which Park was assassinated, some hypothetical American media stories about the U.S.``s involvement based on such ambiguous circumstances, and state-run media``s reckless incrimination of the United States in some communist bloc countries. As a superpower, the United States, however, was not so naive as to appear obviously that it had anything to do with the incident. And Kim seems to have interpreted in his own way what he had heard in the United States. He may have possibly seen what U.S. leaders had told him concerning their understanding of the political situation in South Korea as an indirect go-ahead for him to put his determination into action. But this hypothetical needs more intensive studies in the future. After Park``s death, the United States took a few things into consideration as far as South Korea was concerned: whether the next leader would be capable of managing the government, whether the next power group would be pro-U.S., and how to minimize political expenses here. These were variables the United States thought seriously of to defend its interests in Korea as an outside force. The United States then apparently believed it might have to use those variables when it had to exert some influence in South Korea``s domestic affairs. Under these circumstances, South Korea``s opposition parties were naturally left out as they ran counter to the U.S.``s principle of realism called maximization of efficiency. As far as the ruling party in South Korea was concerned at that time, no figures, even Kim Jong-pil or Chung Il-kwon, emerged as powerful candidates for leadership, which means that the United States had to try hard to find one. At the time, the United States saw the South Korean situation following Park``s assassination from a security point of view. It paid attention to a peculiar social structure in South Korea under which people were united against threats from North Korea and a solid bureaucracy existed. This led the United States to take a wait-and-see, noninterference attitude toward South Korea. In fact, the United States adopted such a policy because it was reluctant to bear or pay expenses for its involvement. After all, the United States took a wait-and-see attitude after Park``s death. Meanwhile, the United States kept its eyes on South Korean military leaders as it was interested in who would be the next South Korean leader, considering their favorable view of the United States based on their training and educational experience at various American military institutions or think tanks. The South Korean military was believed to be the only group on which the United States could rely concerning the future of South Korea. So the United States thought it should remain patient and prudent as to which military leader it should support for South Korea``s future. The military had become the single largest group in South Korea due to the security situation caused by the national division. It had already attracted U.S.``s attention not only because of its large size, but also because of military leaders`` pro-U.S. views. But on the other hand, it was a group that could turn into an anti-U.S. nationalistic conservative force in one way or another-the worst-case scenario that the United States feared most. Such two quite different potential danger factors brought about synergy effects and made the United States pay more attention to the South Korean military. The United States had always had to defend its security interests in Northeast Asia as a showcase of democracy since the Syngman Rhee administration. Under these circumstances, the South Korean military was seen as a highly handy political group that would not hesitate to defend the U.S. interests in this region. Therefore, it became clear to the United States which direction it should take. When you wait and see, it simply means that you are waiting for a powerful leader to emerge, doesn``t it? At long last, a strong man came into play, but he was not as rational a military leader as the United States had expected him to be. From Korea``s historical point of view, the South Korean military leaders who emerged after Park``s assassination were a lucky group encouraged by the Reagan administration``s hard-line conservative, anticommunist policy under the neo-Cold War system. The good luck that befell the South Korean military leaders turned out to be ill fortune for South Korea as a whole in that the wheel of history was forced to turn fast by South Korean people themselves.
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