우리나라 전자정부서비스 이용실태의 국제비교

권혁성(權赫星),김준한(金俊漢) 한국지역정보화학회 2016 한국지역정보화학회지 Vol.19 No.4

우리나라는 UN 전자정부 평가에서는 3회 연속 1위를 차지하였으나, 와세다대학교의 2016년 평가에서는 65개국 중 4위, Accenture의 2014년 평가에서는 10개국 중 4위를 기록하여 상대적인 약점이 있음이 드러나고 있다. 그 원인을 분석해 본 결과 우리나라의 전자정부는 환경이나 공급 측면에서는 강점을 보이나, 이용 측면에서는 그렇지 못한 것으로 나타났다. 외국과의 전자정부서비스 이용 실태를 비교해 본 결과 전자정부서비스 이용률은 높지 않은 수준이었고 이용 빈도는 상당이 낮은 편이었다. 불만 또는 미이용 이유로는 상대적으로 ‘이용하기 어려움’과 ‘이용하기 복잡함’ 등의 응답이 많아 우리나라 전자정부서비스가 충분히 이용자 중심적이지 못하다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 전자정부서비스 이용의 활성화를 위해서는 소위 전자정부 강국들이 이미 추진하고 있는 전자정부서비스의 의무적 사용, 단일 전자메일함, Single-Sign-On이 가능한 개인화된 서비스의 확대, 통합 서비스포털의 확대와 모바일 친화적 개편 및 플랫폼화, 수요자 측면을 강조하는 이용실태 조사 등의 활성화 방안을 제시하였다.

4월 혁명 이후 최루탄 도입과 그 성격

권혁은 수선사학회 2022 史林 Vol.- No.82

. Since the April Revolution, police have faced strong urge to reform and purge. Urging of police reform and purge were concentrated on the intelligence police which were the main players of various evils during the Rhee Syngman regime, but were also raised against the police firing upon the protesting people during the April Revolution. However, the Chang Myon government tried to strengthen the police's riot control ability to counter the unification movement with the United States from November 1960. The U.S. was deeply intervened in the police's riot control training and the introduction of riot control equipment. In the process, tear gas was procured and riot control training using tear gas was promoted. The U.S. public safety advisors' perception of tear gas was behind this process. Most of the public safety advisors in Korea have been veterans of police-related jobs for a long time in the United States since the 1930s. In the 1930s, the police reform movement emerged in the United States, and the modern police system was established, and in the process, a method of riot control using tear gas instead of live ammunition was widely used. Since then, tear gas has begun to use commonly in riot control as a “humanitarian” weapon that can suppress protests without bloodshed. The public safety advisors recommended the so-called “modernization” of riot control, which calls for the introduction of “humanitarian” methods using tear gas. In this process, the main weapon of police's riot control has been turned into tear gas.

삼위일체론 연구

권혁봉(權赫奉) 침례신학대학교 출판부 1986 복음과 실천 Vol.9 No.1

<일반논문> 구술을 통해 본 베트남특수 : 군인 해외근무수당을 둘러싼 오해와 베트남특수의 계급별 경험 차이

권혁은 덕성여자대학교 인문과학연구소 2016 인문과학연구 Vol.22 No.-

본고는 파월군인 9명의 구술을 통해 군인 해외근무수당에 관해 참전군인들 사이에서 광범위하게 존재한 오해의 맥락과 베트남특수의 계급별 경험 차이를 고찰한다. 해외근무수당이란 미국정부가 파월국 군인들에게 지급한 수당으로 국내에서 지급되는 한국군 월급에 비해 상당한 거액이었다. 미국이 한국 군인들에게 지급한 수당은 태국, 필리핀 등과 비슷한 수준이었고 정부가 수당을 중간에서 전용할 여지는 없었지만, 참전군인들 사이에서는 오랫동안 이를 둘러싼 여러가지 오해가 존재하였다. 그것은 일차적으로 한국군이 미군에 비해서는 적은 비용으로 파병되었기 때문이며, 이차적으로 월급 외에 별도의 수당을 지급한 타국 정부와 달리 한국 정부는 파월군인들에게 월급만을 지급했기 때문이었다. 뿐만 아니라 위관급 이상으로 파병된 군인들에게 베트남전은 내집마련이나 TV구입과 같이 개인적으로 경제적 부를 축적할 기회를 제공했지만 하사급 이하 대부분의 사병들이 받은 수당은 그들이 경제적으로 도약하기에 충분한 규모는 아니었다. 따라서 베트남특수 경험은 파월군인의 계급에 따라 차이가 있으며, 대부분의 사병들에게 국가적 차원의 특수와 개인적 차원의 특수 간에는 일정한 간극이 있었다고 할 수 있다. This paper examine why the vietnam veterans have had misgivings on overseas allowance for a long time and how the vietnam veterans were booming in the war depending on their ranks. The overseas allowance was paid by the American government to the military personnel from the third country such as Thiland, the Philippines, and Korea and which was much larger than the salary paid by the home government. Although the American government paid Korean military personnel the overseas allowance as much as the other country and the Korean government could not divert it, there were a lot of misgivings in the veterans' society on the allowances for a long time. Because a cost of dispatching the Korean troops was much cheaper than the American', and the Korean government did not pay the military personnel separate extra money in contrast with the Thiland, Philippines, and South Vietnam government. In addition, although a lot of the officers over company grade amassed wealth making good use of the overseas allowance, most of the soldiers under corporal could not take off economically because their allowance was not as much as the officers'. Therefore, there was the gap between national vietnam war booming and the personal vietnam war booming for the most of soldiers under corporal.

