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Developments and Prospects in some of DPRK`s Main Economic Development Zones, 2015-2016
Andray Abrahamian 평화문제연구소 2015 統一問題硏究 Vol.27 No.2
This paper surveys three of the key special economic zones created in the last several years in North Korea-Wonsan, Sinuiju and Unjong. These, like other economic zones, face significant challenges, including little-to-no track-record to draw on, communications and travel issues, as well as the broader political-economic environment, domestically and internationally. However, unlike make of the smaller SEZs, these three fit into national priority projects, increasing their chances of mobilizing domestic resources and building links with potential foreign investors. Certain domestic policy changes and improved relations with the DPRK’s neighbors would help considerably with the latter.
North Korea and Transitioning Myanmar in Comparative Perspective
Andray Abrahamian 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2017 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.41 No.4
North Korea and Myanmar both experienced core existential challenges early in their postcolonial history: the former via a challenger state in South Korea and its superpower ally the United States, the latter via multiple internal insurgencies. Both young states responded to these threats in an intensely militarized, authoritarian fashion. Their responses also eventually earned them pariah status, sanctioned respectively for their weapons programs and suppression of democracy. Myanmar, unlike North Korea, has been able to alleviate its security concerns with various battlefield victories and peace treaties in the 1990s and 2000s, and then turned to address the reasons for its pariah status. North Korea has been unable to find such a victory and thus is unlikely to escape its position as a sanctioned, isolated state.
( Rose Adams ),( Andray Abrahamian ) 이화여자대학교 통일학연구원 2020 Journal of peace and unification Vol.10 No.2
When the Chinese state sought rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s, the state departed from anti-American rhetoric through a series of careful adjustments in elite and mass information dissemination. Today’s North Korea, with a media environment analogous to Mao’s China, is tentatively pursuing a similar shift. Commentary suggests anti-American sentiment is essential to Pyongyang; as was considered the case in China prior to rapprochement. This article, using a consensus-building theoretical paradigm, examines how China managed a domestic propaganda shift and controlled audience costs amongst elites and ordinary citizens. It then highlights elements that North Korea could adapt in a similar transition, including adjusting messages for different segments of society, increasing foreign content, focusing on “good Americans,” and hedging.
Making Training More Effective for North Koreans by Separating Ideation from Capacity-Building
Geoffrey K. See,Andray Abrahamian 통일연구원 2014 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.23 No.1
‘Capacity-building’ programs focused on economics, business and legal training have had more than one and a half decades of history inthe DPRK. Often, the impact of such programs is hard to observe. Onereason for this is that programs often conflate ideation with capacity building objectives. Ideation focuses on the exposure to different ideas on organizing economic activity, in order to encourage participants to see possibilities for their future and motivate them to prioritize economic development as an urgent objective. Capacity-building aims to support government policies by transferring necessary skillsets and knowledge,and its effectiveness is often predicated on pre-existing political will for changes to policy to support economic development. Training programs can be improved through conscious deliberation of these two objectives,and by calibrating the emphasis on the objectives through program design. We examine the role ideation played in the Chinese reform process, when Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore, and extrapolate the role Singapore can play for similar programs for North Koreans.