한국적 ‘신냉전사’의 가능성: 허은(2022), 『냉전과 새마을: 동아시아 냉전의 연쇄와 분단국가체제』, 창비, 596쪽

권혁은 서울대학교 인문학연구원 2022 人文論叢 Vol.79 No.4

선거보도 가이드라인 제정의 타당성

權赫南(권혁남) 관훈클럽 2002 관훈저널 Vol.43 No.3

서이초 사건과 초등 교사의 정체성 변화: 자문화기술지적 접근

권혁은 한국교육인류학회 2024 교육인류학연구 Vol.27 No.1

The 'Seoi-cho incident' is when a teacher at Seoi Elementary School in Seoul took her own life on campus in July 2023. The outpouring of national solidarity and unity among teachers after the Seoi-cho incident suggests a shift in their identities. Focusing on the experiences of "I," the researcher and participant, this study explores how the Seoi-cho incident made me aware of and changed my identity as an elementary teacher. This study shows the changes in my identity through my teaching career into three stages of 'Survival', 'Atrophy', and 'Participation and Awareness'. In the 'Survival' stage, there is the story of a novice teacher experiencing the value of educational interactions through positive relationships with students. On the other hand, the 'Atrophy' stage includes the teacher who lost her confidence and atrophied as a teacher while encountering indiscriminate complaints from school parents. Lastly, the 'Participation and Awareness' stage captures the story of a teacher who realizes her atrophied identity to trigger the Seoi-cho incident and experiences positive possibilities and growth again by participating in collective action. The significance of this study is that it specifically examines the process by which elementary school teachers' identities change through interaction with the sociocultural environment through an autoethnographic approach and analyzes the meaning of the Seoi-cho incident for teachers in depth.

1960년대 후반 한국군 시위 진압 교리의 특성 연구 —1969년 육군본부 발간 『야전교범 19-15 폭동진압』 분석을 중심으로

권혁은 한국국학진흥원 2023 국학연구 Vol.- No.50

This article analyzes Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control, published by the Army Headquarters of Korea in 1969, to examine the nature of the ROK military’s doctrine on riot control in the late 1960s and to explore the origins of the state violence in Buma Uprising and the May 18th Uprising. Under the overwhelming influence of the U.S. military since the U.S. military regime, the ROK military’s doctrine for riot control was based on U.S. military doctrine. The fact that Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control (1969) of Korea was a translation of FM 19-15 Civil Disturbances and Disasters (1964) shows that the doctrine developed after the April Revolution was also based on US military doctrine. However, Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control (1969) of Korea contained ROK military developments that did not exist in FM 19-15 Civil Disturbances and Disasters (1964). It included a description of the requirements for military interventions and a method of riot control that used a combination of bayonets and baton. As of 1969, the law allowed the military to be mobilized to control riot in “wartime, national, or similar emergencies” or when “social order was extremely disturbed due to enemy siege.” However, Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control (1969) of Korea developed a much broader interpretation of the military intervention requirement and developed the logic that “rioting“ alone met the emergency requirement. Like U.S. military doctrine, Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control (1969) of Korea’s primary weapon was the bayonet. Under the doctrine, the bayonet was a weapon used for direct “contact” with protesters, not just for a “show of force,” so it was likely to be sufficiently violent in a real-world situation. However, riot control also included a method of riot control that combined bayonets and batons to attack protesters. This “bayonet combined with baton technique” was unique to the Korean military, developed by the gendarmerie unit of the Capital Security Command. It is likely that the tactics demonstrated by the military during the Buma Uprising and the May 18th Uprising were derived from the “offensive” protest tactics developed in the late 1960s. These offensive riot control techniques were a result of the unique situation in South Korea, where firing was an extremely sensitive issue following the April Revolution and the fall of the Syngman Rhee government.

1980년대 대공경찰조직 확대와 박종철 사건 이후 대공분실 개편

권혁은 민주화운동기념사업회 2023 기억과 전망 Vol.- No.49

Detached offices (bunsil ) had existed within the Korean National Police (KNP) since the establishment of the South Korean government. However, the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1975 and the separation of the Counter-espionage Unit from the Intelligence Division into an independent department in 1976 had a major impact on their operations. As the student movement became radicalized after the May 18 Uprising, the police set up a ‘Counter-leftist Detached Office’ under the Counter-espionage Department, which spearheaded the expansion of the Counter-espionage Department in the 1980s. After death of Park Jong Chol in the Counter-leftist Detached Office in 1987, the KNP announced that it will reduce the office by dividing it into two different detached offices. However, this reorganization plan had already been laid out by December 1986, and moreover, the plan aimed to expand the Counter-leftist Detached Office further, rather than reducing it.

반공과 발전: 1950-70년대 유선전화 근대화와 113 간첩 신고 전화

권혁은 역사문제연구소 2024 역사문제연구 Vol.28 No.1

본 글은 113 간첩 신고 전화가 운영되었던 배경으로 1950~1970년대 유선전화의 발전을 검토함으로써 반공의 기술적 조건을 분석하고자 했다. 2장에서는 한국전쟁 이후 미국의 대한원조를 통한 유선전화 복구와 경찰원조를 통한 경찰의 차량·통신장비 도입으로 112 범죄 신고 전화가 설치되어 상당한 호응을 얻게 되는 과정을 살펴보았다. 3장에서는 1965년 박정희 정부가 한일협정 반대운동에 대응하기 위한 반공드라이브의 일환으로 113 간첩 신고 전화를 설치했고, 그것이 반공법 하에서 신고 시엔 상금을 주고 신고하지 않을 시엔 처벌하는 한국적 반공주의의 특성을 반영한다고 주장했다. 4장에서는 1968년 안보위기 국면 당시 113 간첩 신고 전화의 역할을 살펴봄으로써, 1960년대 유선전화 발전에도 불구하고 실제 간첩 출몰 상황에서 1960년대 말까지 113의 역할은 극히제한적이었기 때문에 설치 후 상당 기간 동안 113은 상징적 역할에 머물렀다고설명했다. 마지막 5장에서는 1970년대 북한의 대남전략 변화로 간첩이 부재하게 되었지만, 전화 보급률 증가로 전화가 도시민의 필수품이 된 상황에서 도시민들은 ‘거동수상자’를 전화로 신고함으로써 반공을 실천하게 되었다고 주장했다. 다른 한편 농어촌의 전화 보급률은 1970년대 말까지 현저히 지체되었기 때문에 농어촌의 간첩 신고는 지역 감시 체제에 기반했다고 설명했다. ‘거동수상자’가 간첩이 아니라고 판명된 경우가 대부분이었지만, 전화가 제공하는 편리성은 감시의 시선과 실천을 일상 속으로 깊숙이 끌어들였다. 그 점에서 박정희 정권기의 ‘발전’은 독재(억압)와 대립항이 아닌, 정확히 같은 이름이었다는 것이 본글의 주장이다. This article analyzes the technological conditions of anti-communism by examining the development of the landline telephone from the 1950s to the 1970s as the context in which the 113 espionage call operated. Chapter 2 examines how the restoration of landline telephones through U.S. aid to South Korea after the Korean War and the introduction of police vehicles and communication equipment through U.S. police aid led to the establishment of the 112 crime report call. Chapter 3 argues that Park Chung-hee government set up the 113 espionage call in 1965 as part of an anti-communist drive to counter the protests against the Korea-Japan agreement, and that it reflected the nature of South Korean anti-communism, which rewarded reporting and punished non-reporting under the anti-communist law. Chapter 4 examines the role of the 113 espionage call during the 1968 security crisis, explaining that despite the development of landline telephones in the 1960s, the role of 113 in actual espionage cases was extremely limited until the late 1960s, so for much of the period after its installation, 113 remained symbolic. The final chapter, Chapter 5, argues that although the change in North Korea’s strategy toward the South in the 1970s led to the absence of espionage, the development of telephone made telephones a necessity for urbanites, and urbanites practiced anti-communism by reporting ‘suspicious persons’ by phone. On the other hand, telephone development in rural areas lagged significantly until the late 1970s, so rural espionage reporting was based on local surveillance systems. In that sense, this article argues that the ‘development’ of Park Chung-hee’s regime was not the opposite of dictatorship (repression), but the exact same thing.